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 Abstract 
 
The University of Sussex  
 
Eric Owusu Boahen 
 
The Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Business and Management 
Thesis Title:  The Impact of Religiosity, Culture, Legal Environment and Corporate 
Governance on Earnings Management Methods. 
 
June 2017 
This thesis examines several important aspects of the impact of religiosity, national culture, 
corporate governance, BIG4 auditors and legal environment on earnings management 
practices in the U.S. and 63 other countries. 
  
First, the study investigates the extent to which religious socials norms of the firms’ 
environment interact with corporate governance and BIG4 audit to affect managers’ 
motivation to engage in expense and revenue misclassification in order to influence 
reported core earnings. The results show that religiosity decreases misclassification and 
complements corporate governance and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) to mitigate 
classification shifting in high, rural and geographically centralised segment areas. In a 
religious social norm environment, the study finds that managers have a disincentive to 
shift revenue items from, and core expenses into, special items to inflate reported core 
earnings to avoid market penalties and beat analysts’ forecasts, even more so in the 
presence of board independence. In addition, the study shows that the interactive term 
between religiosity and audit from the big four auditors also lowers the presence of 
misclassification. Overall, the results show that religiosity lessens misclassification and 
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complements corporate governance and audit against the misclassification of revenue items 
or core expenses.  
Second, the study examines the extent to which religiosity, firms’ legal 
environment, and the interaction between these two variables affect accrual-based and real-
activities earnings management. The results suggest that religiosity, legal environment and 
the interaction between them mitigate accrual-based earnings management. In contrast, the 
study observes a positive association between religiosity and real-activities earnings 
management, suggesting that religious social norms facilitate real-activities earnings 
management. However, the positive effect of religiosity on real activities is subdued when 
the study interacts the legal environment with religiosity. The results also indicate that 
firms’ corporate governance mechanism mitigates both accrual-based and real activities 
earnings management.   
Finally, in Chapter four, the study provides new international evidence by 
examining the relationship between the misclassification of core expenses into special 
items and country-wide religiosity, the national dimensions of culture, and the legal 
environment in developed, emerging and developing countries. The study observes that the 
interaction between religiosity and legal environment, or national cultural dimensions and 
legal environment, mitigates expense misclassification in developed, emerging and 
developing countries. Therefore, the positive effect of power distance, masculinity and 
uncertainty avoidance on earnings management can no longer be demonstrated when 
national dimensions of culture interact with the legal environment. In Chapter five, the 
study concludes, summarises and discusses some of its major findings and contributions. 
The limitations of the study, policy implications and suggestions for future research are 
also provided.     
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1.1. Aim of the Thesis 
Earnings management has the potential to undermine the credibility of financial reporting. 
Much of the research on it focuses on accrual- and real-activities based and their 
relationship with stock prices, board characteristics and managers’ remuneration and 
bonuses (Jarvinen and Myllymaki, 2016; Kothari, Mizik and Roychowdhury, 2016; Gao, 
2013; McGuire et al., 2012; Callen et al., 2011, Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Cohen et al., 
2008) without paying due cognisance to classification shifting. Interestingly, both accrual-
based and real-activities earnings management are based on the measurement and 
recognition of income and expenses which affect past and future reported earnings (Cheng, 
Lee and Shevlin, 2016; Gerakos & Kovrijnykh, 2013). The implication for accrual-based 
and real-activities earnings management methods is that reported net income decreases or 
increases, hence auditors and regulators scrutinise and pay maximum attention to such 
practices (Roychowdhury, 2006; Graham et al., 2005). On the other hand, classification 
shifting is when managers’ report expenses, revenues, gains and losses on income statement 
lines rather than where they should appear in normal financial reporting prescribed by 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) (Barua et al., 2010, Fan et al., 2010; 
McVay, 2006). The extant literature on classification shifting in international studies 
demonstrates that misclassification occurs under different local GAAPs (Behn et al., 2013; 
Haw et al. (2011). However, several studies on classification shifting are based on U.S. 
GAAP (Fan et al., 2010; Barua and Cready, 2008; McVay, 2006). This study uses financial 
statements prepared and reported by firms in line with the standards designed by the 
Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) Framework. These standards are 
collectively referred to as the U.S. GAAP and they govern the preparation of financial 
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statements as well as providing guidance for issuers, auditors and stakeholders of financial 
information. In the U.S., the FASB Accounting Standards or U.S. GAAP provide a primary 
authoritative source to shape or regulate the preparation and presentation of financial 
statements, except SEC registrants firms which are required also to comply with SEC 
guidance. The U.S. GAAP is rule-based but IFRS is principled based. The IFRS allows 
managers more flexibility in the choice of accounting methods and policies in financial 
reporting. The adoption of IFRS with the local GAAPs, will allow more flexibility in the 
choice of accounting standards at both national and international levels. This flexibility and 
discretion in financial reporting can lead to increase in earnings management at both 
national and international levels (Doukakis, 2010).   
With Classification Shifting, income statement items are shifted up or down without 
falsifying or changing the bottom line net income. This involves treating recurring expenses 
as non-recurring on the income statement and therefore there are no implications for future 
reported earnings (McVay, 2006; Barua et al., 2010). Previous studies (McGuire et al., 
2012; Cohen et al., 2008; Roychowdhury, 2006; Graham et al., 2005) provide ample 
evidence of factors affecting earnings management practices, but no study has attempted to 
examine the relationship between religiosity, culture, auditor characteristics, corporate 
governance, legal environment interactions and expense misclassification. The few studies 
that have examined the relationship between religion and earnings management in the U.S. 
overlook the interaction between religion and legal environment, religion and corporate 
governance, and religion and auditor characteristics, and their impact on expense 
misclassification at both national and international levels (Behn et al., 2013; McGuire et 
al., 2012; Callen et al., 2011; Dyreng et al., 2012). 
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The aim of this thesis is to expand the literature and knowledge of earnings management 
and religiosity of firms’ environment, using the social norms and agency theories. In 
particular, the study examines several aspects of the religious social norm environment of 
firms’ headquarters, and their legal and cultural environment, together with their impact on 
firms’ earnings management practices in the U.S. and other countries across the globe. 
First, in Chapter 2, the thesis tests the impact of religiosity, the interaction between 
religiosity and corporate governance, and the interaction between religiosity and audit 
characteristics on classification shifting. Moreover, the study evaluates the effects of 
geographic dispersion, and the effect of religiosity, audit characteristics and corporate 
governance on misclassification in pre- and post- Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, as well as 
financial crisis periods.  
In Chapter 3, the study investigates the impact of religiosity, legal environment and the 
interaction between religiosity and legal environment on accrual-based and real-activities 
based earnings management. The thesis argues that religiosity complements existing 
monitoring mechanisms to mitigate manipulation of accruals, but real activities are 
positively related to the religiosity of a firm’s environment. In addition, firms’ litigation 
environment, examined by the interaction between religion and legal environments, 
constrains accrual-based earnings management but reduces the positive impact of 
religiosity on real activities. In Chapter 4, the study borrows the main argument of social 
norms and agency theories to examine new international evidence of the relationship 
between country-wide religion, national cultural dimensions, legal environment and 
misclassification of special items in developed, emerging and developing countries. 
Initially, the study examines whether firms in these different types of countries are engaged 
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in expense misclassification. Second, the study examines the extent to which country-wide 
religion, national cultural dimensions and legal environment separately or interact to affect 
managers’ classification shifting behaviour in these economies.  
Overall, the results show that religiosity in the firm’s environment mitigates classification 
shifting and complements the existing corporate governance mechanism, auditor 
characteristics and legal environment to decrease managers’ earnings management 
behaviour at both national and international levels. Moreover, the results show that country-
wide religiosity, national cultural dimensions and legal environment interactions subdue 
earnings management practices and misreporting and thus improve the quality of reported 
earnings at both national and international levels.  
 
1.2. Review of Dominant Theories, Financial Reporting and Earnings Management 
Literature 
 
The objective of financial reporting is to provide useful financial information to 
stakeholders who make decisions and provide resources to the firm. Again, it is to compel 
firms to provide financial information to users who lack the ability to compel the reporting 
firm to provide them with useful financial information that will help them to make an 
informed decision. Therefore, auditors are hired to check for the quality of financial 
reporting and compliance with relevant Accounting Standards within the Financial 
Accounting Standard Board (FASB) Conceptual Framework. The FASB Conceptual 
Framework states “that financial statements must be relevant to the users and it must be 
presented in a true and a faithful manner in all material aspect”. However, FASB 
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standards allow managers to use their discretion and judgement in financial reporting and 
structuring of corporate transactions. Consequently, managers can exploit their use of 
discretion and judgement in financial reporting to mislead users of financial information 
about the true position of the firms’ financial performance. Even though, auditors check for 
compliance and ensure that the financial statements are “true and fair”, are free from 
material misstatement and are presented fairly in a manner which reflects the underlying 
economic performance of the firm. However, earnings management in general and 
classification shifting in particular affect FASB qualitative characteristics of relevant 
financial information and faithful representation. For example; misclassification of income 
statement items, cutting down advertising expenses, reducing selling prices or delaying 
payment of expense etc in order to inflate reported income are a violation of relevant 
financial information and faithful representation (an objective of the FASB Conceptual 
Framework). This has serious implication on the quality of financial reporting which 
requires FASB to take into consideration in order to improve firms financial reporting to 
users of financial information.  
 
Notwithstanding the FASB qualitative characteristics, evidence from previous studies 
indicate that firms are engaged in varying methods of earnings management in the U.S. 
Several of these studies have demonstrated an over-concentration of research on accrual-
based earnings management (Zang, 2012; Cohen et al., 2010; Roychowdhury, 2006; 
Graham et al., 2005), misleading stakeholders by the neglect of other methods. However, 
some studies have also explored real activities manipulation, including cutting advertising 
expenses (Cohen et al., 2010); share repurchases (Hribar et al., 2006); disposal of profitable 
assets (Herrmann et al., 2003); reducing selling prices (Jackson and Wilcox, 2000); and 
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debt-equity swaps, derivatives, hedging and securitisation (Dechow and Shakespeare, 
2009; Barton, 2001). Recently, misclassification of core expenses as special items has been 
noted as another method of earnings manipulation (Zalata and Roberts, 2015; Barua et al., 
2010; Fan et al., 2010; Athanasakou et al., 2009; McVay, 2006).  
Interestingly, Lehrer (2004) and Iannaccone (1998) studied the role of religion in 
individuals’ economic decision making and observe that those who select or affiliate with 
a particular religious group are more likely to make choices that conform to the behavioural 
tenets proscribed by the group so as to escape after-death punishment. Previous research 
suggests that religious social norms have a strong influence on human behaviour, and 
therefore a thorough examination of the impact of religion on earnings management is 
essential (McGuire et. al., 2012; Sunstein, 1996; Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004). The 
following paragraphs discuss the different methods of earnings management and the 
underpinning theories of the thesis. The research framework is presented in figure 1. 
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FIGURE 1: RESEARCH FRAMEWORK – RELIGIOSITY, CULTURE, LEGAL 
ENVIRONMENT AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
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1.2.1 Review of Social Norms Theory 
The social norms of a particular environment have a substantial influence on the attitudes, 
behaviour, beliefs and values of the individuals living in that environment. Therefore, 
religious social norms play a vital role in shaping the values, culture, behaviour and 
attitudes of managers of firms that are established in places where there is high religiosity. 
Recent studies that have attempted to establish an association between religious social 
norms and financial reporting have observed a negative relationship between religiosity 
and incidences of financial reporting malpractices (McGuire et al., 2012; Callen et al., 
2011), religiosity and aggressive financial reporting (Dyreng et al., 2012) and a positive 
association between religiosity and conventional beliefs and values (Omer et al., 2015). 
Admittedly, the effect of social norms on an individual’s behaviour is powerful; Cialdini et 
al. (1990, 1991) indicate that the effect of these norms on individuals varies and depends 
on the value they attach to the norms, the different types of norms in the environment, as 
well as the peer pressure on the individual.   
Social norms theory posits that individuals’ behaviour and attitudes are shaped by the social 
norms of the environment in which they live or work (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Sunstein, 
1996; Kohlberg, 1984; Elster, 1989). Norms are socially observable facts that stipulate and 
forbid behaviour in specific situations and are deemed to manipulate social behaviour. 
However, the influence on the behaviour of individuals is due to the desire to gain 
acceptance amongst peer groups (Kohlberg, 1984) and the need to shun the retribution that 
goes with disregard of the established principles, attitudes, viewpoints, beliefs, philosophy 
and values that are deemed suitable and conventional (Sunstein, 1996). Therefore, this 
research predicts that high religious adherence in the environment where firms are 
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headquartered has the potential to shape the behaviour and attitudes of managers and 
influence their moral choices.  Previous research (McGuire et al., 2012; Callen et al., 2011; 
Dyreng et al., 2012; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Sunstein, 1996; Kohlberg, 1984) indicates 
that irrespective of the religious background of managers, social norm theory envisages 
that their behaviour is shaped by the religious social norms of the population in the 
neighbourhood that surrounds them. Kennedy and Lawton (1998) observe that the higher 
the degree of religious social norms in an environment, the stronger its effect on the people 
who live and operate in that environment. In a related study, Welch, Tittle and Petee (1991) 
note that the prominence attached to religious social norms in an environment has a great 
impact on an individual’s devotion to social norms, attitudes and beliefs. To investigate 
whether managers in a religious social norm environment will be involved in dishonesty, 
theft or tax evasion, Welch et al. (1991) observe that the relationship between the 
individual, the religiosity of the environment, dishonesty, crime and theft is negative. In 
accordance with this finding, previous research has indicated that as individuals attain a 
higher level of religiosity, they tend to hold more conservative ideas on moral issues and 
demonstrate conventional ethical values and principles, while the converse is true (Barnett 
et al., 1996; Terpstra et al., 1993).  Following the above, Kennedy and Lawton (1998) and 
McGuire et al. (2012) observe that religious social norms represent a major social tool 
which control beliefs and behaviours of firm managers. They argue that individual firm 
managers make decisions on behalf of the firm and it’s possible that the nature and quality 
of decisions made will be influenced by the social norms of the firm’s environment. Conroy 
and Emerson (2004) and Omer et al. (2015) find that accounting manipulation and mis-
reporting are frowned upon by people with strong religious backgrounds. Likewise, 
professionals and firm managers who value religion will be less inclined to engage in 
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fraudulent financial reporting or hide figures to evade tax (Longenecker et al. 2004). This 
suggests that individual’s level of religiosity and religious social norms of the firm’s 
environment have the potential to mitigate the agency costs arising from the conflict 
between principal and agent relationship in an organisation. Therefore, an examination of 
the impact of local religious social norms on firms’ earnings management practices could 
help to ascertain firms that are engaged in costly actions to shareholders. In addition, social 
norm theory posits that the social norms of the environment impact on behaviours because 
individuals have the tendency to conform to peer pressure (Kohlberg, 1984) so as to avoid 
penalties and costs which are often associated with rejection of acceptable values, beliefs 
and standards (Sunstein, 1996) in the environment. Again, Omer et al. (2015)suggest that 
even though firm managers may or may not be religious, they will nevertheless be 
influenced by the religious norms of the firm’s environment because the religious social 
norms surrounding the population where firms are headquartered are a crucial component 
of the environment in which firm managers operate and live (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004). 
Following the above discussions, an empirical evidence on how religious social norms of 
the firm’s environment influence corporate decisions will provide useful insights and 
information for shareholders, standard-setters, regulators and stakeholders in general ( 
Guiso et al. 2006).  
 
In a related study, Scott (1987) defines institutions as “enduring systems of social beliefs 
and socially organised practices shaped by religion, work, politics, laws and regulations”. 
Consequently, Suchman (1995) discusses institutional theory and observes that 
organisations are social and cultural systems which provide goods and services. As a result, 
studying the social systems, beliefs and values of the people in an environment helps to 
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understand the organisation’s environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Conceptually, it 
follows that organisational structures and corporate governance practices are strongly 
formed and influenced by the institutional environment. Indeed, the theoretical framework 
discussed above highlights how decision-making in an organisation is affected by the social 
and cultural factors of its environment (Scott, 1987; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Previous 
studies (Conroy and Emerson, 2004; Longenecker et al., 2004) observe that manipulating 
accounting and financial records is often frowned upon and seen as unethical business 
practice by highly religious individuals. Therefore, religious social norms are capable of 
reducing the costs associated with separating ownership and control (agency costs) within 
an organisation. In fact, religious social norms can impact on agency conflicts and also the 
principal–agent debate regarding decision-making and the objectives of the firm. While 
several studies (Bonini et al., 2012; Harrison and Coombs, 2012; Hernandez, 2012; 
Wiseman et al., 2012; Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009) have examined agency theory, an 
assessment of the effect of religious social norms and agency theory on financial reporting 
and earnings management could deepen our understanding and help reveal organisations 
that are engaged in costly actions to shareholders (Weaver and Agle, 2002; Terpstra et al., 
1993).  
1.2.2 Review of Agency Theory 
A basic component of corporate governance discussions is agency theory. Firm managers, 
rather than owners, control firms; consequently, there has been an attempt to model 
managerial behaviour which is devoid of shareholders’ control (Williamson, 1964; Monsen 
and Downs, 1965). The separation of ownership and control could lead to conflicts of 
interest; therefore, appropriate corporate governance mechanisms must be established to 
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help shareholders to exercise control over the managers responsible for their investment. 
Previous research (Ross, 1973) indicates that several governance mechanisms exist to 
prevent managers from focusing on their own interests rather than those of the shareholders. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) observe that both shareholders and managers are utility 
maximisers, therefore agency problems and conflict of interests are bound to arise since 
managers will not always act or make decisions in the best interest of shareholders.  To 
mitigate conflict of interest requires the implementation of good corporate governance 
practices that will facilitate non-market control mechanisms to be put in place in order to 
safeguard the shareholders’ interests. For instance, the appointment of independent board 
members, establishing board committees, allowing shareholders access to free flow of 
information and separation of the role of the chairman and CEO are ways to protect 
shareholders’ interests against managers’ selfish ambition. 
However, underpinning agency theory is the assumption that individuals are rational beings 
with egocentric and opportunistic behaviour, as well as varying levels of risk appetite 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In relation to agency theory, the 
principals (shareholders) forfeit their authority to agents (managers) to act on their behalf 
so that decisions made by the agent will maximise the wealth of the principal (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Agency theory stipulates that senior management (CEOs and directors) 
tend to be selfish opportunists and will use their first-class information to manipulate 
owners unless effectively monitored or incentivised to do otherwise (Baker, Collins and 
Reitenga, 2009). Conventionally, agency theorists assert that shareholders’ interests are 
taken for granted because managers pursue interests that do not maximise the wealth of 
shareholders (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Berle and Means’s (1932) 
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study regarding separation of ownership and control indicates that the separation of roles 
between ownership and control results in costs to shareholders known as agency costs, 
which need expensive processes and mechanisms to manage. For example, a technique 
introduced by shareholders to maximise their wealth is to grant compensation packages to 
managers through the board of directors as a source of motivation and encouragement 
(Holmstrom, 1979). However, shareholders prefer to maximise their wealth from any given 
level of performance and want rewards to CEOs to be as low as possible (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). Indeed, studies (Hu et al., 2013; Adams et al., 
2005; Graham et al., 2005) have observed that CEOs are agents of the firms they manage 
and wield substantial influence on the decision-making process of their firms, which can 
influence performance negatively or positively. From the viewpoint of agency theory and 
costs, where CEOs power is entrenched and established, performance will be affected 
negatively. However, studies have also revealed that a possible adverse effect of strong 
CEO power leads to sub-optimal decision-making, but on a positive note, firms with 
powerful CEOs act quickly to improve performance (Coles, Daniel and Nayeen, 2008; 
Harris and Helfat, 1998; Boyd, 1995; Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994).  
Similarly, firms with a strong and effective corporate governance mechanism are expected 
to report improved performance and financial reporting quality. Previous studies indicate 
that CEO power has a limited effect on financial reporting when the corporate governance 
system is effective (Abbot et al., 2003; Kang and Shivdasani, 1997). In a related study, 
Aguilera et al. (2008) state that corporate governance denotes a system of interrelated 
practices having strategic or institutional complementarities, in which governance practices 
will be effective only in certain combinations. In fact, a main prescription of agency theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29 
is that effective boards will be mainly composed of independent directors, with separate 
CEO and chairperson positions (Aguilera, 2005). Shareholders face difficulties in 
monitoring agents’ behaviour; therefore, they rely on a variety of different governance 
mechanisms to monitor management, such as direct shareholder supervision, independent 
boards, strong audit committees, board control and external auditors (Adams, Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2010; Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). To investigate the impact of board 
composition on firm performance, studies by Adams and Ferreira (2005) and Carcello et 
al., (2002) have reported mixed and inconclusive findings. In this vein, this study adopts 
social norm and agency theories to examine how the corporate governance and religious 
social norms of the firm's environment affect the earnings management choices of firm 
managers. The theoretical arguments draw on the social norm and agency theories and posit 
that the religious social norm of the firm’s environment affects the decisions, values, beliefs 
and behaviour of the individuals working for the firm. Moreover, corporate governance 
practices affect earnings management choices. Therefore, this study predicts that a highly 
religious environment has a positive effect on managers’ moral values, beliefs and ethical 
principles, but a negative or positive association with earnings management choices.  
 
1.2.3 Stewardship Theory 
Stewardship theory assumes that firm mangers pursue actions in the best interest of the firm 
even if that action is not in their best interest. McCuddy and Pirie (2007) define stewardship 
as “doing things that benefit ourselves and the people currently around us”. Leopold (1998, 
p.288) states that stewardship is “a protective restraint, a taking care of resources through 
nurturing and thrifty management of their use”. In a related study, Newton (1997, p.606) 
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defines stewardship as “a duty of care and conservation with regard to resources or 
property”. Agency theory portrays firm managers as opportunistic individuals who try to 
maximise their selfish interest (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In contrast, stewardship theory 
suggests that steward managers are willing to sacrifice their personal interest to promote 
the long term interest of firm owners and other beneficiaries (Hernandez, 2012).  The main 
difference between them is that the agency theory focuses on self-interest and stewardship 
theory protects the interest of others. However, Davis et al (1997) observe that unlike the 
agency theory, the literature on the relationship between the principal (firm owners) and 
the agent (firm managers), have paid little attention to stewardship theory. Again, 
Donaldson (2008) complains that corporate governance literature show over concentration 
on agency and transaction costs theories and portray firm managers as; self-interested, 
opportunistic, utility maximizers whose aim is to achieve economic benefits. Therefore, a 
tension arises between the principal and the agent, which stems from the fact that both 
parties struggle to maximise their economic benefits. In effect, by virtue of their position 
as firm managers, the agents have access to more information than the principal; they bear 
the risk of employment which also appears higher than the risk of capital borne by the 
principal. The risk levels bring tension; therefore, the agency theory states that the principal 
should be aware of this tension, work hard to prevent moral hazard (Holmstrom, 1979), 
ensure the agents acts in the best interest of the principal, and develop mechanisms to stop 
opportunistic behaviour of the agents (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Thus, agency theory 
focuses on the conflict of interest between agents and principals.  
Le Breton-Miller and Lester (2011) indicate that stewardship theory resolves the conflict 
of interest and underlying tension arising from the risk exposure levels between the agents 
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(employment risk) and the principal (risk of capital). The stewardship theory assumes that 
agents will behave in a trustworthy manner, will work hard in the best interest of the firm 
and will focus on what is best for the principal regardless of the agent’s self-interest (Davis 
et al. 1997; Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Under the stewardship theory, there is no moral 
hazard since agents do not consider their selfish interest to act against the principal. The 
understanding is that the principal will share the residual claims from the firm equitably 
and the maximisation of the principal’s (shareholder’s) wealth by the agent is also 
maximisation of the agent’s wealth or interest. In other words, steward managers align their 
interest with the principal owners of the firm with the belief that what is best for the owners 
is what is equally best for them and their constituents (Davis et al., 1997). That is, the 
pursuit of the goals of the organisation will benefit both the principal and the agent. 
Therefore, the stewardship theory assumes that firm managers and owners share a common 
interest between themselves; however, this assumption is contrary to the notion that firm 
managers are self-seeking, individualistic, opportunistic and self-serving as espoused in the 
agency theory and by organisational economists in the market system (Donaldson, 1990). 
While the agency theory is too narrowly focussed on agents opportunistic and self-serving 
behaviour, it ignores situations where firm managers act in the best interest of the owners. 
Similarly, simply utilizing stewardship assumptions by trusting and relying on firm 
managers to act in the best interest of the organisations or owners without any monitoring 
or corporate governance mechanism is equally naïve. This study is underpinned by both 
agency and stewardship theories and provides a balance in the corporate governance and 
earnings management research as it shows the complementary role of stewardship theory. 
It’s possible that stewardship theory can mitigate the agency costs and may provide further 
explanation as well as play a monitoring role that will help the firm and the shareholders.     
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1.2.4 Review of Religious Social Norms and Financial Reporting  
Several studies (Terpstra et al., 1993; Barnett et al., 1996; Weaver and Agle, 2002; Conroy 
and Emerson, 2004; Longenecker et al., 2004) have considered the effect of religiosity on 
business ethics. For example, Weaver and Agle (2002) observe that business ethics are 
positively related to religiosity, especially when religion is an important part of an 
individual’s self-identity. The individual’s self-identity influences the social situation of 
the person and consequently their overall behaviour, as guided by the role expectation 
associated with that identity (Zahn, 1970). Ethical and good moral values are taught in 
religious gatherings, therefore regular attendance at religious programmes and activities is 
deemed to strengthen individuals’ ethical values (Parboteeah et al., 2008). Previous 
research indicates that highly religious individuals tend to hold more conservative views 
and have higher moral standards than individuals with a weaker religious background 
(Terpstra et al., 1993; Barnett et al., 1996). Following these studies, Conroy and Emerson 
(2004) examine the association between religiosity and financial reporting and find that 
religiosity is negatively related to the use of accounting manipulation. In a related study, 
Longenecker et al. (2004) find that among U.S. business managers’ unethical decisions are 
associated with those who deem religion to be less important for them. The study observes 
that religiosity is positively related to business ethics and high moral values. Similarly, 
Hilary and Hui (2009) find that managers of firms headquartered in highly religious areas 
demonstrate conventional corporate investing behaviours.  
Intuitively, managers who work in environments with varied social norms tend to display 
wide-ranging behaviours (Tayler and Bloomfield, 2010). In fact, individuals who have 
responsibility for making decisions for firms are influenced by their moral values and level 
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of religiosity, which eventually shape the decisions they make inside the firm. Research 
indicates that managers of firms in highly religious areas are neither risk seekers nor risk 
neutral and are therefore less susceptible to financial malpractices and lawsuits (McGuire 
et al., 2012; Grullon et al., 2010). At the micro level, Lehrer (2004) and Iannaccone (1998) 
observe that individuals who affiliate themselves with a particular religious group have the 
tendency to make decisions to appeal to the laid down religious requirements in order to 
avoid punishment after death. In addition, research at the macroeconomic level by Guiso 
et al. (2003) and Barro and McCleary (2003) finds that religiosity impacts on economic 
beliefs and attitudes across countries. Their studies observe further that religious beliefs 
and church attendance affect personality traits and economic performance. In a cross-
country study, Callen et al. (2011) attempted an investigation into whether religious social 
norms have any influence on earnings management, but they found no connection between 
proxies for earnings management and religiosity.        
Previous research suggests that religious social norms have a strong influence on human 
behaviour, and therefore a thorough examination of the impact of religion on financial 
reporting is essential (Sunstein, 1996; Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004). In a related study, 
Graham et al. (2005) find that managers deem real activities earnings management as more 
morally and ethically appropriate than accrual manipulation. Kennedy and Lawton (1998) 
find that religion is a vital social mechanism with the potential to dictate beliefs and 
behaviour. In relation to religion and financial reporting, concurrent research (Conroy and 
Emerson, 2004; Longenecker et al., 2004) reveals that it is unethical and unacceptable 
practice for religious individuals to manipulate accounting information. In a recent study, 
using only twenty states and a few firms, McGuire et al. (2012) report that in the U.S., firms 
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that are headquartered in highly religious environments exhibit lower incidences of 
financial reporting irregularities.  
 
1.2.5 Review of Religious Social Norms and Earnings Management 
Several studies have examined earnings management practices; however, the literature on 
the association between religious social norms and earnings management methods is 
limited (McGuire et al., 2012; Dyreng et al., 2012. This study anticipates that earnings 
management practices will be shaped and influenced by the religious social norms of the 
environment where firms are headquartered. The focus of previous research has 
concentrated on establishing whether or not there is an evidence of earnings management 
and when earnings management occurs. For example, studies have examined general 
measures of earnings management in samples of organisations where there are clear 
motivations to manipulate earnings (Gerakos and Kovrijnykh, 2013; Zang, 2012, 
Roychowdhury, 2006). Generally, findings from previous studies have been consistent with 
organisations’ manipulation of earnings prior to initial public offerings (IPOs) (Kim and 
Park, 2014; Roychowdhury, 2006), to secure job security and increase performance-based 
compensations (Gerakos and Kovrijnykh, 2013; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Cohen et al., 
2008); to secure substantial external funds or avoid violating loans contracts (Horton, 
Serafeim & Serafeim, 2013; Graham et al., 2005); to circumvent the costs of regulations or 
increase the benefits associated with regulations (Zang, 2012; Badertscher, 2011); or to 
misclassify expenses from recurring ones to non-recurring expenses and exceptional items 
(McVay, 2006). 
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Healy and Wahlen (1999) define earnings management as “managers’ use of judgment in 
financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead 
some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to 
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers”. The 
literature indicates that firm managers exercise judgement in financial reporting in several 
ways. For instance, discretion is exercised in determining: (i) the useful life and the 
disposable value of non-current assets; (ii) the post-employment benefits of existing staff; 
(iii) deferred taxes; (iv) losses from bad debts; (v) impairments of assets; and (vi) pension 
benefits obligations. In addition, judgement is required from managers in selecting from 
appropriate and suitable accounting methods and policies for reporting specific economic 
transactions, including the straight-line and the reducing balance methods of depreciation, 
or the various inventory valuation methods (LIFO, FIFO or weighted-average). 
Rowchowdhury (2006) indicates that managers can exercise judgement in working capital 
management by increasing or decreasing inventory levels, delaying or speeding up the 
timing of inventory shipments or purchases, as well as implementing flexible or rigid 
receivable policies. Similarly, managers can choose to delay or make expenditures on 
research and development (R & D), advertising and maintenance. They also can exercise 
discretion in structuring corporate transactions; for instance, lease contracts and obligations 
can be structured as an on- or off-balance sheet exposure, business combinations can be 
structured either as purchase accounting or pooling of interest method, and equity 
investments can be structured as an associate investment instead of a subsidiary in order to 
avoid consolidation.      
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Healy and Wahlen’s (1999) definition of earnings management suggests that its main 
objective is to mislead stakeholders about the economic performance of the firm. This is 
only possible and can only arise in firms where there is information asymmetry between 
managers and stakeholders, as well as where managers are optimistic that stakeholders are 
incapable of undoing the earnings management (Stein, 1989). In fact, managers are capable 
of utilising accounting judgement to provide useful financial information and detailed 
financial reports to stakeholders. Interestingly, this is possible where accounting choices 
and estimates are deemed to be appropriate and credible pointers of the financial 
performance of the firm. For example, managers’ estimates of net receivables in firms with 
strong external monitoring will be considered as effective and credible forecasts of cash 
collections.  Previous research (Gerakos and Kovrijnykh, 2013; Horton, Serafeim, & 
Serafeim, 2013; Zang, 2012) indicates that the use of judgement in financial reporting has 
the advantage of improving management’s communication between them and external 
stakeholders and of resource allocation; however, the cost is possible earnings management 
through misallocation of resources and manipulation of reported earnings. In line with 
previous research, this study defines earnings management as the intentional use of 
legitimate accounting techniques and rules to generate high quality financial reports to 
mislead users either through revenue recognition or expenses. Three methods of earnings 
management (accrual-based, real-activities based and misclassification of expenses) are 
noted in this study. 
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1.2.6 Review of Corporate Governance and Earnings Management 
The agency theory has shown that strong corporate governance mechanism serves as a form 
of monitoring to curb crafty managerial behaviour, financial mis-reporting and mitigate 
information risk. A sound corporate governance mechanism requires superior board 
independence, autonomous audit committees, strong board size and separation of the CEO 
and the chairman roles (Kim, Mauldin and Patro, 2014; Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca, 2014; 
Jo and Harjoto, 2011). Therefore, audit committees and strong boards play an important 
role to guard the interest of the principal as well as provide them with good quality financial 
information which is free from manipulation. A strong governance mechanism provides 
both direct and indirect oversight in helping to analyse the financial statements with the 
aim of reducing financial reporting irregularities (Laux and Laux 2009).  Where CEOs have 
the power and influence to shape the composition of audit committees and board oversight 
policy, the efficiency of the audit committee and the board will be impaired and hindered, 
thus increasing the agency conflicts. This means that the presence of audit committee and 
board will not necessarily provide an absolute deterrent for financial reporting 
irregularities, especially earnings management. Therefore, the board and audit committee 
members should have the competence to function without undue influence from the CEO.        
The accounting literature is satiated with studies that discuss the association between 
corporate governance mechanism and financial reporting irregularities (Dechow et al. 
1996; Beasley, 1996; Dechow and Dichev, 2002). These studies find that firms’ that are 
involved in financial reporting irregularities have weak corporate governance mechanism. 
For example, studies (eg. Cohen et al. 2010; Dhaliwal et al. 2010; Agrawal and Chadha, 
2005; Faber, 2005; Abbott et al. 2004) observe that firms that have weak audit committees 
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and whose board of directors are controlled by inside directors with few external non-
executive directors have very weak financial reporting system. Importantly, the presence 
of autonomous audit committees reduces the motivation by firms to be involved in 
fraudulent financial reporting, the misstatement of financial reports, rather firms aspire to 
maintain high accruals quality. Recently, Rubin and Segal (2012) examine the attitude of 
reputable directors towards financial reporting and find that high standing directors have 
preference for companies with high inherent earnings quality and lower levels of 
discretionary accruals. Several studies have examined the turnover of outside directors (eg. 
Faber, 2005; Srinivasan, 2005; 2004), senior management (Livingston, 1997; Beneish, 
1999) following the detection of financial reporting irregularities and accounting 
restatement. Apart from Beneish (1999), these studies find substantial turnover in boards, 
top managers and financial officers in firms that restate earnings and report financial 
irregularities. The following paragraphs provide a discussion of the various governance 
mechanisms.  
 
1.2.6.1 Board Size 
The extant literature on corporate governance and board composition agree that board size 
is important. These studies (Coles et al., 2008; Harris and Raviv, 2008; Raheja, 2005) 
observe that there are a number of factors that determine optimal board size and these 
include; the proportion of insiders and outsiders on the board, the industry in which the 
firm operates, the size and complexity of the firm. Small boards are easy to coordinate, able 
to have effective discussions and agree on issues effectively and efficiently. They also have 
fewer independent directors with versatile skills, who are able to demand private 
information disclosure from insider members in order to reduce earnings management 
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practices and financial reporting irregularities (Xie et al., 2003). The empirical evidence 
indicates mixed results between board size and financial reporting irregularities. For 
example, Abbot et al., (2004) and Beasley (1996) observe a positive relationship between 
board size and financial statement fraud, board size and earnings restatement respectively. 
On the contrary, Xie et al., (2003) and Peasnell et al., (2005) find a negative relationship 
between abnormal working capital accruals and board size but Osma (2008) observe no 
relationship between real earnings management and board size.  
 
1.2.6.2 Audit Committee  
The size of audit committee might influence the level of earnings management. Audit 
committees provide relevant expertise and work to promote shareholders’ interests. Large 
audit committees are expected to be more independent are less susceptible to CEOs undue 
influence than small audit committees. A good corporate governance mechanism mandates 
each firm to establish an audit committee with a minimum number of at least 3 independent 
directors (Combined code, 2008; Smith committee, 2003).  The empirical evidence 
demonstrates the significance of audit committee size. For example, prior studies Abbot et 
al., 2004; Bedard et al., 2004; Xie et al., 2003) observe that the relationship between audit 
committee size and accruals-based earnings management is insignificantly negative. In a 
related study, Lin and Hwang (2010) and Yang and Krishnan (2005) find that large audit 
committees are control accruals-based earnings management effectively. It is expected that 
large audit committees are likely to have independent directors who are willing and capable 
to mitigate opportunistic managerial behaviour in earnings management.   
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1.2.6.3 Independent Board 
Fama and Jensen (1983) observe that board composition plays a crucial role in protecting 
the interests of shareholders as well as reduce agency costs arising from separation of 
ownership and control. Specifically, they indicate that independent or non-executive 
directors (NEDs) help to improve the board monitoring against financial reporting 
irregularities. Prior research (Bedard et al., 2004; Gerety and Lehn, 1997) indicates that 
NEDs who violate accounting and financial reporting requirements are more likely to have 
their contracts terminated as directors. However, independent directors who are deemed to 
have reputation as experts to monitor management opportunistic behaviour are likely to 
obtain additional directorships. This suggests that NEDs are incentivised to confront 
managerial aggressive financial reporting behaviour rather than conspire with them. A high 
proportion of independent board is desirable but as the number increases, the inducements 
for individual directors to become informed decreases. Similarly, as independent board 
members increases, insider directors’ number also decrease, this hinders inside directors 
incentives to disclose private information. This could also result from less competition 
among insider directors or CEO control of insider directors (Raheja, 2005). Empirical 
evidence indicates that a higher proportion of independent board increases and improves 
the quality of financial reporting. For example, Beasley (1996) observe a positive 
relationship between a lower proportion of independent directors and conduct of fraud. 
Again, Osman (2008) and Klein (2002) find a negative relationship between a proportion 
of independent directors and earnings management practices. As a result of different 
conflicting theoretical arguments, this thesis does not predict a sign for the proportion of 
independent directors. 
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1.2.6.4 Stock Ownership 
The agency theory indicates that stock ownership by the independent directors will 
motivate them to scrutinise managerial behaviour by better aligning their interests with 
shareholders, thus making it easier for them to question and challenge management 
proposals (Bedard et al., 2004; Beasley, 1996; Jensen, 1993). On the contrary, when 
independent directors have too high share ownership, they will act as insiders; collude with 
mangers to safeguard their investments in the company and to exploit non-controlling 
interest shareholders (Carcello and Neal, 2003). In fact, corporate governance mechanism 
in most countries forbids independent directors to receive stock option compensation 
(Bedard et al., 2004). The empirical evidence substantiates the above viewpoints. Beasley 
(1996) observe a negative relationship between the level of independent directors’ stock 
ownership and probability of fraud. Similarly, Klein (2002) indicates that there is a negative 
relationship between accruals-based earnings management and the existence of outside 
block shareholders on audit committee, an indication that stock ownership aligns the 
interests of both external shareholders and independent directors. On the contrary, Bedard 
et al., (2004) and Yang and Krishnan (2005) observe that as stock ownership on audit 
committees members (whether independent or not) increases, the level of accruals-based 
earnings management also increases. Again, Lin and Hwang (2010) undertake a meta-
analysis and find that stock ownership by audit committee members is positively related to 
earnings management, supporting the alignment of the interests of independent directors 
with insider directors.   
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1.2.6.5 Powerful CEOs 
The recent flurry of corporate humiliation involving top management in reputable 
organisations creates uncertainties and serious concerns among investors (Farber, 2005). A 
significant body of research with varying results is devoted to understanding the 
relationship between powerful CEOs (defined in this thesis as: longer tenure in the position 
and CEO share ownership) corporate decision-making, financial performance and 
reporting (eg. Cadman and Sunder 2014; Morse et al. 2011; Adams et al. 2005; Kang & 
Zardkoohi, 2005). These studies observe that CEOs who wield a degree of influence and 
power make decisions that maximise their own interest at the expense of shareholders. 
Morse et al (2011) reveal that powerful CEOs have the tendency to even manipulate 
compensation agreements to agree with favourable measures of performance. Previous 
studies (eg. Evans, Luo and Nagarajan 2014; Veprauskaite and Adams 2013; Jiraporn et al. 
2012; Liu & Jiraporn, 2010; Combs et al. 2007) also indicate that directors can be 
influenced and firm performance prejudiced when CEO dominates the board members in 
decision-making because of “structural power”. The implication of this observation is that 
CEO power is likely to influence firm’s financial performance and reporting either 
positively or negatively. Recently, Evans et al., (2014), Veprauskaite and Adams (2013) 
find that the degree of relationship between CEO power and firm financial performance is 
negative. The findings confirm that higher concentration of power in the hands of CEOs 
adversely affect financial performance and reporting. Again, several studies have 
investigated the link between top management characteristics and financial reporting 
irregularities and observe that CEO with long tenure and substantial share ownership make 
deviant decisions which affect financial reporting of the firm (Jermias and Gani, 2014; 
Brochet and Srinivasan, 2013; Hennes et al. 2008; Srinivasan, 2005; Beasley, 1996; 
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Beasley et al. 1999; Dechow et al. 1996). Consequently, the extant literature reveals that 
CEOs with structural power are likely to engage in financial reporting irregularities and 
issue fraudulent financial statements (Srinivasan, 2011, 2008; Dunn, 2004; Farber, 2005; 
Dechow et al. 1996). Similarly, other studies (Srinivasan, 2013, Hennes et al. 2008; Faber, 
2005; Finkelstein, 1992; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993) observe that CEO that has 
concentration of power resulting from share ownership is more likely to engage in aberrant 
decision-making to affect financial reporting quality of the firm. Another measure of 
committee governance quality is CEO Directors. They might form part of the board and 
work as CEO of another unaffiliated firm. There is a growing discussion about their 
presence on the board. Sun and Cahan (2009) find that CEO Directors appear more 
sympathetic and are more likely to support their fellow CEOs as they share similar views. 
Prior studies (Faleye, 2008; Daily et al., 1998) indicate that they may be motivated to take 
steps that can be used as benchmarks to help them justify their aberrant decisions in their 
own firms. This signals that the presence of CEO Directors can lead to lower governance 
quality and ignores the impact on their market value. However, CEO Directors are 
concerned about how to gain reputation for independence and competence. They aim at 
improving the efficiency of corporate committees because of their expertise and experience 
(Sun and Cahan, 2009; Faleye, 2008)    
1.2.6.6 Outside Directorship 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that independent directors have a motivation to act in a way 
that will protect their reputation as monitoring experts, and this helps them to secure outside 
directorships positions. The opportunity for the new outside directorships, will increase 
their exposure, experience and improve best practice (Bedard et al., 2004). This suggests 
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that earnings management is minimised in firms where board and audit committee members 
has more directorships.  Conversely, more time and effort are required to effectively 
monitor management as the number of outside directorship increases, the effect is a 
reduction in monitoring quality and the likelihood of earnings management (Beasley, 
1996). The existing studies support both stories. For example, Beasley (1996) observe a 
positive relationship between outside directors and the probability of fraud. On the 
contrary, these studies (Yang and Krishnan, 205; Bedard et al., 2004) find a negative 
relationship between accruals based earnings management and directors holding multiple 
directorships. The tenure of outside directors has also been found to affect financial 
reporting quality. Beasley (1996) observe that the probability of fraud decreases the longer 
the tenure of outside directorship.  Similarly, Yang and Krishnan (2005) and Bedard et al., 
(2004) observe that as outside directorship tenure increases, the lower the degree of 
accruals earnings management. Again, empirical evidence support the role of financial 
experience on the board or among the audit committee members. Previous studies (Yang 
and Krishnan, 2005; Xie et al., 2003) find that the relationship between audit committee 
members with high finance or banking background and accruals earnings management is 
negative. Similarly, Hossain et al., (2011) and Abbott et al., (2004) find that audit 
committee with one at least one member with financial expertise mitigates accruals 
earnings management and the lowers the probability of restatement. The extant literature 
suggests that the above factors are important, however, neither theory nor empirical 
evidence has reached consensus on the exact relationship between these factors and 
earnings management.  
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Unlike the previous studies, this thesis focuses on the interaction between corporate 
governance variables (defined in this thesis as the presence of an audit committee, board 
size and independent board) and the religiosity of the firms’ environment on earnings 
management practices. Even though, there are several measures of corporate governance 
mechanism as discussed in the extant literature, this thesis uses only three variables (audit 
committee, board size and independent board) as proxies of corporate governance because 
of lack of data availability for other governance variables. The researcher did not have 
access to the databases of the remaining governance variables. Again, the other governance 
variables (such as; CEO Duality, Share Ownership, CEO Directors, Outside Directorship 
etc.) were not accessible or the researcher did not have sufficient data firm-year 
observations that correspond with the estimate of unexpected core earnings or abnormal 
accruals. Therefore, in this thesis, these three variables (audit committee, board size and 
independent board) will be used as proxies of corporate governance mechanism. 
Admittedly, this is a limitation but it does not affect the results and findings of the study.   
 
1.2.7 Why Do Firm Managers Engage in Earnings Management? 
The literature on earnings management provides several reasons why firm managers’ are 
engaged in earnings management. In fact, firm managers use various methods and 
accounting strategies to smooth the path of earnings on quarterly or annual basis. Earnings 
management does not involve dubious accounting practices or methods. It can involve 
window dressing of financial statements to attract investors or keep lenders and other 
supplies of credits. The financial statement is made to appear profitable by sometimes 
lowering profits in one financial year in order to increase profits in another accounting year. 
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It appears dubious and fraudulent but it is not because the firm is reporting the same 
earnings but simply spreading the profits evenly over a specific accounting periods.  
Previous studies Kothari et al., (2016) and Fan et al., (2010) indicate that to meet external 
stakeholder expectations and projections, firms may engage in earnings management. For 
example, this may involve misclassification of core expenses into non-recurring expenses, 
delay in expenditure on discretionary expenses (e.g. advertising expenses, research and 
development expenses etc.), defer or accelerate accruals payment or reduce selling prices 
in order to boost the firm’s reported income or earnings. There is the need to smooth income 
or make the reported earnings to appear more predictable, less volatile and attractive That 
is, firms use their judgement and discretion to apply the accounting policies and procedures 
in a manner that will help to influence reported earnings and the quality of financial 
reporting. In particular, prior studies (e.g. Zang, 2012; McVay, 2006, Roychowdhury, 
2006) provide some reasons why firms’ engage in earnings management practices. These 
include: (i) to increase their private benefits (ii) to meet or avoid violating debts covenants 
(iii) to enjoy preferable regulations (e.g.tax and other industry-specific regulations) and (iv) 
to respond to stock market. 
1.2.7.1 To Augment Managerial Private Benefits  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) explain managers’ opportunistic behaviour for their private 
benefits at the expense of shareholders. Managers either avoid responsibility or spend 
excessively to promote their private benefits. To reduce the conflict of interests, firm 
managers are often given compensation packages in proportion to firm performance, which 
is determined by an accounting measure such as revenue or earnings (Kothari et al., 2016).  
The procedure to align managers’ shareholders interest provides an incentive for managers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 47 
to change reported accounting numbers to increase their compensation packages. Cohen et 
al., (2008) find that managers have the tendency to engage in earnings management when 
their compensation package is performance-based. Zalata and Robert (2015) indicate that 
managers engage in earnings management to improve their performance so as to get enough 
bonus but they hoard excess earnings through income-decreasing earnings management for 
future use.  There is also empirical evidence that earnings management increases with 
performance-linked compensation components such as stock options, bonus, and 
managers’ equity holdings (Dechow et al., 2012; Cohen et al., 2008; Cheng and Warfield, 
2005).  Apart from compensation packages, managers can also influence earnings to 
increase other benefits. Ahmed et al (2006) indicate that to secure their jobs or get a better 
job offer in future, managers may manage earnings. They manage earnings to conceal poor 
performance and to maintain their jobs. In contrast, Zang (2012) and Baneish (1999) 
observe that newly appointed managers “take a big bath” (i.e. recording losses) in the first 
of their appointment. This big loss becomes a source for increase in reported earnings in 
subsequent years, allowing the new managers to blame previous managers for the big loss.  
 
1.2.7.2 To Avoid or Meet Debts Covenant 
Lenders and creditors are interested in the financial performance of firms. Therefore, they 
set financial objectives for firms to meet. Firms which are not able meet such objectives 
may face some restrictions on their ability to use credit facilities or face some violation 
expenses. To keep debts covenants, managers may engage in earnings management to 
increase reported earnings to ensure that debts covenants are not violated.  DeFond and 
Jiambalvo (1994) find a positive relationship between firms that are likely to violate the 
debts covenants and earnings managements practices. Cohen et al. (2012) observe that the 
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use of debt finance encourages upward earnings management. Recently, McGuire et al.  
(2012) and Jarvinen and Myllymaki, (2016) use financial leverage as a control variable 
where the dependent variable is a measure of accrual-based or real activities earnings 
management. Thus, firms manage earnings to avoid violation of debts covenants.  
1.2.7.3 To Benefit From Preferable Regulations 
Industries such as banks, insurance and utilities are regulated based on accounting numbers 
(Graham et al., 2005). For instance, financial services require a minimum capital 
requirement, reserves and insurance firms have a mandatory minimum financial health to 
meet. Therefore, firms in these industries have a greater incentive to manage earnings to 
meet regulations. Donelson et al., (2016) indicate that commercial banks manage earnings 
by adjusting loan loss provision or writing off loans to improve the capital adequacy ratio 
above industry benchmark. Beaver et al (2003) also find that insurance companies engage 
in reinsurance transactions or tend to inflate earnings through an understatement of claim 
losses to improve or manage reported earnings. Firms in general manage earnings to escape 
hostile regulations, minimise tax expenses or defer tax payments. When firms are exposed 
to alternative minimum tax, they inflate earnings before introduction of any alternative 
minimum tax regulation to deflate earnings afterwards or reduce tax expenses. Similarly, 
to manage earnings firms reduce tax expenses by timing purchase of inventories (Zang, 
2012).      
1.2.7.4 To Respond To Stock Markets 
There is a stock market-driven motivation for earnings management. The three most 
important benchmarks that firms are required to meet are zero earnings, previous year 
earnings and consensus analyst forecast. It is not desirable for firms to report loss, because 
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of the reaction of the stock market. Shareholders want firms to report profit always because 
the market undervalues loss reporting and income-decreasing firms. Consequently, firms 
smooth earnings and growth pattern. Graham et al., (2005) report that firms engage in 
earnings management in order to meet earnings benchmark or build credibility with capital 
markets. There is a general notion that stock market penalises volatile earnings streams but 
firms that have steady and predictable earnings streams are rewarded by stock market 
(Dechow et al., 2012). Again, negative earnings surprises are seriously punished by stock 
market, therefore, firm managers are careful not to report negative earnings (Jarvinen and 
Myllymaki, 2016).  In addition, firms engage in earnings management because they want 
to improve their credit rating, influence market price of shares, maintain or improve 
management reputation prior to shareholders meeting. Zalata and Robert (2015) and 
Graham et al., (2005) indicate that firms engage in earnings management so as to meet or 
beat analyst forecast or benchmark. 
1.2.7.5 Stock Market Over-valuation or Mispricing  
Prior studies indicate that substantially over-priced firms manage earnings to maintain the 
over-valuation (Jensen, 2005). On the contrary, Sawicki and Shrestha (2008) find no 
relationship between accruals earnings and stock market mispricing. In relation to earnings 
management, Madhogarhia et al., (2009) observe that growth firms manage earnings more 
aggressively than value firms because of severe asymmetric information. In a related study, 
Houmes and Skantz (2010) indicate that managers are not always sure whether their firms 
are over or under priced but they observe a positive relationship between the use of 
discretionary accruals and firms being over-priced. In addition, Badertscher (2008) finds 
that when firms have to restate their financial statements because of financial statements 
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irregularities, they tend to manage reported earnings upwards using both accruals and real 
activities based earnings in at least three years prior to the restatement year.   
1.2.7.6 Internal Targets and Goals 
In addition to the above, firm managers engage in earnings management when they want 
to meet internal targets and goals. They influence departmental budgets and key 
performance indicators to avoid the blame from top management or the effects of blowing 
the budget.  Even though, not common in practice, the literature indicates that firms can 
reduce their profits in the current accounting period by adjusting for provisions and 
amortisation in order to cover next year’s financial loss (Dechow et al., 2012; Barua and 
Cready (2008). This procedure exploits the prudence concept which is an acceptable 
practice. Despite the good intentions and reasons management have to engage in earnings 
management practices, investment is based on trust. Therefore, investor confidence is very 
important for the long term survival of the firm. Firm managers should work hard to protect 
shareholders interest and wealth as well as be careful not to break their trust. 
 
1.3 Research Questions and Contributions 
Previous studies on earnings management and religious social norms of the firm 
environment have noted a number of gaps in the literature, which provide the motivation 
for this study. First, these studies have only examined accrual-based and real activities and 
report that religiosity mitigates the accrual-based but real activities approach increases in a 
religious social norm environment (McGuire et al., 2012; Dryeng et al., 2012). At both 
national and international levels, no study has attempted an examination of the effect of 
religious social norms on classification shifting. Therefore, in Chapter 2 the study examines 
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for the first time whether religiosity is associated with income-decreasing special items or 
special revenue classification shifting. Second, the study examines whether classification 
shifting occurs in rural or urban areas, despite the high earnings quality often associated 
with the former. Previous studies (Zalata and Robert, 2015; Haw et al., 2011) observe that 
internal corporate governance mechanisms affect earnings management. Hence, this study 
investigates the effect of interactive terms in relation to corporate governance, audit tenure 
and the BIG4 auditors on classification shifting in a religious social norms environment. 
Moreover, the study provides different evidence of the interaction between religiosity and 
corporate governance variables, such as board size, board independence, audit committee, 
audit tenure and the BIG4 auditors. The evidence shows that religiosity is negative and 
significantly associated with classification shifting. Furthermore, the study highlights the 
monitoring role of religiosity, audit characteristics and governance variables in the pre- and 
post-Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) period.  In addition, the study demonstrates the effect of 
the geographic dispersion of segments and the impact of religiosity on misclassification, 
confirming that religiosity mitigates classification shifting in centralised segments but has 
no effect on misclassification in geographically dispersed segments.  The research also 
shows that religiosity affects classification shifting in urban areas, despite the 
heterogeneous belief systems often associated with these areas, but that the effect is much 
more pronounced in rural areas. It is observed that religiosity serves as a monitoring 
mechanism to complement existing governance structures and external monitoring put in 
place by management to mitigate misclassification. 
Furthermore, in Chapter 3 the study investigates the impact of religious social norms and 
firms’ legal environment on both accrual-based and real activities earnings management. 
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Previous research (Behn et al., 2013; Callen et al., 2011) has shown the need to consider 
the legal environment when investigating the two approaches to earnings management. 
However, the literature has no evidence of the effect of interactions between the legal 
environment and religious social norms on accrual-based and real activities-based earnings 
management (McGuire et al., 2012; Dryeng et al., 2012).  Consequently, this study 
examines for the first time the effect of interactive terms in relation to religiosity and the 
legal environment on earnings management. Interactions between religiosity, legal 
environment and governance variables are examined to assess their impact on earnings 
management practices in high and low religious areas, highest and lowest legal 
environment areas, and rural and urban areas in the U.S. The study also uses different 
measures of accruals and real activities to assess their impact on religiosity, legal 
environment and governance variables. Overall, it is found that religiosity is negative and 
significantly related to accrual-based earnings management, suggesting that manipulation 
of accruals decreases in a religious social norm environment, perhaps because of scrutiny 
by auditors, or ethical concerns and external monitoring. The study observes that in a 
religious social norm environment, firm managers favour real activities earnings 
management, but that the positive effect of religiosity on real activities is subdued when 
the legal environment interacts with religiosity. In addition, it is observed that corporate 
governance mechanisms decrease accrual-based and real activities-based earnings 
management and that religiosity complements existing monitoring systems in the firm to 
control earnings manipulation. 
After examining the effect of the religious social norms of the firms’ environment, legal 
environment and governance mechanisms on earnings management practices in the U.S., 
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the study explores international evidence in Chapter 4. Although there have been previous 
studies on classification shifting and financial analyst monitoring, classification shifting 
and corporate governance in an international setting (Behn et al., 2013; Haw et al., 2011), 
little is known about the effects of country-wide religiosity, the individual dimensions of 
cultural perspectives and the legal environment on classification shifting in developed, 
emerging and developing countries. In addition, this study investigates the association 
between classification shifting and the interactive terms between country-wide religiosity 
and legal environment, and the individual dimensions of the cultural and legal 
environments in developed, emerging and developing countries. In the further analysis, 
different expectation models are used to compute unexpected core earnings, to exclude 
countries with large or insignificant firm year observations, and to break the data into high 
or low religiosity countries to assess their impact on classification shifting. Overall, the 
study observes that religiosity and legal environment decrease firm managers’ incentive to 
misclassify core expenses in developed, emerging and developing countries, but that the 
negative impact is much more pronounced when country-wide religiosity interacts with the 
legal environment. It is found that individual cultural dimensions of power distance, 
masculinity and uncertainty avoidance facilitate expense misclassification in the three types 
of country, but that individualism and long-term orientation deter classification shifting in 
developed and emerging countries. However, the positive impact of power distance, 
masculinity and uncertainty avoidance on classification shifting in developing countries 
can no longer be demonstrated when the legal environment interacts with them.  
Overall, to broaden the findings and knowledge on the relationship between religious social 
norms, the legal environment, and individual dimensions of culture and earnings 
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management practices at national and international levels, this study seeks to address the 
following research questions:  
1. Do religious social norms, corporate governance and audit interactions affect 
misclassification, based on evidence from the U.S. (in Chapter 2)?   
 
2. Do religious social norms and legal environment interactions affect accrual-based 
and real activities-based earnings management, based on evidence from the U.S. (in 
Chapter 3)? 
 
 
3. Do country-wide religiosity, national culture dimensions and legal environment 
interactions affect classification shifting, based on global evidence (in Chapter 4)? 
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1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis has five chapters and is organized as follows. Chapter 1 briefly discusses the 
aim of the thesis, the research questions, and the contributions, and reviews agency and 
social norms theories. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are separate self-contained chapters which 
address the thesis research questions in detail. In particular: 
In Chapter 2, the study provides new U.S. evidence on the impact of religiosity, BIG4 audit 
and corporate governance on the misclassification of core expenses or revenue into special 
items. 
In Chapter 3, new U.S. evidence is provided by examining the effect of religiosity, legal 
environment and the interaction term between religiosity and the legal environment on 
accrual and real activities-based earnings management.   
In Chapter 4, the study presents new international evidence (from 63 countries) on the 
relationship between country-wide religiosity, national dimensions of culture, legal 
environment and misclassification of core expenses into special items.   
Finally, in Chapter 5 some concluding remarks are made and a brief summary given of the 
study’s main results and limitations, as well as opportunities for future research.  
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Chapter 2: Impact of Religiosity, Corporate Governance and Auditor 
Characteristics on Classification Shifting- Evidence from the U.S. 
2.1. Introduction   
The aim of this study is to provide an empirical assessment of the extent to which the 
religious social norms of the firms’ environment interact with corporate governance and 
the BIG4 audit firms to affect the misclassification of income-decreasing special items or 
special revenue items which may influence reported core earnings. The study fills the gap 
in the literature on managers’ opportunistic misclassification of revenue and/or expense 
items in a religious social norm environment. It is important to ascertain whether the 
religious social norms of the firms’ environment mitigate managers’ opportunistic 
behaviour or economic motivations in classification shifting1. In economic terms, the study 
suggests that religious social norms might influence misclassification of special items in 
order to signal and help users to understand the firms’ underlying financial performance, 
in line with previous research (Francis et al., 1996; Lougee and Marquardt 2004; Bowen et 
al., 2005). With regard to opportunistic behaviour, the study holds a similar view to earlier 
studies (McVay, 2006; Fan et al., 2010), that misclassifying core expenses or revenue items 
into special items aims to influence perceptions of the firms’ performance in a biased way. 
Previous research indicates that highly religious individuals tend to hold more conservative 
views and higher moral standards than individuals with lower religious backgrounds 
(Terpstra et al., 1993; Barnett et al., 1996). Following these studies, Conroy and Emerson 
(2004) examine the association between religiosity and financial reporting and find that 
religiosity is negatively related to the use of accounting manipulation. Kennedy and Lawton 
                                                          
1 Classification shifting does not involve GAAP violation; auditors and regulators do not scrutinize classification shifting 
as they do for accrual-based and real-activities earnings management (Fan et al., 2010; McVay, 2006). 
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(1998) observe that the higher the degree of religious social norms in an environment, the 
stronger their effect on the people who live and operate in that environment. Another strand 
of the literature (Terpstra et al., 1993; Barnett et al., 1996; Longenecker et al., 2004) 
provides evidence of the impact of religiosity on business ethics. For example, Davidson 
and Stevens (2013) as well as Weaver and Agle (2002) observe that business ethics is 
positively related to religiosity, especially when religion is an important part of a people’s 
self-identity. Similarly, Welch et al. (1991) note that the prominence attached to religious 
social norms in an environment has a great impact on people’s devotion to social norms, 
attitudes and beliefs. It should be stressed that firm managers’ behaviour is shaped by the 
religious social norms of the population in the neighbourhood that surrounds them. This is 
because research by Omer et al. (2015) and McGuire et al. (2012) indicate that the social 
norms of the firm’s environment shape and influence the behaviour of the people in the 
local environment in line with the social norms theory. As indicated, firm managers are 
agents of the firm according to agency theory and these firm managers make decisions for 
the firm on behalf of the principal (owners). The behaviour and decisions of agents, who 
have been entrusted with the responsibility of creating and maximising shareholders 
wealth, have positive or negative effects on the going concern of the organisation. Thus, 
behaviour at the firm-level is influenced by the social norms of the environment which 
affects the decisions, attitudes and behaviour of agents (firm managers) of the 
organisations.     
The study extends the research in the area of classification shifting to examine whether 
religious social norms in the firms’ environment influence misclassification of core 
expenses and/or revenue in order to influence market perceptions, influence share price or 
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beat analysts’ benchmarks. Previous research documents evidence of misclassification in 
expense items and demonstrates that managers opportunistically shift core expenses (cost 
of goods sold and selling, general and administrative expenses) to special items (Zalata and 
Roberts, 2015; Behn et al., 2013; Haw, Ho and Li, 2011, Fan et al., 2010 and McVay, 
2006); misclassify expenses in discontinued operations as operating expenses (Barua, Lin 
and Sbaraglia, 2010); and shift extraordinary items into operating expenses (Barnea, Ronen 
and Sadan, 1976) to inflate core earnings. Several factors have been noted to mitigate 
classification shifting: for example, good internal corporate governance (Zalata and 
Roberts, 2015; Veprauskaite and Adams, 2013; Xie, Davidson, & DaDalt, 2003); the 
monitoring role of financial analysts (Behn et al., 2013); and strong investor protection 
(Haw et al., 2011). Recently, Zalata and Roberts (2015) have found that high quality 
internal governance, in terms of the overall quality of board and audit committees, mitigates 
classification shifting. Similarly, other studies (Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca, 2014; Kim, 
Mauldin and Patro, 2014; Haw et al., 2011; Lin and Hwang, 2010; Harris and Raviv, 2008) 
indicate that strong corporate governance acts as a form of monitoring mechanism, controls 
devious managerial behaviour, mitigates classification shifting, and reduces information 
risk. For example, Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003) and Peasnell, Pope and Young (2005) 
observe a negative association between board tenure, proportion of independent directors 
and earnings manipulations. In addition, Hossain et al. (2011) observe that the relationship 
between board size, number of meetings and earnings management is negative. Moreover, 
audit committees (Abbott et al., 2003), number of meetings and financial expertise (Coles, 
Daniel and Naveen, 2008), CEO tenure (Cadman and Sunder, 2014), number of outside 
directors (Chau and Gray, 2010) and CEO reputation (Francis, Huang, Rajgopal and Zang, 
2008) have been found to affect the quality of earnings and financial reporting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 59 
 
There are two main motivations for this study. First, it examines the impact of religious 
social norms on managers’ motivation to manage core earnings using core expenses or 
revenue items in classification shifting. Initially, the study employs McVay’s (2006) 
expectation model to assess the existence of classification shifting and the impact of 
religiosity on it in the U.S. It concurs with the concerns raised by Fan et al. (2010) and 
excludes contemporaneous accruals from the original McVay (2006) model. Furthermore, 
the study replaces total accruals with working capital accruals (which exclude depreciation 
expenses and other exceptional items) to avoid any bias associated with the original McVay 
(2006) model, as reported by Athanasakou, Strong & Water (2009). In addition, the data is 
divided into rural and urban areas, high and low religious areas, geographically centralised 
and dispersed segments, as well as pre- and post- Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) period, in 
order to assess the effect of religious social norms on classification shifting.   
Second, the study includes the interaction terms between religiosity and corporate 
governance variables, religiosity and audit tenure, as well as religiosity and the BIG4 
auditors, in line with Zalata and Roberts (2015). Using McVay’s (2006) model to re-assess 
the impact of religiosity on classification shifting. The study responds to the call by Callen 
et al. (2011) and McGuire et al. (2012) to examine the extent to which religion affects 
earnings management on a broader scale by exploring the association between religiosity 
and misclassification of revenue items or core expenses into special items. The focus is on 
all U.S. states and uses the complete U.S. county-level religious dataset from The 
Association of Religious Data Archives (ARDA) database and all U.S. firms on the 
Compustat database. Overall, the study identifies 698 distinct counties that are the 
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headquarters of at least one of the firms on the Compustat annual database used in the 
analyses. Financial data is collected from all firms on the Compustat database between 
2000 and 2015.  
From the analyses, the study observes a significant negative association between religious 
social norms and classification shifting. The results suggest that religiosity mitigates 
managers’ incentive for this shifting. Therefore, managers in a highly religious 
environment have no motivation to misclassify core expenses into special items or shift 
revenue items to meet capital market pressures or earnings targets. The study finds that 
religiosity is negatively related to classification shifting in firms located in urban areas, in 
the light of the low earnings quality or heterogeneous beliefs systems often associated with 
urban areas; however, the negative effect is acute in rural areas. In further analysis, the 
interaction between religiosity and corporate governance, audit tenure, and the BIG4 
auditors is examined, and it is found that in a religious social norms environment, their 
effect is more pronounced and negatively significant. Finally, the study finds that religiosity 
decreases misclassification in geographically centralised segments but has no effect on 
geographically dispersed ones. It is also found that religiosity combats misclassification in 
pre- and post- financial crisis or SOX periods, but that the complementary role of religiosity 
was acute during and after the SOX Act (2002) was implemented.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 (1) presents the literature and develops the 
hypotheses, section 2.3 provides the research design and discusses the empirical 
methodology, and section 2.4 describes the data, sample selection and descriptive statistics. 
Section 2.5 discusses the empirical results, Section 2.6 presents several robustness checks, 
and section 2.7 provides the conclusion.  
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2.2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
In this section, the study provides extensive literature review and develops hypotheses for 
the study. In particular, the study provides literature on core earnings, bottom-line net 
income, religious social norms, misclassification, corporate governance and auditor 
characteristics. 
2.2.1 Core Earnings and Net Income (Bottom-line Earnings). 
Fan and Liu (2015) indicate that there are two categories of earnings. These are normally 
referred to as operating or core earnings and non-operating earnings. Core earnings are 
referred to as the income from operations. Core earnings are expected to continue into the 
future. However, non-operating earnings are non-recurring and are not expected to affect 
future earnings. Prior studies (Zalata and Robert, 2015; McVay (2006) indicate that 
managers opportunistically move core expenses into special items in order to increase 
reported core earnings while the bottom-line net income remains the same. McVay (2006) 
defines core earnings as the difference between core expenses and net sales. On the other 
hand, core expenses are the aggregate of cost of goods sold, selling, general and 
administrative (SG&A) expenses (McVay, 2006; Fan et al. 2010). The market focuses on 
core earnings which exclude non-recurring expenses; this provides managers with the 
incentive to engage in misclassification of core expenses to boost core earnings without 
interfering with bottom-line net income. It should be noted that core expenses are not the 
same as operating expenses. For example, operating expenses relate to day to day running 
expenses of the business such as; advertising expenses, office expenses, accountancy fees, 
legal expenses, insurance expenses, license fees etc. The bottom line net income or earnings 
are derived as income after deducting and adjusting for all expenses (core, non-core, 
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operating expenses, discontinued operations expenses etc.) during the financial year that 
are attributable to shareholders. 
2.2.2 Misclassification of Income Statement Items 
Zalata and Robert (2015) and McVay (2006) state that misclassification or classification 
shifting does not involve the recognition or the measurement of income statement items. 
Rather, it involves shifting core expenses into non-core or non-recurring expenses on the 
income statement. The process involves shifting core expenses into special items in order 
to boost or inflate the firm’s reported core earnings instead of the bottom line net income. 
The main aim of misclassification is to inflate the firm’s reported core earnings on the 
income statement.  McVay (2006) observe that special items are by definition infrequent 
or transitory. Therefore, some stakeholders find it difficult to understand their nature and 
weight on income statement. As a result, some managers opportunistically misclassify a 
portion of their core expenses as special items in order to inflate the firm’s core earnings. 
The extant literature indicate that classification shifting may be preferred to other methods 
of earnings management since it does not change the GAAP net income, does not affect 
future earnings, does not involve reversal of accruals, does not involve loss of future 
revenue from forgone opportunities and has limited scrutiny from auditors (Athanasakou 
et al., 2009; McVay, 2006). Below illustrates classification shifting on a simple income 
statement line items and presentations. 
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               Illustration A: Proforma Income Statement 
            £m 
              Sales Revenue                                                                        XXXX 
              Deduct: Cost of Sales                                                            (XXX) 
              GROSS PROFIT                  XXXX  
              Deduct: Selling, General & Administrative Expenses          (XXX) 
              CORE EARNINGS                                                               XXX        
              +/- Special Items                                                                     (XX) 
              +/- Tax and Interest Expense/Income                                      (XX)  
              -/- Other Non-recurring Expenses (e.g. Disc. Operations)      (XX) 
               NET INCOME (BOTTOM-LINE EARNINGS)                XXX 
 
As can be seen, when firm managers want to engage in misclassification to 
opportunistically increase the firm’s core earnings, they will shift some core expense 
(selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses) into special items down the income 
statement. These special items can be (negative or positive) income-decreasing or income-
increasing. McVay (2006, p. 506) define special items as events resulting from a firm’s 
ordinary course of business activities but are unusual or infrequent in occurrence which 
must be separately disclosed in the income statement or the notes to the financial 
statements. Her studies provide examples of special items to include: “write-downs or 
write-offs of equipment, inventories, receivables, or intangibles; gains or losses from the 
sale of equipment or investments and special one-time charges resulting from corporate 
restructuring” As illustrated in the above proforma income statement A, the red arrow 
points towards special items and shows misclassification of SG&A expenses into income-
decreasing special items. As core earnings increase because of the misclassification, 
income-decreasing special items also increase. On the other hand, firms can also 
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misclassify special revenue items upwards; this is referred to as income-increasing special 
items.  
Again, as illustrated in the proforma income statement B below, the arrow indicates an 
upward misclassification of special revenue items to inflate the reported core earnings. The 
blue arrow points upwards, which is an indication of classification shifting involving 
special revenue items to increase reported core earnings.  Therefore, there is a positive 
relationship between core earnings and income-decreasing special items when firms are 
engaged in core expense classification shifting. Researchers that have investigated 
classification shifting involving special items, use Special Items (#17) on Compustat 
database. Recently, the FASB Accounting Standards updates have eliminated extraordinary 
items from the income statement presentation (Subtopic 225-20). The standard setters and 
stakeholders argue that the concept of extraordinary items cause uncertainty because firm 
managers are not sure when to classify an item as unusual or infrequent. Again, other 
stakeholders are of the view that extraordinary items are rare nowadays in the current 
practice and classifying them is a mere waste of time.  However, even though special items 
are not formally defined by FASB Accounting Standards, the amendment allows the 
following to be presented and disclosed in the income statement. “A material event or 
transaction that an entity considers to be of an unusual nature or of a type that indicates 
infrequency of occurrence or both shall be reported as a separate component of income 
from continuing operations. The nature and financial effects of each event or transaction 
shall be presented as a separate component of income from continuing operations or, 
alternatively, disclosed in notes to financial statements” (Subtopic 225-20-45-16).      
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                Illustration B: Proforma Income Statement 
 
                      £m 
              Sales Revenue                                                                      XXXX 
              Deduct: Cost of Sales                                                          (XXX) 
              GROSS PROFIT               XXXX  
              Deduct: Selling, General & Administrative Expenses        (XXX) 
              CORE EARNINGS                                                             XXX        
              +/- Special Items                                                                   XX) 
              +/- Tax and Interest Expense/Income                                   (XX)  
              -/- Other Non-recurring Expenses (e.g.Disc. Operations)     (XX) 
               NET INCOME (BOTTOM-LINE EARNINGS)            XXX 
 
2.2.3 Religious Social Norms  
From the viewpoint of social norm theory, managers of firms operating in religious 
environment with diverse social norms exhibit varied behaviours (Tayler and Bloomfield, 
2011). In fact, individuals’ decisions are shaped by the moral values and social norms of 
the environment in which they live or work. The resilience of religious social norms has 
presented great surprises in recent decades (Renneboog and Spaenjers, 2011; Hilary and 
Hui, 2009). For instance, previous research has established the relationship between 
religion and personal behaviour (Lehrer, 2004, p.180); religion and development 
(Mersland, D’Espallier and Supphellen, 2012; Ter Haar & Ellis, 2006); and religion, 
economic attitudes and household income (Renneboog and Spaenjers, 2011).  
Previous researchers have also indicated that religion affects individuals’ behaviour and 
that religiosity enhances individuals’ ethical values and attitudes (Tayler and Bloomfield, 
2011; Vitell, 2009; Parboteeah, Hoegl and Cullen, 2008). This view is also corroborated by 
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Shu, Sulaeman and Yeung (2012), who find that one’s level of religiosity is positively 
correlated with high ethical values. According to Lehrer (2004), personal religious values 
such as discipline (Kennedy and Lawton, 1998), accountability (Iannaccone, 1998) and 
honesty (Keister, 2003) have the potential to influence the performance of firms and, for 
that matter, the characteristics of individuals. In a related study, Barro and McCleary (2003) 
assess the impact of religiosity on performance and observe that managers can maintain 
high levels of success and performance irrespective of the demographic and cultural 
background in which the moral values are implemented. Sunder (2005) underscores the 
importance of religious values to the stakeholders of the firm and finds that the absence of 
religiosity can potentially harm stakeholders and affect the whole system and performance 
of the organisation (Omer et al., 2015).  
2.2.4. Classification Shifting and Religious Social Norms 
Previous studies document evidence of earnings management using accrual and real-
activities approaches (Kim and Park, 2014; Wongsunwai, 2013; Badertscher, 2011). 
Accrual management has a high cost of detection and involves borrowing earnings from 
future periods, either through acceleration of revenues or by delaying expenses (Donelson, 
Mcinnis & Mergenthaler, 2013; Gao, 2013; Gerakos and Kovrijnykh, 2013). On the other 
hand, real activities have a lower cost of detection and involve the provision of discounts 
to boost sales and the cutting down of discretionary expenses, such as advertising and 
research and development costs, to increase earnings (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Gunny, 
2010; Roychowdhury, 2006; Graham, Harvey & Rajgopal, 2005). In fact, previous studies 
aimed at establishing the association between religion and earnings management (McGuire 
et al., 2012; Callen et al., 2011; Dyreng et al., 2012) have ignored classification shifting as 
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an earnings management method. McVay (2006) indicates that classification shifting re-
arranges income statement items and does not change the bottom-line reported earnings, 
but does involve classifying operating expenses as discontinued operations (Barua et al., 
2010); classifying operating expenses as extraordinary items (Barnea, Ronen and Sadan, 
1976); classifying operating expenses as special items (Fan et al., 2010; McVay, 2006); 
and classifying other operating income as special items (Noh et al., 2014).  Indeed, 
establishing the link between individuals’ religious values and economic development has 
been extensively covered in the economics literature, but the link between religion and 
classification shifting is missing in the accounting literature. Recent studies (Zalata and 
Robert, 2015; Fan et al., 2010 and McVay, 2006) indicate that whilst the various methods 
of earnings management raise expectations of future performance, both real-activities and 
accrual-based earnings management have the effect of reducing future or past earnings. 
Consequently, the reputation and the quality of the company are compromised (Cao et al., 
2012). With income-decreasing classification shifting, McVay (2006) indicates that there 
is no change in reported bottom-line earnings; rather, core earnings are inflated as recurring 
items are shifted to non-recurring and exceptional items, leading to a positive relationship 
between core earnings and special items (Behn et al., 2013). There is no implication for 
future reported earnings (Barua et al., 2010), therefore there is limited external monitoring 
and vigilance (Nelson et al., 2002).  
Whilst some methods of earnings management do not seem to be fraudulent, the anti-
manipulative culture of religious groups serves as a strong deterrent against all forms of 
manipulative behaviour, both at the firm and country-wide levels (Callen et al., 2011). For 
example, Christians are admonished in the Holy Bible to observe the following: “And put 
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on the new nature (the regenerate self) created in God’s image, [Godlike] in true 
righteousness and holiness. Therefore, rejecting all falsity and being done now with it, let 
everyone express the truth with his neighbour, for we are all parts of one body and members 
one of another” (Ephesians 4:24-25 AMP). Similarly, Friedman (2002) observes that the 
Rabbis in Judaism teach members to “not put a stumbling block before a blind person to 
condone any form of manipulative activity even if there is no gain for the manipulator”. In 
addition, the teaching in the Holy Quran is no different; Surah 4:29 commands that 
“believers should not consume one another’s wealth unlawfully”. The ethics literature 
argues that managers with strong religious backgrounds have strong morals, are less likely 
to engage in questionable business activities, and are more likely to demonstrate self-
control and ethical intentions (McCullough and Willoughby, 2009; Vitell, 2009).  
On ethical grounds, previous studies (McGuire et al., 2012; Dryeng et al., 2010; Grullen et 
al., 2010) indicate that religiosity influences accrual-based earnings management and curbs 
financial reporting irregularities. For example, Callen et al. (2011) find no relationship 
between the religious social norms of the firms’ environment and accrual-based earnings 
management. Dryeng et al. (2010) studied the relationship between religious adherence and 
accrual-based earnings management and found that accruals of managers in areas of high 
religious adherence demonstrate minor departures from anticipations, and that deviations, 
when they occur, tend to improve the time series mapping of accruals into cash flows. 
However, McGuire et al. (2012) report a negative association between religiosity and 
accrual-based management, but a positive relationship between real-activities based 
earnings management and religiosity. This finding is consistent with Hilary and Hui (2009), 
who observe that firms headquartered in highly religious environments exhibit traditional 
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corporate investing behaviour. Indeed, classification shifting re-arranges income statement 
items and does not change the bottom-line reported earnings. Therefore, previous studies 
(Fan et al., 2010; McVay, 2006) observe that auditors and regulators do not scrutinize 
expenses misclassification. Consequently, it is probable that managers in areas with strong 
religious backgrounds might shift core expense items downwards to improve reported core 
earnings. Scott (1995) argues that earnings management can be beneficial, by signalling 
managers’ inside information to investors. Notwithstanding the above discussions, it is 
unethical business practice in a religious social norms environment to hide behind the 
negligence of regulators and auditors to engage in manipulation of financial reports or to 
manage core earnings upwards/downwards to mislead stakeholders. Therefore, this study 
posits that religiosity in a firm’s environment might complement existing monitoring 
mechanisms put in place by management to mitigate expenses misclassification, or it is 
probable that managers in areas with strong religious backgrounds would misclassify core 
expenses into special items to increase reported core earnings in order to signal their inside 
information to investors. The above arguments therefore lead to the following hypothesis:  
H1a Classification shifting using income-decreasing special items is related to the 
religiosity of the firms’ environment. 
 
On the other hand, McVay (2006) and Bulkeley (2002) indicate that managers might 
misclassify revenue items upwards in order to increase reported core earnings. Previous 
research (Alfonso, Cheng and Pan, 2012; Cheon, 2011) indicates that firms’ operating 
income covers all items, except investment income and financial cost when operating 
income is low. Moreover, Noh et al. (2014) investigate whether managers engage in 
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classification shifting using both revenue and expenses items. They find that firms 
generally shift other income to influence reported core earnings, but engage in shifting of 
core expenses into special items simply to meet or beat earnings benchmarks. Therefore, it 
is probable that firms misclassify revenue items to influence reported core earnings. McVay 
(2006) suggests that future research should consider upward classification shifting of 
revenue items. However, previous studies in the business ethics literature (Terpstra et al., 
1993; Barnett et al., 1996; Weaver and Agle, 2002; Conroy and Emerson, 2004; 
Longenecker et al., 2004) indicate that providing misleading financial information is 
ethically and morally unacceptable. In addition, the teachings of the various religious 
groups forbid the mis-reporting of financial information. For example, The Holy Bible says 
'You shall not steal, nor deal falsely, nor lie to one another. 'You shall not swear falsely by 
My name, bear false witness so as to profane the name of your God; I am the LORD 
(Exodus 20:15; Leviticus 19:11-12). The Holy Quran also states that “It is not for any 
Prophet to take illegally or falsify a part of booty (Ghulul), and whosoever deceives his 
companions as regards the booty, he shall bring forth on the Day of Resurrection that which 
he took (illegally). Then every person shall be paid in full what he has earned, and they 
shall not be dealt with unjustly” (Surah 161).  In addition, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) (2000) has expressed serious concern over the improper 
misclassification of line items on the income statement, especially revenue items, thus 
prompting the SEC to regulate individual line items on financial statements. Therefore, this 
study investigates whether or not firms in the U.S. are engaged in shifting special revenue 
items to boost total revenue or reported core earnings. Secondly, it examines the impact of 
religiosity in the firms’ environment on upward misclassification of special revenue. 
Following the above discussions, it is examined whether managers in religious social norm 
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environments might or might not be involved in opportunistic or economic 
misclassification of special revenue items to lower the expectations of the market, hide 
certain internal information from shareholders, or mislead investors and financial analysts. 
The hypothesis that follows is stated below: 
H1b: Classification shifting using special revenue items is related to the religiosity of 
the firms’ environment. 
2.2.5. Classification Shifting, Religiosity and Corporate Governance 
A sound corporate governance mechanism requires superior board independence, 
autonomous audit committees and separation of the CEO and the chairman roles (Kim, 
Mauldin and Patro, 2014; Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca, 2014; Jo and Harjoto, 2011). 
Interestingly, previous research on corporate governance has concentrated on the 
characteristics of corporate governance, including board structure and independence; 
ownership structure and influence; financial transparency and disclosure; and financial 
stakeholders’ rights and relations on performance, shareholder value and financial 
reporting (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Cullen and Christopher, 2002). Chau and Gray 
(2010) also examine the relationship between managerial ownership and financial reporting 
and find that managerial ownership is negatively associated with the levels of voluntary 
financial disclosure. Previous research indicates that corporate governance in the area of 
public ownership allows a large number of investors to press for full disclosure and quality 
financial reporting from management (Chau and Gray, 2002; Cullen and Christopher, 
2002). Publicly-owned companies have more shareholders and therefore are expected to 
exert more pressure on the board for more disclosure and extra information as a result of 
accountability issues.  
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However, some studies (Kim et al., 2014; Uddin and Choudhury, 2008) indicate that some 
shareholders in publicly-owned companies do not understand the financial reports 
presented at the annual general meeting (AGM) and therefore cannot influence financial 
reporting quality. In addition, board independence is regarded as a key corporate 
governance mechanism that affects financial reporting quality because it is expected to 
make decisions that protect the interests of shareholders. Therefore, research indicates that 
financial reporting quality is positively associated with board independence, estimated as 
the number of independent directors on the board. In a related study, Li and Srinivasan 
(2011) observe that monitoring quality and financial reporting are enhanced when the roles 
of CEO and chairman are separated. Other studies (Kim et al., 2014; Jo and Harjoto, 2011) 
state that separating the two roles strengthens the corporate governance mechanism and 
internal control system for effective financial reporting and performance management, but 
they observe that several companies that have capable and effective boards are managed 
by individuals with a combination of CEO and chairman positions. In fact, a key influence 
on corporate governance mechanisms is the presence of audit committees in an organisation 
(Turley and Zaman, 2004, 2007). The audit committee has the responsibility of ensuring 
effective internal control procedures, approving the choice of accounting policies, and 
influencing the financial reporting and disclosure quality within an organisation. Li and 
Srinivasan (2011) indicate that there is a positive association between the audit committee 
and financial reporting quality.  
Various studies (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Klein, 2002) observe that earnings 
management or restatements decrease when independent directors with banking experience 
or professional accounting backgrounds are on the audit committee. Previous research has 
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also indicated a positive association between the market reaction and the appointment of a 
board member with an accounting background to the firm’s audit committee. For example, 
Davidson and Stevens, (2013) observe that the effectiveness of the audit committee is 
enhanced and the integrity of financial reporting is significantly improved when there is 
the presence of a financial expert on the audit committee. Similarly, when ownership is 
concentrated in the hands of just a few individuals, these shareholders exert pressure on the 
board of directors, to the detriment of external creditors and non-controlling interests. 
Likewise, when the corporate governance system allows for independent scrutiny of 
managerial decision-making, shareholder value is enhanced and all stakeholders benefit 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). 
Similarly, Zalata and Roberts (2015) observe that high quality internal governance in the 
board and audit committees mitigates classification shifting. Several studies (Gonzalez and 
Garcia-Meca, 2014; Kim et al., 2014; Haw et al., 2011; Lin and Hwang, 2010; Harris and 
Raviv, 2008) indicate that strong corporate governance acts as a form of monitoring 
mechanism, controls devious managerial behaviour, mitigates classification shifting, and 
reduces information risk. In addition, Hossain et al., (2011) observe that the relationship 
between board size, the number of meetings and accruals management is negative. 
Moreover, audit committees (Abbott et al., 2003); number of meetings and financial 
expertise (Coles et al, (2008); number of outside directors (Chau and Gray, 2010); and CEO 
reputation (Francis et al., 2008) have been found to affect financial reporting. Unlike the 
studies discussed above, the current study centres on the interaction between corporate 
governance (defined in this study as the presence of an audit committee, strong board size 
and independent board) and the religiosity of the firms’ environment on classification 
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shifting. The literature examines the relationship between corporate governance and other 
aspects of the organisation, including financial statement disclosure or reporting 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Faber, 2005; Srinivasan, 2005; Cullen and Christopher, 
2002). Recently, several studies have also examined the association between religiosity and 
financial reporting irregularities (McGuire et al., 2012; Callen et al., 2011; Grullon et al., 
2010). However, no study has examined religion and misclassification in association with 
the effect of the interaction between corporate governance and religiosity on classification 
shifting in the U.S. 
Therefore, it is probable that the influence of religious social norms on classification 
shifting would be significant or insignificant for firms with good internal corporate 
governance. On the other hand, it could also mean that the influence of religious social 
norms could complement internal corporate governance mechanisms in mitigating 
classification shifting. Following the above discussions and in line with previous studies 
(Zalata and Roberts, 2015), this study uses board size, board independence and audit 
committees as proxies for internal corporate governance mechanisms to examine the effect 
of religiosity on classification shifting. The above discussions lead to the following 
hypothesis:  
H2a: The interaction between religiosity and internal corporate governance 
mechanisms is related to managers’ classification shifting behaviour.  
 
2.2.5.1 Auditor Characteristics 
On the other hand, several studies (Haw et al., 2011; Francis and Yu, 2009; Francis and 
Wong, 2008; Fan and Wong, 2005; Myers and Omer, 2003) indicate that auditor 
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characteristics (defined in this thesis as Big 42 auditors and auditor tenure) have been noted 
to be negatively associated with accruals earnings management, since high quality auditors 
complement existing corporate governance mechanisms. The extant audit literature 
documents evidence that Big 4 auditors are larger in size, have better training programmes 
and provide higher audit quality than others (Eshleman and Guo, 2014). There is a general 
consensus that larger audit firms have a reputation to protect shareholder interests and 
therefore will not sacrifice their independence on any given audit engagement (Boone et 
al., 2010; DeAngelo, 1981). The larger audit firms have more resources to embark on 
training programmes that will equip the auditors to become better trained auditors than 
small audit firms. For example, Big 4 auditors are noted for their conventional approach in 
issuing audit reports (Francis and Krishnan, 1999). Again, investors value the financial 
reports of firms audited by the Big 4 auditors and this is consistent with investors reposing 
confidence in the earnings quality of firms audited by Big 4 auditors. Also, prior studies 
indicate that firms audited by Big 4 auditors report lower discretionary accruals, suggesting 
that higher earnings quality is associated with Big 4 auditor clients (Hohenfels, 2016; 
Eshleman and Guo, 2014). Again, several studies (e.g. Asthana and Boone, 2012; Choi et 
al., 2012) that have examined audit quality have used Big 4 auditors as control variables, 
even though, there are limited studies that have examined the impact of Big 4 or non-Big 4 
auditors on higher audit quality. For example, Choi et al., (2012) find that the relationship 
between Big 4 auditors and accruals-based earning management is negative. Similarly, 
Asthana and Boone, (2012) observe that firms audited by Big 4 auditors have lower 
                                                          
2 In this thesis, the study uses the term Big 4 to refer to the Big 5 or Big 4 accounting firms in line with 
studies by Eshleman and Guo, (2014).  
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magnitude of discretionary accruals and are less likely to beat or meet analysts’ earnings 
per share (EPS). A higher level of discretionary accruals is an indication of management 
opportunistic behaviour to engage in earnings management. This suggests that Big 4 
auditors have low tolerance for earnings management (Boone et al., 2010) and Lennox and 
Pittman (2010) find that firms audited by Big 4 are less likely to engage in fraudulent 
transactions or commit fraud. Furthermore, Haw et al. (2011) find that in East Asia 
classification shifting decreases with firms audited by the Big 4 and external auditors with 
short tenures are associated with lower earnings quality. Francis and Yu (2009) study the 
relationship between higher audit quality and the larger offices of Big 4 auditors and 
observe that clients in larger offices engage in less aggressive earnings management 
behaviour. The study concludes that audit quality is higher in larger Big 4 offices, but 
makes no claim that there is a positive association between smaller offices and low audit 
quality. In a related study, Francis and Wong (2008) examine the relationship between 
earnings quality, investor protection environment and the dichotomy between Big 4 and 
non-Big 4 audits. They indicate that Big 4 auditors are concerned about their reputation and 
the cost of misreporting, so are more likely to enforce higher earnings quality, whereas non-
Big 4 auditors are less concerned about their reputation capital and dismissal from clients, 
resulting in a compromise of the quality of financial reporting. Again, they find that 
earnings quality is higher when the investor protection environment is strong and firms are 
audited by the Big 4.  
Focussing on auditor tenure, there is a growing concern that longer auditor tenure impairs 
auditor independence and lowers audit quality (Hohenfels, 2016). Prior studies (Francis 
and Wong, 2008; Myers et al., 2003) observe that audit tenure affects audit quality, earnings 
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management, going concern, lawsuit against auditors and investors’ confidence. Kwon et 
al.; (2014) indicate that investors’ response to financial statements is often linked to how 
they perceive and evaluate the auditor’s ability to detect material misstatements and correct 
accounting irregularities. When investors lose confidence in audit quality, this could affect 
the credibility of financial information, suggesting that that longer auditor tenure decrease 
audit quality, especially in countries with poor accounting information. Myers et al. (2003) 
find that longer auditor tenure influences higher quality reporting and earnings management 
negatively. Similarly, Davis et al. (2009) find that short-and-long term auditor tenure 
provide an incentive for firm’s use of discretionary accruals to either beat or meet analyst 
forecast before Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (SOX) was implemented. The study indicates 
that earnings management was high in the pre-SOX period because of higher auditor 
tolerance and long-term auditor-client relationships.      
However, McGuire et al. (2012) examine the possibility that managers of firms in highly 
religious areas might recognize real activities earnings management as less unethical or 
risky, because real activities do not violate GAAP. They find a positive association between 
religiosity and both measures of real earnings management and observe that auditor 
vigilance is lower, as real activities do not break accounting regulations. Similarly, other 
research (Behn et al., 2013; Fan et al., 2010; McVay, 2006) reports that misclassification 
of core expenses into special items does not change GAAP earnings, thus limiting the 
scrutiny of auditors and regulators (Nelson et al., 2002).  Following the above, it is possible 
that auditor characteristics could complement religious social norms of the firms’ 
environment, might or might not influence misclassification of special items in a religious 
social norms environment to boost reported core earnings.  Therefore, it is important to 
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show that the results of this study are not influenced by auditor characteristics (Big 4 
auditors and auditor tenure) in the firms. The following hypothesis is therefore formulated 
for testing: 
H2b: The interaction between religiosity and BIG4 auditor and between religiosity 
and auditor tenure is related to managers’ classification shifting behaviour.  
2.2.6. Classification Shifting and Religiosity in Rural and Urban Areas 
Loughran and Schultz (2005) and Loughran (2007) observe that reported earnings quality 
is higher in rural areas and that rural companies are more likely to report voluntary 
management earnings forecasts. Similarly, Ucran (2007) finds that relative to urban firms, 
rural firms provide higher quality financial information, better corporate disclosures and 
better quality reported earnings. Conventionally, previous research (McGuire et al., 2012; 
Ucran, 2007) has indicated that those who live in rural areas tend to exhibit more traditional 
views and religiosity than their counterparts in urban areas. Similarly, McGuire et al. (2012) 
examine religiosity and accrual-based earnings management in rural and urban areas and 
observe that religiosity decreases earnings management in rural areas, despite the higher 
earnings quality associated with these areas. Ucran (2007) indicates that rural areas are 
associated with fewer local investors, poorer liquidity and low investment, leading to higher 
costs of capital and lower market value. Consequently, managers of rural firms provide 
information to minimise the adverse effects of the areas in which they are situated. Previous 
studies also argue that managers of rural firms may provide better corporate disclosures to 
maintain their personal reputation in society because they interact socially with potential 
investors and other stakeholders. In contrast, in urban settings it is possible for managers 
to distance their social life from employees and potential investors (Loughran, 2007; Ucran, 
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2007; Loughran and Schultz, 2005). Therefore, managers of urban firms might be involved 
in the classification shifting of special items because they might feel less pressure to 
maintain their personal reputation. On the other hand, when management in rural firms 
seeks private benefits, they might try to engage in misclassification to hide information 
from the public at the expense of shareholders, which is likely to be manifested in 
classification shifting and lower earnings quality. Following the above discussion, it is 
important to show that our results concerning the impact of the religious social norms of 
the firms’ environment on classification shifting are not influenced by the high or low 
earnings quality attributable to firms headquartered in rural or urban areas. The above 
discussions lead to the following hypothesis:     
  
H3: Religiosity in firms’ headquarters could affect managers’ classification shifting 
behaviour differently in urban and rural areas. 
 
2.3. Research Design and Empirical Methodology  
2.3.1 Measuring Religiosity  
This study utilises the religious dataset published by the Religious Congregations and 
Membership Study (RCMS) between 2000 and 2010 to measure the strength of religious 
social norms. It uses these datasets to create a proxy for religiosity. The religiosity dataset 
is derived from survey by the Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies 
(ASARB), and the results are published on the website of the Association of Religion Data 
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Archive (ARDA). The survey consists of an average of 173 religious bodies3 and a total of 
248,957 congregations, with an average of 150,686,156 adherents. This represents 51.9% 
of the average U.S. population during the period between 2000 and 2010. The average 
percentage of population showing religiosity and religious adherence in each U.S. county 
is 64.4%, and respondents exceeded 55.9% of the total population from each county. 
Religious adherents consist of all members, full members, communicants or non- 
communicants, baptized or non-baptized, regular attendants, participants of weekly 
religious activities and those who consider religion as an important part of their life.  
 
The dataset is then scaled by the total county population as reported by U.S. Census Bureau 
of that same period. In theory, the higher the percentage of religious adherents in a county, 
the higher the impact of religious social norms on the firms headquartered there. Therefore, 
the study uses the total number of religious adherents per capita, in line with previous 
studies (Grullon et al., 2009; Hout and Greely, 1998).  Overall, 698 distinctive counties are 
identified that are the headquarters of at least one of the firms on the Compustat annual 
database used in our analyses between 2000 and 2015. The county-level religiosity scores 
are matched to their respective U.S. States by merging them by year, using the state code 
identifiers from Compustat’s company location code where firms are headquartered in 
order to derive the state-level religious dataset. The study uses religious datasets covering 
all U.S. states. The data requirement for each dependent and independent variable is a 
function of the number of observations and tests required for the analysis.  
                                                          
3 Of this, there were on average 154 Christian denominations and associations (including Messianic Jews, Latter-Day 
Saints, and Universalist groups); there were also counts of Shinto, Sikh, Jain, National Spiritualist Association 
Congregations, and several congregations and adherents from three Buddhist groupings, four Hindu groupings, Bahas, 
four Jewish groupings, Zoroastrians and Muslims. 
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As observed by previous research (Dyreng et al., 2012; Hilary and Hui, 2009), the 
definition of the number of adherents is potentially subjective, therefore it introduces bias 
and noise into the measure of religious adherence. ARDA does not provide the 
characteristics of those who do not respond, rendering the results incomplete and biased, 
despite the fact that the high level of coverage minimises the bias associated with the 
response rate. Finke and Scheitle (2005) observe that the majority of African-American 
denominations were not asked to participate in the RCMS, yielding undercounts of total 
adherents in some counties, hence there is an element of sampling bias. Fortunately, the 
2000 and 2010 RCMS county-level data files contain an estimated adjustment for the total 
number of adherents, which the study collected when constructing religious adherence. To 
construct religious adherence for sample years between 2000 and 2010, this study follows 
previous research (Dyreng et al., 2012; Hilary and Hui, 2009; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000) 
and linearly interpolates using RCMS religious adherence values from 2000 and 2010. For 
years subsequent to 2015, the study extrapolates using the slope of the line fitted between 
the 2000 and 2010 data points. This procedure yields annual county- level estimates of 
religiosity. 
 
Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics for the measure of RELIGIOSITY (REL) and 
shows that religiosity in the U.S. is declining, from an average of approximately 53% in 
2000 to an average of 48% in 2010 in each county. This is consistent with the 2008 
American Religious Identification Survey, which reports a substantial decline in religiosity 
in the U.S. population between 1990 and 2008. In addition, Table 2.1 indicates that 
approximately 54% of all people in each U.S. county are affiliated with a religion, attend a 
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religious activity or consider religion to be important in their life. The mean age and 
population with higher education are approximately 40 years and 86% respectively. The 
mean natural logs of population and income are 2.6 million and $10,340, but the original 
data shows a mean of 3.9 million per county and a mean household income of over $91,000. 
Approximately 30.56% of the population are classified as minorities and 42% are affiliated 
with the Republican political party, in line with previous studies (McGuire et al., 2012; 
Omer et al., 2015). 
 
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics of Religiosity and Demographic Variables 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 Skewness Kurtosis 
REL 53.5 18.07 36.27 
52.47 
63.33 0.83 2.69 
RELAdh – 2000 53 18.6 39.4 
51.1 
64.7 0.74 2.98 
RELAdh – 2010 48 15.6 24.6 
46.8 
52.3 0.88 2.68 
AGE 40.06 1.79 40.01 
40.28 
41.37 -0.82 2.57 
EDUC 85.64 2.54 83.5 
87.1 
87.52 -1.05 2.68 
POPN 2.59 0.07 2.51 
2.58 
2.65 -0.48 1.47 
MIN 30.56 12.38 19.65 
25.76 
38.28 0.91 2.62 
POL 41.52 3.09 38.76 
40.87 
42.57 0.08 2.64 
INCOME 10.53 0.08 10.59 
10.64 
10.70 -1.03 2.48 
Notes: Religiosity (REL) = is the variable of interest, measured as the average of U.S. counties’ religiosity scores 
weighted by their population for years 2000 and 2010. RELAdh = a measure of religious adherence for U.S. counties in 
2000 and 2010. The Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies (ASARB) compiles the religiosity datasets, 
which are published by the Association of Religion Data Archive (ARDA). POPN = natural log of the estimate of the 
population for each U.S. state in millions;  INCOME = household income for each U.S. state in ten thousands ($), 
estimated by the U.S. Census Bureau; EDU = a measure of the adult population of each U.S. state with a college education, 
estimated by Gallup interviews;   AGE = average age of residents of each U.S. state, based on the responses from Gallup 
interviews; MIN = percentage of racial minorities in each U.S. state, based on responses to the Gallup interviews; and 
POL = percentage of the population that are affiliated with the Republican political party (McGuire et al., 2012). 
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In the robustness tests, the study use the Gallup religious databases for the twenty most and 
least religious U.S. states for the same study period. Based on the responses collected by 
Gallup on whether religion is important, and whether respondents attend religious activities 
weekly or are affiliated with religion, Mississippi emerged as the most religious state, 
whilst Vermont is the least religious state. The most religious states are mainly in the South, 
with the exception of Utah, while the least religious states are concentrated in New England 
and the West. 
 
Table 2.2: Comparison of Most and Least Religious States in the US 
Ten Most  
Religious States in the 
U.S. 
Ranking 
Top States 
Ten Least 
 Religious States in the 
U.S. 
Ranking 
Bottom States 
Mississippi 1 Vermont 1 
Utah 2 New Hampshire 2 
Alabama 3 Maine 3 
Louisiana 4 Massachusetts 4 
South Carolina 5 Oregon 5 
Tennessee 6 Nevada 6 
Georgia 7 Washington 7 
Arkansas 8 Connecticut 8 
North Carolina 9 Hawaii 9 
Oklahoma 10 District of Columbia 10 
Notes: Table 2.2 shows a comparison of the most and least religious states in the U.S., as compiled by Gallup. Since 
1965, Gallup has conducted interviews about U.S. adults’ religiosity. The results over the years suggest that religious 
attitudes are very stable, consistent with ASARB studies. The percentage of U.S. adults who consider religion to be 
important according to Gallup are as follows: 1990 = 58 percent; 2000 = 58 percent; 2005 = 55 percent; 2006 = 56 percent; 
2007 = 56 percent; 2008 = 54 percent; 2009 = 56 percent; 2010 = 56 percent. 
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2.3.2. Measuring Unexpected Core Earnings Classification Shifting  
To estimate unexpected core earnings, the study first focuses on the allocation of expenses 
between core expenses and special items. Secondly, it focuses on the misclassification of 
special revenue items into total revenue to increase reported core earnings. The study 
expects core earnings to be overstated when core expenses or revenue items, are 
misclassified, and anticipates that when managers deliberately misclassify core expenses 
or special revenue, unexpected core earnings will be positively associated with special 
items. The study employs McVay’s (2006) and Athanasakou et al.’s (2009) expectation 
model and makes estimates of the coefficients, which are used to compute normal core 
earnings; equation (1) is run cross-sectionally for each industry-year using the Compustat 
industry classifications. The unexpected core earnings (UNEXP_CE) are then computed as 
the difference between reported core earnings (REP_CE) and expected core earnings 
(NOR_CE) for each firm.  
 
𝑁𝑂𝑅_𝐶𝐸𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑡
+ 𝛽5∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑁𝐸𝐺_∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  ,                       (1)               
 
  
  
where 𝑁𝑂𝑅_𝐶𝐸𝑡 is the core earnings before noncore special items and depreciation, 
calculated as (Sales – Cost of Goods Sold – Selling, General and Administrative 
Expenses)/Sales. 𝐶𝐸𝑡−1 is the lagged core earnings and 𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑡 is the asset turnover ratio. In 
line with previous studies (McVay, 2006; Fan et al., 2010), this study includes 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑡−1, which is the previous year’s operating accruals and 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑡, which is 
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current year accruals. ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡 is the change in sales and 𝑁𝐸𝐺_∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡 is the percentage 
change in sales, where  ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆 is less than 0, otherwise zero.  
 
2.3.3. Control Variables  
In line with previous research (McVay, 2006; Fan et al., 2010), the study includes lagged 
core earnings (𝐶𝐸𝑡−1) because of the unrelenting nature of core earnings. An asset turnover 
ratio (𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑡) is added to the model because Nassim and Penman (2001) report that there 
exists a negative relationship between profit margin and 𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑡. In addition, McVay (2006) 
indicates that inclusion of 𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑡 in model (1) is crucial, because changes to the operating 
strategies are associated with firms that have large income-decreasing special items; for 
example, firms can change their profit and sales mix to affect the level of core earnings. 
The study includes 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑡−1, which are the previous year’s operating accruals and 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑡, which are current year accruals in the model. Previous studies (Fan et al., 
2010; McVay, 2006) observe that the earnings performance of firms is influenced by 
accruals and cash flow earnings components. These studies note that accrual manipulation 
could result in high or low accruals figures, which can affect a firm’s performance. 
Therefore, this study includes accruals to ensure a good prediction of core earnings. 
Previous research (McVay, 2006; Baker, Collins and Reitenga, 2009) also indicates that an 
increase in costs is associated with changes in activity level. The study therefore includes 
the change in sales (∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡) and the percentage change in sales (𝑁𝐸𝐺∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡), if 
∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡 is less than 0, otherwise zero. In addition, it includes firm-level control variables 
and control for return on assets (ROA) as previous studies indicate that firm performance 
influences earnings management (Zalata and Roberts, 2015; Cohen et al., 2008; McVay, 
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2006). The poorer the performance of the firm, the keener will be the tendency to engage 
in misclassification of special items to increase reported core earnings. Thus, a negative 
coefficient on ROA is anticipated. Firm size (SIZE) is also included to control for the 
existing variations in accrual behaviour between large and small firms. Previous studies 
(Ashbaugh et al., 2003) indicate that small firms are more likely to engage in earnings 
manipulations than large ones. Therefore, depending on the size of the firms in the sample, 
the study expects a negative or positive association between unexpected core earnings and 
SIZE. To secure external financing, it has previously been indicated that management 
might manipulate reported earnings upwards. Therefore, the study controls for leverage 
(LEV), estimated as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, as previous studies indicate 
that managing earnings upwards allows firms to meet debts covenants (Zhang, 2008; 
Badertscher, 2011). In addition, Daniel et al. (2008) report that firms with leverage have 
the tendency to manage earnings because of debts covenants, therefore a positive 
relationship between LEV and unexpected core earnings is expected.  
Finally, in line with earlier studies (McGuire et al., 2012; Hillary et al., 2009), the study 
controls for population, income level, education level, age, proportion of minorities and 
political affiliations in the counties and states to avoid the results being driven by 
geographic or demographic differences.  
2.3.4. Classification Shifting Using Special Items Expenses and Revenue 
This study follows McVay’s (2006) model to test whether firms shift core expenses into 
special items, or special revenue into normal revenue, in order to increase their core 
earnings. Initially, it examines the classification of core expenses into special items or 
special revenue from core expenses within the income statement as an earnings 
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management tool (McVay, 2006; Fan et al., 2010). Core expenses are relatively steady, 
while special items are infrequent or unusual in nature (Fan et al., 2010; McVay, 2006; 
Doyle et al., 2003). When firms engage in classification shifting, unexpected core earnings 
increase. 
𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑃_𝐶𝐸𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑇 + 𝜀𝑡,     (2) 
  
where 𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑃_𝐶𝐸𝑡, is the unexpected core earnings, calculated as the difference between 
reported and normal or expected core earnings from equation (1). The variable of interest 
𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑡 is income-decreasing special items scaled by sales and REVT is total revenue 
scaled by total assets. When firms shift core expenses to income-decreasing special items, 
they increase both core earnings and income-decreasing special items. Similarly, when 
firms classify special revenues as normal revenues they will increase both core earnings 
and total revenues (Fan et al., 2010; McVay, 2006). Therefore, it is expected that the 
coefficients β1 and β2 in equation 2 will be positive. Furthermore, the study interacts 
religiosity (REL) with special items (SPITEM) and total revenue (REVT) to generate new 
variables in model (3).  
 
𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐶𝐸𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑀 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐸𝐿 × 𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑇𝑡−1 + 
𝛽4𝑅𝐸𝐿 × REVT + 𝛽5𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿 𝑉𝐴𝑅𝐼𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑆 + 𝜀𝑡                
 
 
(3) 
 
Current accruals are excluded from equation (1). Recent studies (Fan et al., 2010; Barua 
and Cready, 2008) attribute McVay’s (2006) estimation of expected core earnings to model 
bias because of the inclusion of contemporaneous accruals in the formation of expected 
core earnings values. These studies argue that the inclusion of current accruals results in 
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the creation of a mechanical bias, leading to a positive association between unexpected core 
earnings (a dependent variable) and special items (an independent variable). This therefore 
suggests that the misclassification of core earnings into special items reported by McVay 
(2006) is not classification shifting, but is symbolic of model bias. Thus, the Fan et al. 
(2010) model without contemporaneous accruals is shown below: 
𝐶𝐸𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽5∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑁𝐸𝐺_∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                
 
(4) 
In the further supplemental analyses, the validity and results of both the McVay (2006) and 
Fan et al. (2010) models are estimated to assess the impact of religiosity on classification 
shifting and to interact religiosity with corporate governance variables, BIG4 auditors and 
audit tenure. 
 
2.3.5. Model Testing the Relationship between Religiosity and Classification Shifting 
The study uses equation (3) and includes the interactions between REL and SPITEM, REL 
and REVT, as well as the firm-level control variables as shown in equations (5), (6) and 
(7). The generic regression model takes the following form: 
UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3 REL×SPITEM + β4 SIZE + β5 LEV + β6 CASFO + 
β7 ROA + β8 BMV + β9 BIG4 + β10 ANALYST_FOL + Demographic Control Variables + Year 
Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects                                                                        (5) 
UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 REVT + β2REL + β3 REL×REVT  + β4 SIZE + β5 LEV + β6 CASFO + β7 
ROA + β8 BMV + β9 BIG4 + β10 ANALYST_FOL + Demographic Control Variables + Year Fixed 
Effects + Industry Fixed Effects                                                                                         (6) 
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UNEXP_CE = β0 + + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3 REL×SPITEM  +β4 REVT + β4REL + β5 
REL×REVT  + β6 SIZE + β7 LEV + β8 CASFO + β9 ROA + β10 BMV + β11 BIG4 + β12 
ANALYST_FOL  + Demographic Control Variables + Year Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects                                                                                                          
(7) 
To test hypotheses 1a and 1b, the study examines the coefficient of the religiosity of firms’ 
environment (REL), and the interaction between REL and SPITEM (REL×SPITEM) in 
equation (5). It also examines the coefficient of the interaction between REL and REVT 
(REL×REVT) in equation (6) and the combined effect is shown in equation (7). It is 
expected that religiosity will mitigate managers’ incentive to misclassify core expenses or 
special revenue to increase reported core earnings because of the ethical and moral issues 
involved in religious social norms. Therefore, we anticipate a negative coefficient on REL, 
RELSPITEM and RELREVT.  
Hypothesis 2 is tested to assess the impact of REL, RELSPITEM and RELREVT on 
UNEXP_CE, when firms have corporate governance mechanisms in place.  Initially, the 
study controls for corporate governance variables and tests the interaction between REL 
and corporate governance variables.  In particular, board size (BODSIZE), number of 
independent directors (BODIND) and audit committees size (AUCOM) are used as proxies 
for corporate governance, in line with previous studies (Zalata and Anderson, 2015; Haw 
et al., 2011). The interactions between REL and governance variables give the following 
three new variables: REL×BODSIZE, REL×BODIND and REL×AUCOM. Note that board 
and audit committee characteristics are tested separately to avoid multicollinearity 
problems. The study predicts a significant and negative relationship between 
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misclassification and REL×BODSIZE, REL×BODIND and REL×AUCOM. The following 
regression model is used:  
  UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3REL x SPITEM + β4REVT + β5 REL x REVT 
+β6BODSIZE + β7BODIND + β8AUCOM + β9 REL×BODSIZE + β10REL×BODIND + β11 
REL×AUCOM +β12 SIZE + β13LEV + β14CASFO + β15ROA + β16BMV + Demographic Control 
Variables + Year Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects                                (8)    
 
2.3.6. Fixed Effects Model and Preliminary Mis-Specification Tests 
The fixed effects (FE) model is used to run a series of regression results. To arrive at this 
decision, the study initially tests the panel data regression assumption to facilitate the 
choice between pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) and the FE or random effects (RE) 
regression models. The Breusch and Pagan (1980) Langrange Multiple (LM) test is 
conducted to choose between pooled OLS and the FE or RE model.  Given that there were 
significance differences (panel effects) across the firms, the pooled OLS was inappropriate 
and therefore rejected. This therefore suggests that the alternative FE or RE models will be 
appropriate. In line with McKnight and Weir (2009), the Hausman specification test was 
conducted to select the appropriate model from the FE and RE estimation models for the 
purpose of testing the hypotheses. The choice between the FE and RE regression models 
was made after performing the Hausman specification test. With regards to UNEXP_CE, 
the Hausman test gave Chi2 (X2) of 276.15 (p-value = 0.0000), indicating that the p-value 
is less than 5%, therefore, the fixed effects regression model is suitable and appropriate for 
running the regression models. In addition, the study conducts preliminary, mis-
specification tests for normality using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality, tests the 
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presence of heteroscedasticity, using Breusch-Pagan tests for heteroscedasticity and finally 
checks for serial correlation or auto-correlation by conducting a Wooldridge test for auto-
correlation in panel data. The results of these preliminary tests are reported in the regression 
tables throughout the study. In summary, the results of the preliminary tests indicate that 
the data meet the requirements of normality, there is an absence of heteroscedasticity and 
auto-correlation or serial effects. 
 
       Table 2.3:  List of Variables and Definitions 
Variables Proxy Definition 
 
Religiosity  
REL 
Strength of religiosity for each U.S. county measured by 
Association of Statisticians of American Religious 
Bodies (ASARB) surveys. The results of these surveys 
are published on the website of the Association of 
Religion Data Archive (ARDA). The average of each 
county’s religiosity score is weighted by its population. 
Normal Core 
Earnings 
NOR_CE This is the core earnings that are expected to occur in 
the normal course of business activity, devoid of 
classification shifting.  The study follows McVay’s 
(2006) expectation model in equation 1. 
 
Reported Core 
Earnings     REP_CE
 
Estimated as sales – cost of goods sold – selling, general 
and administration expenses. Depreciation and 
amortization are excluded from cost of sales, selling, 
general and administrative expenses. 
Unexpected 
Core Earnings    UNEXP_CE 
This the difference between reported core earnings and 
normal or expected core earnings (McVay, 2006). 
Special Items 
SPTIEM 
Income-Decreasing Special Items as a percentage of 
sales, calculated as [Special Items (#17)  ]/Sales (#12) 
when Special Items are income-decreasing, and 0 
otherwise (McVay, 2006). 
Total Revenue 
REVT 
Total revenue scaled by total assets. 
 
Asset 
Turnover 
ATO
 
Sales scaled by average net operating assets, where net 
operating assets are the difference between operating 
assets and operating liabilities. Operating assets = total 
assets – cash and cash equivalent. Operating Liabilities = 
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total assets – total debt - book value of common equity – 
preferred equity – minority interests.
 Percentage 
Change in 
Sales 
∆Sales
 
(Salest – Salest-1)/ Salest
 
Percentage 
Change in 
Sales 
NEG_∆Sales
 
where ∆SALES is less than 0, otherwise zero.
 
Cash flow 
from 
operations 
CASFO Is the cash flow from operational activities scaled by? 
lagged total assets. 
Total Assets TA Measured as total non-current assets plus total current 
assets. 
Size of the 
Firm 
SIZE 
The natural log of total assets. 
Return on 
Assets 
ROA Measured as net income before extraordinary items 
divided by average total assets. 
Leverage LEV Financial leverage, measured as total debts scaled by 
total equity. 
 
Market to 
Book Value 
MBV Measured as total assets divided by market 
capitalization. 
Reported Loss  LOSS An indicator variable that equals 1 if income before 
extraordinary items was negative in the current or 
previous two fiscal years, and 0 otherwise. 
Audit 
Committee 
Presence  
AUCOM 
A dummy variable coded as 1 if the company has an 
audit committee, otherwise zero. 
Independent 
Board  
BODIND Calculated as the number of independent directors 
divided by the total number of directors on the board. 
Defined as non-executive directors holding less than 5% 
of the voting securities and having no direct or indirect 
interest or relationship that could reasonably influence 
their objective judgment and decision making. 
Board Size  BODSIZE Total number of directors on the board. 
Religiosity 
interacts with 
Board Size 
 RELBODSIZE Religiosity multiplied by board size. 
Religiosity 
interacts with 
Board 
Independence 
RELBODIND Religiosity multiplied by board independence. 
Religiosity 
interacts with 
Audit 
Committee 
RELAUCOM Religiosity multiplied by audit committee. 
BIG4 Auditors BIG4 
This is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a 
company’s auditing firm is one of the BIG4 auditors, 
otherwise zero (0).   
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Audit Tenure TEN 
The natural log of the number years the auditor has been 
with the company. 
Analysts 
Following 
ANA_FOL 
Natural log of the number of analysts following the 
firm. 
Total Accruals  
TAC 
Difference between earnings before extraordinary items 
and discontinued operations and the cash flow from 
operational activities scaled by lagged total assets. 
Operating 
Accrual 
ACCRUALS
 
Operating Accrual = (net income before extraordinary 
items – cash flow from operation)/sales.
 Working 
Capital 
Accruals 
WC_ACCRUAL
S 
Measured as earnings before extraordinary items plus 
depreciation and amortisation minus cash flow from 
operational activities. 
 
2.4. Data, Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
Financial data was collected from the annual Compustat database between 2000 and 2015; 
additional data was also obtained from other sources, including annual reports, audit 
analytics, CRSP and I/B/E/S. Firms with missing data and those with fewer than 15 firm-
year observations to test the hypotheses and estimate expected core earnings are excluded, 
in line with previous research (Haw et al., 2011; Fan et al., 2010; McVay, 2006). In 
addition, to avoid bias and the creation of outliers resulting from the inclusion of 
insignificant firms in the sample, the study excludes any observation with sales revenue of 
less than $1,000,000 (Haw et al., 2011; Fan et al., 2010; McVay, 2006), as sales is used as 
a deflator for the majority of the variables, thus reducing the full sample to 23,164 firm-
year observations. Utility firms and financial services companies have different reporting 
environments and regulations, therefore their observations are deleted, in line with previous 
studies (Zalata and Roberts, 2015; Fan et al., 2010; McVay, 2006). Industries are classified 
using the Fama and French (1997) industry classification code and the results are not 
influenced by the number of observations or the code. The final sample is used to estimate 
the normal or expected core earnings. 
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Notes: UNEXP_CE is computed as the difference between reported core earnings (REP_CE) and expected core earnings 
(NOR_CE) for each firm (McVay, 2006). REP_CE is the reported core earnings estimated as sales – cost of goods sold 
– selling, general and administration expenses. Depreciation and Amortization are excluded from Cost of Sales, Selling, 
General and Administrative Expenses. BODSIZE = total number of directors on the board; BODIND is calculated as the 
number of independent directors divided by the total number of directors on the board; AUCOM = audit committee; 
REL×BODSIZE = religiosity multiplied by board size; REL×BODIND = religiosity multiplied by board independence; 
REL×AUCOM = religiosity multiplied by audit committee. REVT is total revenue scaled by total assets. REL×REVT 
=religiosity multiplied by total revenue scaled by total assets. ATO is sales scaled by average net operating assets, where 
net operating assets is the difference between operating assets and operating liabilities. Operating assets = total assets – 
cash and cash equivalent. Operating Liabilities = total assets – total debt - book value of common equity – preferred 
equity – minority interests. ACCRUALS is calculated as (net income before extraordinary items – cash flow from 
operation)/sales. ∆Sales is (Salest – Salest-1)/ Salest and NEG_∆Sales is when ∆SALES is less than 0, otherwise zero. 
SIZE is the natural log of total assets, LEV is the financial leverage measured as the total debts scaled by total equity, 
CASFO is the cash flow from operational activities, scaled lagged total assets ROA is measured as net income before 
extraordinary items divided by average total assets and MBV is measured as total assets divided by market capitalization. 
All other variables are defined above and in Appendix A.
 
 
Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample 
Variables Mean Median Standard 
Deviatio
n 
25% 75% 
SALES (in M) 1627.363 202.597 3441.067 30.883 1159.031 
UNEXP_CE 0.002 0.003 0.069 -0.003 0.004 
SPITEM 0.002 0.001 0.012 0.001 0.008 
REVT 0.021 0.011 0.061 0.001 0.029 
RELxSPITEM -0.004 -0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.003 
RELxREVT 0.005 0.003 0.159 0.000 0.109 
BODSIZE 11.428 11.303 4.196 9.597 13.245 
BODIND 0.670 0.720 0.078 0.650 0.770 
AUCOM 5.458 5.256 2.284 4.125 5.502 
REL×BODSIZE 6.905 6.960 1.862 6.226 7.558 
REL×BODIND 0.081 0.108 0.033 0.055 0.32 
REL×AUCOM 3.567 3.744 1.097 3.726 3.834 
ATO 2.143 1.782 1.531 0.950 2.981 
CHANGE_ATO 0.029 0.004 0.376 -0.135 0.141 
ACCRUALS -0.019 0.028 0.201 -0.035 0.077 
ACCRUALSt-1 -0.026 0.029 0.254 -0.030 0.078 
∆SALES 0.096 0.058 0.300 -0.055 0.191 
NEG_∆SALES 0.075 0.043 0.359 -0.048 0.176 
SIZE 5.680 5.190 1.760 3.390 6.860 
LEV 0.151 0.101 0.162 0.001 0.252 
CASFO 0.072 0.089 0.156 0.045 0.141 
ROA -0.311 0.042 0.141 -0.032 0.084 
ANALYST_FOL 2.91 3.00 1.40 2.00 4.00 
BIG4 0.69 1.00 0.31 1.00 1.00 
MBV 2.012 1.754 1.212 1.024 2.912 
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Table 2.4 presents descriptive statistics for the regression variables for all firms. The mean, 
median, standard deviation, first quartile and third quartile are reported. The dependent 
variable UNEXP_CE has a mean of 0.002 (approximately zero); the median of 
UNEXP_CE is 0.001 with a standard deviation 0.069; and the mean SPITEM is positive 
(0.002), indicating income-decreasing special items. In addition, the mean and median of 
income-increasing special items are positive, at 0.021 and 0.011 respectively. In addition, 
the mean (median) REL×SPITEM and REL×REVT, indicating the interaction between 
religiosity (REL) and income-decreasing special items (SPITEM), and religiosity and 
special revenue, are approximately zero. The other distributions are similar and consistent 
with previous research (McVay, 2006; Fan et al., 2010). For example, the mean and median 
board size is approximately 11 and ranges between 10 and 11, which is also consistent with 
earlier studies (Zalata and Roberts, 2015; Haw et al., 2011; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Mean 
board independence shows a slight rise to approximately 67%, consistent with previous 
studies in the U.S. (Abbot et al., (2003) reported 61%; Frankel, McVay and Soliman (2011) 
reported 66 %.). Similarly, audit committee size is in line with earlier studies in the U.S. 
(Faleye, 2011; Mangena and Pike, 2005). All other univariate statistics and distributions 
for all variables appear similar to those of McVay (2006) and Fan et al., (2010), which are 
winsorized at the first and 99th percentile.  Table 2.5 provides Pearson and Spearman’s 
correlation matrix among religiosity, unexpected core earnings and firm-level control 
variables. Religiosity is negatively correlated with unexpected core earnings. Both the firm 
level and demographic control variables are correlated with UNEXP_CE in a manner 
broadly consistent with previous research (McGuire et al., 2012; Dyreng et al., 2012). 
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The study also conducts further tests to ensure that there are no multi-collinearity problems 
among the independent variables. Appendix A, Table A1 provides the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) and the associated tolerance levels (TOL) for each of the independent 
variables. As indicated, the F-value is more than 1 and the P-value is less than 0.05, 
therefore, the result is statistically significant, this indicates that all the independent 
variables are good predictors of the dependent variable (UNEXP_CE). Again, the VIF 
values are all less than 10, as recommended by prior studies (Greene, 2012; Kennedy, 
2008). The VIF indicates the extent to which any of the independent variables influences 
the estimated coefficients of the other independent variables included in the model. In other 
words, the VIF checks whether it is appropriate to include all the independent variables in 
the same model that is used to estimate the dependent variable. It quantifies the severity of 
multi-collinearity in the estimation of the regression coefficients. When the VIF exceeds 
10 or more, the results of the regression analysis are often doubted. In this study, all the 
VIF in Appendix A, Table A1 are less than 10, suggesting that the coefficients are not 
inflated by other independent variables in the model. 
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         Table 2.5: Pearson’s (above) and Spearman’s (below) correlation matrices 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 REP_CE  0.20 0.08 0.01 -0.12 0.04 0.06 -0.14 -0.03 -0.05 0.08 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.09 -0.05 -0.11 -0.05 0.01 -0.10 
2 UNEXP_CE 0.20  0.09 -0.04 -0.02 -0.06 -0.01 -0.14 -0.20 -0.07 0.04 0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 
3 SPITEM 0.08 0.09  -0.01 -0.13 -0.04 -0.09 -0.21 -0.07 -0.02 0.03 -0.06 0.01 -0.02 -0.11 -0.08 0.17 -0.07 -0.01 -0.12 
4 ATO 0.01 -0.04 -0.02  0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.07 -0.01 0.07 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5 ACCRUALS -0.12 -0.02 -0.15 0.07  -0.01 -0.01 0.25 0.27 0.10 -0.23 0.01 0.18 0.08 -0.28 0.19 -0.28 0.08 -0.07 0.11 
6 ∆SALES 0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 -0.07  0.17 -0.06 0.10 -0.02 -0.08 0.17 0.02 -0.07 0.08 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.04 
7 NEG_∆SALES 0.06 -0.05 -0.06 0.06 0.00 0.15  -0.01 0.22 0.00 0.02 0.16 -0.04 0.05 -0.05 0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 
8 SIZE -0.14 -0.11 -0.23 0.08 0.24 -0.02 0.02  0.29 0.12 0.09 -0.04 0.19 -0.14 -0.18 -0.19 -0.40 0.27 0.10 0.39 
9 ROA -0.03 -0.21 -0.05 0.04 0.25 0.13 0.22 0.26  -0.02 -0.12 0.14 0.01 0.04 -0.17 0.13 -0.16 0.02 -0.01 0.11 
10 MBV -0.05 -0.10 -0.01 0.02 0.11 -0.01 0.05 0.13 -0.02  0.15 -0.02 0.23 -0.06 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.07 
11 LEV 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.07 -0.16 -0.05 0.01 0.10 -0.11 0.13  -0.07 0.27 -0.08 0.00 -0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.02 0.11 
12 BIG 4 -0.05 0.06 -0.06 -0.02 0.07 0.14 0.19 -0.02 0.13 -0.01 -0.05  -0.02 0.07 -0.07 0.06 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 -0.03 
13 ANAL_FOL -0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.03 0.23 0.01 -0.03 0.24 0.01 0.23 0.26 -0.01  0.00 0.02 -0.03 0.08 -0.05 0.00 0.04 
14 REL -0.05 -0.02 -0.06 0.01 0.05 -0.09 0.07 -0.16 0.08 -0.08 -0.08 0.09 0.00  -0.30 0.20 -0.17 -0.01 -0.29 -0.28 
15 AGE -0.05 -0.06 -0.09 -0.02 -0.31 0.10 -0.08 -0.19 -0.13 0.03 -0.01 -0.10 0.01 -0.27  -0.24 0.35 -0.15 0.35 -0.05 
16 EDUC 0.04 0.07 -0.05 0.01 0.24 0.02 0.10 0.11 0.13 -0.02 -0.03 0.05 -0.02 0.23 -0.27  -0.23 0.20 0.26 0.24 
17 POPN -0.12 -0.10 0.22 0.01 -0.26 -0.05 -0.05 -0.42 -0.08 0.02 0.06 -0.05 0.07 -0.16 0.36 -0.25  -0.26 0.18 -0.23 
18 MIN 0.02 0.03 -0.05 -0.02 0.09 -0.02 -0.03 0.30 0.06 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 -0.10 0.15 -0.26  0.35 0.21 
19 POL 0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.00 -0.10 -0.09 -0.06 0.12 0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.08 0.01 -0.28 0.31 0.26 0.20 0.35  0.12 
20 INCOME -0.10 -0.04 -0.12 0.02 0.09 -0.04 -0.02 0.42 0.05 0.06 0.11 -0.04 0.03 -0.26 -0.01 0.21 -0.25 0.21 0.12 
 
 All variables are defined in Table 2.3. Bold co-efficients are significant at p < 0.10 (in a two tailed test). 
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2.5. Empirical Regression Results and Discussions 
To assess whether religiosity is related to classification shifting, the study initially 
investigates whether U.S. firms are currently engaged in classification shifting, as reported 
by McVay (2006) and corroborated by Fan et al. (2010). In Table 2.6, initially only 
SPITEM is included in Model (2) to provide basic regression results. The coefficient on 
SPITEM is positive and significant (SPITEM; p-value = 0.002), suggesting that some firms 
in the U.S. inflate core earnings by misclassifying core expenses into special items. When 
only REVT is included in Model (2), the coefficient on REVT is also positive and 
significant (REVT; p-value = 0.001), suggesting that firms in the U.S. are involved in 
upward classification shifting. Finally, both SPITEM and REVT are included in Model 2 
and observe a significant positive relationship between unexpected core earnings and both 
SPITEM and REVT. The result indicates that when revenue is shifted upward or core 
expenses are shifted downwards on the income statement, unexpected core earnings 
increase (UNEXP_CE), suggesting that firms do not only report true and fair performance, 
but are involved in misclassification of special items to increase reported core earnings. 
This is consistent with previous findings that unexpected core earnings increase with 
special items. Firms with huge write-offs and restructuring charges tend to perform poorly, 
but the converse is equally true for firms with special items (McVay, 2006; Fan et al., 
2010).  
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Table 2.6: Regression of Unexpected Core Earnings on Special Expenses and Special 
Revenue  
Dependent Variable = UNEXP_CE 
Variables  SPITEM REVT SPITEM & REVT  
 Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values 
Intercept 0.002 0.33 -0.010 -2.47** -0.08 -2.30*** 
SPITEM 0.31 3.11***   0.46 4.20*** 
REVT   0.13 3.65*** 0.14 3.57*** 
Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10 
Breusch-
Pagan 
 1807.15  1723.13  1152.24 
P-Value  (0.3259)  (0.3514)  (0.3654) 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov 
 468  383  327 
P-Value  (0.4209)  (0.3618)  (0.3415) 
Wooldridge 
Test 
 123.28  118.25  134.79 
P-Value  (0.3617)  (0.2879)  (0.3861) 
Notes: We use *,** and *** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent levels. We show co-efficient estimates and t-statistics in separate columns. SPITEM = income-decreasing 
special items scaled by sales; REVT is total revenue scaled by total assets. The parameters are estimated based on the 
following model; all variables are defined in Table 2.3. 
 
UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2 REVT + Demographic Control Variables + Year Fixed Effects + 
Industry Fixed Effects. 
 
Following Hypothesis 1, the study examines the association between religiosity (REL) and 
unexpected core earnings (UNEXP_CE), as well as the interaction between REL and 
SPITEM as the variable of interest (REL×SPITEM). Regressions are run using fixed effects 
to account for heterogeneity across firms, with the results shown in Table 2.7, Model (5). 
The results indicate that religiosity is negatively related to UNEXP_CE, (REL; p-value = 
0.004). Similarly, the study finds a significantly negative relationship between 
REL×SPITEM and UNEXP_CE (REL×SPITEM, p-value = 0.001). In Table 2.7, Model 
(6), REL is interacted with REVT and reports the regression results of UNEXP_CE on REL 
x REVT. The results show a significant negative relationship between UNEXP_CE and 
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REL x REVT (p-value = 0.000). Thereafter, all the variables of interest are included in 
Model (7) and the regression is re-run. The results are consistent with previous findings, as 
shown in Table 2.7. That is, religiosity mitigates managers’ incentive to misclassify 
revenue items upwards to increase reported core earnings. Therefore, the results suggest 
that religious managers possibly deem it unacceptable, unethical and morally wrong to 
engage in classification shifting to boost core earnings to signal managers’ inside 
information to investors, raising the expectation of the market or beating/meeting earnings 
benchmarks. Perhaps, as indicated by previous studies (McVay, 2006; Fan et al., 2010), 
this might be due to the limited scrutiny of auditors and other external monitors, often 
associated with classification shifting. The result is also consistent with the study of 
McGuire et al. (2012), which observe that accruals earnings management is negatively 
related to the religiosity of the firms’ environment. This is a notable contribution to the 
literature, as this study is the first to attempt an association between classification shifting 
and the religiosity of the firms’ environment. 
Table 2.7: Regression of Unexpected Core Earnings on Special Items Expenses and 
Special Revenue    
Dependent Variable = UNEXP_CE 
Variables  Model (5)  Model (6)  Model (7)  
 Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values 
Intercept -0.07 -1.61 0.06 1.74* -0.04 -1.30 
SPITEM  0.28 3.78***   0.16 3.41*** 
REVT   0.16 4.35*** 0.12 3.97*** 
REL -0.34 -3.74*** -0.30 -3.38** -0.28 -2.76** 
REL×SPITEM -0.23 -2.92***   -0.19 -2.56** 
REL×REVT   -0.09   -7.88*** -0.08 -4.51** 
SIZE -0.03 -1.45 -0.05 -1.17 -0.06 -1.19 
LEV  0.07 2.26** 0.09 2.53** 0.10 2.68** 
CASFO  0.09 1.10 0.02 1.07 0.05 1.15 
ROA -0.06  -3.37*** -0.16  -2.37** -0.18  -2.39** 
MBV -0.03 -2.07** -0.04 -1.77* -0.06 -1.78* 
BIG4 -0.04 -1.62 -0.03 -1.22 -0.04 -1.28 
ANA_FOL -0.04 -1.56 -0.02 -1.36 -0.04 -1.42 
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Demographic 
Control 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.24 0.24 
Breusch-Pagan  5018.29  5002.62  6084.35 
P-Value  (0.7141)  (0.7087)  (0.7354) 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov 
 539  568  683 
P-Value  (0.6148)  (0.6202)  (0.6415) 
Wooldridge Test  89.65  106.24  118.27 
P-Value  (0.3383)  (0.3456)  (0.3762) 
Notes: We use *,** and *** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent levels. We show co-efficient estimates and t-statistics in separate columns. SPITEM = income-decreasing 
special items scaled by sales, REVT is total revenue scaled by total assets, REL = religiosity of the firms’ environment, 
and REL×SPITEM = interaction between religiosity and income-decreasing special items. REL×REVT = interaction 
between religiosity and total revenue scaled by total assets. SIZE is the natural log of total assets, LEV is the financial 
leverage measured as the total debts scaled by total equity, and CASFO is the cash flow from operational activities scaled 
by lagged total assets. ROA is measured as net income before extraordinary items divided by average total assets and 
MBV is measured as total assets divided by market capitalization. BIG4 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is 
audited by the BIG4, otherwise zero, and ANLYST_FOL represents the natural log of the number of financial analysts 
following the firm. The parameters are estimated based on the following model; all variables are defined in Table 2.3. 
 
UNEXP_CE = β0 + + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3 SPITEM × REL +β4 REVT + β5 REVT × REL + β6 SIZE + 
β7 LEV + β8 CASFO + β9 ROA + β10 BMV + β11 BIG4 + β12 ANALYST_FOL + Demographic Control 
Variables + Year Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects                                                                          
In addition, the study finds that the firm-level control variables are associated with 
UNEXP_CE, in line previous studies (Zalata and Roberts, 2015; Haw et al., 2011).  For 
example, the coefficient of ROA is negative and significantly, at 1%, related to 
UNEXP_CE, suggesting that firms engage in misclassification when they are performing 
poorly. Market to book value (MBV) is negative and significantly related to UNEXP_CE, 
suggesting that firms are less likely to engage in classification shifting when the book value 
is high. Similarly, SIZE is negative but insignificantly associated with UNEXP_CE, 
indicating that the sample includes larger firms than smaller firms. Ashbaugh et al. (2003) 
observe that small firms are more likely to manipulate reported profits than large firms, so 
the impact of classification shifting decreases with the greater size of the firm. A positive 
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and significant relationship at the 5% level is observed between leverage (LEV) and 
UNEXP_CE. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) indicate that managers manipulate reported 
earnings upwards to meet debt covenants or contracts. The BIG4 and number of analysts 
following exhibit their expected sign and significant/insignificant levels, in line with 
previous studies (McVay, 2006; Fan et al., 2010; McGuire et al., 2012).   
 
2.5.1. Testing Misclassification in High and Low Religiosity Areas 
The above results and analyses have provided clear evidence that the religiosity of a firm’s 
environment influences classification shifting negatively and significantly. However, the 
analyses do not reveal the extent to which the level (high or low) of religiosity in an area 
affects this shifting. The study tests this by empirically breaking down the datasets into two 
samples, in line with previous research (McGuire et al., 2012), comprising high and low 
religious areas and defining areas with above (or below) the median religiosity figure of 
52% in the sample as having high (or low) religiosity respectively. It is anticipated that a 
highly religious environment will influence classification shifting more significantly than 
areas with low religiosity figures4.     
 
 
 
                                                          
4 We break our sample into high and low religiosity areas because prior studies (McGuire et al., 2012; Callen et al., 2011; 
Dyreng et al., 2012) indicate that a highly religious environment has a significant influence on the attitudes and behaviour 
of the people living there. 
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Notes: We use *,** and *** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent levels. We show co-efficient estimates and t-statistics in separate columns. The parameters are estimated 
based on the following model; all variables are defined in Table 2.3. 
 
UNEXP_CE = β0 + + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3 SPITEM × REL +β4 REVT +  β5 REVT × REL + β6 SIZE 
+ β7 LEV + β8 CASFO + β9 ROA + β10 BMV + β11 BIG4 + β12 ANALYST_FOL + Demographic Control 
Variables + Year Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects                                                                                                          
 
Table 2.8 presents the results of the analysis of high and low religious areas on managers’ 
classification shifting. Interestingly, the study finds that there is a strong negative 
association at the 1% significance level (P< 0.01) between REL x SPITEM and 
 
Table 2.8: Classification Shifting in High and Low Religiosity Areas 
 High  Low 
Variables Coefficient t-values  Coefficient t-values 
Intercept -0.08 -0.060  -0.03 -0.077 
SPITEM   0.08 3.16***  0.04 2.45** 
REVT   0.18  3.85***  0.09 2.20** 
REL -0.36 -3.09***  -0.07 -1.46 
REL×SPITEM -0.26 -3.28***  -0.06 -1.09 
REL×REVT -0.14 -3.09***  -0.08 -1.39 
SIZE -0.08 -2.45**  -0.05 -2.04** 
LEV  0.08     1.61   0.08  1.32 
CASFO  0.15 2.91**   0.11  0.62 
ROA -0.05    -2.18**  -0.12 -1.78* 
MBV -0.06    -1.69*  -0.05 -1.19 
BIG4 -0.04     -1.54  -0.03 -0.89 
ANA_FOL -0.03     -1.21  -0.02 -1.02 
Demographic Control 
Variables 
Yes       Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.27  0.22 0.22 
Observations 14,124 14,124  8,566 8,566 
Breusch-Pagan  5314.47   4486.15 
P-Value  (0.7372)   (0.6254) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov  456   379 
P-Value  (0.6245)   (0.4687) 
Wooldridge Test  121.32   109.69 
P-Value  (0.3986) 
 
 (0.3516) 
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UNEXP_CE in high religiosity areas. Similarly, there is a negative relationship at the 1% 
significance level (P<0.03) between REL x REVT and UNEXP_CE at the high religiosity 
areas. On the contrary, it is found that the association between REL×SPITEM, REL×REVT 
and UNEXP_CE in low religiosity areas is negative, but not significant. This reinforces the 
findings that religious social norms influence classification shifting, and that the effect is 
acute, especially in highly religious social norm environments, consistent with previous 
studies (McGuire et al., 2012; Callen et al., 2011; Dyreng et al., 2012). 
 
2.5.2. Religiosity, Corporate Governance and Classification Shifting 
Previous studies (Zalata and Roberts, 2015; Haw et al., 2011) indicate that corporate 
governance mechanisms affect earnings management practices. Hypothesis 2a is tested to 
assess the interactive effect between religiosity and governance variables on unexpected 
core earnings to ensure that previous findings are robust in the presence of internal 
corporate governance. The study uses BODSIZE, BODIND and AUCOM as proxies for 
internal corporate governance, in line with previous research (Zalata and Roberts, 2015).  
Thereafter, the study focuses on the interaction between REL×BODSIZE, REL×BODIND 
and REL×AUCOM to assess their impact on UNEXP_CE. Separate regressions are run for 
each variable to avoid multicollinearity problems. First, the study includes BODSIZE in 
the model, followed by BODINS and AUCOM. The same process is repeated for REL x 
BODSIZE, REL x BODIND and REL x AUCOM respectively; subsequently all the 
variables are included in the model and the results appear very similar and consistent. 
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Table 2.9: Impact of Religiosity and Corporate Governance on Classification 
Shifting 
 
Dependent Variable = UNEXP_CE 
 Coefficient  t-value 
Intercept -0.08  -1.37 
SPITEM  0.06  2.94*** 
REVT  0.19  3.50*** 
REL -0.12  -3.64*** 
RELxSPITEM -0.15  -3.12*** 
RELxREVT -0.13  -3.82*** 
BODSIZE -0.03  -2.22** 
BODIND -0.04  -1.74* 
AUCOM -0.02  -0.74 
REL×BODSIZE -0.24  -3.92*** 
REL×BODIND -0.39  -3.67*** 
REL×AUCOM -0.17   -2.87*** 
SIZE -0.02  -1.17 
LEV  0.11  1.70 
CASFO  0.03  0.86 
ROA -0.07  -1.19 
MBV -0.03  -1.76* 
Demographic Control 
Variables Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.52  0.52 
Observations 23164  23164 
Breusch-Pagan   4287.54 
P-Value   (0.6514) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov   146.86 
P-Value   (0.3415) 
Wooldridge Test   81.67 
P-Value  
 
(0.2963) 
 
Notes: We use *,** and *** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent levels. We show co-efficient estimates and t-statistics in separate columns.. The parameters are estimated 
based on the following model. All variables are defined in Table 2.3.  
UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3RELSPITEM + β4 REVT + β5 REVT × REL + β6BODSIZE + 
β7BODIND + β8AUCOM + β9RELxBODSIZE + β10RELxBODIND + β11RELxAUCOM +β12 SIZE + β13LEV 
+ β14CASFO + β15ROA + β16BMV + Demographic Control Variables + Year Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed 
Effects        
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As indicated in Table 2.9, the study finds a significant negative relationship (at the 1% 
level, p-value = 0.001) between REL×SPITEM and UNEXP_CE. In addition, the 
coefficient on REL x REVT and UNEXP_CE is negative and significant (-0.13; -3.82). 
Consistent with previous research (Zalata and Roberts, 2015; Haw et al., 2011; Sun and 
Cahan, 2009), the results show that there is a negative association at the 5% significance 
level between UNEXP_CE and BODSIZE, and between UNEXP_CE and BODIND at the 
10% significance level. First, this result suggests that large board size constrains 
classification shifting and this may be due to the size or the presence of financial experts 
on the board. This is consistent with the findings of (Peasnell et al. (2005) and Xie et al. 
(2003) who observe that the optimal board size influences managerial decision and 
financial reporting quality. Again, the result suggests that misclassification is less common 
in firms with large number of independent directors, which confirms the arguments that 
independent directors on the board are able or more likely to confront or monitor aggressive 
misreporting of financial information. That is, they are not prone to less monitoring, caused 
by free-rider problems or less information from insider-directors (Zalata and Robert, 2015). 
Thus, corporate governance mechanisms within the firms in the sample mitigate 
misclassification of core expenses or special revenue items. On the contrary, the 
relationship between UNEXP_CE and AUCOM is negative but not significant, suggesting 
that large audit committees are not better at mitigating expense misclassification, perhaps, 
due to the limited auditor vigilant and the fact that classification shifting does not violate 
FASB accounting rules. With regards to the interactive variables, the study also finds 
significant (at the 1% level) negative association between REL×BODSIZE, 
REL×BODIND, REL×AUCOM and UNEXP_CE. This suggests that in a religious social 
norms environment, there is a decrease in management misclassification activity. This 
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negative impact of religion on managerial opportunistic behaviour is influenced by 
corporate governance mechanism such as; BODSIZE, BODIND and AUCOM. As board 
size increases coupled with a high proportion of independent directors, the ability to engage 
in managerial opportunistic behaviour to influence reported core earnings via classification 
shifting, reduces. However, the impact becomes relatively more pronounced in a religious 
environment. The change in significant level (from 10% to 1% or 5% to 1%) after the 
interaction demonstrates the impact of religious social norms on classification shifting. This 
is consistent with the earlier findings that managers have less motivation to misclassify core 
expenses or revenue items in an environment where religious social norms influence 
managerial behaviour and decisions (McGuire et al 2012). Therefore, the initial results are 
supported; that religiosity complements existing monitoring mechanisms put in place by 
management to hinder misclassification. 
2.5.3. Religiosity, Auditor Characteristics and Classification Shifting  
Hypothesis 2b is tested to assess the extent to which the interaction between religiosity and 
auditor characteristics impact classification shifting. Previous studies indicate that auditor 
characteristics affect accrual-based earnings management but because misclassification 
does not violate GAAP, auditors pay less attention to this (McGuire et al., 2012; McVay, 
2006). In the previous analyses, the study controls for BIG4 and analyst following, but 
observes an insignificant negative relationship between UNEXP_CE and the BIG4 
auditors.  
Panel A in Table 2.10 shows the regression results when only income-decreasing special 
items are included (SPITEM) in Model (5); the results show a positive and significant co-
efficient of (0.14, t = 2.03). However, the coefficient on SPITEM x BIG4 is negative but 
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not significant (-0.04, t = -1.09). The interaction between BIG4 and REL is included in 
Model (5). The coefficient on REL×BIG4 is negative and significant (-0.13, t = -1.94), 
similarly the interaction between REL×SPITEM×BIG4 shows a significant and negative 
coefficient of (-0.25 t = -2.21), indicating that in a religious social norm environment, 
misclassification behaviour is constrained substantially, and this is induced by BIG4 
auditors. That is, even though, BIG4 auditors pay less attention to expense 
misclassification, in a religious social norms environment, BIG4 complements religiosity 
and existing monitoring mechanisms to mitigate classification shifting.  In Model (6), the 
study includes only special revenue; the coefficient on REVT is positive and significant 
(0.06, t = 2.05), but the coefficient on REVT×BIG4 is negative but not significant (-0.03, t 
= -1.23). Thereafter, the study interacts REL, REVT and BIG4, and the results show that 
the coefficient on REL×REVT×BIG4 is negative and significant (-0.18, t = -2.14). When 
both REVT and SPITEM are included in Model (7), the results and inferences remain the 
same. The coefficient on SPITEM×BIG4 is (-0.05, t = -1.64) and REVT×BIG4 is (-0.04, t 
= -1.36); still negative, but not significant. The coefficient on REL×SPITEM×BIG4 is (-
0.17, t = -1.81) and REL×REVT×BIG4 is (-0.16, t = -1.98), both being negative and 
significant at 10%. Overall, the study reports some evidence that firms with BIG4 auditors 
in relation to religious social norms engage less in upward and downward classification 
shifting. Note though that there is some variability in the significance of such an effect. 
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Table 2.10: Regression of Unexpected Core Earnings on Special Items Expenses and 
Special Revenue: Auditor Characteristics & Religiosity 
Dependent Variable = UNEXP_CE 
Variables  Model (5) 
SPITEM 
Model (6) 
REVT 
Model (7) 
SPITEM & REVT 
Panel A: BIG4  Auditors 
 Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values 
Intercept -0.05 -0.37 0.07 1.31 0.06 0.80 
SPITEM  0.14   2.03**   0.16   2.05** 
SPITEM×BIG4 -0.04 -1.09   -0.05 -1.64 
REVT    0.06  2.05** 0.09   1.97** 
REVT×BIG4   -0.03 -1.23 -0.04 -1.36 
REL×SPITEM×BIG4 -0.25 -2.21**   -0.17 -1.81** 
REL×REVT×BIG4   -0.18 -2.14** -0.16 1.98** 
REL×BIG4 -0.13  -1.94**  -0.05 -2.32** -0.07 -2.33** 
BIG4 -0.08 -1.24 -0.03 -1.42 -0.09  -0.883 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.11 
Breusch-Pagan  5423.36  5173.84  5624.23 
P-Value  (0.6879)  (0.6257)  (0.7185) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov  116.94  124.56  114.68 
P-Value  (0.4523)  (0.4625)  (0.4236) 
Wooldridge Test  128.44  87.29  121.32 
P-Value  (0.2937)  (0.1876)  (0.2618) 
Panel B: Auditor Tenure 
       
Intercept -0.04 -0.39 -0.02 -0.54 -0.03         0.69 
SPITEM  0.33 2.94***   -0.30  2.86*** 
SPITEM×TEN -0.06 -1.38   -0.08 -1.21 
REVT    0.02  3.09***        0.02  3.04*** 
REVT×TEN   -0.09 -2.40**  -0.08 -2.68** 
REL×SPITEM×TEN  -0.05 -2.45**    -0.07 3.15*** 
REL×REVT×TEN   -0.06  2.31**     -0.08**  -2.39** 
RELTEN -0.04 -2.08** -0.08 -1.82*    -0.07* -1.78* 
TEN -0.02 -0.88 -0.04 -1.54  -0.05 -1.55 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.09 
Breusch-Pagan  5251.36  5721.31  5815.17 
P-Value  (0.6524)  (0.7238)  (0.7309) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov  114.35  112.13  110.26 
P-Value  (0.4317)  (0.4253)  (0.4123) 
Wooldridge Test  127.84  84.24  121.32 
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P-Value  (0.2832)  (0.1829)  (0.2583) 
Notes: We use *,** and *** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent levels. We show co-efficient estimates and t-statistics in separate columns. SPITEM = income-decreasing 
special items scaled by sales, and REVT is total revenue scaled by total assets. REL = religiosity of the firms’ environment, 
BIG4 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is audited by a BIG4 auditing firm, otherwise zero. SPITEM×BIG4 
= interaction between BIG4 auditors and total revenue by total assets. REVT×BIG4 = interaction between BIG4 and total 
revenue scaled by total assets. REL×SPITEM×BIG4 = interaction among religiosity, BIG4 auditors and income-
decreasing special items. REL×REVT×BIG4 = interaction among religiosity, BIG4 auditors and total revenue scaled by 
total assets.  REL×BIG4 = interaction between BIG4 and religiosity. TEN is the natural log of the number of years the 
auditor has been with the company. SPITEM×TEN = interaction between income-decreasing special items and auditor 
tenure. REVT×TEN = interaction between total revenue scaled by total assets and auditor tenure. REL×TEN = interaction 
between auditor tenure and religiosity. The parameters are estimated based on the following model; all variables are 
defined in Table 2.3. 
 
 
In Table 2.10, Panel B, regression results are shown to indicate whether or not audit tenure, 
interaction between audit tenure (TEN in Table 2.10 captures the number of years the 
auditor has been with the company) and religiosity affect classification shifting. Only 
SPITEM is included in Model (5) and the coefficient is positive and significant (0.33, t = 
2.94), while the result for SPITEM×TEN is negative but not significant (-0.06, t = -1.38), 
suggesting that the number of years an auditor is engaged by the firm as an auditor alone 
does not play an effective role in mitigating classification shifting behaviour in some U.S. 
firms. Perhaps, it could suggest that the longer they are engaged as auditors, the more 
familiar they become with management, this familiarity makes auditors to overlook 
managerial motivation to engage in misclassification. Again, this might also be due to the 
fact that misclassification does not violate the FASB accounting regulations or GAAP, 
hence, there is limited attention and vigilant from the auditors. Thereafter, the study 
includes the interaction between REL and TEN, as well as REL, SPITEM and TEN, in 
Model (5).  The coefficient on REL×TEN is negative and significant (-0.04, t = -2.08) and 
the coefficient on REL×SPITEM×TEN is also negative and significant (-0.05, t = -2.45). 
This suggests that religious social norms of the firm’s environment play an effective 
monitoring role in constraining misclassification activity that is induced by auditor tenure. 
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However, long auditor tenure alone does not mitigate misclassification. The overall results 
present evidence to support the effective monitoring role of religion in curbing 
opportunistic managerial behaviour, which is partially complemented by auditor tenure 
(McGuire et al., 2012). The study also includes REVT in Model (6); the coefficient is 
positive and significant (0.02, t = 3.09) and the coefficient on REVT×TEN is negative and 
significant (-0.09, t = -2.40). The results for RELxTEN and REL×REVT×TEN are (-0.08, 
t = -1.82) and (-0.06, -2.31) respectively. This also indicates that high religiosity in a firm’s 
environment mitigates special revenue misclassification and this negative impact is induced 
by the number of years the firm engages the services of the auditor. Both SPITEM and 
REVT are included in Model (7) and the results and inferences remain the same. The overall 
results indicate that classification shifting is subdued in a religious social norm environment 
and that religiosity complements the existing monitoring mechanisms, such as corporate 
governance and audit practices.   
2.5.4. Religiosity and Classification Shifting in Rural and Urban Areas 
To test hypothesis 3, the sample is disaggregated into rural and urban areas. Previous 
studies observe that earnings quality is associated with firms in rural areas (McGuire et al., 
2012; Ucran, 2007). This point is further strengthened when firms in rural areas are audited 
by the BIG4 auditors and have strong internal controls (Bayley and Taylor, 2007; Dechow 
et al., 2010). To show that religious social norms have an influence on firms located in both 
urban and rural areas, and that the results are not solely due to the lower and higher earnings 
quality of the firms located in the two types of area respectively, the study divides the 
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sample into urban and rural areas. In line with Loughran and Schulz (2005)5, the study 
classifies Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) in each county with a population of over 
five million as urban areas, and repeats the main test using the urban and rural sub-samples. 
Table 2.11: Impact of Religion on Classification Shifting in Urban and Rural 
Areas  
 Urban  Rural 
Variables Coefficient t-values  Coefficient t-values 
Intercept -0.06 -0.70  -0.09  -0.47 
SPITEM 0.07 2.28**  0.04 2.69** 
REVT  0.05 1.84*  0.11 2.20** 
REL -0.05 -1.78*  -0.09 -3.51*** 
REL×SPITEM -0.07 -2.09**  -0.11 -3.87*** 
REL×REVT -0.04 -1.82*  -0.08 -2.27** 
SIZE -0.08 -2.32**  -0.05 -1.74* 
LEV 0.06 1.06  0.00 1.01 
CASFO 0.16 2.23**  0.08 2.18** 
ROA -0.06 -1.77*  -0.07 -1.75* 
MBV -0.06 -1.04  -0.05 -1.02 
BIG4 -0.03 -1.36  -0.02 -1.49 
ANAL_FOL -0.04 -1.26  -0.03 -1.09 
Demographic Control 
Variables 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.37 0.37  0.33 0.33 
Observations 18,124 18,124  4,253 4,253 
Breusch-Pagan  4474.42   4093.67 
P-Value  (0.6469)   (0.6283) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov  259.47   214.68 
P-Value  (0.3126)   (0.2875) 
Wooldridge Test  139.26   132.37 
P-Value 
 
(0.3128) 
  
(0.3083) 
Notes: We use *,** and *** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent levels. We show co-efficient estimates and t-statistics in separate columns. The parameters are estimated 
based on the following model; all variables are defined in Table 2.3. 
 
                                                          
5 Loughran and Schulz (2005) define urban areas as the most-populated areas, with an average of over five million 
residents in the MSA within the county. We replicate our analysis based on their definition and find that the inferences 
remain the same. 
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UNEXP_CE = β0 + + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3 SPITEM × REL +β4 REVT + β5 REVT × REL + β6 SIZE + 
β7 LEV + β8 CASFO + β9 ROA + β10 BMV + β11 BIG4 + β12 ANALYST_FOL + Demographic Control 
Variables + Year Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects                                            
Table 2.11 presents the results of the analysis of the relationship between REL×SPITEM, 
REL x REVT and UNEXP_CE for firms located in urban and rural areas. Indeed, the 
conclusions remain the same using both rural and urban sub-samples.  
The study finds that both REL×SPITEM and REL× REVT are negative and significantly 
(at the 1% level, p-value = 0.004) associated with UNEXP_CE in rural areas, suggesting 
that the negative association between religious social norms and misclassification is not 
solely influenced by the high earnings quality associated with these areas. Note, however, 
that the magnitude of the interaction terms REL×SPITEM and REL× REVT, also the REL, 
is higher in the rural areas than the urban areas, which could be attributed to the 
heterogeneity in religious beliefs of individuals in big cities compared to rural areas, as 
reported by Chalfant and Heller (1991) and Urcan (2007). Thus, religious social norms are 
effective in reducing classification shifting in rural and urban areas, but the effect is 
stronger in the former. Overall, the findings are robust and clearly demonstrate that the 
religiosity of the firms’ environment mitigates classification shifting. 
2.6. Robustness Checks 
2.6.1 Validity of McVay’s (2006) Model 
To develop her expectation model so as to compute unexpected core earnings, McVay 
(2006) includes current year accruals in line with DeAngelo et al (1994) to control for 
firms’ performance. She observes that firms’ extreme performance is significantly 
associated with accruals level. That is, firm’s that have large non-recurring expenses 
(special items) are likely to report negative performance. However, McVay (2006) reports 
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a positive relationship between unexpected core earnings and non-recurring expenses, 
which is a demonstration of the existence of classification shifting. In a related study, Fan 
et al (2010) provide a different explanation and argue that the inclusion of current year or 
contemporary accruals in McVay (2006) expectation model is an illustrative of model bias 
and can create a mechanical positive relationship between unexpected core earnings and 
non-recurring expenses. Fan et al (2010) report that the dependent variable (unexpected 
core earnings) is partially determined by the accruals in the McVay (2006) expectation 
model, and this is regressed on non-recurring expenses or special items (independent 
variable), a situation that is likely to introduce mechanical bias. Fan et al (2010) conclude 
that there is no classification shifting of core expenses into non-recurring expenses, rather 
McVay (2006) finding is an evidence of mechanical bias.  
Consequently, McVay (2008) re-visited her studies and argues against Fan et al (2010) by 
using a sample of firms with positive core earnings to subdue the impact of accruals on 
earnings performance. Using the full sample, she excluded current accruals from the model 
and observes that the relationship between non-recurring expenses and unexpected core 
earnings was negative, an indication that there is no classification shifting. Therefore, 
McVay (2008) concludes that in the absence of performance control (current accruals) in 
the expectation model, researchers should use firms that report positive core earnings 
because such firms are less likely to be affected by performance effect. Following the above 
debate over the validity of McVay (2006) model, this study addresses Fan et al (2010) 
concerns regarding total accruals in McVay (2006) expectation model. The normal or 
expected core earnings are estimated using total accruals and working capital accruals, 
similar to Fan et al (2010) and Athanasakou et al. (2009) respectively to condition the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 115 
normal core earnings on current accruals so as to control for firms’ performance. The study, 
therefore, substitutes total accruals by working capital accruals because working capital 
accruals exclude depreciations expenses and other non-recurring accruals items which 
helps to subdue McVay (2006) expectation model bias.  
In Table 2.12, the results for both Athanasakou et al.’s (2009) and Fan et al.’s (2010) 
classification shifting models are estimated.  To employ Fan et al.’s (2010) model, the study 
drops contemporaneous accruals from McVay's expectation model. It is found that 
SPITEM and REVT are positive and significantly (1%; p-value =0.002) related to 
UNEXP_CE. The coefficients on both REL×SPITEM and REL× REVT are still negative 
and significantly (P < 0.001) associated with UNEXP_CE.  These results are similar to 
those of McVay (2006), suggesting that the initial findings of misclassification of core 
expenses and revenue items rooted in McVay’s (2006) expectation model are bias free. 
Furthermore, in line with Athanasakou et al. (2009), the study surrogates total accruals by 
working capital accruals in both McVay’s (2006) and Fan et al.’s (2010) expectation 
models. Athanasakou et al. (2009) observe that the substitution of working capital accruals 
is important, because total accruals in McVay's (2006) model comprise depreciation 
expenses and special items accruals, which are likely to introduce bias. Therefore, the 
regression results are re-estimated using working capital accruals, but the results as 
indicated by Athanasakou et al.’s (2009) model and inferences remain similar to the initial 
results. That is, core earnings increase when a substantial amount of core expenses are 
classified as special items, which is consistent with classification shifting. 
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Table 2.12: Religiosity and Different Models of Classification Shifting. 
 Athanasakou et al.’s 
(2009) Model 
 Fan et al.’s 
 (2010) Model 
Variables Coefficient t-values  Coefficient t-values 
Intercept -0.08 -0.65  -0.05 -0.73 
SPITEM 0.07 3.27***  0.08 2.96*** 
REVT 0.16 3.78***  0.12 2.24** 
REL -0.12 -2.93***  -0.17 -3.65*** 
REL×SPITEM -0.15 -3.09***  -0.13 -3.07*** 
REL×REVT -0.09 -3.83***  -0.11 -2.48** 
SIZE -0.03 -2.14**  -0.04 -2.48** 
LEV 0.19 1.41  0.03  1.56 
CASFO 0.19 1.49  0.13 1.48 
ROA -0.08 -1.71*  -0.09 -1.67* 
MBV -0.07  -2.04**  -0.04 -2.28** 
BIG4 -0.04 -1.22  -0.05 -1.09 
ANA_FOL -0.03 -1.37  -0.04 -1.27 
Demographic Control Variables Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.53 0.53  0.46 0.46 
Observations 23164 23164  23164 23164 
Breusch-Pagan  5287.54   5197.29 
P-Value  (0.7418)   (0.7239) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov  454   372 
P-Value  (0.6241)   (0.4682) 
Wooldridge Test  120.28   107.63 
P-Value 
 
(0.3782) 
  
(0.3511) 
Notes: We use *,** and *** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent levels. We show co-efficient estimates and t-statistics in separate columns. The parameters are estimated 
based on the following model; all variables are defined in Table 2.3. 
 
UNEXP_CE = β0 + + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3 SPITEM × REL +β4 REVT + β5 REVT × REL + β6 SIZE + 
β7 LEV + β8 CASFO + β9 ROA + β10 BMV + β11 BIG4 + β12 ANALYST_FOL + Demographic Control 
Variables + Year Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects    
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2.6.2. Testing Misclassification in Pre- and Post- Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2000 and 
Financial Crisis Periods 
To ensure that the results of the study are not influenced by the confounding effects of 
various events that took place during the study period, the extent to which religiosity 
affected the misclassification of special items in the pre- and post- SOX or financial crisis 
and stock market crash periods is examined. To achieve this, the study divides the data into 
the period prior to the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX, 2000-2002), the 
period prior to the financial crises and stock market crash (2003-2009), and the post 
financial crises period (2010-2015). Previous studies (Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia, 2007; 
Engel, Hayes and Wang, 2006; Jain and Rezaee 2006; Bushee and Leuz, 2005) indicate 
that the SOX enactment brought about an improvement in the reliability of financial 
information, a reduction in financial statement fraud, the strengthening of corporate 
governance mechanisms, and an improvement in the liquidity of firms. Cohen et al. (2008) 
observe that the level of real activities earnings management increased after the passage of 
SOX. Conversely, they found that accrual-based earnings management was high prior to 
the passage of SOX, suggesting that firms engaged in more real activities than accrual-
based earnings management after the passage of SOX. Therefore, this study examines the 
effect of religious social norms on misclassification before and after the passage of SOX in 
2002.
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Table 2.13: Religiosity and Misclassification in Pre and Post Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) and Financial Crisis Periods 
Dependent Variable = UNEXP_CE 
Variables  2000-2002  2003-2006   2007-2009 2010-2015  
 Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values 
Intercept -0.05 -0.72 -0.04 -0.74 -0.06 -0.77 -0.04 -0.64 
SPITEM 0.32 4.52*** 0.17 2.44** 0.49 6.48*** 0.18 2.34** 
REVT 0.19 3.98*** 0.14 2.37* 0.23 5.29*** 0.12 2.18*** 
REL -0.26 -3.52*** -0.25 -2.28** -0.31 -3.83*** -0.27 -3.66*** 
REL×SPITEM -0.17 -3.64*** -0.20 -2.42** -0.25 -3.79*** -0.20 -3.87*** 
REL×REVT -0.07 -3.26*** -0.07 -2.56** -0.14 -3.58*** -0.09 -3.91*** 
SIZE -0.03 -1.32 -0.02 -1.03 -0.06 -1.39 -0.02 -1.12 
LEV 0.06 2.35** 0.04 2.24** 0.09 3.56*** 0.04 2.26** 
CASFO 0.04 1.28 0.02 1.12 0.04 1.26 0.03 1.16 
ROA -0.06 -2.36** -0.03 -2.14** -0.09 -3.46*** -0.04 -2.18** 
MBV -0.01 -2.42** -0.02 -2.08** -0.08 -2.38** -0.06 -1.78* 
BIG4 -0.02 -1.49 -0.02 -1.20 -0.04 -1.53 -0.04 -1.28 
ANA_FOL -0.02 -1.63 -0.02 -1.44 -0.03 -1.49 -0.04 -1.44 
Demographic 
Cont. Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,054 3,054 6,126 6,126 4,703 4,703 9,281 9,281 
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.30 
Breusch-Pagan  4732.41  5136.31  5068.72  5786.37 
P-Value  (0.6061)  (0.7134)  (0.7035)     (0.7463) 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov  
122.16 
 
121.58 
 
142.36 
 
      163.59 
P-Value  (0.4362)  (0.4254)  (0.4526)           (0.4625) 
Wooldridge Test  86.29  85.91  88.29        87.29 
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P-value  (0.2332)  (0.2326)  (0.3012)       (0.2336) 
The study uses *, **, *** in a two-tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. All variables are defined in Table 
2.3. Co-efficients and t-values are shown in separate columns. The parameters are estimated based on the following model: 
 UNEXP_CE = β0 + + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3 SPITEM × REL +β4 REVT + β5 REVT × REL + β6 SIZE + β7 LEV + β8 CASFO + β9 ROA + β10 BMV + 
β11 BIG4 + β12 ANALYST_FOL + Demographic Control Variables + Year Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects     
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The regression results in Table 2.13 show some firms in the U.S are engaged in 
misclassification of special items to boost reported core earnings in the pre-and post-SOX 
period as well as the financial crisis period.  As can be seen from the results, there was a 
positive relationship at the 1% significance level between SPITEM, REVT and 
UNEXP_CE across all levels. Prior to the enactment and implementation of SOX Act in 
2002, the results show a positive and significant co-efficient of (0.32, t = 4.52) between 
SPITEM and UNEXP_CE. Similarly, the results in post-SOX and financial crisis periods 
show a positive and significant relationship between SPITEM and UNEXP_CE 
respectively. However, the effect is remarkable and much more pronounced during the 
financial crisis period (0.49, t = 6.48). This suggests that during the financial crisis period, 
firms in the U.S. opportunistically engaged in classification shifting (McVay, 2006), 
perhaps, to avoid reporting losses. Again, it could also suggest that firms in the U.S. 
misclassify core expenses into special items to improve their reported core earnings in order 
to boost investor confidence or meet/beat analysts forecast. In addition, the relationship 
between REVT and UNEXP_CE is also significantly positive in pre-and post-SOX periods 
as well as financial crisis periods (0.19, t = 3.98; 0.14, t = 2.37 and 0.23, t = 5.29; 
respectively). This also implies that classification shifting is a prevalent issue among firms 
in the U.S. to boost reported core earnings and the effect is acute during the financial crisis 
period. The financial crisis brought hardship upon firms and affected investor confidence 
globally. That is, some firms in the U.S. are engaged in upward classification shifting of 
special revenue to boost reported core earnings, especially during the financial crisis period, 
despite the SOX Act (2002). Perhaps, the increase in the degree of misclassification in the 
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pre-and-post financial crises can also be partly attributed to the limited auditor scrutiny of 
classification shifting (Zalata and Roberts, 2015; McVay, 2006) or due to the fact that it 
does not violate U.S GAAP/FASB accounting rules. It could also mean that firms 
opportunistically engage in misclassification in the post-SOX or financial crisis periods to 
boost investors’ confidence, increase firm mangers’ private benefits, meet or beat analysts 
forecast (Kothari et al., 2016, Zalata and Robert, 2015) due to poor financial performance 
or limited auditor vigilance.  
In relation to whether religiosity mitigates misclassification in the pre-or post-SOX periods 
as well as financial crisis period, the results indicate that the interactive terms REL x 
SPITEM and REL x REVT are negatively related to UNEXPE_CE at the 1% significance 
level. However, the coefficients and t-values are substantially significant after the 
enactment of SOX Act (2002) and the financial crisis periods, suggesting that religiosity 
complements SOX and other monitoring systems to mitigate misclassification of core 
expenses and special revenue after the enactment of SOX in 2002. It also implies that while 
the SOX Act (2002) helps to decrease earnings manipulation, the effect is much more 
pronounced in a religious social norms environment. The results are consistent with the 
findings of prior studies (McGuire et al., 2012; McVay, 2006) and indicate that 
classification shifting of special expenses and revenue items occurs in firms in the U.S. but 
decreases in religious social norm environments significantly.  
2.6.3. Geographical Dispersion 
The analyses above are based on the assumption that religiosity in the geographic area 
surrounding a firm’s headquarters has an influence on the misclassification of core 
expenses and special revenue to boost reported core earnings. However, McGuire et al. 
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(2012) indicate that firms are geographically dispersed, with geographic segments located 
in areas far away from their corporate headquarters.  Some of these segments have 
autonomous structures which allow them to make decisions on behalf of corporate 
headquarters. Therefore, it is possible that the religious social norms in the area surrounding 
the corporate headquarters will have no influence on the segments’ financial reporting and 
classification shifting behaviour. This is possible because the segmental reports and 
decisions are more likely to be influenced by the religious social norms of the area where 
the segments are located. Consequently, the study creates two sub samples in line with the 
geographic segment data from Compustat to assess whether or not the results differ based 
on the geographic dispersion of the firm.  
Following previous research (McGuire et al., 2012), the geographic segment data from the 
Compustat annual database are utilised. Thereafter, the study finds the mean and median 
of the segments to be 2.05 and 1.04 respectively. The maximum number of geographic 
segments is 35. Therefore, firms with two or fewer geographic segments are classified as 
being centralised, and those firms with more than two geographic segments as 
geographically dispersed. Table 2.14 shows the regressions results of the geographically 
centralised and dispersed segment. It is found that the association between religion and 
unexpected core earnings is significantly negative at 1% in the geographically centralised 
sample, consistent with earlier findings. For example, the coefficients on both REL x 
SPITEM and REL x REVT are negative and significant. This indicates that religious social 
norms in the firm’s environment are effective at monitoring misclassification behaviour in 
firms that are geographically centralised. This is consistent with the social norms theory 
and confirms that firm managers’ decisions and behaviour at corporate level are partly 
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influenced by the religious social norms in the firms’ environment. In contrast, the 
relationship between religiosity and unexpected core earnings is negative but not significant 
in the geographically dispersed sample. This result is consistent with initial findings, 
suggesting that geographic dispersion influences the extent to which religious social norms 
subdue expense misclassification to increase reported core earnings. Furthermore, the 
results confirm that religious social norms in the firms’ environment have a negative impact 
on expense misclassification into special items. 
 
Table 2.14: Regressions of Religion on Classification Shifting Using Geographically 
Centralised and Dispersed Segment Sub-Samples 
 Centralised 
Segments 
 Dispersed 
 Segments 
Variables Coefficient t-values  Coefficient t-values 
Intercept -0.07   -0.71  -0.04 -0.83 
SPITEM 0.06 2.96***  0.04 2.82*** 
REVT 0.13 3.35***  0.10 2.09** 
REL -0.18 -4.29***  -0.12 -1.53 
REL×SPITEM -0.16 -3.42***  -0.09 -1.48 
REL×REVT -0.12 -3.92***  -0.07 -1.32 
SIZE -0.06 -2.36**  -0.04 -2.43** 
LEV 0.19 1.41  0.03  1.56 
CASFO 0.19 1.49  0.13 1.48 
ROA -0.07 -1.78*  -0.08 -1.72* 
MBV -0.09  -2.18**  -0.03 -2.32** 
BIG4 -0.05 -1.02  -0.05 -1.09 
ANA_FOL -0.04 -1.32  -0.04 -1.27 
Demographic Cont. Variables Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.38  0.32 0.32 
Observations 18623 18623  4541 4541 
Breusch-Pagan  5509.31   4787.27 
P-Value  (0.7607)   (0.6278) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov  245.68   125.72 
P-Value  (0.5836)   (0.2247) 
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Wooldridge Test  128.36   119.83 
P-Value 
 
(0.3859) 
  
(0.2725) 
Notes: We use *,** and *** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent levels. We show co-efficient estimates and t-statistics in separate columns. The parameters are estimated 
based on the following model; all variables are defined in Table 2.3. 
 
  UNEXP_CE = β0 + + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3 SPITEM × REL +β4 REVT + β5 REVT × REL + β6 SIZE 
+ β7 LEV + β8 CASFO + β9 ROA + β10 BMV + β11 BIG4 + β12 ANALYST_FOL + Demographic Control 
Variables + Year Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects         
The results in Table 2.14 for geographically centralised and dispersed segments are not 
perfectly comparable because of the differences in the sample size. To minimise selection 
bias and noise and to check whether the difference in sample size has effects on the 
inferences, the study repeats the centralised regressions using 4541 firm year observations 
in order to be consistent with the sample of geographically dispersed segments. The results 
in Table 2.15 are quite similar and consistent with the previous results reported in Table 
2.14. Again, SPITEM is positive and significantly related to UNEXP_CE. In addition, the 
coefficients on both REL x SPITEM and REL x REVT are negative and significant at the 
99% confidence level. This suggests that the results of the study are not prone or subject to 
sample selection bias but firms’ religious social norms environment are effective in 
mitigating misclassification behaviour. 
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Table 2.15: Regressions of Religiosity on Classification Shifting using the 
Centralised Segment Sub-Sample  
 
 
Dependent Variable = UNEXP_CE 
 Coefficient  t-value 
Intercept -0.07  -1.32 
SPITEM  0.06  2.82*** 
REVT  0.16  3.19*** 
REL -0.11  -3.27*** 
RELxSPITEM -0.13  -3.07*** 
RELxREVT -0.12  -3.47*** 
SIZE -0.02  -1.14 
LEV  0.10  1.63 
CASFO  0.03  0.84 
ROA -0.06  -1.17 
MBV -0.03  -1.75* 
ANA_FOL -0.02  -1.28 
Demographic Cont. 
Variables Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.32  0.32 
Observations 4541  4541 
Breusch-Pagan   4178.83 
P-Value   (0.6078) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov   86.63 
P-Value   (0.2328) 
Wooldridge Test   104.27 
P-Value  
 
(0.3167) 
 
 
Notes: We use *,** and *** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent levels. We show co-efficient estimates and t-statistics in separate columns. The parameters are estimated 
based on the following model; all variables are defined in Table 2.3. 
 
  UNEXP_CE = β0 + + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3 SPITEM × REL +β4 REVT + β5 REVT × REL + β6 SIZE 
+ β7 LEV + β8 CASFO + β9 ROA + β10 BMV + β11 BIG4 + β12 ANALYST_FOL + Demographic Control 
Variables + Year Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 126 
 
Table 2.16: Religiosity and Classification Shifting in Twenty U.S. States 
Dependent Variable: UNEXP_CE 
 Coefficient  t-value 
Intercept -0.06  -0.68 
SPITEM 0.06       2.98*** 
REVT 0.10      3.56*** 
REL -0.12    -2.94** 
REL×SPITEM -0.13       -4.02*** 
REL×REVT -0.11    -2.89** 
SIZE -0.05  -1.84* 
LEV 0.05  1.47 
CASFO 0.23      2.57** 
ROA -0.09     -1.75* 
MBV -0.07  -1.09 
BIG4 -0.03  -1.42 
ANAL_FOL -0.02  -1.33 
Demographic Control 
Variables Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.49  0.49 
Observations 12,325  12,325 
Breusch-Pagan   5786.37 
P-Value   (0.7463) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov   143.47 
P-Value   (0.3349) 
Wooldridge Test   82.73 
P-value   (0.2654) 
Notes: We use *,** and *** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent levels. We show co-efficient estimates and t-statistics in separate columns. The parameters are estimated 
based on the following model; all variables are defined in Table 2.3. 
UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2 REL + β2 REL×SPITEM + β2 SIZE + β3 LEV + β4 CASFO + β5 
ROA + β6 MBV + β7 ROA + β8 MBV + Demographic Control Variables + Year Fixed Effects + Industry 
Fixed Effects   
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2.6.4. Alternative Measure of Religiosity 
Although the measure of religious social norms is supported by previous studies (McGuire 
et al., 2012; Callen et al., 2011; Grullon et al., 2010), further robustness tests are conducted 
to ensure that the results are free from potential bias and do not rely on generalisation of 
religious datasets across several years. The study uses different sources of religious datasets 
collected by Gallup surveys for the study period.6 It runs regressions for only the twenty 
U.S. States with available Gallup religious datasets. Interestingly, it is found that the results 
presented in Table 2.16 are consistent with the initial results. The inferences still remain 
the same when religiosity is measured by a simple aggregate of the responses to the three 
Gallup questions on religion. Specifically, the coefficients on REL x SPITEM and REL x 
REVT are negative and significant, (-0.13, t = -4.02) and (-0.11, t = -2.89) respectively, 
indicating that religiosity mitigates misclassification. Overall, the results suggest that 
religiosity complements existing monitoring systems put in place by management to 
mitigate classification-shifting behaviour.  The study provides first time evidence to 
indicate the negative influence of religious social norms in curbing management incentives 
to shift core expense or revenue items into special items. First time evidence of 
misclassification in the pre- and post- SOX Act (2002) period, rural and urban areas, and 
geographically centralised and dispersed segments is documented. In general, the results 
indicate that in a religious social norm environment, managers have a disincentive to signal 
information to investors to increase reported core earnings. 
 
 
                                                          
6 Thereafter, we take a sub-sample of our original data based on the twenty most and least religious states in the U.S., as 
reported by the Gallup surveys in Table 2. We substitute our original religious datasets with the Gallup religious datasets 
for the twenty U.S. States and merge them into the Compustat financial data file using the state code identifiers. 
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2.7. Conclusion 
The aim of this study is to examine economic or opportunistic motivation to misclassify 
core expenses or revenue into special items in a religious social norm environment. 
Previous studies (Behn et al., 2013; Haw et al., 2011; McVay, 2006) observe that 
classification shifting is deemed as an inexpensive approach to overstate core earnings in 
order to meet or beat analyst forecasts, and disguise private control benefits to the detriment 
of shareholders. The study documents evidence to show that classification shifting is 
prevalent and economically significant among U.S. firms. Consistent with previous studies 
(Fan et al., 2010; McVay, 2006), it is demonstrated that special items increase with 
unexpected core earnings; hence, the positive relationship between special items and 
unexpected core earnings. The study contributes to the financial reporting and earnings 
management literature and provides evidence that religiosity is negatively associated with 
upward and downward classification shifting. It indicates that managers have little 
economic or opportunistic motivation for expense misclassification in a religious 
environment. Thus, religiosity appears to be more effective to combat classification shifting 
in highly religious areas. In addition, it is shown that religiosity complements corporate 
governance mechanisms, for example, board size, board independence, BIG4 auditors and 
audit tenure, to mitigate classification shifting. The study observes that expense 
misclassification occured in the pre- and post- SOX Act 2002 periods and the financial 
crisis period, but the religiosity of the firm appears to complement the SOX regulations to 
mitigate classification shifting behaviour in post-SOX enactment. Furthermore, it is shown 
that geographical dispersion has an effect on the extent to which religious social norms 
restrain managers’ misclassification behaviour. The study has several policy and practical 
implications. First, the findings are consistent with social norm theory, as social norms are 
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reported to shape the behaviour and attitudes of managers in corporate decision-making. 
The complementary role of religion and the associated interaction between religiosity, 
corporate governance and audit practices are highlighted. Therefore, a platform is provided 
for management to strengthen existing corporate governance and audit practices. This is 
important, because religion is rarely discussed in secular organisations, but an 
understanding of the role of religion in shaping corporate financial reporting will help 
policy decisions to create value for shareholders.  
The limitations of this study are two-fold. It did not control for state-level culture due to 
the inability to access the state-level cultural database in the U.S. It is admitted that there 
are other proxies for internal corporate governance which are not addressed (for example, 
institutional ownership and CEO duality) because of lack of data accessibility.  However, 
the study controls for audit characteristics, board size, board independence and audit 
committee as internal governance variables. In addition, religious adherence and the 
religious social norms of the firms’ environment are used. Future studies should investigate 
the religious backgrounds of managers and employees. Notwithstanding, the present results 
are useful for regulators, external monitors and investors, as they indicate that religion 
strengthens the existing monitoring mechanisms put in place by management to mitigate 
classification shifting. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance Levels (TOL)    
Dependent Variable = UNEXP_CE 
Variables       
 Coefficient t-values TOL  VIF  
Intercept -0.07   -1.61     
SPITEM  0.28 3.78*** 0.48 
 
 2.1  
REVT  0.16 4.35*** 0.71  1.4  
REL -0.34 -3.74*** 0.56  1.8  
REL×SPITEM -0.23 -2.92*** 0.43  2.3  
REL×REVT -0.09   -7.88*** 0.63  1.6  
SIZE -0.03    -1.45 0.67  1.5  
LEV  0.07 2.26** 0.71  1.4  
CASFO  0.09     1.10 0.53  1.9  
ROA -0.06   -3.37*** 0.63  1.6  
MBV -0.03 -2.07** 0.83  1.2  
BIG4 -0.04     -1.62 0.77  1.3  
ANA_FOL -0.04     -1.56 0.45  2.2  
POPN -0.34     -1.37 0.32  3.1  
INCOME -0.13   -2.25** 0.59  1.7  
EDUC -0.08  -1.79* 0.48  2.1  
       
AGE  0.15    2.36** 0.71  1.4  
POLITICAL   0.06    2.47** 0.56  1.8  
MINORITY  -0.12       1.48 
 
0.43  2.3  
Observations 23,164 23,164     
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.16     
   F-Value    17.59*** 
Notes: We use *, ** and *** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent levels. We show co-efficient estimates and t-statistics in separate columns. The parameters are estimated 
based on the following model; all variables are defined in Table 2.3. 
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Chapter 3 – Impact of Religiosity and Firms’ Legal Environment on Accrual-Based 
and Real Activities-Based Earnings Management – Evidence from the U.S.  
3.1. Introduction 
 
The literature on earnings management abounds with studies that document evidence that 
accrual-based and real activities earnings management are pervasive, but their drivers are 
yet to receive maximum consensus. Recent studies (Jarvinen and Myllymaki, 2016; Kothari 
et al., 2016) have examined real activities versus accrual-based approaches in seasons 
equity offering (SEO) valuation,  real activities earnings management in the pre- and post- 
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act (2002) period, reporting material weakness. These studies 
observe that that both accrual-based and real activities earnings management are pervasive 
during SEO valuations, but that real activities are predominant in the post-SOX period. 
Similarly, Cheng et al. (2016) studied the relationship between internal governance 
mechanisms and real activities and found that strong internal governance weakens real 
activities manipulations.  Several studies (Baxamusa and Jalal, 2014; McGuire et al., 2012; 
Dyreng et al., 2012; Grullon et al., 2010; Dechow et al., 1996) also indicate that the 
religious social norms of the firms’ environment negatively influence accrual-based 
earnings management but have a positive influence on the real activities-based approach. 
In addition, previous cross-country studies have investigated the relationship between a 
country’s legal environment and investor protection (Behn et al., 2013; La Porta et al.,  
1998); its legal environment and accrual-based earnings management (Callen et al., 2011); 
and earnings management and investor protection (Luez et al., 2003). These studies observe 
that a strong legal environment boosts investor confidence, but does not mitigate accrual-
based earnings management. In a related study, Eleswarapu and Venkataraman (2006) 
indicate that the level of disclosure is influenced by the legal environment and that 
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information risk is reduced as laws and regulations curb insider trading and adverse 
selection. They find that an improved legal environment lowers the cost of equity in stock 
markets and that the legal environment makes it unlawful for firms to make false statements 
of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact.  
 
Similarly, Skinner (1997) examines the association between earnings disclosure and 
litigation costs and observes that litigation costs decrease with more timely adverse 
earnings disclosure. His/her study finds that voluntary disclosures increase during quarters 
that result in litigation, which is due to the desire by managers to pre-disclose adverse news 
in an attempt to reduce the cost of litigation associated with bad news in the quarter. Skinner 
(1994) and Kasznik and Lev (1995) also observe that managers are more likely to 
predisclose adverse news to reduce litigation costs. In a related study, Francis, Philbrick 
and Schipper (1994a) document evidence to show that many lawsuits occur during 
quarterly periods when earnings predisclosures are made, signifying that the costs of 
litigation cannot be avoided by managers. 
 
At both national and global levels, the U.S. legal environment is deemed to be robust, of 
high quality and fair, but cumbersome and characterised by several law suits. Generally, 
recent surveys in the U.S. indicate that some U.S. states are associated with more business-
friendly legal environments, whilst others have worse legal environments for doing 
business or making business decisions. During the past decade, several surveys have been 
conducted to ascertain the effects of the U.S. litigation environment on business decisions. 
For example, a survey by McKinsey and Company, a global firm with more than 10,000 
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consultants and 2,000 research and information professionals, found that total U.S. 
commercial tort costs between 1950 and 2006 grew from $13 billion to $259.6 billion per 
year, which in GDP terms is an increase of 1.87 percent per year. This growth in 
commercial tort costs was found to be twice those in Germany and three times those of the 
United Kingdom and France. In a related study by McKinsey and Company (2011), “Survey 
respondents said that a fair and predictable legal environment was the second most 
important criterion determining a financial centre’s competitiveness. In this regard, they 
felt the U.S. was at a competitive disadvantage to the United Kingdom (UK). They attribute 
this U.S. disadvantage to a propensity toward litigation and concerns that the US legal 
environment is less fair and less predictable than the UK.” Recently, Harris Interactive 
conducted a survey for the Institute for Legal Reform (ILR) at the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce between 2002 and 2015 and found that the “litigation environment in a U.S. 
state is likely to affect important business decisions; such as where to do business, locate 
business or what to report to stakeholders.”  
The aim of this study is to empirically explore the extent to which the interaction between 
the U.S. litigation environment and religiosity of the firms’ environment impacts on 
accruals-based and real activities earnings management practices. The literature provides 
evidence that religion and culture shape firms’ decisions. For example, Baxamusa and Jalal 
(2014) find that the leverage levels of firms in the U.S. are affected by religion; other studies 
(McGuire et al., 2012; Callen et al., 2011; Dyreng et al., 2012; Grullon et al., 2010) find 
that the religiosity of the firms' environment influences accrual-based or real activities-
based earnings management practices. Similarly, culture is also noted to affect firms’ 
decisions at national and cross-country levels. For example, Gray, Kang and Yoo (2013) 
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and Callen et al. (2011) find that national culture influences the cost of equity and earnings 
management, whilst Aggarwal and Goodell (2014) state that culture influences capital 
structure. Therefore, Sunder (2005), observes that full assessment of financial reporting 
requires an appreciable understanding of the religious social norms in a firm’s environment, 
and Levitt (1998) suggests that the erosion of social norms underpins financial statement 
manipulation. Indeed, previous studies have established a positive relationship between 
religiosity and business ethics (Terpstra, Rozell and Robinson, 1993; Barnett, Jermier and 
Lafferty, 1996; Weaver and Agle, 2002; Conroy and Emerson, 2004; Longenecker, 
McKinney and Moore, 2004).  Moreover, Terpstra et al. (1993) and Barnett et al. (1996) 
indicate that highly religious individuals are found to exhibit traditional views and higher 
morals than individuals with weaker religious backgrounds. In related studies, Conroy and 
Emerson (2004) and Kennedy and Lawton (1998) find that individuals’ behaviour, ethical 
values and attitudes are shaped by the degree of religious social norms in the environment. 
Thus managers’ behaviour is shaped by the religious social norms of the population in the 
neighbourhood that surrounds them. Other studies (McGuire et al., 2012; Callen et al., 
2011; Dyreng et al., 2012) have examined religion in relation to earnings management and 
other aspects of financial reporting with mixed results; but little is known about the impact 
of the litigation environment and religiosity on accrual-based and real activities earnings 
management. Clearly, the effect of the litigation environment, and its interaction with the 
religiosity of the firms’ environment, on earnings management remains unexplored, whilst 
findings from studies on the relationship between the legal environment/religiosity and 
accrual-based or real activities-based approaches need to be explored further (McGuire et 
al., 2012; Hilary and Hui, 2009). This study explores and fills this gap in the literature on 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 135 
accrual and real activities earnings management, and the associated interaction between the 
litigation environment and the religiosity of the firms’ environment in the U.S.  
Indeed, the influence of religious social norms on different aspects of economic choices 
and outcomes has been considered in previous literature (Shu et al., 2012; Taylor and 
Bloomfield, 2011; Davidson and Stevens, 2013; Kumar et al., 2010; Guiso et al., 2009; 
Hillary and Hui, 2009; Fischer and Huddart, 2008). The evidence in the accounting 
literature regarding the effect of religion and the legal environment on accrual-based and 
real activities earnings management is scarce. Clearly, this study is different from previous 
ones as it investigates the extent to which the religious social norms of the firm environment 
interact with firms’ legal/litigation environment in order to assess their impact on earnings 
management. Thus, this study is the first to provide empirical results about the impact of 
the interactive term between religiosity and the legal environment on the two types of 
earnings management. As in Chapter 2, but on a broader scale, the study utilises all U.S. 
county-level religious datasets from The Association of Religious Data Archives (ARDA) 
database between 2000 and 2010 to determine the strength of religious social norms, and 
all U.S. firms in the Compustat database for a minimum period of 10 years to extend the 
research to the area of accrual-based and real activities earnings management. Overall, the 
study identifies 698 distinct counties that are the headquarters of at least one of the firms 
on the Compustat annual database used in the analysis. The detailed process of collecting 
religiosity datasets was discussed in Chapter 2; therefore; in Chapter 3, the study does not 
enter into full discussion of the process again.  
Furthermore, the study collected datasets from the Lawsuit Climate Survey conducted for 
the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform by the Harris Poll between 2002 and 2015 to 
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measure the legal environment. Respondents were asked to score key elements, including 
having and enforcing meaningful venue requirements; overall treatment of tort and contract 
litigation; treatment of class action suits and mass consolidation suits; damages; timeliness 
of summary judgement or dismissal; discovery, scientific and technical evidence; judges’ 
impartiality and competence; and juries’ fairness and effect on business practices and 
financial reporting. To compute state level litigation index scores, each element was graded 
and the overall ranking of State Liability Systems was developed by creating an index using 
the grades provided for each of the key elements, plus overall performance grade. To create 
the index, the key elements plus the overall performance grade were rescaled from zero (0) 
to one hundred (100), where A = 100, B = 75, C = 50, D = 25 and F = 0. The state-level 
litigation index scores were matched to their respective U.S. states by merging them by 
year using the state code identifiers from Compustat’s company location code where firms 
are headquartered in order to derive the state-level litigation dataset. The study uses a 
litigation dataset covering all U.S. states. 
Financial data was collected from all firms on the Compustat database between 2002 and 
2015 which were identified as having required datasets. In line with previous research, data 
from specialised industries such as banks and insurances companies, as well as other 
financial services, were excluded from the datasets (Donelson et al., 2016; McGuire et al., 
2012; Zang, 2012). The study excludes financial services companies, as previous studies 
(eg. Francis and Yu, 2009; Maijoor and Vanstraelen, 2006) indicate that their accrual 
generating processes differ significantly and require specific accounting rules and 
requirements; for example, minimum capital requirements and specific regulations 
governing financial services companies. 
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From the results of the analyses, the study finds that religiosity is negative and significantly 
associated with accrual-based earnings management, in line with previous research 
(McGuire et al., 2012; Callen et al., 2011; Dyreng et al., 2012) but positive and significantly 
related to the proxies for real activities earnings management. The study also interacts 
religiosity with the legal environment and observes that the latter weakens the positive 
impact of religiosity on real activities, but complements religiosity in mitigating accrual-
based earnings management. Therefore, in a legal environment the positive effect of 
religiosity on real activities reported by previous studies (McGuire et al., 2012; Dyreng et 
al., 2012) can no longer be demonstrated. Thus, religiosity and the legal environment serve 
as forms of monitoring mechanisms to mitigate accrual-based earnings management, but 
the positive effect of religiosity on real activities is not sustainable when the legal 
environment interacts with religiosity. This is a notable contribution to the literature on 
earnings management. 
Several robustness tests are conducted to examine the association between religiosity and 
legal environment, their interactions and the proxies for accrual-based and real activities 
earnings management to support the initial regression results. Initially, the data is divided 
into high and low religiosity areas. The study defines high religiosity areas as those above 
the median religiosity figure, and low areas as those below it. Concurrent with previous 
studies (McGuire et al., 2012; Dyreng et al., 2012), highly religious environments influence 
earnings management more significantly than low religiosity areas.  As expected, the study 
finds that highly religious areas based on the subsample record more significant 
negative/positive associations between religiosity and accrual-based/real activities earnings 
management methods than low religiosity areas. The inferences remain the same when 
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religiosity is interacted with legal environment. The data is also divided into urban and rural 
areas to assess the impact of the high or low earnings quality often respectively associated 
with rural or urban areas (McGuire et al. 2012; Urcan, 2007). Previous studies (McGuire 
et al. 2012; Loughran and Schulz, 2005) classify Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) in 
each county with populations of over five million as urban areas. This study repeats the 
main test using only the urban subsample, comprising MSA areas within the county with 
an average population of over five million residents, and the findings remain the same; 
religiosity and legal environment are negative and significantly related to accrual-based 
earnings management even in urban areas, despite the varying differences in religious 
beliefs among individuals in the big cities relative to rural areas. However, the impact was 
much more pronounced in rural areas than urban ones. 
 
Furthermore, previous research (Cheng et al., 2016; Zalata and Roberts, 2015; Lin and 
Hwang, 2010; Harris and Raviv, 2008) observes that good corporate governance 
mechanisms in firms mitigates accrual-based and real activities earnings management 
practices. In additional analysis, this study includes three variables (board size, number of 
independent directors and audit committees) as proxies for corporate governance. It also 
interacts religiosity with proxies for corporate governance and re-runs the regression 
models. Notably, it is observed that the interactive term between governance variables and 
religious social norms is negative and significantly associated (at the 1% level) with 
accrual-based earnings management, suggesting that religiosity serves as a form of 
monitoring and complements corporate governance to decrease real activities. In further 
robustness tests, the study repeats the regression for real activities earnings management, 
using individual measures instead of aggregated ones. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) note that 
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aggregating the individual variables to compute proxies’ for real activities-based earnings 
management has the potential to influence earnings and dilute the results. In particular, this 
study uses abnormal production costs, abnormal discretionary expenses and abnormal cash 
flows as dependent variables and proxies for real activities-based earnings management. It 
is found that the coefficient on religiosity is positive and significant. However, the 
coefficient on the interactive term between religiosity and legal environment is negative, 
and insignificantly related to all three individual measures. In addition, different definitions 
from the literature are used for accruals, in line with prior research (Behn et al., 2013; 
Dechow et al, 2012; Haw, Ho and Li, 2011; Xie et al., 2003). Working capital accruals are 
substituted for accruals in the modified Jones model for each firm year observation and 
two-digit SIC code and industry. The study finds that religiosity is negative and 
significantly associated with abnormal accruals, even when working capital accruals are 
used in the modified Jones model. In additional analysis, both the Jones model and 
modified Jones model are augmented to include lagged return on assets. Dechow et al. 
(2012) and Kothari et al (2005) indicate that inclusion of lagged return on assets mitigates 
model misspecification.  In both the Jones model and modified Jones model with lagged 
return on assets, the study finds that the relationship between abnormal accruals, legal 
environment and religiosity is significantly negative.  
Finally, the study makes important contributions. First, in agreement with previous studies 
(McGuire et al et. 2012; Callen et al. 2011, Dyreng et al., 2012), it is found that religiosity 
impacts negatively on accrual-based and positively on real activities earnings management. 
This study confirms and substantiates earlier studies that show the relationship between 
religiosity and accrual-based and real activities earnings management. Second, it is shown 
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that the legal environment plays a complementary role in mitigating accrual-based 
management, or weakening the positive impact of religiosity on real activities management, 
especially when religiosity and legal environment interact. The study also observes that 
corporate governance mechanisms decrease accrual-based earnings management and that 
the effect is more pronounced when governance variables interact with religiosity. 
Therefore, it is noted that religiosity can serve as a form of internal monitoring to mitigate 
accrual-based earnings manipulation. In addition, it is observed that religiosity, legal 
environment and internal governance interactions decrease the positive impact of 
religiosity on real activities. This may be due to the fear of law suits, legal action or loss of 
reputation. Third, concurrent with previous studies (McGuire et al., 2012; Callen et al., 
2011; Dyreng et al., 2012; Grullon et al., 2010), this study provides additional evidence 
that even with different measures and models,  religiosity is negatively or positively 
associated with accruals-based or real-activities earnings management. In addition, it is 
shown that religiosity decreases earnings management in firms in rural areas more than in 
urban areas, and that real activities earnings management increase in a religious social norm 
environment. However, the positive effect of religiosity on real activities is subdued by 
firms’ legal/litigation environment. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents the literature and develops the 
hypotheses; section 3.3 explains the research design and discusses the empirical 
methodology; and section 3.4 describes the data, sample selection and descriptive statistics. 
Section 3.5 discusses the empirical results, while Section 3.6 presents several robustness 
checks and section 3.7 provides the conclusion.  
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3.2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
This section provides a discussion of the literature and hypotheses on litigation 
environment, real activities and accrual-based earnings management methods.  
3.2.1. Litigation Environment 
Previous cross-country research (Chung and Wynn, 2008; Leuz et al., 2003; La Porta, 1998; 
Skinner, 1994) suggests that strong investor rights and legal enforcement boost investment 
and the quality of financial reporting. At the country-level, Chung and Wynn (2008) and 
Baginski, Hassell and Kimbrough (2002) indicate that U.S. laws create a litigious 
environment which impacts negatively on management earnings forecast. These studies 
indicate that the fear of litigation influences management earnings forecast decisions and 
associated security prices. In addition, Core et al. (1997) find that firms purchase directors’ 
and officers’ insurance cover when they have more litigation risks. Similarly, other research 
(Chung and Wynn, 2008; Leuz et al., 2003; La Porta et al., 1998; Skinner, 1994) indicates 
that litigation fears facilitate management disclosure of information in order to defend 
managers against shareholders blaming them for concealing vital information, or to reduce 
the number of investors qualifying for class action suits. Previous studies (Chung and 
Wynn, 2008; Kasznik and Lev, 1995; Skinner, 1994) find evidence of bad news 
announcements being obstructed by management using quantitative measures.  In 
comparing U.S. and Canadian litigation environments, Baginski et al. (2002) and Skinner 
(1994) find that U.S. firms in less litigious environments tend to issue less frequent, less 
precision and shorter-term forecasts, but that Canadian firms reduce issuing of forecasts 
when earnings decrease, and vice-versa.  In a related study, Field, Lowry and Shu (2005) 
examine the relationship between disclosures and litigation and find no evidence that 
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disclosure triggers litigation; observing that it in fact deters certain types of litigation. To 
restrain fraudulent practices and protect investors, La Porta et al. (1998) observe that there 
should be a well-functioning judiciary system, serving as an indication of strong legal 
enforcement. Using different proxies to measure “law and order”, such as the aggregate of 
the efficiency of the judicial system, contract repudiation by government, corruption, rule 
of law, and risk of expropriation, to assess the extent to which countries’ legal enforcement 
affects investor protection, La Porta et al. (1998) find stronger investor protection in 
common law countries than in civil law countries. Thus, law enforcement and investor 
protection are strong in common law countries. Similarly, Leuz et al. (2003) investigate the 
relationship between accrual-based earnings management and investor protection. They 
observe that there is a negative relationship between strong investor protection, evidenced 
by a well-functioning legal system, and accrual-based earnings management, but that a 
positive association exists when there is weak investor protection and a legal system. 
Following these findings, Callen et al. (2011) argue that Leuz et al. (2003) did not control 
for culture and religion; therefore, their findings might be influenced by the national 
cultural and religious backgrounds. As a result, they examine the relationship between 
accrual-based earnings management and countries’ legal environment by controlling for 
culture and religion. They find that there is no relationship when culture and religion are 
considered as control variables. King et al. (1990) indicate that managers fear possible 
litigation if earnings forecasts are eventually inaccurate. Other studies (Skinner, 1994, 
1997; Francis et al., 1994) argue that disclosure of bad news is positively related to the 
threat of litigation, and that managers’ incentive to provide forward-looking information is 
negatively related to this threat. However, Field et al. (2005) observe that disclosure 
potentially mitigates certain types of litigation and that there is no evidence that disclosure 
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triggers litigation. Interestingly, no study has examined the impact of the U.S. litigation 
environment on accrual-based and real activities earnings management practices. This 
study extends the research in the area of earnings management to assess how the litigation 
environment of U.S. states affects managers’ choice of earnings management practices. In 
particular, it seeks to establish the impact of firms’ litigation environment on both real-
activities and accrual-based approaches. The above discussions lead to the following 
hypotheses:     
H1a: The legal environment of a firm is related to accrual-based earnings 
management. 
H1b: The legal environment of a firm is related to real-activities earnings 
management. 
 
3.2.2. Real-Activities Earnings Management and Religiosity 
On the other hand, real activities earnings management occurs when managers undertake 
actions that deviate from initial best practice to increase reported earnings (Vorst, 2016; 
Zang, 2012; Gunny, 2005). Schipper (1989) defines earnings management as “a purposeful 
intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intention of obtaining 
some private gain…[a] minor extension of this definition would encompass “real” 
earnings management, accomplished by timing investment or financing to alter reported 
earnings or some subset of them?.” The figure below illustrates various tools and methods 
used by firms to engage in real activities earnings management to influence firms’ reported 
earnings are summarised in Figure 1 as follows.  
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Figure 1: Tools of Real Activities Earnings Management 
Tools Conservative 
Cutting 
Advertising 
Expenses  
 
Firms intentionally reduce expenditure on advertising. The result is an 
increase in the reported earnings and increase cash flow from operations. 
Share 
Repurchases 
 
Firms use share repurchase to improve earnings per share (EPS) as the 
number of outstanding shares reduces through the repurchase. Firms use 
share repurchases to manage reported earnings and EPS to avoid reporting 
poor performance, to avoid decrease in earnings, to meet or exceed sell-side 
analysts’ earnings performance. 
Disposal of 
Profitable Assets 
 
Firms engage in asset disposal at a time when they can use the gains from 
sale of the assets to influence reported earnings. Firms increase earnings 
through the gains arising from the sale of marketable securities and non-
current assets. 
Reducing Selling 
Prices  
 
Firms increase sales revenue and consequently reported earnings through 
price reduction or by offering price discounts as well as flexible or more 
lenient credit terms. Even though, this is a short-term measure. 
Over production 
 
Firms engage in overproduction to increase inventory and reduce cost of 
goods sold (COGS) in order to avoid reporting losses or to increase reported 
earnings. 
Adapted from:  Roychowdhury (2006) 
 
The ensuing paragraphs provide a discussion of the various tools and methods used by 
managers’ to engage in a range of real activities to influence reported net income.  
3.2.2.1 Cutting Advertising Expenses  
Cohen et al. (2010) indicate that the evidence on real activities management mostly 
focusses on firm managers opportunistically cutting down expenditure on adverting 
expenses and R&D expenditures to reduce reported expenses. Consistent with the matching 
concept, these discretionary expenses are treated in the same period that they are incurred. 
Therefore, firms can influence the reported earnings by intentionally cutting down on 
discretionary advertising expenses. Roychowdhury (2006) observes that this is most likely 
to occur when expenditure on advertising expenses or R&D expenditures do not generate 
incomes or revenues immediately. When firm managers want to meet earnings target, they 
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will cut down discretionary expenditures which include advertising expenses. In general, a 
sharp decline in discretionary expenditures leads to abnormally low discretionary expenses 
in proportion to sales (Roychowdhury, 2006). In addition, Graham et al. (2005) observe 
that advertising expenses are used by management to influence earnings target because of 
its impact on sales. A cut in advertising expenses increases cash flow and profit but the 
long term effect is likely to be negative. However, if firm managers want to meet earnings 
forecast and benchmarks, they tend to focus on short-term goals and cutting down adverting 
expenses is a key real activities management that they consider to embark on.  
3.2.2.2 Share Repurchases 
Share repurchases involve firms buying back shares from their shareholders. Vermaelen 
(2005) provide five ways in which firms repurchase shares. These include; open-market 
repurchase which involves managers buying back shares directly from sellers in the capital 
market. Second, firms repurchase shares through private acquisition and this method is used 
when the parties do not want the stock market to react. The third method is repurchase by 
tender or public bidding. Vermaelen (2005) indicates that “public fixed price tender offers 
include firms that offer to repurchase its shares from shareholders at a fixed price”. Vafeas 
et al. (2003) report that firms manage their earnings downwards with the incentive that 
shareholders will sell their respective shares at lower prices. Again, firms can repurchase 
their shares using “a Dutch-action” (extended tender offer), where shareholders set the price 
within a range and the firms buy at a lowest prices ranges. The last way of share repurchase 
is with synthetic repurchases or derivatives. This involves put options, forward contracts, 
call options etc. Previous studies (Burgstahler and Eames, 2002; Brown and Caylor, 2004) 
observe that firms use share repurchases to manage reported earnings and earnings per 
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share (EPS) to avoid reporting poor performance, to avoid decrease in earnings, to meet or 
exceed sell-side analysts’ earnings performance. Therefore, Hribar et al. (2006) investigate 
the conditions where firms use a share repurchase to meet or beat analysts’ (EPS) and 
indicate that share repurchases are common among corporate managers. They find a 
positive relationship between disproportionately large number of accretive stock 
repurchases and EPS management. That is, firms would have missed analysts’ forecasts if 
not the stock repurchase, suggesting that some firms are engaged in stock repurchases to 
compensate for a shortfall in earnings or some firms will avoid stock repurchase when 
earnings are likely to fall.  Managers have incentive to influence quarterly EPS to beat 
analysts’ forecasts through share repurchases because of the desire to build their reputation 
and credibility. Lin et al (2009) observe that firm managers use share repurchase as a 
substitute device for discretionary accruals in earnings management behaviour. They 
conclude that the magnitude of earnings management is positively related to share 
repurchases, especially stock options.  
3.2.2.3 Disposal of Profitable Assets 
The literature indicates that firms engage in asset disposal at a time when they can use the 
gains from sale of the assets to influence reported earnings. Bartov (1993) find that 
managers sell assets and use the gains to boost the reported earnings whenever there is a 
possibility of debt covenants violations and decline in earnings’ growth. Similarly, 
Hermann et al. (2003) investigate the extent to which firm managers in Japan utilise profit 
from the sale of assets to influence reported earnings. They observe that when firms 
operating income falls below analysts benchmark or management’s forecast of earnings, 
they increase the firm’s earnings through the sale of marketable securities and non-current 
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assets. The choice of the depreciation methods, rate and the timing of the sale of assets are 
at the discretion and choice of firm managers.  Gunny (2010) indicates that firms report 
gains or losses on the sale of assets on the income statement, and they achieve this by timing 
the disposal of assets to occur in the period when they can use the gains to manage the 
reported income.  
3.2.2.4 Reducing Selling Prices  
This involves firm managers attempt to increase sales revenue during the year by reducing 
selling price or offering price discounts as well as flexible or more lenient credit terms 
(Roychowdhury, 2006). To accelerate sales or generate additional sales in the current year 
from the next fiscal year, managers reduce selling prices and offer limited price discounts. 
The increase in sales volumes as a consequence of price reductions and discounts appear 
temporary but disappear shortly when the old prices are re-established. Cash flows per sale 
from the additional sales are likely to be low as margins falls. However, Jackson and 
Wilcox (2000) indicate that total earnings from the additional sales will be higher in the 
current period than past and next fiscal years. The net effect is that price discounts and 
reduction in selling prices will lead to lower margins relative to production costs which are 
likely to be abnormally high. In general, selling price reductions and lenient credit terms 
boost sales volumes temporarily to increase earnings.  
3.2.2.5 Over Production 
Roychowdhury (2006) indicate that firms can manage earnings upwards by producing more 
than necessary to meet demand. Higher production levels lead to economies of scale as 
fixed costs is spread over large quantities.  Abnormal production costs for a given sale level 
is an indication of sales manipulation resulting from price discounts or cost of goods sold 
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(COGS) expense manipulation. Sales manipulation in the current year will increase 
reported earnings but it’s at the expense of next fiscal year’s earnings. As firms overproduce 
to spread the fixed overhead costs over a large number of units, reported earnings increase 
provided the decrease in per-unit cost is not offset by inventory holding costs such as rent, 
insurance, fire, theft etc. Thomas and Zhang (2002) observe that COGS decreases due to 
overproduction, but they note that the reduction in COGS can also be caused by adverse 
economic circumstances. Therefore, prior studies (Roychowdhury, 2006; Thomas and 
Zhang, 2002) conclude that firms engage in overproduction to reduce COGS expense in 
order to avoid reporting losses or increase their reported earnings. In general, when firms 
have high production costs, it signals real activities earnings management. This is 
consistent with firms cutting down selling prices or offering price discounts to increase 
sales revenue and reported earnings.        
3.2.2.6 Debt/Equity Swaps Derivatives 
Hand (1988) observes that firms undertake debt-equity swaps for two main reasons. The 
first reason is to smooth an unexpected and transitory decrease in earnings per share. The 
second reason is to relax potentially sinking-fund constraints. The study concludes that 
firms have higher motivation and incentive to engage in debt-equity swaps to smooth 
earnings than to relax potentially sinking fund constraints. Again, prior studies (Dechow 
and Shakespeare, 2009; Barton, 2001) indicate that firms intentionally retire debt early to 
receive substantial cash payment which is normally higher than the book value of the debt. 
This results in accounting gains or loss which are required by FASB to be reported as 
special or unusual items on the income statement. To manipulate earnings, firm managers 
select a fiscal period that will allow them to retire debt early. Even though, there is no actual 
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exchange of cash, debt for debt swaps (e.g. new debts are issued for old debts), debt for 
equity swaps (e.g. shares are issued for existing outstanding debts) are often implemented 
as an income smoothing tool.   
3.2.2.7 Hedging and Securitisation 
Dechow et al (2010) observe that securitisation and hedging typically occur in financial 
services industry (e.g. to repackage loans), retail (e.g. store credits cards), auto lease in 
manufacturing sector and in real estate industry where loans for commercial properties, 
land and domestic are provided. The firm sells receivables to obtain or augment cash flow, 
thus helping to relend to potential customers. Securitisation allows retained cash flows to 
be recorded at prevailing market price or fair value, and this creates an incentive for firms 
to manipulate reported earnings as there is no active market value for receivables sold. An 
industry specialist is reported to have stated that (The New York Times, 1st May, 2007) 
with regards to “gain on sale accounting, firms have a tendency to create machines that 
manufacture earnings out of thin air”.  Dechow et al (2010) observe that managers use 
discretionary gains in periods where earnings before securitisation is low. To avoid facing 
problems and scrutiny from existing and potential investors, regulators and the struggle to 
attract both customers and employees, firm managers engage in earnings manipulation. 
Prior studies (Dechow and Shakespeare, 2009; Karaoglu, 2005) indicate that there are 
benefits in reporting higher current earnings than the potential costs of future write-downs. 
On the contrary, when firms record a higher pre-securitisation earnings, the incentive 
record gains is reduced, they will prefer to report loss instead. Similarly, when pre-
securitisation earnings are below previous year’s actual earnings, firm managers are more 
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likely to manipulate earnings because firms are rewarded by the market for reporting 
positive earnings or improvements.    
 
Previous studies (Kothari et al., 2016; Gerakos and Kovrijnykh, 2013; Zang, 2012, 
Rowchowdhury, 2006) indicate that managers manipulate earnings to boost reported 
performance through real activities. The limited literature that explores the potential for 
managers to use real activities to manipulate earnings to mislead stakeholders includes the 
following areas: cutting down expenses for advertising (Cohen et al., 2010); share 
repurchases (Hribar et al., 2006); disposal of profitable assets (Herrmann et al., 2003); 
reducing selling prices (Jackson and Wilcox, 2000); and debt-equity swaps, derivatives, 
hedging and securitisation (Dechow and Shakespeare, 2009; Barton, 2001). Related studies 
(Vorst, 2016; Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 2005) indicate other reasons why managers 
engage in real activities management, such as limited ability to report discretionary 
accruals, the risky nature of accruals manipulation, and the fact that accruals must take 
place at the end of the year and managers face uncertainty as to which accounting 
treatments the auditor will allow at that time. Even though managers make decisions, 
auditors check compliance with standards and accounting treatments must meet 
international requirements. 
 
Indeed, in examining the trade-off between accrual-based earnings management and real 
activities manipulation, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) report that with the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), there has been a decline in accrual-based earnings 
management, but that real activities manipulations have increased. Graham et al. (2005) 
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observe that meeting earnings targets (zero earnings, prior year earnings and analyst 
forecasts) is a strong motivational factor for financial executives to engage in aggressive 
reduction of research and development (R&D) costs, to delay maintenance and advertising 
expenditures, and to accelerate sales through price discounts, despite the fact that 
manipulation has the potential to cause a decline in firm value. This is simply because some 
of the real activities management in the current period might impact future cash flows 
negatively. For instance, offering price discounts in an attempt to boost sales revenue will 
enable firms to improve current period earnings targets, but may lead to high expectations 
of future discounts from customers. Producing in excess of the required quantities also 
generates huge inventory holding costs, such as rent, insurance, theft, fire and outmoded 
costs (Roychowdhury, 2006). Admittedly, there are costs associated with real activities 
manipulation in the long-run, however managers consider accrual-based earnings 
manipulation to be costly, at least in the short-term. Previous studies show that managers 
have a preference for real activities because they view real activities earnings management 
as ethically correct, not a GAAP violation, and they cannot easily be second-guessed by 
regulators and auditors (Zarowin, 2010). However, other studies indicate that real activities 
earnings management is more damaging than accrual-based manipulation due to the fact 
that real activities are ethical and morally appropriate (Jarvnen and Mallymaki, 2016; Zang, 
2012).   
Other studies (Merchant, 1990; Graham et al., 2005) observe that managers prefer using 
real activities to accrual-based earnings manipulation because depending on accruals alone 
is risky and subject to the scrutiny of auditors and regulators. The studies on real activities 
management have concentrated on managers opportunistically reducing the costs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 152 
associated with R&D, with the aim of improving reported income. For example, Bens et 
al. (2003) find that managers finance the repurchase of stocks to avoid earnings per share 
(EPS) dilution through employee stock option grants and stock option exercises, with the 
aim of reducing R&D expenditure. Similarly, Dechow and Sloan (1991) find that in order 
to increase reported earnings, CEOs cut down R&D expenses toward the end of their 
tenure, findings which are also corroborated by Baber et al. (1991) and Bushee (1998). In 
fact, several studies on real activities earnings management suggest that managers engage 
in other activities, including over production, in order to lower the cost of goods sold as 
closing inventory increases, or by providing limited discounts to boost reported sales 
revenues. For example, a substantial number of respondents in Graham et al.’s (2005) study 
report that they cut down discretionary expenditures or were engaged in reducing capital 
investments. Bartov (1993) indicates that firms which report higher profits from the sale of 
assets use this to mitigate the effect of negative earnings changes. Thomas and Zhang 
(2002) confirm that overproduction is used by managers to manipulate reported earnings, 
but also admit that adverse economic circumstances can influence production levels and 
real activities manipulations. Graham et al. (2005) indicate other forms of real activities, 
including delays or cuts in travel budgets and maintenance expenses, postponement or 
elimination of capital investments, management of pension funds, or securitisation of firm 
assets.  Roychowdhury (2003) observes that abnormal production cost is an indication that 
sales have been manipulated by abnormal price discounts and cost of sales manipulation 
through overproduction. 
 
Studies have attempted an examination of the relationship between religious social norms 
and earnings management, but with mixed results. For example, in a cross-country study 
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Callen et al. (2011) observe that religion does not mitigate earnings management. At the 
national level, McGuire et al. (2012) and Dyreng et al. (2012) also report a positive 
relationship between real activities based earnings management and religiosity. In addition, 
Hillary and Hui (2009) find that firms headquartered in a highly religious environment 
demonstrate more traditional corporate investing behaviour compared to firms 
headquartered in areas with fewer religious adherents.  Notwithstanding the above, the 
desire to meet earnings targets as a result of capital market pressures renders all managers 
susceptible to upward or downward earnings management. Zang (2012) and Gunny (2010) 
observe that firms that engage in real activities management perform better in reported 
earnings. Similarly, Bhojraj et al. (2009) and Doyle et al. (2013) establish a negative 
relationship between operating performance and firms that beat analyst forecasts through 
real activities. 
Collectively, the above evidence from previous studies suggests that managers engage in 
real activities earnings management to influence reported earnings. Conceptually, this 
study argues that from the view point of social norm theory, managers with strong religious 
values working in a strong legal environment will be less inclined to engage in fraudulent 
financial reporting or earnings management practices because of their strong morals, 
values, beliefs and attitudes, and because of possible legal action that could affect their 
reputation. However, McGuire et al. (2012) observe that religious adherence does not 
exclude individuals from engaging in dishonest practices. Previous studies (McGuire et al., 
2012; Dyreng et al., 2012; Callen et al., 2009) observe that real activities earnings 
management is not a GAAP violation, nor is subject to external monitoring or scrutiny of 
auditors. Therefore, it is possible that managers working in religious social norm 
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environments will be involved in real activities manipulation because there is no external 
monitoring or auditor vigilance, or that they will be constrained by the legal environment 
because of law suits, reputation concerns and fear of negative publicity as a result of law 
suits. Following the above discussions, this study argues further that it is also possible for 
managers of firms headquartered in highly religious environments, coupled with strong 
legal environments, to ignore top management pressure to engage in real activities because 
of the legal and ethical issues involved, as well as individual managers’ self-identity. 
Following this, and the desire to meet earnings targets and market pressures, it is posited 
that managers working in highly religious and legal environments will be less inclined to 
engage in real activities earnings management to increase or decrease reported earnings. 
The following hypotheses are therefore presented for testing:   
H2a: Real activities earnings management is related to the religiosity of the firm’s 
environment. 
H2b: Real activities earnings management is related to the interaction between 
religiosity and firms’ legal environment. 
 
3.2.3. Accrual-Based Earnings Management and Religiosity 
Firms managers can influence reported earnings through accrual-based earnings 
management. Prior studies indicate that firms can accelerate or delay revenue recognition, 
overstate inventory, record obsolete inventory as part of assets, refuse to write-down slow-
moving inventory, offer liberal credits terms, understate bad debts provisions or reduce bad 
debts by ignoring defaults, create fictitious receivables to support non-existent sales or 
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services (Cohen et al., 2010; Rankin et al., 2012). Similarly, the extant literature has 
identified other tools or forms of accruals-based earnings management use by firms such 
as; computing liberal useful life and residual value of assets, restating the useful life and 
residual value upwards or changing the useful life and residual value to meet earnings 
targets. Finally, firms can capitalise or manipulate some expenses (e.g. marketing expenses) 
to meet earnings targets. The various tools and methods used by firms to engage in accruals-
based earnings management to influence firms’ reported earnings are summarised in Figure 
2 as follows.  
Figure 2: Tools and Methods of Accruals-Based Earnings Management 
Tools Conservative Moderate Aggressive Fraud 
Revenue 
recognition on 
services 
Services are 
prepaid and 
performed in full  
Services prepaid 
and partially 
performed 
Services are 
agreed to but not 
yet performed 
Fraudulent 
scheme 
Inventory Lower of cost 
and net realizable 
value is 
consistently 
applied 
Slow to write-
down slow-
moving 
inventory 
Obsolete 
inventory is still 
recorded as an 
asset 
Overstate 
inventory where 
non-existent 
inventory is 
recognised 
Accounts 
receivable 
Conservative 
credit terms and 
bad debts 
allowances used 
Liberal credit 
terms and bad 
debts provision 
estimates 
Liberal use of 
credit policies to 
expand sales; 
understate bad 
debts provisions 
or reduce bad 
debts by 
ignoring likely 
defaults 
Fictitious 
receivables 
established to 
support non-
existent sales or 
services 
Depreciation Conservative 
useful life and 
residual value 
computed 
 
Liberal useful 
life and residual 
value computed 
Restate useful 
life and residual 
value upward 
Change useful 
life and residual 
value estimates 
to meet earnings 
targets 
Advertising, 
marketing 
Expensed as 
incurred 
Expensed based 
on a formula; 
perhaps sales-
based 
Marketing costs 
are capitalised  
Costs are 
capitalised and 
manipulated to 
meet earnings 
targets 
Adapted from:  Rankin et al. (2012), Contemporary Issues in Accounting, pp. 258-261 
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Previous studies (Horton, Serafeim & Serafeim, 2013; Zang, 2012; Matsumoto, 2002; 
Krull, 2004) document ample evidence of managers using the accrual-based earnings 
management method to manipulate accounting rules in order to report earnings figures that 
meet or beat the consensus analysts’ forecasts. The difference between net income and cash 
flows results in accruals. For instance, firms create accrual of revenue during growth 
periods by selling goods and services on credit (Gerakos and Kovrijnykh, 2013). To engage 
in accrual-based earnings management, firms can decrease or increase income by creating 
non-discretionary accruals. However, of particular concern are the discretionary accruals 
which have an effect on reported earnings (Horton et al., 2013). For example, firms might 
engage in upward or downward adjustments in bad debts, inventory write-downs, warranty 
costs etc. The market penalises firms for not meeting earnings benchmarks, but rewards 
those that meet or exceed expectations. Following the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act 
of (2002), studies indicate that accrual-based earnings management appears to be 
decreasing (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). Given the heightened regulatory environment, the 
risks and costs associated with being found to have engaged in accrual-based management 
is perceived to be higher than the rewards or benefits of managing earnings. For example, 
Robb (1998) observes that using loan loss provision to manipulate earnings upward is 
common with bank managers when analysts have reached a consensus in their earnings 
predictions.  In a related study, Payne and Robb (2000) find that discretionary accruals are 
higher in firms with pre-managed earnings below analysts’ earnings benchmarks and 
expectations. Similarly, Moehrle (2002) indicates that some firms manage earnings to beat 
analysts’ forecasts by restructuring accrual reversals.  
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Furthermore, other studies (Badertscher, 2011; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Cohen et al., 
2008; Roychowdhury, 2006; Graham et al., 2005) also indicate that managers manipulate 
earnings to boost firms’ reported performance to stakeholders through accrual-based 
earnings management. These studies observe that the freedom and discretion to make 
choices and select suitable accounting policies within the GAAP include the choice of 
depreciation rates and methods (Gerakos and Kovrijnykh, 2013); revenue recognition and 
credit policies (Horton et al., 2013); deferred tax assumptions (Zang, 2012); and inventory 
valuation methods and bad debt provisions (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010), leading to the 
creation of abnormal accruals and consequently the manipulation of reported income. In 
addition, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) indicate that firms use accrual manipulation during 
season equity offerings and that discretionary accruals are more likely to be associated with 
earnings increases than real activities.  In a related study, Daniel et al.,  (2008) studied 
accrual manipulations for firms with or without debt and observe that those with pre-
managed earnings lower than the level of expected dividends manage earnings upwards 
through accrual manipulations. They interpret these results as indicating that firms with 
debt need to manage earnings upwards in order to avoid violating covenants that restrict 
the maximum level of dividend payout by reference to accounting earnings. Similarly, 
Armstrong, Guay and Weber (2010a) point to the need to treat the debt contract and 
characteristics of the accounting system as being jointly determined. In addition, Zhang 
(2008) corroborates prior findings and show that firms wishing to access public debt 
markets have an incentive to pre-commit to higher standards of financial reporting, and that 
those borrowers who report earnings more conservatively, all things being equal, pay lower 
rates of interest on their debt. Brown and Caylor (2005) observe that, for US firms, meeting 
and beating the consensus forecast has become more important over time. Prior to the mid-
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1990s, loss avoidance or earnings decrease avoidance were more important thresholds, but 
since then meeting and beating forecasts has been dominant in the U.S. Similarly, Gore et 
al. (2007) for the UK, and Daske et al., (2006) for the EU, present evidence that UK and 
EU firms manage accruals to simply meet or beat consensus forecasts. Generally, firms 
manage earnings to meet or beat three types of thresholds: zero earnings (i.e. to avoid 
reporting a loss); last year’s earnings (to avoid reporting an earnings decline); and the 
consensus of analysts’ forecast. 
Research (Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998; Shivakumar, 2000; DuCharme et al., 2004) 
indicates that accrual-based manipulations amount to GAAP violation, subject to external 
monitoring and auditors’ scrutiny. Therefore, Bruns and Merchant (1990) indicate that 
managers prefer real activities manipulations to accrual-based methods on ethical grounds. 
In addition, Graham et al. (2005) observe that it is risky and costly to depend on accrual-
based earnings management because of the close scrutiny of external monitors and auditors. 
Despite the expectation to meet earnings targets and capital market pressures, previous 
research (Callen et al., 2011; Dyreng et al., 2012; Hilary and Hui, 2009) observes that there 
is a negative relationship between the risk appetite levels of individuals and their religiosity. 
These studies observe that individuals who are risk seekers are more likely to engage in 
accrual-based earnings management. Dyreng et al. (2012) and Grullon et al. (2010) also 
report that firms in a highly religious environment report lower financial reporting 
irregularities. Similarly, McGuire et al. (2012) corroborate existing findings and indicate 
that firms headquartered in highly religious areas have lower accounting risk and 
misreporting associated with accounting restatements.  
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In addition, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) observe a decrease in accrual-based earnings 
management in the period following the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002), 
suggesting that it has succeeded in subduing accrual earnings management. The accounting 
scandals that engulfed Enron, WorldCom, Arthur Andersen and others provided a platform 
for regulations regarding financial reporting to be tightened. For example, provisions such 
as 1) the establishment of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) as 
an oversight body of the public accounting industry; 2) the requirement that all CEOs and 
CFOs certify that to the best of their knowledge the financial statements are free of material 
misstatement; and 3) the prohibition of auditors from providing non-audit consulting 
services to their audit clients have helped to minimise accrual-based earnings management. 
Furthermore, Koh et al. (2008) investigated management incentive to engage in accrual-
based earnings management so as to meet or beat analysts’ targets in the period following 
the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002). They conclude that accrual-based earnings management 
techniques were less prevalent in the post-accounting scandals of 1990 and 2000. In 
addition, the study finds that future cash flows are positively related to meeting or 
exceeding analysts’ forecasts in the post-Sarbanes Oxley period, suggesting an 
improvement in the quality of earnings as accrual-based earnings management decreases. 
Therefore, this study predicts that managers whose firms are headquartered in a highly 
religious social norm environments will be less likely to be involved in accrual-based 
earnings management. It is also predicted that the interaction between religiosity and firms’ 
litigation environment has an influence on accrual-based earnings management practices. 
Following the above arguments and the perception that accrual-based earnings 
management is manipulative and unethical, the hypotheses that follow are that: 
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H3a: Accrual-based earnings management is related to the religiosity of the firm’s 
environment.  
H3b: Accrual-based earnings management is related to the interaction between 
religiosity and firms’ legal environment.  
 
 
 
3.3. Research Design and Empirical Methodology 
 
3.3.1. Measuring Religiosity  
 
As detailed in Chapter 2, the study utilises the religious dataset published by the Religious 
Congregations and Membership Study (RCMS) from between 2000 and 2010 to measure 
the strength of religious social norms. Overall, 698 distinct counties are identified that are 
the headquarters of at least one of the firms on the Compustat annual database used in the 
analysis. The religious dataset covers all U.S. states. The study uses the adjusted 2000 and 
2010 RCMS county-level religious datasets for the number of religious adherents and 
follows previous studies (Dyreng et al., 2012; Hilary and Hui, 2009; Alesina and La 
Ferrara, 2000) in using RCMS religious adherence values. This procedure yields annual 
county-level estimates of religiosity. 
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3.3.2. Measuring Litigation/Legal Environment  
 
To measure the litigation environment, the study uses datasets from the Lawsuit Climate 
Survey conducted for the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform by the Harris Poll 
between 2000 and 2015. The aim is to determine how firms perceive the litigation 
environment and how it affects important business decisions. The respondents in each state 
were tasked to grade (A through to F) several key elements, including having and enforcing 
meaningful venue requirements; overall treatment of tort and contract litigation; treatment 
of class action and mass consolidation suits; damages; timeliness of summary judgement 
or dismissal; discovery, scientific and technical evidence; judges’ and juries impartiality 
and competence. Several people were interviewed at the firm level, and respondents 
included general counsel, corporate counsel, associate or assistant counsel, or other senior 
litigators or attorneys. The remaining respondents were chief financial officers, 
accountants, finance directors and senior executives who were knowledgeable about or 
responsible for litigation in their companies. On average, respondents had 19 years’ of 
relevant finance or legal experience, including that in their current position, and had been 
involved in or been familiar with litigation in their current companies for an average of 10 
years. All the respondents were familiar with litigation or had litigated in the states they 
rated within the previous four years, 78% within the past three years. All industries were 
represented, but the most common industry sector was manufacturing. In 2015, 75% of 
respondents reported that a state’s litigation environment was likely to impact on important 
business decisions in their companies, such as financial reporting and where to do business. 
This shows a significant improvement from the 70% in 2012 and 67% in 2010. The 
participants in the survey came from all the states in the U.S. and data were collected using 
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telephone interviews (telephone numbers were gathered from Hoovers Phone, InfoUSA, 
ALM Legal Intelligence and Leadership Directories) and email addresses were drawn from 
Hoovers Connect, Mail, ALM Law Journal, Today’s General Counsel, National Data 
Group, InfoUSA, ALM Legal Intelligence and Leadership Directories). An electronic 
version of the alert letter was sent to each respondent, protected by a password. 
Respondents were screened to ensure that they had the relevant experience to answer the 
questions and the average annual or yearly responses between 2002 and 2015 from both 
telephone and online respondents totalled 5,346 responses or state evaluations. A 
computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) system was used to make calls and input 
responses, thus boosting the reliability of the data reported. To further strengthen the 
reliability of the data, interviewers entered responses during the interview process to 
minimise clerical mistakes. The interview questions were answered before interviewers 
moved to the next question, ensuring that questions were not skipped. In addition, there 
was an online editing system that did not accept out of range punches, and required 
confirmation of feedback that appeared strange or explanations for variations between 
certain key responses.  Several telephone call backs were made; in addition, alert letters 
were sent to respondents together with email invitations to help them take the survey at 
their own convenience. With regards to the online interviews, the interviewers used a self-
administered online questionnaire facilitated by proprietary web-assisted interviewing 
software. To prevent respondents from answering the survey more than once, the e-mail 
version was password protected. Some respondents received an initial invitation and e-mail 
reminders. To compute state level litigation scores, each element was graded from A 
through to F, where A = 5.0 and F = 1.0. The mean grade was computed by converting the 
letter grade. Therefore, the mean score shown can also be referred to as a letter grade. 
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Finally, the overall ranking of the State Liability Systems table was developed by creating 
an index using the grades provided for each of the key elements, plus the overall 
performance grade. There was high correlation between the key elements, but it was 
determined to ensure that each element contributed equally to the final index. To create the 
index, the key elements, plus the overall performance, were rescaled from zero (0) to 
hundred (100), where A = 100, B = 75, C = 50, D = 25 and F = 0. Other evaluations that 
contained 6 or more, “not sure” or “decline to answer” responses were deleted. 
The state-level litigation index scores were matched to their respective U.S. states by 
merging them by year using the state code identifiers from Compustat’s company location 
code where firms were headquartered in order to derive the state-level litigation dataset. 
This study uses the litigation dataset covering all U.S. states. Admittedly, courts and 
localities within states vary in fairness and reasonableness; notwithstanding, respondents 
were asked to examine the state as a whole. Indeed, the results of sample surveys are often 
associated with sampling variation or error. The limitation of this survey is the fact that 
respondents were not asked extensive questions about each state. Moreover, survey studies 
are susceptible to errors such as refusal to be interviewed, question wording and order, 
interviewer error, and weighting by demographic control data (Hair Jr. et al., 2015). 
Therefore, it is probable that some states received low grades because of sampling errors, 
or because of the bad reputation of one or more of their counties or jurisdiction. 
Notwithstanding, the procedures followed by the Harris Poll ensured that errors were kept 
to a minimum. Table 3.1 shows the twenty highest and lowest litigation environments in 
the U.S. for the same study period.  
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Table 3.1: Comparison of Highest and Lowest Litigation Environments in the U.S.: 
2002 -2015 
Ten Highest  
Litigation Environment 
Ranking 
Top States 
Ten Lowest 
  Litigation 
Environment 
Ranking 
Bottom States 
Delaware 1st = 76.5 West Virginia 1st = 46.3 
Vermont 2nd = 73.8 Louisiana 2nd = 46.5 
Nebraska 3rd = 73.0 Illinois 3rd = 48.0 
Iowa 4th = 72.2 California 4th = 49.9 
New Hampshire 5th = 70.7 Alabama 5th = 55.1 
Idaho 6th = 70.5 New Mexico 6th = 55.2 
North Carolina 7th = 70.2 Florida 7th = 56.0 
Wyoming 8th = 69.7 Mississippi 8th = 56.3 
South Dakota 9th = 69.5 Missouri 9th = 56.6 
Utah 10th = 69.0 Arkansas 10th = 57.7 
Notes: Table 3.1 shows a comparison of highest and lowest litigation environments in the U.S. compiled by the Harris 
Poll for the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform between 2002 and 2015. Since 2002, the Harris Poll has conducted 
year by year surveys of state liability systems and the lists above show the average of the overall rankings of state liability 
systems for the period of the study. 
 
In the further analysis section, the litigation environment datasets for the twenty highest 
and lowest litigation environments compiled by the Harris Poll between 2002 and 2015 for 
the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform are used. Based on the ten criteria, Delaware 
emerged as the state with the strongest legal environment, whilst West Virginia was the 
state with the weakest environment across the ten measures of state liability systems in the 
U.S. The scores range from as high as 76 to as low as 36 as index scores of the state liability 
system.  
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   Table 3.2: List of Variables and Definitions 
Variables Proxy Definition 
 
Religiosity  
REL 
Strength of religiosity for each U.S. county measured by 
the Association of Statisticians of American Religious 
Bodies (ASARB) surveys. The results of these surveys 
are published on the website of the Association of 
Religious Data Archive (ARDA). The average of each 
county’s religiosity score is weighted by its population. 
Litigation 
Environment 
LEGAL 
The average index score of the overall ranking of the 
state liability systems by the Harris Poll for each U.S. 
state. The results of these surveys are published on the 
website of the U.S. Chamber Institute For Legal 
Reform.  
Religiosity X 
Litigation 
Environment 
REL x LEGAL Religiosity multiplied by legal environment. 
Abnormal 
Accruals  
ABNOR_ACC Measure of abnormal accruals or residuals using the 
cross-sectional modified Jones model in equation 1. 
(McGuire et al., 2012; Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994; 
Dechow et al., 1995) See below. 
Discretionary 
Expenses 
D_EXP Measured as the aggregate of advertising expenses, 
R&D expenses, and SG & A expenses scaled by lagged 
total assets. 
Abnormal 
Discretionary 
Expenses 
ABNOR_DEXP Estimated after regressing discretionary expenses on the 
inverse of lagged total assets and lagged sales scaled by 
lagged total assets. The figure for (ABNOR_DEXP) is 
multiplied by negative one (-1); consequently, a higher 
(ABNOR_DEXP) figure represents higher real earnings 
management.  
Cash Flow from 
Operations 
CASFO It’s the cash flow from operational activities scaled 
lagged total assets. 
Abnormal Cash 
Flow 
ABNOR_CASH Estimated by regressing CASFO scaled by lagged total 
assets on the inverse of lagged total assets, sales scaled 
by lagged total assets, and change in sales scaled by 
lagged total assets. The figure for (ABNOR_ CASH) is 
multiplied by negative one (-1); consequently, a higher 
(ABNOR_ CASH) figure represents higher real earnings 
management. 
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Production Costs PCOST Measured as the aggregate of cost of sales and change 
in inventory during the year, scaled by lagged total 
assets.  
Abnormal 
Production Costs 
ABNOR_PCOST Residuals estimated by regressing PCOST on the 
inverse of lagged total assets, sales scaled by lagged 
total assets, and change in sales scaled by lagged total 
assets. The figure for (ABNOR_PCOST) is NOT 
multiplied by negative one (-1); consequently, a higher 
(ABNOR_PCOST) figure represents higher real 
earnings management.  
Real Earnings 
Activities 1 
REALMGMT1 Calculated as the aggregate of abnormal discretionary 
expenditures (ABNOR_DEXP) and abnormal 
production costs (ABNOR_PCOST). The higher the 
value, the higher the levels of real earnings 
management. 
Real Earnings 
Activities 2 
REALMGMT2 Calculated as the aggregate of abnormal discretionary 
expenditure (ABNOR_DEXP) and abnormal cash flows 
(ABNOR_CASH). The higher the value, the higher the 
level of real earnings management. 
Total Assets TA Measured as total non-current assets plus total current 
assets. 
Size of the Firm SIZE The natural log of total assets. 
Analyst 
Following 
ANALYST_FOL Number of financial analysts following the firm in the 
I/B/E/S summary file. 
Return on Assets ROA Measured as net income before extraordinary items, 
divided by average total assets. 
Leverage LEV Total liabilities scaled by total assets. 
Presence of Big 4 
Auditors  
BIG4 A value of 1 if the firm was audited by one of the big 4 
auditors, otherwise zero. 
Market to Book 
Value 
MBV Measured as total assets divided by market 
capitalization. 
Reported Loss  LOSS An indicator variable that equals 1 if income before 
extraordinary items was negative in the current or 
previous two fiscal years, and 0 otherwise. 
Operational Risk OP_RISK Estimated as five year rolling standard deviation of 
operating cash flows estimated from both the current 
and previous four years. 
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Firms Located in 
Rural Areas 
RURAL Indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is 
headquartered outside the 490 largest counties in the 
sample, and 0 otherwise. 
Benchmark BENCHMARK The indicator value is 1 if (a) net income scaled by total 
assets is more than or equal to 0 and less than 0.01. 
Alternatively, if the change in net income scaled by total 
assets from the previous to the current year is greater 
than or equal to 0 and less than 0.01, and 0 otherwise. 
Auditor Tenure TENURE Natural log of the number of years the auditor has been 
with the firm. 
Change in GDP CHANGE_GDP Annual percentage change in GDP. 
Firm Level of 
Investment 
INVESTMENT Percentage of capital expenditure at the beginning of the 
year (t) to total net property, plant and equipment at the 
end of the year (t). 
Net Operating 
Assets 
NOA Defined as the sum of shareholders’ equity less cash and 
marketable securities, plus total debt at the beginning of 
the year, scaled by total assets at the beginning of the 
year. 
Population  POPN Natural log of the estimate of the population for each 
U.S. state in millions. 
Income  INCOME Household income for each U.S. state in ten thousands 
($) estimated by the Census Bureau. 
Education  EDU A measure of the adult population of each U.S. state 
with a college education, estimated by Gallup 
interviews.   
Age of 
Respondents  
AGE Average age of residents in each U.S. state, based on 
responses from Gallup interviews. 
Minority MIN Percentage of racial minorities in each U.S. state, based 
on responses from Gallup interviews. 
Political POL Percentage of the population that are affiliated with the 
Republican Political Party. 
CEO-Tenure CEO_TEN Measured as the number of years a CEO has held the 
position in the organisation. 
Audit Committee 
Presence  
AUCOM A dummy variable coded as 1 if the company has an 
audit committee, otherwise zero. 
Independent 
Board  
IND_BOARD Calculated as the number of independent directors 
divided by the total number of directors on the board. 
Defined as non-executive directors holding less than 5% 
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of the voting securities and having no direct or indirect 
interest or relationship that could reasonably influence 
their objective judgment and decision making. 
Board Size  BODSIZE Total number of directors on the board. 
Religiosity 
Interacts with 
Board Size 
 RELBODSIZE 
Religiosity multiplied by Board Size. 
 
 
 
Religiosity 
Interacts with 
Board 
Independence 
RELBODIND Religiosity multiplied by Board Independence. 
Religiosity 
Interacts with 
Audit Committee 
RELAUCOM Religiosity multiplied by Audit Committee. 
Religiosity 
Interacts with 
CEO Tenure 
RELCEOTEN Religiosity multiplied by CEO Tenure 
Normal Core 
Earnings 
NOR_CE This is the core earnings that are actually expected to 
occur in the normal course of business activity, devoid 
of classification shifting.  The study follows McVay’s 
(2006) expectation model in equation 6. 
 
Reported Core 
Earnings 
    REP_CE 
Estimated as sales – cost of goods sold – selling, general 
and administration expenses. Depreciation and 
Amortization are excluded from Cost of Sales, Selling, 
General and Administrative Expenses. 
Unexpected Core 
Earnings  
  UNEXP_CE 
It’s the difference between reported and normal or 
expected core earnings (McVay, 2006). 
Asset Turnover 
ATO 
Sales scaled by average net operating assets, where net 
operating assets are the difference between operating 
assets and operating liabilities. Operating assets = total 
assets – cash and cash equivalent. Operating liabilities 
= total assets – total debt - book value of common equity 
– preferred equity – minority interests. 
Total Accruals  
TAC 
Difference between earnings before extraordinary items 
and discontinued operations and the cash flow from 
operational activities, scaled by lagged total assets. 
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Operating 
Accruals 
ACCRUALS 
Operating Accruals = (net income before extraordinary 
items – cash flow from operation)/sales. 
Working Capital 
Accruals WC_ACCRUALS 
Measured as earnings before extraordinary items, plus 
depreciation and amortisation, minus cash flow from 
operational activities. 
Percent Change in 
Sales 
∆Sales (Salest – Salest-1)/ Salest 
% change in Sales NEG_∆Sales where ∆SALES is less than 0, otherwise zero. 
 
3.4. Earnings Management Metrics 
 
In this section, it is shown how accrual-based and real activities earnings management 
proxies are measured in line with the previous literature. There is difficulty in detecting 
earnings management by external monitors without the application of different measures 
used in the literature as proxies for earnings management (Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Kothari 
et al., 2005). In line with previous research, the study uses different measures to proxy for 
accrual-based and real activities earnings management.   
3.4.1. Measuring Accrual-Based Earnings Management 
 
The cross-sectional modified Jones model is used to estimate discretionary accruals, as 
previous studies (Ball, 2013; Gerakos & Kovrijnykh, 2013; McGuire et al., 2012; Cohen 
and Zarowin, 2010; Dechow et al., 1995; Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994) report that it is 
effective. The model allows researchers to decompose discretionary accruals from non-
discretionary accruals by adjusting change in sales for the change in receivables. This study 
estimates the model for each firm and industry, classified by its two-digit SIC code. This 
procedure partially enables the researcher to regulate the changes in economic conditions 
that affect industries and total accruals so that the coefficients differ across time. This study 
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subtracts change in accounts receivable (∆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) from change in sales (∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡) before 
estimating the residuals cross-sectionally and yearly for all firm-year observations in the 
same two-digit SIC code. To estimate abnormal discretionary accruals, total accruals is 
defined as income before extraordinary items, but after adjusting for operating cash flows 
scaled by lagged total assets. The Compustat data items for total accrual estimations = 
(Data123-(Data308-Data124)/(lagged Data6). The cross-sectional model is in the form of: 
(1)  
TACit
TAit−1
= β0 (
1
TAit−1
) + β1 (
∆SALESit − ∆RECit
TAit−1
) + β2 (
PPEit
TAit−1
) + εit 
                               
where 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 = EBXI-CASFO; EBXI is the earnings before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations; CASFO is the cash flow from operational activities scaled by 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1, (lagged total assets),  ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 (change in sales) is scaled by 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1, lagged total 
assets, ∆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is (change in accounts receivables) and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 is net property, plant and 
equipment, scaled by 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 lagged total assets. εit is the residuals representing the 
measure of earnings management as dependent variable in the model. In line with previous 
studies (Kothari et al., 2005; White, 1980), assets are used as a deflator to mitigate 
heteroscedasticity in residuals, but not to eliminate it, and a constant in the model 
estimation is also included in order (i) to manage heteroscedasticity not dealt with by using 
assets as a deflator, and (ii) to minimise the effect of omitted variables (Brown, Lo and Lys 
(1999). Discretionary abnormal accruals are used and it is anticipated that in a religious 
social norms environment, firm managers would be less inclined to manipulate accruals 
and for that matter report income upwards. Based on the previous studies cited above on 
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religiosity and earnings management, this study predicts a negative relationship between 
religiosity and abnormal accruals and that the interaction between religiosity and legal 
environment will be negatively related to accrual-based earnings management. 
In addition, in the robustness test the study estimates discretionary abnormal accruals using 
other definitions of accruals used in the literature. Total accruals estimated in the modified 
Jones model in equation (1) are replaced by working capital accruals (WC_ACRUALS), 
defined as income before extraordinary items, plus depreciation and amortisation, minus 
cash flows from operating activities (Dechow et al., 2012; Peasnell et al., 1999). The 
revised modified Jones model is as follows:  
(2)  
(𝑊𝐶_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆) = β0 (
1
TAit−1
) + β1 (
∆SALESit−∆RECit
TAit−1
) + β2 (
PPEit
TAit−1
) +
εit                                                                  
 
where 𝑊𝐶_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 = IB+DP-OANCF; IB is the earnings before extraordinary items; 
DP are depreciation and amortisation; and OANCF is cash flow from operational activities. 
The Compustat data items for working capital estimations are (Data18 + Data 14-Data 308). 
Also in line with previous studies (Kothari et at., 2005; White, 1980), assets are used as a 
deflator to eliminate heteroscedasticity in residuals. Kothari et al. (2005) use performance-
matched discretionary accruals and report that the modified Jones model is severely mis-
specified for samples of firms experiencing non-random performance. However, Dechow 
et al. (2012) argue that Kothari et al.’s (2005) performance-matched accruals model 
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explains only 10%-12% of the variations in accruals and therefore distorts the measure of 
discretionary accruals. They indicate further that Kothari et al.’s (2005) model is prone to 
management discretion and bias. Consequently, this study maintains the modified Jones 
model and redefines the measure of discretionary abnormal accruals using working capital 
accruals to establish the impact of both religiosity and legal environment on accrual-based 
earnings management. 
3.4.2. Measuring Real Activities Earnings Management 
 
This study relies on previous ones to develop proxies for real activities earnings 
management. As in McGuire et al. (2012), it uses two measures to measure real activities 
earnings management. Initially, the study computes and aggregates abnormal cash flows 
(ABNOR_CASH), abnormal production costs (ABNOR_PCOST) and abnormal 
discretionary expenses (ABNOR_DEXP) for each firm and industry classified by its two-
digit SIC code, using the model developed by Dechow et al. (1991). Abnormal cash flows 
(ABNOR_CASH) is computed as the deviations from the predicted values from the 
industry-year regression. The following cross-sectional regression model is run for each 
industry and year, as in previous studies (McGuire et al., 2012; Zang, 2012; Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010; Cohen et al., 2008; Roychowdhury, 2006):  
(3)  
CASFOit
TAit−1
= β0 (
1
TAit−1
) + β1 (
SALESit
TAit−1
) + β2 (
∆SALESit
TAit−1
) + εit                                       
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where CASFO is the cash flow from operational activities (Data308 – Data124) 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1, 
lagged total assets, and ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 is change in sales. As indicated above, sales represent 
annual sales revenue (Data12) and total assets (Data6) are the aggregate of both non-current 
and current assets. The figure for (ABNOR_CASH) is multiplied by negative one (-1), in 
line with previous studies (McGuire et al., 2012; Zang, 2012; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; 
Cohen et al., 2008; Roychowdhury, 2006). Therefore, a higher (ABNOR_CASH) figure 
represents higher real activities earnings management. Abnormal production costs 
(ABNOR_PCOST) are also estimated as the deviations from predicted values from the 
industry-year regression. Following previous studies, abnormal production costs are 
estimated using the following regression model: 
(4)  
𝑃𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛽0 (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽1 (
  𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡−1
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 (
∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + (
∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡−1
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     
 
where PCOST is the aggregate of cost of sales (Data41) and change in inventory during the 
year (Data3). Sales represent annual sales revenue (Data12) and total assets (Data6) is the 
aggregate of both non-current and current assets. Again, consistent with previous research 
(McGuire et al., 2012; Zang, 2012; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Cohen et al., 2008; 
Roychowdhury, 2006) the figure for (ABNOR_PCOST) is not multiplied by negative one 
(-1); consequently, a higher (ABNOR_PCOST) figure represents higher real earnings 
management.  
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Discretionary expenses are modelled as a function of lagged sales to avoid the problem of 
significantly lower residuals from running regression using current sales. Subsequently, 
abnormal discretionary expenses (ABNOR_DEXP) are computed from the predicted 
values from the industry-year regression. Following previous studies, abnormal 
discretionary expenses are estimated using the following regression model: 
(5)  
𝐷_𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛽0 (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽1 (
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡−1
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                    
 
 
where D_EXP is the aggregate of advertising expenses (Data45), research and development 
(R& D) expenses (Data46) and selling, general and administration (SG & A) expenses 
(Data189). Following previous studies (McGuire et al., 2012; Zang, 2012; Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010; Cohen et al., 2008; Roychowdhury, 2006), where SG & A is available but 
advertising and R&D expenses are not available, the value of zero is given. Sales equal 
annual sales revenue, and assets (TA) is the aggregate of both non-current and current 
assets. Also in line with previous studies, the figure for (ABNOR_DEXP) is multiplied by 
negative one (-1), and consequently a higher (ABNOR_DEXP) figure represents higher 
real activities earnings management.   
The residuals from abnormal cash flows (ABNOR_CASH), abnormal production costs 
(ABNOR_PCOST) and abnormal discretionary expenses (ABNOR_DEXP) are aggregated 
as proxies for the two measures of real earnings management. As previously indicated, 
firms that manipulate earnings upwards are characterised by unusually low cash flows from 
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operations, low discretionary expenses and high production costs. As in previous studies, 
the first proxy to measure real activities earnings management is REALMGMT1, abnormal 
discretionary expenses (ABNOR_DEXP) are multiplied by negative one (-1) and the 
results added to abnormal production costs (ABNOR_PCOST). The higher the aggregate 
of these two measures, the stronger the evidence that the firm is cutting expenses and is 
therefore involved in real activities earnings management. The second proxy for real 
activities earnings management is REALMGMT2. Again, consistent with previous studies, 
the study computes the aggregate of abnormal cash flows (ABNOR_CASH) and abnormal 
discretionary expenses (ABNOR_DEXP) after multiplying each of them by negative one 
(-1). These measures are multiplied by negative one (-1) to assess the extent of 
manipulation in sales and discretionary expenses, as the higher the results, the more likely 
the firm is engaged in managing earnings upwards. As indicated by Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010), the individual variables to be used to compute the proxies for real activities earnings 
management have varying impacts and therefore can change or provide misleading results 
when aggregated. In the robustness check, the study examines and reports on both 
aggregated measures and individual proxies for real earnings management to assess the 
impact of religiosity and legal environment on each of them. 
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3.4.3. Model Testing the Relationship between Religiosity, Firms’ Legal Environment 
and Methods of Managing Earnings 
The impact of religiosity and legal environment on accrual-based and real activities 
earnings management methods are investigated using McGuire et al.’s (2012) model to 
establish the extent to which religiosity and firms’ legal environment affect the methods. 
The model is in the form:  
(6) EARNSMGMT = β0 + β1 REL + β2LEGAL + β3REL x LEGAL + β4SIZE + β5 
ANALYST_FOL +β6ROA + β7LEV + β8BIG4 + β9 BMV + β10LOSS + β11 
OP_RISK +β12 RURAL + β13BENCHMARK + β14TENURE + 
β15RCHANGE_GDP + β16INVESTMENT + β17NOA + β18POPN + β19INCOME 
+ β20EDUC + β21POLITICS + β22AGE + β23MINORITY + β24Industry Indicators 
+ 𝜀                                 
 
EARNSMGMT is used to proxy for accrual-based and real activities earnings manipulation. 
First, the study proxies for accrual-based earnings management and computes abnormal 
accruals (ABNOR_ACC) using a cross-sectional modified Jones model. It is predicted that 
there will be a negative relationship between religiosity, legal environment and accrual-
based earnings management; that is, managers in religious social norms and legal 
environments would be less inclined to manipulate accruals or, for that matter, report 
income upwards. Previous studies (McGuire et al., 2012; Hribar and Nicholas, 2007) 
observe that using absolute discretionary accruals can provide misleading results, therefore, 
making use of signed accruals establishes a clear association between legal environments, 
religiosity of the firms’ environment and the method of managing earnings.   
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In addition, two proxies are used to measure real activities earnings management by 
aggregating abnormal cash flows (ABNOR_CASH), abnormal production costs 
(ABNOR_PCOST)  and abnormal discretionary expenses (ABNOR_DEXP) for each firm 
(McGuire et al. 2012). However, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) observe that theoretically it 
would not be appropriate to add all three measures because both abnormal production costs 
and abnormal cash flows share common cost activities. The first of the two proxies for real 
earnings management (REALMGMT1) is the aggregate of abnormal discretionary expenses 
(ABNOR_DEXP) and abnormal production costs (ABNOR_PCOST). The second proxy 
for real earnings management (REALMGMT2) is estimated as the total of abnormal 
discretionary expenses (ABNOR_DEXP) and abnormal cash flows (ABNOR_CASH). To 
avoid double counting of costs, both abnormal discretionary expenses and abnormal cash 
flows are multiplied by (-1). This results in reduced core expenses, higher estimated core 
earnings and therefore a higher measure of real earnings management (Zang, 2012; 
McGuire et al., 2012; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). To test hypotheses H1-H3, the study 
examines the coefficient of the religiosity, legal environment and interaction between 
religiosity and firms’ legal environment (REL, LEGAL and REL x LEGAL) and anticipates 
a negative coefficient on REL, LEGAL and REL x LEGAL, and a negative relationship 
between REL, LEGAL and REL x LEGAL and accrual-based earnings management, but a 
positive association between REL, LEGAL and REL x LEGAL and real earnings 
management. 
3.4.4. Control Variables  
In addition to the variable of interest, additional firm-level and county-level demographic 
control variables are included, which earlier research indicates are the determinants of 
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accrual-based and real activities earnings management. In particular, the study controls for 
the presence of the Big4 auditors, analyst following, profitability, auditor tenure and growth 
opportunities, because research indicates that these factors impact on the choice of earnings 
management method (McGuire et al., 2012; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). For example, 
Becker et al. (1998) observe that there is a negative association between audit quality and 
earnings management. In addition, the study controls for firms located in rural areas 
because previous research (Walker, 2013; Urcan, 2007) observes that higher earnings 
quality is associated with firms located in rural areas. Again, using percentage change in 
gross domestic product as a proxy for changes in economic activities, the study controls for 
differences in economic activities between years, as changes in economic conditions can 
impact on the real activities of firms (McGuire et al., 2012; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; 
Cohen et al., 2008). Given the costs associated with each method of manipulating earnings, 
the net operating assets of each firm are included to control for earnings manipulation. In 
addition, the study controls for return on assets, as firm performance influences the choice 
of earnings management method (Cohen et al., 2008; Kothari et al., 2005). The poorer the 
performance of the firm, the keener will be the tendency to manipulate reported earnings 
by management. Therefore, a negative coefficient on return on assets is anticipated. Firm 
size is also included to control for the variations in accruals behaviour between large and 
small firms (Gul, Fung and Jaggi, 2009).  
Previous studies (Ashbaugh, Lafond and Mayhew, 2003) indicate that small firms are more 
likely to engage in earnings management than large firms. Therefore, depending on the size 
of the firms in the sample, a negative or positive association is expected between earnings 
management and firm size. To secure external financing, previous studies (Chung and 
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Kallupur, 2003; Johnson and Nelson, 2002) indicate that management might manage 
reported earnings upwards. Therefore, this study controls for leverage, estimated as the 
ratio of long-term debt to total assets, as earlier studies indicate that manipulating earnings 
upwards allows firms to meet debts covenants (Zang, 2012; Badertscher, 2011; Yu, 2008; 
Sweeney, 1994). In addition, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) report that firms with a higher 
debt (leverage) have the tendency to manipulate earnings because of debt covenants, 
therefore a positive relationship between leverage and earnings management is expected. 
Furthermore, the study controls for firms reporting operational loss in the previous year 
because Francis and Yu (2009) observe that there is a positive relationship between 
earnings management and prior year losses, but a negative one between firms reporting 
profits in the previous year and earnings management. However, the sign of operating loss 
can be negative or positive, depending on whether earnings management is income 
decreasing or increasing.      
3.5. Data Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
As detailed in Chapter 2, the study collect data from all the firms on the Compustat database 
between 2002 and 2015 which are identified as having the required datasets. Additional 
financial data is obtained from other sources, including Annual Reports and Audit 
Analytics. In line with previous research, data from specialised industries such as banks 
and insurances companies, as well as other financial services, are excluded from the 
datasets (Donelson et al., 2016; McGuire et al., 2012; Zang, 2012). Financial services 
companies with Standard Industry Classification code (SIC) 60-69 are deleted, as previous 
studies (Francis and Yu, 2009; Maijoor and Vanstraelen, 2006) indicate that their accruals 
generating processes differ significantly and require specific accounting rules and 
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requirements; for example, minimum capital requirements and specific regulations 
governing financial service companies. Firms with missing data and those with fewer than 
eight firm-year observations to estimate discretionary accruals are also excluded (Cohen 
and Zarowin, 2010; Francis and Yu, 2009). In addition, to avoid bias resulting from the 
inclusion of insignificant firms in the sample, any observation with a revenue of less than 
$1,000,000 (Ball and Shivakumar, 2008) is excluded, thus reducing the number of firms 
and firm-year observations with all the necessary variables to 1,416 and 21,729 
respectively. The final sample is used to estimate discretionary accrual and real activities 
earnings management measures. Tables B1 and B2 (Appendix B) provide a detailed 
breakdown of the sampling procedure and firms’ classification by year and industry. 
The legal environment datasets are obtained from the Lawsuit Climate Survey conducted 
by Harris Polls for the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform between 2002 and 2015. 
The study uses state-level litigation index scores to match and merges them with their 
respective U.S. states using the state code identifiers from Compustat’s firm headquarters 
location code to derive the state-level litigation dataset. As also detailed in Chapter 2, 
religious data are collected from the Religious Congregations Membership Study (RCMS), 
compiled by the Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies (ASARB), to 
create a proxy for religiosity. In Chapter 2, the procedure and measurement of the 
religiosity data are clearly outlined, with their limitations. Therefore, in Chapter 3 the study 
will not enter into an in-depth discussion of this. Furthermore, 698 unique counties are 
identified that are the headquarters for at least one firm in the study between 2002 and 2015. 
As discussed, the county-level religiosity and litigation scores are matched to their 
respective U.S. states by merging them year by year into Compustat, using the state code 
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identifiers from Compustat’s company location code of where firms are headquartered in 
order to derive the state-level religious and litigation datasets. The data requirement for 
each dependent and independent variable is a function of the number of observations and 
tests required for the analyses. All the financial data for earnings management are 
accessible from Compustat and Annual Reports. 
3.5.1. Descriptive Analysis 
Table 3.3 provides descriptive statistics for the measure of legal environment (LEGAL) 
and religiosity (REL). The table shows that the mean and median U.S. legal environment 
is approximately 68% and 72% respectively, suggesting that the legal environment is very 
strong in the U.S. This is consistent with the results of Baxamusa and Jalal (2014). 
However, average religiosity in the U.S. is approximately 54% and the median is 52%. This 
result suggests that 54% of people in all U.S. counties are affiliated with a particular 
religion, attend a religious activity or consider religion to be important in their life. The 
results are consistent with McGuire et al. (2012), who indicate that religiosity in the U.S. 
appears to be declining, in line with the 2008 American Religious Identification Survey, 
which reports a substantial decline in religiosity in the U.S. population between 1990 and 
2008.  
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 Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics for Religiosity and Legal Environment 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 Skewness Kurtosis 
REL 53.5 18.07 36.27 
52.47 
63.33 0.83 2.69 
LEGAL 68.09 8.26 61.7 
71.5 
75.6 0.73 2.54 
Notes: REL is the variable of interest, measured as the average of U.S. counties’ religiosity score weighted by the county’s 
population for years 2000 and 2010. LEGAL = a measure of the average index score of the overall ranking of the state 
liability systems produced by Harris Poll for each U.S. state.  
          
Table 3.4 Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Demographic Control Variables 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 Skewness Kurtosis 
 
ABNOR_ACC 
 
-0.01 
 
0.24 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.14 
 
0.03 
 
-0.62 
 
2.62 
REALMGMT1 -0.02 0.35 -0.48 -0.21 0.02 -0.17 1.52 
REALMGMT1 -0.29 0.43 -0.55 -0.27 0.04 -0.16 1.51 
 
POPN 2.61 0.08 2.52 2.6     2.68 -0.5     1.5 
INCOME 10.86 0.09 10.84 10.88 10.93 -1.02     2.53 
EDUC 85.98 2.71 83.9 87.2 87.67 -1.08     2.87 
AGE 40.44 1.83 40.02 40.35 41.89 -0.84     2.94 
MIN 30.58 12.42 19.69 25.83 38.47 0.95     2.71 
POL 41.61 3.14 39 41 43 0.09    2.87 
 
Notes: ABNOR_ACC is a measure of abnormal accruals or residuals using the cross-sectional modified Jones model in 
equation 1 (McGuire et al., 2012; Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Dechow et al., 1995); REALMGMT is calculated as the 
aggregate of abnormal discretionary expenditures (ABNOR_DEXP) and abnormal production costs (ABNOR_PCOST)t; 
REALMGMT2 is calculated as the aggregate of abnormal discretionary expenditure (ABNOR_DEXP) and abnormal 
cash flows (ABNOR_CASH; POPN = the natural log of the estimate of the population for each U.S. state in millions;  
INCOME = household income for each U.S. state in ten thousands ($), estimated by the U.S. Census Bureau; EDU = a 
measure of the adult population in each U.S. state with a college education, estimated by Gallup interviews;   AGE = 
average age of residents in each U.S. state, based on the responses from Gallup interviews; MIN = percentage of racial 
minorities in each U.S. state, from responses to the Gallup interviews; and POL = percentage of the population that are 
affiliated with the Republican political party. 
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Table 3.4 presents descriptive statistics for all the dependent variables (ABNOR_ACC, 
REALMGMT1 and REALMGMT2) which are proxies for accrual-based and real-activities 
earnings management methods. Consistent with previous studies (McGuire et al., 2012; 
Omer et al., 2015) the univariate statistics appear similar to other distributions for all 
dependent variables which are winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles. For example, the 
mean and median of ABNOR_ACC, REALMGMT1 and REALMGMT2 are 
approximately equal to zero, in line with earlier studies (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; 
Roychowdhury, 2006). In addition, the demographic control variables show similar 
distributions to previous studies. For example, average age is approximately 40 years and 
86% of the population have a minimum of a college education. In addition, approximately 
42% of the population are affiliated with the Republican Political Party and the average 
minority population is roughly 31%.  To control for skewness and kurtosis in the income 
and population variables, in line with previous studies (McGuire et al., 2012; Omer et al., 
2015) the natural log of each county’s income and population is taken. The original data 
show that on average each county has a population of 3.9 million people and average 
household income is $91,700 per year.  
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  Table 3.5: Descriptive Statistics for Firm-Level Control Variables 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 Skewness Kurtosis 
SIZE 5.68 1.76 3.39 5.19 6.88 0.86 2.83 
ANALYST_FOL 2.91 1.4 2.00 3.00 4.00 0.28 2.03 
ROA -0.31 0.14 -0.03 0.04 0.08 -1.59 2.77 
LEV 0.15 0.16 0.00 0.1 0.25 0.89 2.67 
BIG4 0.69 0.31 1.00 1.00 1.00 -2.49 3.19 
MBV 2.01 1.21 1.02 1.75 2.91 0.49 1.98 
LOSS 0.48 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.06 1.00 
OP_RISK 0.65 16.35 0.23 0.5 0.86 0.91 2.79 
RURAL 2.9 0.12 2.82 2.88 2.98 0.72 2.91 
BENCHMARK 0.04 0.11 -0.04 0.04 0.08 -1.11 3.15 
TENURE 1.31 0.57 1.10 1.39 1.79 -0.72 3.06 
CHANGE_GDP 1.89 1.65 0.80 1.7 2.70 0.89 3.29 
INVESTMENT 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.94 3.01 
NOA 0.78 1.26 0.39 0.49 0.88 -0.16 1.57 
 
Notes: SIZE is the natural log of total assets; ANALYST_FOL is the number of financial analysts following the firm in 
the I/B/E/S summary file; ROA is return on assets measured as net income before extraordinary items, divided by average 
total assets; LEV is financial leverage, measured as total liabilities scaled by total assets; BIG4 = an indicator variable 
equal to a value of 1 if the firm was audited by the big 4 auditors, otherwise zero; MBV is measured as total assets divided 
by market capitalization; LOSS = an indicator variable that equals 1 if income before extraordinary items was negative 
in the current or previous two fiscal years, and 0 otherwise; OP_RISK is estimated as the five year rolling standard 
deviation of operating cash flows estimated from both the current and previous four years; RURAL = indicator variable 
that equals 1 if the firm is headquartered outside the 490 largest counties in the sample, and 0 otherwise; BENCHMARK 
= an indicator value equal to 1 if (a) net income scaled by total assets is more than or equal to 0 and less than 0.01, or  if 
the change in net income scaled by total assets from the previous to the current year is greater than or equal to 0 and less 
than 0.01, and 0 otherwise; TENURE = the natural log of the number of years the auditor has been with the firm; 
CHANGE_GDP = annual percentage change in gross domestic product; INVESTMENT = percentage of capital 
expenditure at the beginning of the year (t) to total net property, plant and equipment at the end of the year (t); and NOA  
is defined as the sum of shareholders’ equity less cash and marketable securities, plus total debt at the beginning of the 
year, scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year. 
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Notes: REL is the variable of interest, measured as the average of U.S. counties’ religiosity score weighted by the county’s 
population for the years 2000 and 2010. LEGAL = a measure of the average index score of the overall ranking of the state 
liability systems produced by Harris Poll for each U.S. state; AGE = average age of residents in each U.S. state, based on 
the responses from Gallup interviews; EDUC = a measure of the adult population of each U.S. state with a college 
education, estimated by Gallup interviews; POL = percentage of the population that are affiliated with the Republican 
political party; MIN = percentage of racial minorities in each U.S. state, calculated from responses to Gallup interviews; 
POPN = natural log of the estimate of the population for each U.S. state in millions; and  INCOME = household income 
for each U.S. state in ten thousands ($), as estimated by the U.S. Census Bureau. 
 
Table 3.5 presents the univariate statistics for the firm-level control variables (SIZE, 
ANALYST_FOL, ROA, LEV, BIG4, MBV, LOSS, OP_RISK, RURAL, BENCHMARK, 
TENURE, CHANGE_GDP, INVESTMENT, NOA). The univariate results are similar to 
distributions in previous research (McGuire et al., 2012; Callen et al., 2011).  
Approximately 69% of the Big 4 auditors examine the financial records of the firms, and 
48% of the firms reported a loss in the previous two years or the current financial year. In 
addition, an average of approximately three analysts follow each firms, and 2.9% of the 
firm-year observations are from rural counties. In Table 3.6 the study presents correlations 
between the litigation environment (LEGAL), religiosity (REL) and demographic control 
variables. Consistent with McGuire et al. (2012), the correlations between religiosity (REL) 
and the demographic control variables in each county are mainly negative, with the 
exception of residents in counties who are affiliated with the Republican political party and 
the percentage of racial minorities in each county.  Similarly, correlations between the legal 
environment (LEGAL) and demographic control variables are mainly negative. This 
Table 3.6: Correlations between Demographic Variables (Pearson Above/Spearman 
Below) 
VARIABLE REL LEGAL AGE EDUC POL MIN POPN INCOME 
REL  -0.20 -0.31 -0.36 0.41 0.15 -0.27 -0.35 
LEGAL -0.20  -0.41 - 0.40 -0.02 -0.36 -0.26 -0.42 
AGE -0.31 -0.41  -0.39 -0.22 -0.10 -0.36 -0.30 
EDUC -0.36 -0.40 -0.39  -0.38 0.14 0.12 0.37 
POL 0.41 -0.02 -0.22 -0.38  0.10 -0.24 -0.32 
MIN 0.15 -0.36 -0.10 0.14 0.10  0.27 0.26 
POPN -0.27 -0.26 -0.36 0.11 -0.24 0.27  0.47 
INCOME -0.35 -0.42 -0.30 0.38 -0.32 0.26 0.47  
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finding is consistent with evidence presented in previous studies (McGuire et al., 2012; 
Dyreng et al., 2012; Grullon et al., 2010). 
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 provide correlation between the firm-level control variables, 
litigation/legal environment (LEGAL) and religiosity (REL). Consistent with McGuire et 
al. (2012) and Callen et al. (2011), there is a negative correlation between religiosity (REL) 
and accrual-based earnings management (ABNOR_ACC), but a positive one between 
religiosity (REL) and the proxies for real earnings management (REALMGMT1 and 
REALMGMT2). Similarly, the study also finds a negative correlation between legal 
environment (LEGAL) and both accrual-based and real-activities earnings management. 
Earlier studies indicate that accrual-based earnings management results from financial 
reporting decisions. Therefore, the negative correlation between religiosity and accrual-
based earnings management is expected, as for ethical and moral reasons managers in 
religious social norms environment might frown on the manipulation of accounting 
information. In a legal environment, managers are also careful because of litigation 
concerns, law suits and fear of loss of reputation.  
In the following section, multivariate tests are performed to provide a more detailed 
interpretation of the association between religiosity, legal environment and the dependent 
variables. The firm-level control variables are associated with ABNOR_ACC, 
REALMGMT1 and REALMGMT2, in line with McGuire et al. (2012). For example, SIZE 
is negatively correlated with religiosity (REL) and demonstrates the risk appetite of firm 
managers who work in highly religious environments. SIZE, ROA and BIG4 are also 
negatively and significantly correlated with ABNOR_ACC, which indicates that large 
firms with high ROA, which are audited by the BIG4 with close external monitoring are 
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less likely to manage earnings through accrual-based earnings management. The 
correlations between the dependent variables, firm-level control variables and religiosity 
range from significant to less significant to insignificant. The correlation matrix below also 
shows that there is no multi-collinearity problems among the variables used in the model 
and therefore the study could include all the variables in a model. Similar to Chapter 2, the 
study conducts further test to ensure that there are no multi-collinearity problems. 
Specifically, the study computes and examines the variance inflation factor (VIF) for the 
independent variables in Chapter 3. The F-value is more than one (1) and the P-value is 
less than 0.05, suggesting a statistically significant effect of independent variables on the 
dependent variables. Greene (2012) and Kennedy (2008) indicate that a VIF of 10 or less 
is a good indication that there is no multi-collinearity among the independent variables in 
a correlation matrix. It is observed that the highest VIF score is 3.4 amongst all the 
independent variables. Appendix B, Table B3 provides the VIF and the associated tolerance 
levels (TOL) for all independent variables. 
The multivariate analysis will help explain the extent of the relationships and highlight the 
importance of including these control variables.
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Table 3.7: Correlations between Firm Level Variables in the Models (Pearson Above/Spearman Below) 
 
All variables are defined in Table 3.2. Bold co-efficients are significant at   p < 0.10 (in a two tailed test).
 Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
(1) 
REL  -0.08 0.06 0.06 -0.05 0.01 -0.08 -0.02 0.04 -0.04 
 -0.01 0.04 0.09 0.02 0.02  0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.06 
(2) 
ABNOR_ACCRUA -0.08  -0.43 -0.42 -0.35 -0.01 -0.08 -0.32  0.03 -0.01 
 0.10 0.14 0.01 -0.01 -0.29 -0.04 -0.01 -0.22 0.05 
(3) 
REALMGMT1 0.06 -0.43  0.39 -0.11 -0.07 -0.18 -0.16 0.12 -0.06 
-0.02 0.06 0.08 -0.00 -0.15 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.17 
(4) 
REALMGMT2 0.06 -0.42 0.39  -0.06 -0.07 -0.16 -0.12 0.14 -0.06 
-0.03 0.05 0.07 -0.00 -0.10 -0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.16 
(5) 
LEGAL -0.05 -0.35 -0.11 -0.06  -0.02 -0.33 -0.18 0.17 -0.11 
-0.09 0.01 0.22 -0.01 -0.17 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.39 
(6) 
ANALYST_FOL 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.07 -0.02  0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 
0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 
(7) 
SIZE -0.08 -0.08 -0.18 -0.16 -0.33 0.02  0.10 0.32 0.24 
0.18 -0.17 -0.03 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.01 -0.07 0.28 
(8) 
ROA -0.02 -0.33 -0.16 -0.12 -0.18 -0.02 0.10  -0.20 0.00 0.35 -0.33 -0.05 0.04 0.31 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.03 
(9) 
LEV 0.04 0.03 0.12 0.14  0.17 0.01 0.32 -0.20  0.09 
0.01 0.07 0.02 -0.01 -0.20 -0.02 -0.00 -0.04 -0.38 
(10) 
BIG4 -0.04 -0.01 -0.06 -0.06 -0.11 -0.01 0.24 0.00 0.09  
0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.25 
(11) 
MBV -0.01 -0.10 -0.02 -0.03 -0.09 0.02 0.18 0.35 0.01 0.05  -0.24 -0.03 0.03 0.35 0.03 -0.02 -0.12 0.14 
(12) 
LOSS 0.04 0.14 0.06 0.05 0.01 -0.01 -0.17 -0.33 0.07 -0.02 -0.24  0.03 -0.02 -0.38 -0.02 -0.02 -0.08 -0.18 
(13) 
OP_RISK 0.09 0.01 0.08 0.07 0.22 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.03  -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.02 
(14) 
RURAL 0.02 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.02  0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.00 
(15) 
BENCHMARK 0.02 -0.29 -0.15 -0.10 -0.17 -0.02 0.09 0.31 -0.20 0.01 0.35 -0.38 -0.01 0.03  0.02 0.01 -0.07 0.02 
(16) 
TENURE 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02  -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
(17) 
CHANGE_GDP 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.03  0.02 -0.01 
(18) 
INVESTMENT -0.05 -0.22 0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.00 -0.09 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.12 -0.08 0.04 -0.04 -0.07 -0.01 0.02  -0.13 
(19) 
NOA 0.06 0.05 0.17 0.16 0.39 0.02 0.27 0.03 -0.38 0.25 0.14 -0.18 -0.02 -0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.13  
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3.5.1. Hausman Specification Test Statistics 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the fixed effects (FE) model is used to run a series of regression 
results in Chapter 3.  In line with McKnight and Weir (2009), the Hausman specification 
test is conducted to select the appropriate estimation model to test the hypotheses. The 
results after performing this test are shown below. 
Table 3.8: Hausman Specification Test Statistics 
Variable  
Chi2 (X2) 
 
P-value 
Decision 
 Fixed Effects 
ABNOR_ACC 145.27 0.0000 Fixed effects 
REALMGMT1 197.18 0.0000 Fixed effects 
REALMGMT2 261.48 0.0000 Fixed effects 
 
Table 3.8 indicates that the regression models of the earnings management methods are in 
favour of the fixed effects model after running the Hausman specification test. The fixed 
effects regression model is implemented as the appropriate model to investigate the 
relationship between religiosity, legal environment and earnings management methods 
because the p-value is less than 5%.  Again, the study conducts initial mis-specification 
tests for normality (using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality), tests for the presence of 
heteroscedasticity, (using Breusch-Pagan tests for heteroscedasticity) and finally checks for 
serial correlation or auto-correlation (using Wooldridge test for auto-correlation in panel 
data). The results of these preliminary tests indicate that the data meet the requirements of 
normality, there is an absence of heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation or serial effects. 
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3.6. Empirical Regression Results and Discussions 
The study has provided a descriptive analysis of the variables. In this section, the 
multivariate results and the linear regression of the panel data indicating the association 
between the dependent variables (ABNOR_ACC, REALMGMT1 and REALMGMT2) and 
the independent variables (REL, LEGAL and RELxLEGAL), as well as the specific firm-
level and demographic control variables identified in this study are presented. 
 
3.6.1. Testing the Relationship between Legal Environment and Accrual-based/Real 
Activities Earnings Management 
 
The study now runs a series of regression results to test the hypotheses, following the 
backwards stepwise regression method, with the aim of (i) selecting a subset of variables 
that makes the regression model simple and with good predictive ability and (ii) minimising 
the variance that results from calculating unnecessary terms. To achieve robust results, 
several stepwise regressions are run for each dependent variable, but for the purpose of 
brevity only four stepwise regression results are provided, as the subsequent removal or 
addition of predictors did not influence the standard errors, t-values, coefficients or results 
of each variable in the model after the third and subsequent stepwise regressions were run. 
The dependent variables denote different measures of earnings management practised by 
firm managers. To test hypothesis 1, four separate regressions were run using model (6). 
Table 3.9 shows the regression results of the relationship between legal environment 
(LEGAL) and accrual-based (ABNOR_ACC) earnings management. Initially, all variables 
are included in the regression model and the results are shown in column (1). Thereafter, 
predictors (CHANGE_GDP and POPN) with insignificant p-values were dropped to re-run 
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the regression model. The results after dropping the predictors are shown in column (2). 
Predictors LOSS and TENURE with insignificant p-values are also dropped and the results 
are shown in column (3). Finally, in column (4) BENCHMARK and RURAL are dropped 
from the model. The associated co-efficient and t-values for LEGAL and ABNOR_ACC 
are (-0.004, -1.452; -0.004, -1.454; -0.004, -1.458; and -0.005, -1.458). Overall, it is 
observed that there is an insignificant negative association between LEGAL and 
ABNOR_ACC, suggesting that the legal environment has the potential to decrease accrual 
manipulation, but that the impact is negatively insignificant. This confirms the notion that 
earnings management is not illegal. The results are consistent with the findings of previous 
studies (Behn et al., 2013; Callen et al., 2011).  
The study also follows the procedure above to examine the association between legal 
environment (LEGAL) and the two measures of real activities (REALMGMT1 & 
REALMGMT2) earnings management. The results are shown in columns (5) to (8) of 
Table 3.9. An insignificant negative association is observed between legal environment and 
the two measures of real activities earnings management. The associated co-efficient and 
t-values for LEGAL and REALMGMT1 are (-0.031, -1.076; -0.030, -1.072 and -0.030, -
1.072). The insignificant negative relationship in Table 3.9 indicates that both accruals and 
real earnings management are not affected by firms’ litigation environment. The result is 
consistent with earnings management not being associated with litigation risk because 
actual, not fraudulent, transactions are being reported as they actually happened. In fact, it 
shows that companies are sued for fraud, not necessarily less-than-optimal decisions. This 
finding is consistent with Callen et al, (2011) who observe an insignificant negative 
relationship between legal environment and earnings management methods.  
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Table 3.9: Regression of Legal Environment on Accrual-based and Real Activities Earnings Management  
 
Variables 
             (Accrual-Based Earnings Management)  Dependent Variables:                      (Real Activities Earnings Management) 
      (1)  (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
ABNOR_ACC  ABNOR_ACC ABNOR_ACC ABNOR_ACC   REALMGMT1 REALMGMT1  REALMGMT2 REALMGMT2 
 
LEGAL  -0.004   -0.004  -0.004  -0.005   -0.031 -0.030  -0.021 -0.023 
 (-1.452)  (-1.454) (-1.458) (-1.458)   (-1.076) (-1.072)  (-1.547) (-1.562) 
SIZE  -0.065***      -0.064***     -0.063***     -0.062***      -0.447***    -0.441***   -0.313***  -0.304*** 
 (-9.287)  (-9.280) (-9.272) (-9.270)    (-9.292)  (-9.224)  (-9.663) (-9.412) 
ANALYST_FOL   -0.005*    -0.005*   -0.005*   -0.005*   -0.064 -0.063  -0.049 -0.048 
 (-1.741)  (-1.741) (-1.740) (-1.740)   (-0.851) (-0.848)  (-1.476) (-1.472) 
ROA   -0.125***    -0.124***   -0.123***   -0.122***      -0.187***    -0.184***      -0.201***     -0.198*** 
 (-3.016)  (-3.015) (-3.014) (-3.012)   (-3.247) (-3.241)  (-4.087) (-4.034) 
LEV   0.034***    0.034***    0.032***   0.031***     0.085*   0.083*    0.064*   0.065* 
 (3.875)  (3.875) (3.868) (3.865)   (1.784) (1.776)  (1.701) (1.704) 
BIG4 -0.052**  -0.051** -0.050** -0.049**   -0.023 -0.022   -0.027*  -0.027* 
 (-2.250)  (-2.248) (-2.244) (-2.242)   (-1.018) (-1.017)  (-1.762) (-1.762) 
MBV   0.016***    0.016***    0.015***    0.014***    -0.026**  -0.024**    -0.096***   -0.095*** 
 (6.036)  (6.034) (6.032) (6.030)   (-2.183) (-2.178)  (-5.718) (-5.712) 
LOSS 0.085  0.083       0.043*   0.042*    0.055**   0.054** 
 (1.175)  (1.173)     (1.775) (1.770)  (2.124) (2.121) 
OPERA_RISK     0.022***      0.022***     0.021***     0.021***        0.087***      0.084***     0.162**    0.160** 
 (3.573)  (3.570) (3.567) (3.565)   (2.806) (2.801)  (2.368) (2.359) 
RURAL  0.007   0.007  0.006            -0.053         -0.051  -0.071 -0.070 
 (1.456)  (1.456) (1.452)    (-1.078) (-1.075)  (-1.274) (-1.271) 
BENCHMARK   0.027    0.026   0.025    -0.022* -0.020*   -0.017*  -0.015* 
 (0.754)  (0.753) (0.752)    (-1.749) (-1.735)  (-1.776) (-1.762) 
TENURE -0.009  -0.009             -0.007   -0.003  
 (-0.493)  (-0.493)     (-0.274)   (-0.137)  
CHANGE_GDP  -0.008        -0.092*  -0.091*  -0.008 -0.007 
 (-0.754)       (-1.763) (-1.761)  (-1.224) (-1.223) 
INVESTMENT   -0.065**    -0.063**   -0.063**   -0.061**     0.026**   0.025**    0.030  
 (-2.118)  (-2.116) (-2.116) (-2.113)   (2.351) (2.348)  (0.854)  
NOA      0.040***       0.039***      0.039***      0.038***     0.012**   0.011**      0.043***     0.042*** 
 (4.478)  (4.470) (4.468) (4.466)   (2.109) (2.104)  (3.105) (3.101) 
POPN -0.408        -0.082  -0.080   -0.079 -0.078 
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 (-1.478)       (-1.109) (-1.108)  (-1.105) (-1.103) 
INCOME  -0.142**   -0.140**  -0.140**  -0.139**     -0.342*   -0.326*   -0.311 -0.310 
 (-2.478)  (-2.473) (-2.471) (-2.467)   (-1.769) (-1.754)  (-1.347) (-1.345) 
EDUC  -0.042***   -0.041***  -0.041***  -0.040***     -0.072***   -0.071***       -0.279***      -0.264*** 
 (-3.478)  (-3.472) (-3.467) (-3.464)   (-4.109) (-4.107)  (-4.428) (-4.415) 
AGE     0.072***      0.071***     0.070***     0.068***     0.162**   0.160**   -0.479**  -0.457** 
 (4.478)  (4.474) (4.467) (4.454)   (2.090) (2.087)  (-3.432) (-3.378) 
POLITICAL   0.004**    0.004**   0.003**   0.003**           0.002    -0.009  
 (2.175)  (2.174) (2.170) (2.168)   (0.109)   (-0.050)  
MINORITY         -0.018          -0.018         -0.017         -0.017   0.112    0.085  
 (-1.478)  (-1.478) (-1.473) (-1.472)   (1.109)   (0.878)  
CONSTANT 0.734  0.732 0.731 0.731     0.654   0.654   0.679  0.679 
 (1.046)  (1.042) (1.041) (1.041)   (1.320) (1.320)  (1.208) (1.208) 
             
Industry Fixed Effects YES  YES YES YES   YES YES  YES YES 
Observations 21,279  21,279 21,279 21,279   21,090 21,090  21,090 21,090 
R-squared (Overall) 0.33  0.32 0.32 0.31   0.12 0.11  0.16 0.15 
Breusch-Pagan 1178.83  1165.32 1158.54 1108.49   2581.76 2395.82  2266.63 2198.28 
P-Value (0.6581)  (0.6478) (0.6255) (0.6209)   (0.7673) (0.7438)  (0.7193) (0.7087) 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov 
683  678 674 672   435 339  237 233 
P-Value (0.6415)  (0.6406) (0.6394) (0.6388)   (0.4138) (0.3726)  (0.2181) (0.1896) 
Wooldridge Test 119.26  117.69 115.56 121.62   88.43 82.78  152.78 150.36 
P-Value (0.3861)  (0.3756) (0.3668) (0.3926)   (0.2378) (0.1981)  (0.2987) (0.2853) 
 
Notes: All variables are defined in Table 3.1b. The study uses *,**and *** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. 
The co-efficient estimates are shown above and the t-statistics below in brackets. 
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Table 3.10: Regression of Legal Environment and Religiosity on Real Activities (1) 
Dependent Variable:  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES REALMGMT1 REALMGMT1 REALMGMT1 REALMGMT1 
     
REL    0.273***    0.268***    0.264***    0.263*** 
           (3.287)           (3.281)           (3.278)           (3.276) 
LEGAL -0.029 -0.028 -0.027 -0.026 
 (-1.064) (-1.063) (-1.062) (-1.061) 
REL x LEGAL           -0.165           -0.163           -0.161           -0.160 
 (-1.387) (-1.383) (-1.380) (-1.378) 
SIZE    -0.365***    -0.363***    -0.362***    -0.360*** 
 (-5.627) (-5.625) (-5.624) (-5.621) 
ANALYST_FOL -0.015 -0.014 -0.013 -0.012 
 (-0.741) (-0.738) (-0.734) (-0.731) 
ROA   -0.342***   -0.338***   -0.332***   -0.329*** 
 (-4.016) (-4.012) (-4.006) (-4.001) 
LEV  0.134*  0.133*  0.132*  0.132* 
 (1.875) (1.870) (1.867) (1.865) 
BIG4  0.052  0.052  0.052  0.050 
 (1.250) (1.250) (1.250) (1.248) 
MBV      -0.138***      -0.136***      -0.135***      -0.132*** 
 (-7.036) (-7.003) (-6.976) (-6.936) 
LOSS 0.065* 0.060* 0.058* 0.057* 
 (1.775) (1.771) (1.767) (1.765) 
OPERA_RISK     0.032**     0.032**     0.031**     0.030** 
 (2.473) (2.471) (2.470) (2.469) 
RURAL  -0.017  -0.017   
 (-1.056) (-1.056)   
BENCHMARK -0.327* -0.327* -0.325* -0.324* 
 (-1.762) (-1.762) (-1.760) (-1.756) 
TENURE -0.009 -0.009   
 (-0.593) (-0.593)   
CHANGE_GDP  -0.018*  -0.018*  -0.017*  -0.017* 
 (-1.854) (-1.853) (-1.851) (-1.850) 
INVESTMENT   0.185*   0.184*   0.182*   0.180* 
 (1.818) (1.814) (1.810) (1.808) 
NOA    0.140**    0.139**    0.138**    0.137** 
 (2.278) (2.272) (2.270) (2.269) 
POPN            -0.038    
 (-0.278)    
INCOME  -0.252*  -0.251*  -0.251*  -0.250* 
 (-1.878) (-1.877) (-1.877) (-1.876) 
EDUC    -0.358***    -0.356***    -0.355***    -0.355*** 
 (-4.478) (-4.474) (-4.472) (-4.472) 
AGE    0.372**    0.370**    0.368**    0.367** 
 (2.478) (2.476) (2.474) (2.471) 
POLITICAL 0.001    
 (0.175)    
MINORITY             0.019             0.019             0.019  
 (1.178) (1.178) (1.178)  
CONSTANT 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 
 (1.046) (1.046) (1.046) (1.046) 
     
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 21.090 21.090 21.090 21.090 
R-squared (Overall) 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 
Breusch-Pagan 2497.65 2358.32 2237.22 2145.41 
P-Value (0.7489) (0.7381) (0.7127) (0.7036) 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 195 
3.6.2. Testing the Relationship between Religiosity and Legal Environment 
Interactions on Real Activities (1) 
 
To test Hypotheses 2a and 2b, four stepwise regressions are run to ascertain the impact of 
REL and the interactive term REL x LEGAL on the first measure of real activities earnings 
management (REALMGMT1). To run the model, REL and REL x LEGAL are included 
separately in the model; thereafter, the study includes both REL and the interactive term 
REL x LEGAL, but the results in Table 3.10 do not differ. Initially, two insignificant 
predictors with p-values (POPN, P-values = 0.887 and POLITICAL, P-values = 0.844) are 
dropped, and the resulting co-efficient and t-values for REL and REALMGMT1 are 
positive (0.273*** 3.287; 0.268*** 3.281; 0.264*** 3.278 and 0.263*** 3.276), 
suggesting that religious social norms increase real activities earnings management.  On 
the contrary, the associated coefficients and t-values for the interactive term REL x LEGAL 
and REALMGMT1 are negative (-0.165 -1.387; -0.163 -1.383; -0.161 -1.380; and -0.160, 
-1.378), indicating that litigation environment and religious social norms of the firmhas an 
insignificant negative impact on real activities. Similarly, the following predictors with 
insignificant p-values are dropped from the model (TENURE, P-value = 0.613 and 
RURAL, P-value = 0.295) and no significant change in the standard error, t-values and 
coefficients of the remaining variables is observed. In addition, the study runs several 
regressions and consistently finds a significantly positive relationship between REL and 
REALMGMT1, but an insignificant negative association between the interactive term REL 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 437 423 407 386 
P-Value (0.7437) (0.7375) (0.7238) (0.7218) 
Wooldridge Test 88.43 87.59 84.78 82.83 
P-Value (0.4137) (0.4128) (0.4113) (0.4108) 
Notes:  All variables are defined in Table 3.1b. The study uses *,** and *** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate 
statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels respectively. Co-efficient estimates are shown above 
and t-statistics below in brackets. 
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x LEGAL and REALMGMT1 after controlling for both firm-level and demographic-level 
control variables. This finding is consistent with McGuire et al. (2012), who observe a 
positive relationship between real activities and religiosity in the U.S. 
 
3.6.3. Testing the Relationship between Religiosity and Legal Environment 
Interactions on Real Activities Earnings Management (2) 
 
To test hypotheses 2a and 2b, the study again runs four stepwise regressions to establish 
the association between REL, the interactive term REL x LEGAL and the second measure 
of real-activities earnings management (REALMGMT2). Initially, the study runs the model 
with all the variables and three insignificant predictors with high P-values (POLITICAL, 
P-value = 0.986; TENURE, P-value = 0.911; POPN, P-value = 0.602) are excluded from 
the model. Other predictors with insignificant p-values are also dropped; the association 
between REL and REALMGMT2 remains significantly positive, but between REL x 
LEGAL and REALMGMT2 insignificantly negative. Table 3.11 shows the resulting 
coefficients and t-values (REL = 0.057*** 3.315; 0.055*** 3.313, 0.054*** 3.311 and 
0.052*** 3.309), suggesting that real activities increase in religious social norm 
environments. However, an insignificant negative relationship is observed between REL x 
LEGAL and REALMGMT2 (-0.076, -1.498; -0.075, -1.496; -0.075, -1.495 and -0.074, -
1.493). The results in Tables 3.9 and 3.10 suggest that in religious social norm environment 
managers perceive real activities to be safe, less questionable, and less unethical. However, 
the interactive term REL x LEGAL is negative but insignificantly related to real activities, 
suggesting that in a religious environment, litigation risk does not induce real activities 
earnings management because real activities do not breach the law  
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Table 3.11: Regression of Legal Environment and Religiosity on Real Activities (2) 
Dependent Variable:  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES REALMGMT2 REALMGMT2 REALMGMT2 REALMGMT2 
     
REL      0.057***      0.055***      0.054***      0.052*** 
           (3.315)           (3.313)           (3.311)           (3.309) 
LEGAL -0.020 -0.020 -0.019 -0.018 
 (-1.531) (-1.530) (-1.524) (-1.521) 
REL x LEGAL           -0.076           -0.075           -0.075           -0.074 
 (-1.498) (-1.496) (-1.495) (-1.493) 
SIZE    -0.462***    -0.460***    -0.458***    -0.456*** 
  (-9.238)  (-9.231)  (-9.228)  (-9.225) 
ANALYST_FOL -0.056 -0.056 -0.055 -0.055 
 (-1.551) (-1.550) (-1.548) (-1.547) 
ROA    -0.257***    -0.256***    -0.256***    -0.255*** 
 (-3.087) (-3.086) (-3.085) (-3.084) 
LEV   0.068*   0.066*   0.065*   0.065* 
 (1.725) (1.722) (1.721) (1.720) 
BIG4 -0.042 -0.042 -0.042  
 (-1.015) (-1.015) (-1.015)  
MBV   -0.025**   -0.022**   -0.021**   -0.018** 
 (-2.172) (-2.170) (-2.166) (-2.162) 
LOSS   0.043*   0.041*   0.040*   0.038* 
 (1.775) (1.772) (1.770) (1.767) 
OPERA_RISK     0.086***     0.082***     0.080***     0.078*** 
 (2.850) (2.797) (2.748) (2.714) 
RURAL           -0.055           -0.052           -0.048  
 (-1.083) (-1.081) (-1.073)  
BENCHMARK -0.024* -0.022* -0.024* -0.024* 
 (-1.754) (-1.748) (-1.754) (-1.754) 
TENURE           -0.006    
 (-0.271)    
CHANGE_GDP  -0.084*  -0.082*  -0.082*  -0.076* 
 (-1.730) (-1.724) (-1.723) (-1.716) 
INVESTMENT   0.024**   0.022**   0.020**   0.018** 
 (2.289) (2.278) (2.262) (2.253) 
NOA   0.011**   0.010**   0.010**   0.009** 
 (2.102) (2.100) (2.092) (2.078) 
POPN  -0.079    
 (-1.106)    
INCOME   -0.354*  -0.353*   -0.352*  -0.352* 
 (-1.776) (-1.774) (-1.771) (-1.770) 
EDUC   -0.094***     -0.092***   -0.084***   -0.081*** 
 (-5.088) (-5.064) (-5.027) (-5.002) 
AGE   0.254***     0.251***   0.250***   0.248*** 
 (3.090) (3.084) (3.080) (3.079) 
POLITICAL            0.001    
 (0.090)    
MINORITY 0.112 0.111   
 (1.109) (1.107)   
CONSTANT   0.574 0.568 0.565   0.563 
 (1.340) (1.338) (1.337) (1.335) 
     
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 21.090 21.090 21.090 21.090 
R-squared (Overall) 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.14 
Breusch-Pagan 2251.63 2148.27 2108.28 2076.54 
P-Value (0.7193) (0.7087) (0.7024) (0.7003) 
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or accounting regulations. This finding is consistent with previous studies (McGuire et al., 
2012; Callen et al., 2011), which find a significant positive relationship between religiosity 
and the two measures of earnings management. However, McGuire et al. (2012) failed to 
interact religiosity with firms’ legal environment. The interactive term REL x LEGAL has 
a negative effect on real activities, even though the impact is negatively insignificant.  The 
result shows that real activities manipulation are not violation of the law to attract litigation 
risk or lawsuit. That is, real activities do not involve fraudulent transactions and firms are 
sued for fraud not real activities. The findings of this study are consistent with McGuire et 
al (2012) and that confirm that religious social norm of the firm’s environment is positively 
associated with real earnings management.   
3.6.4. Testing the Relationship between Religiosity and Legal Environment 
Interactions on Accrual-based Earnings Management 
 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b are further tested to assess the relationship between REL, REL x 
LEGAL and ABNOR_ACC. In in a stepwise manner, the study drops predictors with 
insignificant p-values, such as CHANGE_GDP (P-value = 0.969) and TENURE (P-value 
= 0.573), from the model. Thereafter, the following predictors are also dropped from the 
model (Benchmark, P-value = 0.528; Minority, P-value = 0.308; and Loss, P-value = 0.255) 
however, the subsequent removal of insignificant predictors does not influence the results 
of the remaining variables in the model. Table 3.12 provides the regression results. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 237 235 229 234 
P-Value (0.2181) (0.2169) (0.2127) (0.2176) 
Wooldridge Test 152.78 148.23 143.43 150.62 
P-Value (0.2987) (0.2980) (0.2916) (0.2974) 
Notes:  All variables are defined in Table 3.1b. The study uses *, ** and *** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate 
statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels respectively. Co-efficient estimates are shown above 
and t-statistics below in brackets. 
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associated coefficients and t-values between REL and ABNOR_ACC are (-0.074** -
2.415; -0.072** -2.413; -0.069** -2.402 and -0.063** -2.396) and between REL x LEGAL 
and ABNOR_ACC are (-0.137*** -4.651; -0.135*** -4.646; -0.132*** -4.639 and -
0.131*** -4.632) respectively. The relationship between religiosity and abnormal accruals 
remains significantly negative at the 5% level throughout. The effect is very significant at 
the 99% confidence level when religiosity interacts with the legal environment. This 
suggests that religious social norms play a complementary role or strengthens the legal 
environment to decrease managers’ accruals manipulation to influence reported net 
income. Perhaps, this is partly due to external monitoring, scrutiny, auditor vigilance and 
ethical implications involved. This finding is consistent with previous research (McGuire 
et al., 2012; Callen et al., 2011; Dyreng et al., 2012).  
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Table 3.12: Regression of Legal Environment and Religiosity on Accrual-Based 
Earnings Management 
Dependent Variable:  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ABNOR_ACC ABNOR_ACC ABNOR_ACC ABNOR_ACC 
     
REL     -0.074**     -0.072**     -0.069**    -0.063** 
           (-2.415)           (-2.413)           (-2.402)           -(2.396) 
LEGAL  -0.004  -0.004  -0.003  -0.003 
 (-1.458) (-1.457) (-1.451) (-1.449) 
REL x LEGAL          -0.137***           -0.135***           -0.132***           -0.131*** 
 (-4.651) (-4.646) (-4.639) (-4.632) 
SIZE  -0.058***     -0.056***     -0.054***     -0.053*** 
 (-8.467) (-8.452) (-8.438) (-8.424) 
ANALYST_FOL   -0.005*   -0.004*   -0.003*   -0.002* 
 (-1.766) (-1.762) (-1.754) (-1.751) 
ROA   -0.128***   -0.126***   -0.124***   -0.123*** 
 (-3.197) (-3.182) (-3.173) (-3.164) 
LEV   0.028***   0.024***   0.022***   0.021*** 
 (3.668) (3.654) (3.538) (3.531) 
BIG4 -0.056** -0.054** -0.053** -0.052** 
 (-2.376) (-2.371) (-2.366) (-2.257) 
MBV   0.016***   0.015***    0.015***    0.014*** 
 (6.035) (6.034) (6.032) (6.028) 
LOSS 0.084 0.081   
 (1.172) (1.168)   
OPERA_RISK     0.022***     0.021***     0.020***     0.019*** 
 (3.573) (3.570) (3.568) (3.564) 
RURAL  0.007  0.006  0.005  
 (1.456) (1.452) (1.450)  
BENCHMARK   0.027   0.025  0.023  
 (0.754)  (0.750) (0.748)  
TENURE -0.009 -0.007   
 (-0.723) (-0.722)   
CHANGE_GDP  -0.008    
 (-0.705)    
INVESTMENT   -0.068**   -0.066**   -0.065**   -0.063** 
 (-2.194) (-2.190) (-2.186) (-2.182) 
NOA      0.054***      0.053***      0.050***      0.048*** 
 (4.562) (4.557) (4.546) (4.541) 
POPN -0.386    
 (-1.414)    
INCOME  -0.142**  -0.140**  -0.138**   -0.134** 
 (-2.478) (-2.473) (-2.468) (-2.452) 
EDUC  -0.042***  -0.041***  -0.037***   -0.034*** 
 (-3.478) (-3.472) (-3.457) (-3.451) 
AGE     0.064***     0.061***     0.057***     0.052*** 
 (4.408) (4.396) (4.388) (4.376) 
POLITICAL   0.004**   0.003**   0.003**   0.002** 
 (2.175) (2.174) (2.168) (2.156) 
MINORITY           -0.018            -0.017           -0.016           -0.015 
 (-1.424) (-1.421) (-1.420) (-1.418) 
CONSTANT 0.734 0.732 0.731 0.729 
 (1.046) (1.042) (1.041) (1.040) 
     
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 21.279 21.279 21.279 21.279 
R-squared (Overall) 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.31 
Breusch-Pagan 1387.27 1261.49 1179.68 1157.92 
P-Value (0.6872) (0.6613) (0.6583) (0.6255) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 201 
 
Overall, the study finds that the relationship between legal environment and earnings 
management methods is negative but not significant. However, accrual-based earnings 
management decreases significantly when religiosity interacts with legal environment. The 
interactive term REL x LEGAL on both measures of real activities is negative but not 
significant. Thus, the positive impact of religion on real activities noted in previous studies 
(McGuire et al.; 2012; Callen et al., 2011; Dyreng et al., 2012) can no longer be 
demonstrated when religiosity interacts with legal environment. The findings also suggest 
that both religiosity and legal environment play a complementary role in subduing accrual-
based earnings management, and that the effect is acute when religious social norms 
interact with firms’ legal environment. This finding is consistent with previous studies 
(McGuire et al., 2012; Callen et al., 2011; Dyreng et al., 2012), which observe that accruals 
manipulation is frowned on by managers in religious social norms environment because 
they deem it as unethical business practice. Such manipulations are also prone to regulators’ 
and auditors’ scrutiny.  
It is further observed that there are also significant and insignificant levels of association 
between the firm-level control variables and ABNOR_ACC, REALMGMT1 and 
REALMGMT2. The study finds that the firm-level control variables are associated with 
accrual-based and real activities methods of managing earnings. For example, ROA is 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 676 672 667 658 
P-Value (0.6419) (0.6415) (0.6410) (0.6398) 
Wooldridge Test 121.62 118.29 115.64 114.56 
P-Value (0.3524) (0.3512) (0.3429) (0.3412) 
Notes:  All variables are defined in Table 3.1b. The study uses *,** and *** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate 
statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels respectively. Co-efficient estimates are shown above 
and t-statistics below in brackets. 
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negatively and significantly (1%) related to abnormal accruals and real-activities earnings 
management, suggesting that managers are more likely to manipulate reported profits 
upwards when the firm is performing poorly. Analyst following (ANALYST_FOL) is also 
negatively related (although not significant) to the proxies for earnings management, 
suggesting that firm managers are less likely to manage reported earnings when analysts 
are monitoring their performance. This finding is consistent with Behn et al. (2013), who 
find that analyst following is negatively related to earnings management practices.   
Similarly, SIZE is negatively and significantly (at the 1% level) associated with 
ABNOR_ACC, REALMGMT1 and REALMGMT2, indicating that the sample includes 
larger firms than smaller ones. Ashbaugh et al. (2003) observe that small firms are more 
likely to manipulate reported profits than larger ones. Thus, the impact of earnings 
management decreases with greater firm size. A positive and significant relationship at the 
1% level is also observed between leverage (LEV) and the proxies for accrual-based and 
real activities earnings management, because DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) indicate that 
managers manipulate reported earnings upwards to meet debt covenants or contracts. A 
positive association is also found between LOSS and the proxies for earnings management, 
consistent with prior research. For example, Francis and Yu (2009) observe that firms that 
made a loss in previous years are more likely to manage profits upwards in the current year, 
and that those who made profits in the previous years have the tendency to manipulate 
profits downwards.  
The remaining firm-level control variables exhibit their expected sign and significance 
levels. For example, NOA is positively (at the 1% significance level) related to 
ABNOR_ACCRUALS and REALMGMT2, but positively related to REALMGMT1 at the 
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10% significance level. Additionally, BIG4 and TENURE show a weak negative 
relationship with ABNOR_ACCRUALS, suggesting that firm managers reduce accruals 
manipulation when external monitoring from BIG4 is high, but have the tendency to 
increase or decrease real activities manipulation due to limited scrutiny from auditors and 
regulators. The remaining firm-level and demographic control variables maintain their 
expected signs and levels of significance.  
3.7. Robustness Checks 
 
3.7.1. Alternative Measures of Real Activities 
In this section, varying sensitivity analyses are conducted to provide support for the results. 
Different measures of real activities are examined, in line with previous studies (Kothari et 
al., 2016; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). Further sensitivity analyses are also conducted using 
individual measures of real activities earnings management. Specifically, abnormal 
production costs (ABNOR_PCOST), abnormal discretionary expenses (ABNOR_DEXP) 
and abnormal cash flows (ABNOR_CASFO) are used as dependent variables and proxies 
for real activities earnings management. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) observe that 
aggregating these three individual variables to compute REALMGMT1 and 
REALMGMT2 might influence earnings and weaken the results. Table 3.13 provides the 
results for aggregated and individual measures of real activities earnings management. 
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Table 3.13:  Religiosity, Legal Environment and Real Activities Measures 
VARIABLE RAELMGMT1 REALMGMT 
2 
ABNOR_ 
PCOST 
ABNOR_ 
DEXP 
ABNOR_ 
CASFO 
      
REL 
    0.348*** 
(3.240) 
    0.049*** 
(3.396) 
    0.106*** 
(2.680) 
    0.240*** 
(3.200) 
      0.157*** 
      (2.580) 
LEGAL 
-0.210 
(-0.965 
-0.011 
(-1.365) 
-0.008 
(-1.142) 
-0.012 
(-1.265) 
-0.010 
(-1.423) 
REL x LEGAL 
 -0.481 
(-1.450) 
 -0.087 
(-1.478) 
  -0.211** 
(-2.450) 
  -0.342 
(-1.060 
  -0.152 
(-1.350 
SIZE 
   -0.544*** 
(-11.660) 
  -0.556*** 
(-12.540) 
  -0.110*** 
(-3.500) 
     -0.072*** 
  (-5.050) 
  -0.182*** 
(-8.090) 
ANALYST_FOL 
-0.012 
(-0.770) 
-0.023 
(-1.580) 
-0.023** 
(-2.100) 
 -0.036** 
(-2.220) 
-0.017** 
(-2.280) 
ROA 
    -0.951*** 
(-3.141) 
 -0.395*** 
(-3.029) 
    -0.029*** 
(-3.470) 
    -0.056*** 
(-4.360) 
  -0.030*** 
(-3.620) 
LEV 
0.248* 
(1.820) 
0.055 
(0.430) 
   0.045* 
(1.750) 
0.005 
(0.040) 
    0.275*** 
(4.190) 
BIG4 
-0.068 
(-1.040) 
-0.059 
(-0.920) 
-0.100 
 (-0.230) 
-0.107 
  (-1.570) 
-0.011 
(-0.360) 
MBV 
      -0.146*** 
(-10.150) 
    -0.100*** 
(-7.400) 
   -0.94*** 
(-9.490) 
    -0.051*** 
  (-3.530) 
    -0.122*** 
  (-7.770) 
LOSS 
0.052* 
(1.760) 
  0.073** 
(2.580) 
0.014* 
(1.670) 
     0.079** 
(2.590) 
0.025* 
(1.770) 
OPERA_RISK 
    0.037*** 
(2.620) 
   0.041*** 
(2.990) 
   0.015** 
(2.470) 
0.008 
(1.540) 
    0.031*** 
(4.380) 
RURAL 
-0.024 
(-1.050) 
-0.015 
(-0.720) 
-0.021 
  (-1.020) 
-0.010 
(-0.620) 
-0.012 
(-0.520) 
BENCHMARK 
-0.644* 
(-1.770) 
-0.532 
(-1.550) 
0.023 
  (0.920) 
-.0775** 
(-2.110) 
-0.028 
(-0.160) 
TENURE 
-0.009 
(-0.510) 
-0.002 
(-0.110) 
-0.001 
(-0.100) 
-0.026 
(-1.420) 
-0..001 
(-0.111) 
CHANGE_GDP 
-0.012* 
(-1.910) 
-0.007 
(-1.280) 
     -0.011*** 
(-2.590) 
-0.005 
(-0.740) 
-0.006** 
(-2.060) 
INVESTMENT 
0.498* 
(1.940) 
0.147 
(0.600) 
    0.077** 
(1.960) 
      0.840*** 
(3.200) 
  -0.097*** 
(9.670) 
NOA 
  0.106** 
(2.580) 
   0.169*** 
(4.320) 
0.710** 
(2.500) 
     0.226*** 
(5.370) 
0.012 
(1.590) 
CONSTANT 0.679 0.571 0.442 0.357  0.550 
 
Demographic Control 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,090 21,090 21,706 21,706 21,706 
R-square (overall) 0.09 0.15 0.12 0.06 0.09 
Breusch-Pagan 2497.65 2251.63 2247.58 2186.82 2132.47 
P-Value (0.7489) (0.7193) (0.6157) (0.6113) (0.6097) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 435 237 333 549 135 
P-Value (0.4138) (0.2181) (0.3213) (0.6123) (0.1938) 
Wooldridge Test 88.43 152.78 246.21 428.39 67.54 
P-Value (0.2378) (0.2981) (0.3346) (0.5134) (0.1938) 
 
Notes: *,** and *** are used in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent levels. In Table 3.13 we show the results of both aggregated and individual measures of real earnings 
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management (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). Models 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 are estimated using fixed effects regression; co-efficient 
estimates are shown above and t-statistics below in brackets.  
 
 
The individual results of the association between religious social norms and abnormal 
production costs (ABNOR_PCOST), abnormal discretionary expenses (ABNOR_DEXP) 
and abnormal cash flows (ABNOR_CASH) are presented in columns 4 to 6. Columns 2 
and 3 in Table 3.13 show the aggregated results for the measures of real activities earnings 
management, previously reported in Tables 3.11 and 3.12. Interestingly, the study finds 
evidence of a significant (P ≤ 0.003) positive association between religiosity and the three 
individual measures of real activities. The results are consistent with the aggregated 
measures of real activities (REALMGMT1 and REALMGMT2), suggesting that because 
real activities earnings management is not subject to intense scrutiny from auditors and 
does not violate GAAP, managers in religious social norm environment deem it 
appropriate, for example, to reduce advertising expenditure and R&D expenses, delay 
payment of goods, reduce selling prices and give higher discounts to influence reported 
profits upwards or downwards. This is consistent with the findings of McGuire et al. (2012), 
who observe a positive relationship between real activities and the religiosity of the firms’ 
environment. Similarly, the results also show that there is an insignificant negative 
relationship between legal environment and all proxies for real activities- based earnings 
management. The relationship between REL x LEGAL and the measures of real activities 
are also negatively insignificant. The results suggest that the interaction term between 
firms’ legal environment and religious social norms do not affect real activities. Thus, firm 
managers’ incentive to engage in real activities in a religious social norm environment is 
perhaps not affected by the litigation environment, because real activities are not illegal. 
Previous studies (McGuire et al., 2012; Dyreng et al., 2012) have observed the positive 
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relationship between REL and the two proxies of real activities, but failed to interact 
religiosity with the legal environment. This study supports the findings of McGuire et al. 
(2012), but for the first time new evidence is documented to show that the legal 
environment does not affect real activities but complement religious social norms of the 
firm’s environment to mitigate accruals earnings management. Therefore, the findings are 
consistent with earlier studies that indicate that a firm’s legal environment is related or not 
to earnings management practices (Behn et al., 2013; Haw et al., 2011; Callen et al., 2011; 
Leuz et al., 2003).  
3.7.2. Alternative Measures of Discretionary Accruals     
A further robustness test is conducted to estimate discretionary abnormal accruals using the 
working capital accruals defined in model (2). Therefore, in line with previous research 
(Behn et al., 2013; Dechow et al., 2012; Haw, Ho and Li, 2011; Xie et al., 2003), the study 
computes discretionary accruals using the modified Jones model and working capital 
accruals for each firm year observation and two digit SIC code and industry. Initially, only 
the religiosity (REL) of the firms’ environment is included in model (6) and a significant 
negative relationship is observed between REL and abnormal accruals (ABNOR_ACC) 
using total accruals and working capital accruals estimated in the modified Jones model. 
Subsequently, the study includes only a measure of the legal environment (LEGAL) in 
model (6) and an insignificant negative relationship is observed between LEGAL and 
ABNOR_ACC. Again, only the interaction between REL and LEGAL is included in model 
(6) and a significant negative relationship is observed between the interactive term REL x 
LEGAL and ABNOR_ACC. Finally, the study includes all the variables in model (6).  
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Table 3.14 shows the results after including all the variables in model (6) and indicates that 
the relationship between REL, LEGAL, REL x LEGAL and ABNOR_ACC is negatively 
significant, supporting the earlier findings that the association between REL and 
ABNOR_ACC is still negative and significant at a confidence level of 95% when 
discretionary accruals are computed using working capital accruals in the modified Jones 
model. Similarly, the results indicate that the relationship between REL x LEGAL and 
ABNOR_ACC is significantly negative (p < 0.001) when discretionary accruals are 
computed using total accruals and working capital accruals in the modified Jones model. 
The co-efficient of LEGAL is examined, and a negative but an insignificant relationship is 
observed between LEGAL and ABNOR_ACC when total accruals and working capital 
accruals are used in the modified Jones model. The results therefore suggest that the legal 
environment complements religiosity in mitigating accruals manipulation. The inferences 
regarding religious social norms, legal environment and abnormal accruals for firms in the 
U.S remain the same. In additional analysis, the study augments both the Jones model and 
modified Jones model to include lagged return on assets (ROA). Previous studies (Dechow 
et al., 2012; Kothari et al., 2005) observe that the inclusion of past ROA attenuates 
misspecification but does not eliminate it. Interestingly, in both Jones models with lagged 
ROA, it is observed that the relationship between ABNOR_ACC and REL, REL x LEGAL 
is significantly negative (p < 0.01). 
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Table 3.14:  Religiosity and Accrual-based Earnings Management Measures 
VARIABLE Modified-Jones Model 
(Total Accruals) 
Modified-Jones Model 
(Working Capital Accruals) 
   
REL 
                  - 0.062** 
(-2.317) 
    -0.058** 
(-2.254) 
LEGAL 
-0.015 
(-1.520) 
-0.014 
(-1.620) 
REL x LEGAL 
  -0.183*** 
(-3.612) 
   -0.187*** 
(-3.648) 
SIZE 
    -0.067*** 
(-4.600) 
  - 0.054*** 
(-3.460) 
ANALYST_FOL 
-0.004* 
(-1.648) 
-0.043 
(0.150) 
ROA 
   -0.071*** 
(-3.263) 
   -0.028*** 
(-4.460) 
LEV 
      0.092*** 
(4.830) 
      0.023*** 
(5.610) 
BIG4 
  -0.011** 
(-2.090) 
-0.009 
(-0.770) 
MBV 
     0.013*** 
(3.280) 
    0.023*** 
(4.180) 
LOSS 
0.005 
(1.140) 
0.009* 
(1.670) 
OPERA_RISK 
     0.014*** 
(3.290) 
     0.015*** 
(2.940) 
BENCHMARK 
0.005 
(1.530) 
-0.007 
(-0.110) 
TENURE 
-0.034 
(-0.630) 
-0.001 
(-0.380) 
CHANGE_GDP 
-0.002 
(-0.560) 
-0.002 
(-1.610) 
INVESTMENT 
-0.008 
(-0.040) 
-0.006 
(-0.380) 
NOA 
   -0.378*** 
(-9.830) 
    0.038*** 
(5.190) 
CONSTANT 0.024 0.051 
Demographic Control Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 10,902 10,902 
R-square (overall) 0.30 0.32 
 
Breusch-Pagan 1428.67 2094.37 
P-Value (0.6861) (0.7861) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 687 597 
P-Value (0.6415) (0.5608) 
Wooldridge Test 115.69 95.76 
P-Value (0.3726) (0.2871) 
Notes: *,**and *** are used in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent levels; both models 1 and 2 are estimated  using fixed effects regression. To compute abnormal discretional 
accruals, the modified Jones model is revised and total accruals (TAC) are replaced by working capital accruals 
(WC_ACRUALS), defined as earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortisation minus cash flows 
from operating activities (Dechow et al., 2012; Peasnell et al., 1999). Co-efficient estimates are shown above and t-
statistics below in brackets. 
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3.7.3. High and Low Religious Areas 
The study attempts further robustness analysis in high and low religious areas as the 
findings in Tables 3.9 to 3.12 do not reveal the extent to which the level (high or low) of 
religiosity in an area affects accrual-based and real activities earnings management 
practices. The study follows the method used in previous studies (McGuire et al., 2012; 
Callen et al., 2011) to break down the datasets into two samples, comprising high and low 
religious areas.  Areas with above the median religiosity figure of 52% are defined in the 
sample as having high religiosity, and those below this figure are defined as low religiosity 
areas. As indicated by McGuire et al. (2012), the attitudes and behaviour of the people in 
an environment are influenced by its religiosity. Therefore, it is expected that areas with 
high religiosity scores will have a more significant influence on accrual-based earnings 
management practices than areas with low religiosity figures.     
Table 3.15 presents the results of the analysis of the impact of high and low religious areas 
on earnings management. Two proxies for real activities and one proxy for accrual-based 
management are used in three separate regressions using model (6). Interestingly, a strong 
negative or positive association at the 1% significance level (P< 0.01) is observed between 
religiosity and accrual-based or real activities earnings management in high religiosity 
areas respectively. In the high religiosity areas, the inferences remain the same. From the 
results, the coefficients on both REL and REL x LEGAL are negative and significant for 
accrual-based earnings management. Consistent with previous results, the coefficient on 
REL is positive and significant for both measures of real activities earnings management. 
The coefficient on the interactive term REL x LEGAL is also negative, but not significantly 
related to real activities measures, suggesting that real activities in a religious social norms 
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environment are not illegal and firms are sued for fraud or fraudulent transactions but not 
real activities. Not surprisingly, it is noted that the associations between REL and 
ABNOR_ACC, and REALMGMT1 and REALMGMT2 in low religiosity areas is 
negatively or positively weak at the 10% significance level. This suggests and reinforces 
the findings that religious social norms in the firms’ environment has an influence on both 
accruals-based and real activities earnings management, and that the effect is pronounced 
in a highly religious environment. The findings further suggest that the legal environment 
plays a mitigating role and complements religiosity in subduing accrual-based earnings 
management, but has no direct impact on real activities earnings management. 
    Table 3.15: High Religiosity Areas vs Low Religiosity Areas 
Variables ABNOR_ACC REALMGMT1 REALMGMT2 
 HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW 
       
REL 
-0.084** 
(-2.432) 
-0.033* 
(-1.740) 
0.269*** 
(3.261) 
0.132* 
(1.774) 
0.080*** 
(3.221) 
0.056* 
(1.750) 
LEGAL -0.034 -0.026 -0.020 -0.017 -0.031 -0.028 
 (-1.289) (-1.218) (-1.314) (-1.274) (-1.199) (-1.089) 
REL x LEGAL 
-0.195*** 
(-5.458) 
-0.072* 
(-1.782) 
-0.354 
(-1.374) 
-0.144 
(-1.152) 
-0.178 
(-1.360) 
-0.082 
(-1.223) 
SIZE 
-0.051*** 
(-5.780) 
-0.024** 
(-2.280) 
-0.514*** 
(-8.760) 
-0.102 
(-1.010) 
0.524*** 
(9.490) 
0.183* 
(1.900) 
ANALYST_FOL 
-0.005* 
(-1.730) 
-0.001 
(-0.140) 
-0.013 
(-0.640) 
-0.026 
(-0.890) 
-0.035* 
(-1.800) 
-0.028 
(-1.020) 
ROA 
-0.091*** 
(-5.765) 
-0.015*** 
(-2.610) 
-0.317*** 
(-6.020) 
-0.81** 
(-2.160) 
-0.079*** 
(-4.620) 
 
-0.049*** 
(-3.790) 
LEV 
0.119*** 
(4.920) 
0.045* 
(1.870) 
0.360** 
(2.250) 
0.060 
(0.210) 
0.185 
(1.220) 
0.200 
(0.740) 
BIG4 
-0.005 
(-0.360) 
-0.016 
(-0.790) 
-0.114 
(-1.380) 
-0.111 
(-1.060) 
-0.093 
(-1.160) 
-0.127 
(-1.230) 
MBV 
0.015*** 
(5.710) 
0.013*** 
(2.660) 
0.160*** 
(9.300) 
0.118** 
(2.270) 
0.121*** 
(7.450) 
0.058** 
(2.270) 
LOSS 
0.011** 
(1.980) 
0.009 
(0.990) 
0.039 
(1.070) 
0.008 
(0.160) 
0.046 
(1.340) 
0.050 
(1.030) 
OPERA_RISK 
0.014*** 
(5.420) 
0.013*** 
(2.660) 
0.054*** 
(3.190) 
0.028 
(1.080) 
0.055*** 
(3.380) 
0.050* 
(1.980) 
BENCHMARK 
0.045 
(0.760) 
0.016 
(0.120) 
-0.930** 
(-2.340) 
-0.988 
(-1.380) 
-0.982*** 
(-2.620) 
-0.409 
(-0.610) 
TENURE 
-0.002 
(-0.520) 
-0.006 
(-1.060) 
-0.016 
(-0.730) 
-0.037 
(-1.200) 
-0.008 
(-0.400) 
-0.034 
(-1.140) 
CHANGE_GDP 
-0.001 
(-0.840) 
-0.002 
(-0.790) 
-0.007 
(-0.940) 
-0.016 
(-1.530) 
-0.004 
(-0.650) 
-0.011 
(-1.160) 
INVESTMENT 
-0.471*** 
(-9.900) 
-0.268*** 
(-3.420) 
0.793** 
(2.510) 
0.584 
(1.360) 
0.512* 
(1.720) 
0.825 
(0.220) 
NOA 
0.037*** 
(4.770) 
0.018 
(1.250) 
0.021*** 
(3.400) 
0.250** 
(2.090) 
0.102** 
(2.120) 
0.296*** 
(3.820) 
CONSTANT 0.518*** 0.061*** 0.335** 0.116* 0.180** 0.080** 
Demo. Control 
Variables 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
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Industry Fixed 
Effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations 16,463 5,266 14,158 5,932 16,463 5,266 
Adj. R-square 0.25 0.15 0.17 0.10 0.23 0.11 
Breusch-Pagan 1428.67 1385.13 2287.72 2074.12 2132.47 2120.89 
P-Value (0.6861) (0.6524) (0.6152) (0.6105) (0.6097) (0.6074) 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov 
234 145 137 114 208 121 
P-Value (0.3213) (0.1847) (0.2219) (0.1364) (0.2631) (0.1737) 
       
Wooldridge 
Test 
51.47 48.65 35.36 12.86 24.35 84.96 
P-Value (0.2934) (0.1857) (0.2342) (0.1787) (0.2137) (0.1628) 
 
Notes: *,** and *** are used in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent levels; both models 1 and 2 are estimated  using fixed effects regression. To compute abnormal discretional 
accruals, the modified Jones model is revised and total accruals (TAC) are replaced by working capital accruals 
(WC_ACRUALS), defined as earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortisation minus cash flows 
from operating activities (Dechow et al., 2012; Peasnell et al., 1999). Co-efficient estimates are shown above and t-
statistics below in brackets. 
 
 
3.7.4. Highest and Lowest Legal Environment States in the U.S.  
To ensure that the results of the study are free from potential bias and do not rely on 
generalisation of state liability systems across several states and years, the twenty highest 
and lowest legal environment datasets are used, covering the study and sample period. 
Previous studies (Behn et al., 2013; Luez et al., 2003; La Porta et al., 1998) observe that a 
strong legal environment boosts investor confidence and mitigates accrual-based earnings 
management. Therefore, legal environment datasets are selected for highest and lowest 
twenty states listed in Table 3.1. The aim is to ensure that the findings are free from bias 
and are not influenced by the size of the legal environment. Interestingly, it is found that 
the results are consistent with the initial findings. In particular, the coefficient on LEGAL 
is negative and insignificantly related to ABNOR_ACC, REALMGMT1 and 
REALMGMT2. Separate regressions (model 6) are run using sub-samples of the highest 
and lowest legal environment states and the results are presented in Table 3.16. 
Interestingly, the coefficient on LEGAL is negative and shows no significant relationship 
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with ABNOR_ACC, REALMGMT1 or REALMGMT2. The study also re-examines the 
effect of the interactive term REL x LEGAL on ABNOR_ACC, REALMGMT1 and 
REALMGMT2 in both the highest and lowest legal environment states. As shown in Table 
3.16, the coefficient on REL x LEGAL is negative and significantly (p < 0.01) related to 
ABNOR_ACC, suggesting that religiosity is induced by the firm’s litigation environment 
to play an effective monitoring role to reduce accruals earnings management. Overall, the 
results confirm that religiosity plays a monitoring role and that firm legal environment 
complements religiosity in mitigating accrual-based earnings management, but real 
activities are unaffected by litigation environment, in line with prior studies (McGuire et 
al., 2012, Luez et al., 2003; La Porta et al., 1998) 
Table 3.16: Legal Environment and Earnings Management in Twenty US States 
Variables ABNOR_ACC REALMGMT1 REALMGMT2 
 MOST LEAST MOST LEAST MOST LEAST 
       
REL   -0.048** -0.039**     0.236***     0.189***        0.058***    0.038** 
 
   (-2.040)   (-1.982) (2.932) (2.894) (3.020) (2.240) 
LEGAL 
    -0.044 
(-1.133) 
-0.013 
(-0.180) 
      -0.019 
(-1.363) 
-0.013 
(-1.174) 
-0.060 
(-1.221) 
-0.051 
(-1.102) 
REL x LEGAL 
   -0.181*** 
(-3.418) 
   -0.134*** 
(-2.902) 
    -0.244   
    (-1.425) 
-0.205 
(-1.152) 
-0.092 
(-1.560) 
-0.055 
(-1.263) 
SIZE 
  -0.055** 
(-2.460) 
-0.022** 
(-2.278) 
-0.201*** 
(-4.660) 
-0.125** 
(-2.540) 
- 0.050*** 
(-4.150) 
- 0.033*** 
(-3.280) 
ANALYST_FOL 
-0.004 
(-1.370) 
-0.002 
(-0.156) 
      -0.011 
(-1.470) 
-0.003 
(-1.358) 
-0.033** 
(-2.440) 
-0.033** 
(-2.340) 
ROA 
    -0.008** 
(-3.320) 
-0.011** 
(-2.432) 
  -0.132*** 
(-3.232) 
-0.82*** 
(-2.029) 
-0.28*** 
(-3.510) 
-0.11*** 
(-3.380) 
LEV 
     0.015** 
(2.170) 
0.041* 
(1.720) 
0.248* 
(1.820) 
0.055 
(0.430) 
0.059 
(2.580) 
0.020 
(0.120) 
BIG4 
-0.020 
(-1.460) 
-0.014 
(-0.585) 
-0.068 
(-1.040) 
-0.059 
(-0.920) 
-0.082* 
(-2.730) 
0.051** 
(1.680) 
MBV 
 0.003 
(1.150) 
 0.012** 
(2.450) 
-0.46*** 
(-3.240) 
-0.10*** 
(-2.400) 
0.025*** 
(2.330) 
0.014** 
(2.240) 
LOSS 
   0.004** 
(2.170) 
0.008 
(0.860) 
0.052* 
(1.760) 
0.073** 
(2.580) 
0.024* 
(1.730) 
   0.013* 
(1.650) 
OPERA_RISK 
   0.010** 
(2.380) 
  0.011** 
(2.260) 
0.037** 
(2.120) 
0.041** 
(2.090) 
0.003 
(1.100) 
0.002 
(1.420) 
BENCHMARK 
0.007 
(0.540) 
0.014 
(0.110) 
-0.024 
(-1.050) 
-0.015 
(-0.720) 
0.028 
(1.020) 
-0.036* 
(-1.790) 
TENURE 
-0.001 
(-0.360) 
-0.005 
(-1.120) 
-0.144* 
(-1.820) 
-0.132 
(-1.430) 
-0.007 
(-0.060) 
-0.002 
(-0.520) 
CHANGE_GDP 
  0.017** 
(2.040) 
-0.002 
(-0.784) 
-0.009 
(-0.510) 
-0.002 
(-0.110) 
-0.013* 
(-1.760) 
0.007** 
(1.690) 
INVESTMENT 
  -0.192* 
(-3.770) 
-0.054*** 
(-1.730) 
-0.012* 
(-1.910) 
-0.007 
(-1.280) 
-0.394*** 
(-3.620) 
-0.169* 
(-1.670) 
NOA 
         
0.02*** 
0.016 
(1.230) 
0.192* 
(1.830) 
0.120 
(0.810) 
0.055* 
(1.880) 
0.023 
(0.760) 
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(3.970) 
CONSTANT 0.139 0.121        0.264 0.116 0.180 0.118 
Demo. Control 
Variables 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Industry Fixed 
Effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations 6,463 5,388 5,986 5,532 6,463 5,388 
Adj. R-square 0.25 0.15 0.17 0.10 0.23 0.11 
Breusch-Pagan 1531.42 1298.19 2159.67 2079.82 2387.76 2257.89 
P-Value (0.7113) (0.6754) (0.6582) (0.62185) (0.6372) (0.6245) 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov 
282 123 217 114 209 83 
P-Value (0.3437) (0.2157) (0.2239) (0.1932) (0.2419) (0.1421) 
Wooldridge Test 721.26 42.58 39.33 18.59 26.18 82.64 
P-Value (0.2845) (0.1968) (0.2342) (0.1787) (0.2137) (0.1628) 
 
Notes: *,** and *** are used in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent levels; both models 1 and 2 are estimated using fixed effects regression. To compute abnormal discretional 
accruals, the modified Jones model is revised and total accruals (TAC) is replaced by working capital accruals 
(WC_ACRUALS), defined as earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortisation minus cash flows 
from operating activities (Dechow et al., 2012; Peasnell et al., 1999). Co-efficient estimates are shown above and t-
statistics below in brackets.  
 
3.7.5. Religiosity and Legal Environment Interaction in Urban Areas  
Further analysis is conducted to establish whether REL, LEGAL or REL x LEGAL have 
an influence on ABNOR_ACC, REALMGMT1 and REALMGMT2 in firms located in 
urban areas, and that the results are not driven by the higher earnings quality of the firms 
located in rural areas. Earlier studies (McGuire et al., 2012; Ucran, 2007) indicate that 
earnings quality is associated with rural firms and is strengthened when these firms are 
audited by the BIG4 auditors or have strong internal controls (Bayley and Taylor, 2007; 
Dechow et al., 2010). Rural and urban areas sub-samples are used to examine the impact 
of REL, LEGAL and REL x LEGAL on ABNOR_ACC, REALMGMT1 and 
REALMGMT2. The study follows the procedure in previous studies (McGuire et al., 2012; 
Dyreng 2012; Loughran and Schulz, 2005) and classifies MSA in each county with a 
population of over five million as urban areas and repeats the main test using the urban area 
sub-sample.  
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Table 3.17: Religiosity and Legal Environment Interaction in Urban Area Sub-
sample 
VARIABLE ABNOR_ACC REALMGMT1 REALMGMT2 
    
REL 
    -0.044** 
(-2.370) 
   0.280*** 
(2.810) 
    0.092*** 
(3.170) 
LEGAL 
-0.037 
(-1.090) 
-0.080 
(-1.250) 
-0.082 
(-1.270) 
REL x LEGAL 
   -0.137*** 
(-3.090) 
-0.075 
(-1.250) 
 -0.089 
(-1.270) 
SIZE 
     0.057*** 
(7.060) 
  0.504*** 
(9.150) 
   0.513*** 
(9.780) 
ANALYST_FOL 
-0.005* 
(-1.670) 
                   -0.031 
(-1.640) 
-0.043** 
(-2.440) 
ROA 
      - 0.075*** 
(-8.920) 
-0.075*** 
(-6.510) 
  -0.156*** 
(-5.380) 
LEV 
     0.118*** 
(4.870) 
0.259 
(1.580) 
0.022 
(0.140) 
BIG4 
-0.020* 
(-1.660) 
-0.072 
(-0.930) 
0.091 
(1.180) 
MBV 
      0.013*** 
(5.150) 
  0.125*** 
(7.330) 
    0.084*** 
(5.240) 
LOSS 
0.004 
(0.770) 
0.064* 
(1.830) 
  0.075** 
(2.250) 
OPERA_RISK 
      0.015*** 
(5.780) 
0.025 
(1.500) 
  0.028* 
 (1.720) 
BENCHMARK 
0.047 
(0.740) 
0.878** 
(-2.020) 
-0.736* 
 (-1.790) 
TENURE 
-0.002 
(-0.560) 
-0.021 
(-0.960) 
-0.017 
(-0.850) 
CHANGE_GDP 
-0.001 
(-0.040) 
-0.013* 
(-1.760) 
-0.007 
(-0.990) 
INVESTMENT 
-0.392*** 
(-8.570) 
0.194 
(0.620) 
0.169 
(0.570) 
NOA 
0.002*** 
(2.970) 
0.165*** 
(3.380) 
0.223*** 
(4.760) 
CONSTANT 1.368** 1.157** 1.131** 
Demographic Cont. 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12,612 12,111 12,612 
Adj. R-square (overall) 0.19 0.07 0.13 
Breusch-Pagan 1347.42 2127.34 2108.52 
P-Value (0.6228) (0.6427) (0.6229) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 612 582 586 
P-Value (0.6358) (0.6184) (0.6241) 
Wooldridge Test 129.32 132.74 124.28 
P-Value (0.3664) (0.4269) (0.3212) 
Notes: We use *,**,*** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 
percent levels; we estimate both models 1 and 2  using fixed effects regression. To compute abnormal discretional 
accruals, we revise the modified Jones model and replace total accruals (TAC) by working capital accruals 
(WC_ACRUALS) defined as earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortisation minus cash flows 
from operating activities (Dechow et al., 2012; Peasnell et al., 1999). We show co-efficient estimates above and t-statistics 
below in brackets.  
 
Table 3.17 presents the results of the analysis of the relationship between REL, LEGAL, 
REL x LEGAL and ABNOR_ACC, REALMGMT1 and REALMGMT2 for firms located 
in urban areas. Indeed, using only the urban area sub-sample, the conclusions remain the 
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same.  It is found that the coefficient of REL is negative and significantly (at the 5% level) 
associated with ABNOR_ACC, but positive and significantly (at the 1% level) associated 
with REALMGMT and REALMGMT2. Similarly, the coefficient of REL x LEGAL is 
negative and significantly (at the 1% level) associated with ABNOR_ACC, and negative 
but insignificantly associated with REALMGMT and REALMGMT2. This suggests that 
the findings in respect of the association between REL, REL x LEGAL and ABNOR_ACC, 
REALMGMT1 and REALMGMT2 are not solely influenced by the high earnings quality 
associated with rural areas. The findings are robust and clearly demonstrate that the legal 
environment complements religiosity in curbing accruals manipulation, but weakens the 
positive impact of religiosity on real activities in the U.S or legal environment has no direct 
impact on real activities. 
3.7.6. Religiosity, Legal Environment, Corporate Governance and Earnings 
Management 
Previous studies (Cheng et al., 2016; Zalata and Roberts, 2015; Lin and Hwang, 2010; 
Harris and Raviv, 2008) indicate that strong corporate governance acts as a form of 
monitoring mechanism, controls devious managerial behaviour, and reduces information 
risk. Similarly, other studies (Xie et al., 2003; Peasnell et al., 2005) observe a negative 
association between board tenure, proportion of independent directors and accrual-based 
earnings management. Hossain et al., (2011) and Xie et al. (2003) observe that the 
relationship between board size, number of meetings and accrual-based earnings 
management is negative. Moreover, audit committees, number of meetings, financial 
expertise, CEO tenure and number of outside directors have been found to reduce earning 
management. The preceding analyses have demonstrated that the legal environment and 
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religious social norms curb accrual-based earnings management, but weaken the positive 
effect of religiosity on real activities or has no direct effect on managers’ incentive to 
engage in real activities earnings management practices in a firm. Based on the previous 
literature, it is possible that where there is effective corporate governance, the impact of 
religion and legal environment on accrual- and real activities earnings management will be 
irrelevant or insignificant. On the other hand, the influence of firms’ legal environment and 
religious social norms could complement the existing corporate governance mechanisms 
as a form of internal monitoring. The study tests the relationship by controlling for 
corporate governance variables and excludes the BIG4 auditors and auditor tenure from the 
original model to avoid multi-collinearity problems. In particular, board size (BODSIZE), 
number of independent directors (BODIND) and audit committees (AUCOM) are used as 
proxies for corporate governance. Secondly, the study relates and interacts governance 
variables with religiosity (REL x BODSIZE; REL x BODIND and REL x AUCOM) in the 
original model (6). Similar to Chapter 2, to avoid multicollinearity problems, a separate 
regression is run for each variable. First, only BODSIZE is included in the model; 
thereafter, BODINS and AUCOM. The same process is repeated for REL x BODSIZE, 
REL x BODIND and REL x AUCOM respectively. Finally, the study includes all the 
variables in the model, but the results appear very similar. 
Table 3.18 present the initial results of the association between religiosity, legal 
environment, corporate governance variables and proxies for earnings management. 
Clearly, the co-efficient on both REL and REL x LEGAL are negative and significantly 
related to ABNOR_ACC, even after controlling for corporate governance variables in the 
model. A significantly negative relationship (at the 1% level, p-value = 0.003) is found 
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between REL x LEGAL and ABNOR_ACC. However, the study observes a positive 
relationship at the 5% significance level between REL and REALMGMT1, 
REALMGMT2. The coefficient on LEGAL is still negative but not significant. Thereafter, 
the study includes REL x BODSIZE, REL x BODIND and REL x AUCOM in the model 
and finds a significantly negative relationship at the 1% level, p-value = 0.001 between 
REL x BODSIZE, REL x BODIND and REL x AUCOM and ABNOR_ACC. The results 
suggest when a firm operates in a religious social norms environment, with a high 
proportion of independent directors, large board size and strong audit committee with some 
financial experts on the committee, the incentive to engage in accruals-based earnings 
management is reduced. This negative impact of religion on accruals manipulation 
behaviour is induced by the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanism such as; 
BODSIZE, BODIND and AUCOM. This finding is consistent with previous studies (Zalata 
and Robert, 2015; McGuire et al., 2012; Callen et al., 2011). The inferences remain the 
same and confirm that religiosity complements existing governance mechanisms in 
subduing accruals and real activities earnings management practices. The inclusion of 
corporate governance variables maintains the level of significance for the association 
between REL and ABNOR_ACC, but the coefficient and t-values change from -0.074 and 
-2.415 to -0.064 and -2.249 respectively. This suggests that REL mitigates ABNOR_ACC 
and that the results complement the existing corporate governance mechanisms. Therefore, 
the initial results are supported, in that there is a significantly negative association between 
REL and ABNOR_ACC at the 5% significance level. This study reports that firms’ 
religious social norm environment complements existing governance mechanisms (e.g. 
BODSIZE, BODIND and AUCOM) to subdue ABNOR_ACC.   
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Notes: We use *,**,*** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels; 
we estimate both models 1 and 2  using fixed effects regression. To compute abnormal discretional accruals, we revise the modified 
Jones model and replace total accruals (TAC) by working capital accruals (WC_ACRUALS) defined as earnings before extraordinary 
Table 3.18 : Religiosity and Corporate Governance Variable Interactions 
VARIABLE ABNOR_ACC RAELMGMT1 REALMGMT2 
    
REL 
-0.064** 
(-2.249) 
0.259** 
(2.408) 
0.040** 
(2.390) 
LEGAL 
-0.014 
(-1.453) 
-0.210 
(-0.965) 
-0.012 
(-1.382) 
REL x LEGAL 
-0.184*** 
(-3.681) 
- 0.392 
(-1.360) 
-0.078 
(-1.209) 
BODSIZE 
-0.031*** 
(-2.120) 
-0.024** 
(-2.230) 
  -0.094** 
(-2.020) 
BODIND 
-0.293*** 
(-2.703) 
-0.097** 
(-2.420) 
-0.086** 
(-2.190) 
AUCOM 
-0.017** 
(-2.420) 
-0.042** 
(-2.030) 
-0.068 
(-1.449) 
RELBODSIZE 
-0.135*** 
(-3.270) 
-0.054** 
(-2.130) 
-0.088** 
(-2.009) 
RELBODIND 
-0.076*** 
(-3.868) 
-0.087** 
(-2.090) 
-0.016** 
(-1.980) 
RELAUCOM 
-0.275*** 
(-3.346) 
-0.066** 
(-2.040) 
-0.075 
(-1.580) 
SIZE 
-0.034** 
(-2.190) 
0.055*** 
(3.660) 
0.055*** 
(3.500) 
ANALYST_FOL 
-0.066 
(-1.480) 
-0.013 
(-0.810) 
-0.024 
(-1.570) 
ROA 
-0.004*** 
(-4.690) 
-0.095*** 
(-8.360) 
-0.039*** 
(-7.180) 
LEV 
0.170 
(1.350) 
0.252 
(1.550) 
0.058 
(0.440) 
MBV 
0.093 
(1.550) 
0.252 
(1.110) 
0.396* 
(1.920) 
LOSS 
0.013*** 
(2.600) 
0.053** 
(2.470) 
0.099*** 
(3.360) 
OPERA_RISK 
0.005** 
(2.170) 
0.039 
(1.600) 
0.073*** 
(2.590) 
BENCHMARK 
0.014 
(1.480) 
-0.637 
(-1.630) 
0.042 
(1.070) 
CHANGE_GDP 
0.035 
(0.640) 
-0.012 
(-0.960) 
-0.529 
(-1.550) 
INVESTMENT 
-0.004 
(-0.420) 
0.485 
(0.890) 
0.002 
(0.120) 
NOA 
0.377* 
(1.820) 
0.108*** 
(2.620) 
0.008 
(1.320) 
CONSTANT 1.538 1.479 1.422 
Demographic Control Variables Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,729 21,090 21,090 
R-square (overall) 0.29 0.08 0.13 
Breusch-Pagan 4524.43 5273.25 5104.52 
P-Value (0.7245) (0.6718) (0.6497) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 614 587 593 
P-Value (0.6362) (0.6186) (0.6254) 
Wooldridge Test 137.18 135.52 121.37 
P-Value (0.3681) (0.4272) (0.3208) 
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items plus depreciation and amortisation minus cash flows from operating activities (Dechow et al., 2012; Peasnell et al., 1999). We 
show co-efficient estimates above and t-statistics below in brackets. 
 
Once more, the inferences remain the same for real activities earnings management. In 
columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.18, there is a significantly (P < 0.05) positive association 
between REL, REALMGMT1 and REALMGMT2. The coefficient and t-values without 
governance variables (Table 3.10) for REALMGMT1 decrease from 0.273 to 0.259 and 
3.287 to 2.408. Similarly, the coefficient and t-values without governance variables for 
REALMGMT2 fall from 0.057 to 0.040 and 3.315 to 2.390 respectively. Even though 
corporate governance mitigates earnings management, with real-activities the impact 
becomes relatively less pronounced.  
In addition, a negative association is observed between the governance variables 
(BODSIZE, BODIND and AUCOM) and measures of real earnings management, at the 
level of 5% (p < 0.05).  It is also found that the results show a significantly negative 
association at levels of 1% or 5% between RELBODSIZE, RELBODIND, RELAUCOM 
and REALMGMT1, REALMGNT2. This finding indicates that the joint effect of religious 
social norms environment and corporate governance mechanism in an organisation play a 
mitigating role in both accruals and real activities earnings management. That is, in a 
religious social norm environment with high proportion of independent directors, large 
board size and strong audit committee, the extent of real activities are minimised, 
especially, when such activities will compromise shareholders interest or minimize 
shareholder value. Again, the results indicate that the existing governance mechanism 
becomes more effective in mitigating managerial opportunistic behaviour especially in a 
religious social norm environment. This result is consistent with Haw et al., (2011) and 
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McGuire et al., (2012) findings. Indeed, the results show that the religiosity of the firms’ 
environment has the potential to shape the attitudes and behaviour of firms’ managers, even 
when there is a strong corporate governance mechanism in operation. On the other hand, it 
is demonstrated that religious social norms can serve as another form of monitoring for 
stakeholders and complement the existing legal environment or governance mechanisms 
instituted by management to curb accruals manipulation (Ayers et al., 2011; Burns et al., 
2010). Overall, the results demonstrate that religious social norms curb accrual-based 
earnings management, but religious social norm environment is positively related to real-
activities based earnings management. However, the positive effect of religiosity on real 
activities is weakened by the firms’ legal environment and corporate governance 
mechanism.  
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3.8. Conclusions 
The study has examined the impact of religiosity and legal environment, and the interaction 
between these, on accrual-based and real activities-based earnings management in the U.S. 
Previous studies (Kim and Park, 2014; Donelson et al., 2016; McGuire et al., 2012) provide 
evidence that religious social norms in the firms’ environment influence accruals-based and 
real activities earnings management. Several studies (Cheng et al., 2016; Zalata and 
Roberts, 2015; Lin and Hwang, 2010; Harris and Raviv, 2008) also report that a firm’s 
corporate governance mechanism subdues earnings management practices. This study 
builds on previous ones (McGuire et al., 2012; Dyreng et al., 2012) to establish the 
association between religiosity, legal environment and earnings management practices. It 
also examines the interactive effect of legal environment, governance variables and 
religiosity, using county-level religiosity datasets from the ARDA database between 2000 
and 2010. The findings support those of previous studies (McGuire et al., 2012; Callen et 
al., 2011; Dyreng et al., 2012), and it is shown that religiosity is still negative and 
significantly associated with accrual-based earnings management, but positive and 
significantly associated with two measures of real activities earnings management for firms 
headquartered in highly religious social norms environments in the U.S. For the first time, 
religiosity is interacted with the firms’ legal environment to examine their impact on 
accrual-based and real activities earnings management. This study provides the first time 
evidence to complement the earnings management literature and shows that firms’ legal 
environment complements religiosity in mitigating accrual-based earnings management 
practices. Also for the first time, evidence is documented to show that the positive impact 
of religiosity on real activities is subdued by the legal environment. Therefore, the positive 
relationship between religiosity and real activities based earnings management can no 
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longer be supported or demonstrated. The study documents evidence consistent with 
previous studies (Zalata and Roberts, 2015; Lin and Hwang, 2010; Harris and Raviv, 2008) 
and shows that the presence of good corporate governance mechanism in a firm mitigates 
accrual-based earnings management practices and that the negative impact is much more 
pronounced in a religious social norm environment. This also suggests that religiosity 
complements existing governance mechanisms to subdue accrual-based earnings 
management practices. However, the study finds that the positive impact of religiosity on 
real activities becomes less effective when religiosity interacts with the legal environment 
or corporate governance variables. These findings are consistent with those of McGuire et 
al. (2012), who indicate that real activities are positively related to the religiosity of the 
firms’ environment; however, McGuire et al. (2012) did not interact religiosity with the 
legal environment or corporate governance.  
The study contributes to the literature on accrual-based and real activities earnings 
management in three ways. First, it reports that the interaction between religiosity and the 
legal environment has a significant negative effect on accrual-based earnings management. 
This is an important contribution to knowledge and literature on accrual-based earnings 
management. Second, the study shows that firms’ legal environment and good corporate 
governance subdue the positive impact of religiosity on real activities earnings management 
reported by earlier studies (McGuire et al., 2012; Dyreng et al., 2012). However, the 
interactive term between religiosity and governance variables plays a monitoring role in 
subduing accrual-based earnings management. Thus, the findings extend the research that 
examines the relationship between accrual-based and real activities earnings management 
and corporate governance, and documents evidence that religiosity can complement 
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corporate governance to serve as a form of internal monitoring to mitigate accrual-based 
earnings manipulation by firm managers.  
Third, the study supports the findings of previous studies (McGuire et al., 2012; Callen et 
al., 2011; Dyreng et al., 2012; Grullon et al., 2010) and provides additional evidence that 
even with different measures, models and estimations for accrual-based and real activities 
earnings management, religiosity is negatively or positively associated with these methods. 
In addition, it is shown that religiosity impacts on firms in rural and high religious areas 
than urban and low religious areas. However, when religious social norms of the firms’ 
environment interact with firms’ legal environment, managers’ incentives to engage in real 
activities are reduced, probably because of fear of court action, legal suits or loss of 
reputation. In conclusion, it is found that religious social norms shape attitudes and beliefs 
and influence management decision-making, especially for firms headquartered in rural 
and highly religious areas, but that firms’ legal environment plays a complementary role in 
mitigating earnings management practices.  
The limitation of the study is that it uses the religious social norms of the firms’ 
environment, therefore, future studies should consider interviewing management and staff 
to establish their respective religious backgrounds.  Whilst this method will provide 
primary religious data sources for the study, it is very sensitive information to collect, and 
very costly and time- consuming to interview individual managers across several firms in 
the U.S. Moreover, individual managers are not open nowadays about their religious 
position; consequently, previous studies (McGuire et al., 2012; Callen et al., 2011; Dyreng 
et al., 2012; Grullon et al., 2010) have relied on religious databases for their analysis.  
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Another limitation is the legal environment data. Although firm managers were interviewed 
and data collected from sources by Harris Polls, the sample size was small and could affect 
the results of the analysis. It is admitted that this limitation could influence the results and 
therefore future studies should consider a larger sample size. One way to improve the 
overall sample is to widen the scope of respondents by the interviewers; for example, Harris 
Polls could contact as many managers, employees and shareholders as possible who are 
connected to the sampled firms. In addition, this study did not capture the national cultural 
differences across U.S. states. This is likely to be a limitation, as these differences affect 
due diligence, influence firms’ cost of equity (Gray et al., 2013) and foreign direct 
investments (Kogut and Singh, 1998). Cultural differences can also affect the quality of 
financial information (Roth and O’Donnell, 1996) and cultural distant affects the 
shareholder wealth of the acquiring firm (Angwin, 2001). This study did not have access 
to state by state cultural databases. Future research should establish U.S. state by state 
cultural variables (if any) to assess their impact on both accrual-based and real activities 
earnings management. Notwithstanding, the results and the findings from the study are 
useful for regulators, external monitors and stakeholders to help create value for 
shareholders. 
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Appendix B 
Table B1: Sample Selection Procedures and Derivation 
A: Description (Sample Period: 2002-2015)  
 
 
Initial Sample: Firm year observations with financial data 172,619 
Exclude: Financial services companies (SIC Codes 60-69) (51,251) 
Exclude: Firms with missing financial information  (43,883) 
Exclude: Observations with fewer than 8 firms year observations in 
each SIC/year combination 
(28,117) 
Exclude: Firms with revenue less than $1million (27,639) 
Final usable sample  21,729 
 
Number of unique firms               =        1,416  
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Table B2: Classification by Year and Industry 
SIC Industry 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
10 Metal Mining  8 11 13 13 13 15 17 15 14 16 19 17 16 11 
127 
13 Oil & Gas 66 68 71 72 70 68 70 67 71 68 72 69 73 68 631 
20 Food & Related Products 
23 25 29 33 35 36 39 42 45 
43 41 44 47 
25 
353 
22 Textile & Printing Products  
31 33 37 41 43 44 47 51 54 
52 49 53 56 
33 
437 
27 Printing & Publishing 
18 21 19 19 19 17 15 14 14 
15 17 16 16 
21 
165 
28 Chemicals & Allied Products 
103 145 148 137 136 128 126 124 112 
125 128 126 114 
145 
1,173 
34 Primary Metal Products 
80 96 93 84 81 79 77 75 76 
76 79 77 78 
96 
751 
35 Industrial Machinery & Equipment 85 113 102 103 100 97 97 98 95 99 99 100 97 113 909 
36 Electronic Equipment 119 180 189 179 168 160 157 146 139 147 159 148 141 180 1,465 
37 Transportation Equipment 29 40 43 46 46 45 45 44 45 45 47 46 47 40 393 
38 Instruments & Related Products 135 195 196 183 173 160 153 145 132 146 155 147 134 195 1,509 
48 Communications 39 36 39 35 32 31 29 27 25 28 31 29 27 36 303 
49 Electricity, Gas & Sanitary Services 11 21 21 21 19 20 19 15 15 16 21 17 17 21 173 
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50 Wholesale Trade - Durables 123 164 151 141 135 134 131 125 120 126 133 127 122 164 1,242 
73 Business Services 96 130 144 116 104 98 92 83 87 84 94 85 89 130 963 
79 Amusement & Recreation 8 12 12 10 10 10 10 12 12 13 12 14 14 12 107 
80 Health Services 17 23 25 24 24 24 24 20 16 21 26 22 18 23 211 
87 Eng. & Management Services 24 29 30 26 23 20 19 15 15 16 21 17 17 29 213 
 Total 
1372 
1679 1719 1640 1588 1543 1524 1475 1444 1493 1560 1511 1480 1699 21,729 
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Table B3: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance Levels (TOL) 
VARIABLES ABNOR_ACC REALMGMT1 REALMGMT2 
 Co-eff / t-
value 
TOL VIF Co-eff / t-
value 
TOL VIF Co-eff / t-
value 
TOL VIF 
REL 
-0.074 
(-2.415) 0.41 2.46 
  0.259** 
(2.408) 0.42 2.40 
0.040** 
(2.390) 0.40 2.50 
LEGAL 
 -0.004 
(-1.452) 0.38 2.66 
-0.210 
(-0.965) 0.38 2.60 
-0.012 
(-1.382) 0.38 2.62 
REL x LEGAL 
-0.165 
(-1.387) 0.35 2.86 
- 0.392 
(-1.360) 0.36 2.80 
-0.078 
(-1.209) 0.36 2.77 
SIZE 
 -0.065*** 
(-9.287) 0.58 1.71 
   0.055*** 
(3.660) 0.61 1.65 
0.055*** 
(3.500) 0.60 1.67 
ANALYST_FOL 
  -0.005* 
(-1.741) 0.93 1.07 
-0.013 
          (-0.810) 0.99 1.01 
-0.024 
(-1.570) 0.97 1.03 
ROA 
  -0.125*** 
(-3.016) 0.64 1.57 
-0.095*** 
(-8.360) 0.67 1.50 
-0.039*** 
(-7.180) 0.66 1.52 
LEV 
  0.034*** 
(3.875) 0.74 1.36 
0.252 
(1.550) 0.78 1.29 
0.058 
(0.440) 0.75 1.33 
BIG4 
-0.052** 
(-2.250) 0.88 1.14 
-0.072 
(-0.930) 0.93 1.07 
-0.072 
(-0.930) 0.90 1.11 
MBV 
   0.016*** 
(6.036) 0.78 1.28 
0.252 
(1.110) 0.83 1.21 
0.396* 
(1.920) 0.80 1.25 
LOSS 
0.085 
(1.175) 0.65 1.53 
0.053** 
(2.470) 0.68 1.46 
0.099*** 
(3.360) 0.67 1.50 
OPERA_RISK 
    0.022*** 
(3.573) 0.90 1.11 
0.039 
(1.600) 0.96 1.04 
0.073*** 
(2.590) 0.93 1.08 
RURAL 
0.007 
(1.456) 0.58 1.71 
0.007 
(1.456) 0.61 1.65 
0.007 
(1.456) 0.60 1.67 
BENCHMARK 
  0.027 
(0.754) 0.56 1.77 
0.006 
(1.387) 0.59 1.70 
0.004 
(1.408) 0.57 1.74 
TENURE 
-0.009 
(-0.493) 0.79 1.27 
-0.637 
(-1.530) 0.83 1.20 
-0.067 
(-1.470) 0.81 1.24 
CHANGE_GDP 
 -0.008 
(-0.754) 0.82 1.22 
-0.012 
(-0.960) 0.87 1.15 
-0.529 
(-1.550) 0.84 1.19 
INVESTMENT 
  -0.065** 
(-2.118) 0.87 1.15 
0.485 
(0.890) 0.93 1.08 
0.002 
(0.120) 0.94 1.06 
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NOA 
     0.040*** 
(4.478) 0.53 1.87 
0.108*** 
(2.620) 0.56 1.80 
0.008 
(1.320) 0.56 1.78 
BODSIZE 
  -0.031*** 
(-2.120) 0.60 1.67 
-0.024** 
(-2.230) 0.63 1.60 
-0.094** 
(-2.020) 0.63 1.58 
BODIND 
   -0.293*** 
       (-2.703) 0.64 1.57 
-0.097** 
(-2.420) 0.67 1.50 
-0.086** 
(-2.190) 0.68 1.48 
AUCOM 
    0.017** 
       (-2.420) 0.62 1.62 
-0.042** 
(-2.030) 0.65 1.55 
          -0.068 
(-1.449) 0.65 1.53 
RELBODSIZE 
 -0.135*** 
(-3.270) 0.51 1.97 
-0.054** 
(-2.130) 0.53 1.90 
-0.088** 
(-2.009) 0.53 1.88 
RELBODIND 
     -0.076*** 
(-3.868) 0.48 2.07 
-0.087** 
(-2.090) 0.50 2.00 
-0.016** 
(-1.980) 0.51 1.97 
RELAUCOM 
  -0.275*** 
        (-3.346) 0.42 2.37 
-0.066** 
(-2.040) 0.43 2.30 
-0.075 
(-1.580) 0.44 2.27 
POPN 
-0.408 
(-1.478) 0.31 3.20 
-0.408 
(-1.478) 0.29 3.40 
-0.408 
(-1.478) 0.30 3.37 
MINORITY 
        -0.018 
       (-1.478) 0.43 2.34 
        -0.016 
         (-1.407) 0.43 2.32 
         -0.012 
          (-1.308) 0.44 2.29 
EDUC 
    -0.042*** 
(-3.478) 0.49 2.04 
    -0.035*** 
(-2.821) 0.50 2.02 
    -0.034** 
(-2.538) 0.49 2.04 
INCOME 
   -0.142** 
(-2.478) 
 
0.50 1.99 
   -0.028* 
(-1.778) 0.51 1.97 
   -0.012** 
(-2.215) 0.50 1.99 
AGE 
    0.072*** 
(4.478)   
 
0.52 1.91 
    0.038** 
(2.198)   0.53 1.89 
    0.043*** 
(3.104)   0.52 1.91 
POLITICAL 
   0.004** 
 (2.175) 0.55 1.82 
 0.006 
 (0.907) 0.56 1.80 
   0.003* 
 (1.809) 0.55 1.82 
Observations 21,279   21,090   21,090   
Adjusted R2 0.33   0.12   0.16   
F-Value 26.17***   35.64***   23.89***   
    
Notes: All variables are defined in Table 3.1b. The study uses *,**and *** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. The 
co-efficient estimates are shown above and the t-statistics below in brackets. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance Level (TOL) are respectively shown for the three independent 
variables. Full discussion of the VIF and TOL are provided in the study.
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Chapter 4: The Impact of Countrywide Religiosity, National Culture and Legal 
Environment on Classification Shifting- Global Evidence 
 
4.1. Introduction  
Research on accrual-based and real activities earnings management is diverse and recently 
attempts have been made in the U.S. to examine their association with the religious social 
norms of the firms' environment (McGuire et al., 2012; Callen et al., 2011; Dyreng et al., 
2012). This study goes a step further, as it is the first to explore the association between 
countrywide religiosity, countrywide culture, legal environment and classification shifting. 
Specifically, it provides new international evidence on the joint effect of the legal 
environment and countrywide religiosity, and legal environment and national dimensions 
of cultural perspectives on classification shifting in 63 countries. Indeed, the evidence in 
previous literature demonstrates that U.S. firms engage in classification shifting, accrual-
based and real activities earnings management (Jarvinen and Myllymaki, 2016; Kothari et 
al., 2016; Zalata & Roberts, 2015; Fan et al., 2010; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; McVay, 
2006; Rowchoudhury, 2006). Surprisingly, only a few studies have provided evidence of 
classification shifting in an international setting. For instance, Behn et al. (2013) examine 
the relationship between classification shifting, analyst following and investor protection 
in 41 countries and observe that it decreases when analysts follow firms and investor 
protection is strong. Haw et al. (2011) also indicate that in East Asia, code law countries 
are associated with classification shifting behaviour, but that a lower incidence of this is 
seen amongst countries with strong legal institutions.  Interestingly, in relation to the joint 
effect of legal environment and religiosity and legal environment and national culture on 
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classification shifting, no such study exists in the literature. The literature has, however, 
investigated the impact of religiosity on accrual-based and real activities earnings 
management (McGuire et al., 2012; Dyreng et al., 2012). For example, McGuire et al. 
(2012) find a negative relationship between religiosity and accrual–based earnings 
management. Similarly, Callen et al. (2011) explore the relationship between culture and 
accrual-based earnings management in 49 countries. They find that different variables of 
Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions, for example, individualism and uncertainty 
avoidance, are either positively or negatively related to accrual manipulation. In a related 
study, Desender et al. (2007) observe that high individualism and egalitarianism are 
associated with low accrual- or real activities earnings manipulation.  
This study extends the earnings management literature and broadens the international 
evidence of classification shifting. It investigates classification shifting in 63 countries in 
relation to the joint effect of legal environment and religiosity as well as legal environment 
and national culture, as their impact on classification shifting in an international setting is 
missing from the earnings management literature. Previous studies on religiosity and 
accrual-based earnings management in an international setting find that religious affiliation 
and degree of religiosity do not influence this type of earnings management (Callen et al., 
2011). Callen et al. (2011) indicate further that religious adherents do not view earnings 
management as devious managerial practice, like tax evasion, but it’s a positive approach 
to signal firm performance. However, this finding contradicts earlier studies in the U.S. 
(McGuire et al., 2012; Dyreng et al., 2012), which observe a negative association between 
religiosity and accrual-based earnings management and a positive relationship between 
religiosity and real activities earnings management.   
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In addition, this study investigates the extent to which earnings management through the 
misclassification of core expenses into special items is influenced by national culture. The 
effect of culture on classification shifting has not been examined in the earnings 
management literature. Specifically, the literature has failed to document evidence of the 
influence of national culture on classification shifting. Stulz and Williamson (2003) 
observe that culture influences countrywide values, legal systems and institutions, as well 
as economic resource allocation. In a related study, Fan, Rui and Zhao (2008) find that 
corporate financing choices are shaped by culture, industry and a country’s institutional 
factors. Recently, Ahern, Daminelli and Fracassi (2015) find that national cultural 
dimensions of individualism, trust and hierarchy affect financing decisions, mergers and 
acquisitions. Other studies indicate that culture mediates tax evasion and accrual-based 
earnings management (Tsakumis, Curatola and Porcano; 2007; Richardson, 2008). These 
studies observe a negative association between accrual-based earnings management and 
Hofstede’s (1980) culture dimension of individualism, but a positive relationship between 
uncertainty avoidance and accrual manipulation. In addition, Li et al., (2013) find that the 
national culture of individualism is positively related to corporate risk-taking, whereas 
uncertainty avoidance is negatively associated with it. To provide further evidence, this 
study extends international evidence of research on earnings management; specifically, to 
examine the effect of national culture, as well as the joint effect of legal environment and 
national culture, on classification shifting in an international setting.  
Thirdly, the study examines the influence of legal enforcement or environment in reducing 
the misclassification of core expenses into special items. Empirical evidence indicates that 
the legal environment has a negative impact on accrual-based earnings management (Leuz 
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et al., 2003). However, Callen et al. (2011) observe that a country’s legal environment or 
enforcement is mediated by culture, and therefore Leuz et al.’s (2003) findings that the 
legal environment is negatively related to earnings management can no longer be 
supported. In a related study, Haw et al. (2011) find that well-functioning legal institutions 
and the appointment of external auditors mitigate classification shifting behaviour. This 
finding substantiates the observation by Francis and Wang (2008), who observe that a 
country’s legal environment affects auditing practices. Recently, Behn et al. (2013) have 
found evidence of expenses misclassification in both weak and strong investor protection 
countries, with greater evidence of misclassification occurring in countries with weak 
protection. To extend the investigation further, this study also interacts religiosity and legal 
environment, as well as culture and legal environment, to assess their impact on 
classification shifting in an international setting.    
The study collects financial data from the Compustat Global Database to estimate abnormal 
core earnings and determine the extent of classification shifting. The full sample consists 
of 908,125 firm-year observations for the period between 2000 and 2015 across 117 
countries. In line with previous studies (Behn et al., 2013), a minimum of 10 firm-year-
observations are required to estimate abnormal core earnings; consequently, 55 countries 
were deleted because of insufficient firm-year observations and missing financial data. The 
final datasets consisted of 63 countries and 254,916 firm-year observations. The study 
divides the countries into three headings: developed, emerging and developing, in line with 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) grouping.  In addition, the study obtains 
countrywide measures of culture from the updated Hofstede (1980, 1991), as developed by 
Tang and Koveos (2008), and the legal environment scores were collected from the 
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International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), in line with previous research (Leuz et al., 2003; 
La Porta et al., 1998). The ICRG employs 22 variables to measure risk in three main areas: 
political, financial and economic; however, a separate index is created for each 
subcategory. 
Several important findings are reported. First, it is found that expenses misclassification 
occurs in developed, emerging and developing countries and it’s not limited to the U.S. or 
developed countries. Secondly, consistent with previous earnings management studies in 
the U.S. (McGuire et al. 2012), the study finds that religiosity reduces managers’ 
classification shifting behaviour, but that the negative impact is more acute in developing 
countries than emerging and developed ones. Thirdly, it is found that the legal environment 
mitigates expense misclassification in both developed and emerging countries, but that the 
negative effect is insignificant in developing ones. In addition, the study finds that cultural 
dimensions of individualism and long-term orientation play a monitoring role in reducing 
expense misclassification in developed and emerging economies, but that power distance, 
masculinity and uncertain avoidance motivate firm managers’ classification shifting 
behaviour in all three types of countries. On the contrary, a positive association is found 
between classification shifting, individualism and long-term orientation in developing 
countries, suggesting that these countries are short-term result-oriented and collectivist.  
Furthermore, the study examines the interactive terms between countrywide religiosity and 
legal environment, legal environment and individual dimensions of national culture, on 
classification shifting. It is found that the interactive term between religiosity and legal 
environment plays a complementary role in mitigating classification shifting and that the 
negative impact is much more pronounced in developed countries than emerging or 
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developing ones. Finally, the study finds that the legal environment weakens the positive 
effect of power distance, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance on classification shifting 
in all three classifications of countries. In fact, the positive association between 
individualism, long-term orientation and classification shifting in developing countries can 
no longer be demonstrated when the legal environment interact with individual dimensions 
of national culture. 
In the additional sensitivity tests, several issues related to research design are addressed. 
Initially, the study re-estimates unexpected core earnings using different expectation 
models in order to avoid potential bias (Fan et al., 2010; McVay, 2006, 2008). Thereafter, 
countries with large or insignificant firm year observations are excluded and the datasets 
are divided into high or low religiosity countries to assess their impact on classification 
shifting. In summary, evidence of classification shifting is found in developed, emerging 
and developing countries. The monitoring role of countrywide religiosity, legal 
environment and individual cultural dimensions in mitigating such devious financial 
reporting behaviour is documented in this study.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 presents the literature and develops the 
hypotheses, section 4.3 explains the research design and discusses the empirical 
methodology, and section 4.4 describes the data, sample selection and descriptive statistics. 
Section 4.5 discusses the empirical results, while Section 4.6 presents several robustness 
checks and section 4.7 provides the conclusion.  
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4.2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development  
Three interrelated elements of the literature are reviewed. First, McGuire et al. (2012) 
examine the association between religious social norms and accrual-based earnings 
management and find that firms located in areas with lower levels of religiosity or religious 
adherents have incentives to engage in this type of earnings management. Second, in a 
cross-country study Callen et al. (2011) find no relationship between religious social norms 
and earnings management, but observe that a country’s culture has negative effect on 
accrual-based earnings management. Thirdly, in another cross-country study Leuz et al. 
(2003) observe that accrual-based earnings management is positively associated with firms 
in countries where there is weak legal enforcement, weak investor protection, less 
developed equity markets, and concentrated ownership structures. In a related study, Kedia 
and Rajgopal (2011) examine the relationship between financial misreporting and the 
distance between corporate headquarters and SEC offices. They observe a higher incidence 
of earnings misstatements by firms located in areas far away from local SEC offices. In 
addition, Dyreng et al. (2014) examine the relationship between earnings management and 
weak rule of law and find that foreign subsidiaries in countries with a weaker rule of law 
have more foreign earnings management. Recently, Chiu et al. (2013) have observed that 
firms engage in earnings management when top management working for the firm are also 
working for another firm that is engaged in this practice.  
There are several gaps in the literature that make this study relevant. First, no study has 
established the association between religious social norms and classification shifting in an 
international setting. Second, no study has examined the effects of national culture on 
classification shifting. Third, there is no study that has attempted the joint impact of religion 
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and legal environment, culture and legal environment on classification shifting using 
international evidence. This study addresses these gaps by studying the relationship 
between countrywide religious social norms, national culture, legal environment and 
classification shifting. Classification shifting, unlike accrual-based and real activities 
earnings management, does not involve the recognition or measurement of income 
statement items, but involves the shifting of core expenses into non-recurring ones (McVay, 
2006). Specifically, core earnings are inflated instead of the bottom line net income through 
the misclassification of recurring items into non-recurring ones. Previous studies (Zalata 
and Roberts, 2015; Behn et al., 2013; Athanasakou et al., 2009; McVay, 2006) indicate that 
non-recurring expenses are by definition infrequent or transitory; consequently, financial 
statement users are unable to understand their nature and effect on income statements. 
Indeed, Bhattacharya et al. (2007) and Bradshaw & Sloan (2002) corroborate this and 
observe that managers might be motivated to shift core expenses into non-recurring items 
in order to inflate their core earnings. Previous studies (Barua et al., 2010; Fan et al., 2010; 
Athanasakou et al., 2009; McVay, 2006) also document that misclassification of recurring 
expenses into non-recurring ones is preferred to accrual-based and real activities earnings 
management methods because it does not affect future earnings as there are no accruals 
reversals in the following periods or lost revenue from forgone opportunities. Moreover, it 
does not change GAAP net income, thus making it less attractive for auditors and external 
regulators to subject the financial statements to thorough scrutiny (Zalata and Roberts, 
2015; Behn et al., 2013; Athanasakou et al., 2009; McVay, 2006). Limited attention is paid 
to classification shifting in the earnings management literature because previous studies 
have mainly considered accrual-based and real-activities earnings management. The former 
involves managers’ incentive to ‘borrow’ past and future earnings to improve the current 
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period’s reported earnings or financial performance (Kothari et al., 2016; Behn et al; 2013). 
For real-activities earnings management, previous research (Jarvinen and Myllymaki, 
2016; McGuire et al., 2012; Cohen and Zarowin, 2008; Roychowdhury, 2006; Graham et 
al., 2005; Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005) indicate that the amount of revenue is influenced 
by adjusting discretionary expenses to meet current earnings targets, and that this is 
achieved through the acceleration of sales to customers, over-production to reduce the cost 
of sales, delaying or cutting down costs such as repairs and maintenance and advertising 
costs, as well as research and development expenses.  
 
4.2.1. Classification Shifting Studies in the U.S. 
The few studies on classification shifting in the U.S. have observed that managers are 
involved in core expenses misclassification to meet or beat pre-determined earnings 
benchmarks or analyst forecasts (Barua et al., 2010; Fan et al., 2010; McVay, 2006). These 
studies argue that classification shifting is consistent across firms and devoid of auditor or 
regulatory scrutiny. For example, McVay (2006) observe that core expenses are 
misclassified as special items to increase core earnings since investment decisions in the 
U.S. are influenced by the level of these earnings. Fan et al. (2010) investigate quarterly 
financial results of U.S. firms and report that in the U.S. classification shifting occurs 
mostly in the fourth quarter, when the incentive to manage earnings is greater, when accrual 
earnings manipulation is inhibited, and there is the need to meet quarterly earnings 
benchmarks. Similarly, Burgstahler et al. (2002, 2006) study the effect of special items on 
future earnings and report that firms use these to speed up the recognition of future expenses 
into the current period. They find that income-decreasing special items serve as an “inter-
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period transfer” device.  In contrast, Cready, Lopez and Sisneros (2012) extend the analysis 
of previous studies and find that earnings increase in post-special item quarters beyond the 
four quarters considered by Burgstahler et al. (2002, 2006). They observe that future 
earnings increase beyond 16 quarters and that the effects are more remarkable in 
restructuring charges than for asset write downs or impairment charges.  In addition, 
Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) conducted a study in the U.S. capital markets and observe that 
investors are interested in core earnings figures, thus giving incentives for managers to 
manipulate these earnings. However, Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) indicate that firms 
in weak investor protection countries source funds from families, private financiers and 
banks and therefore accounting information is prepared with minimal levels of disclosure 
and transparency. They observe that accrual-based earnings management is associated with 
firms in weak investor protection countries, but incentives to manage core earnings through 
the misclassification of core expenses is difficult to predict. In contrast, Athanasakou et al. 
(2009) find that in the UK firms are more likely to misclassify core expenses into non-
recurring ones than to engage in real activities or manage accrual transactions to meet 
analyst benchmarks or expectations. In a related study, Zalata and Roberts (2015) report 
that the ability to deliberately misclassify core expenses to inflate core earnings is not 
homogeneous across firms and that internal governance mechanisms could mitigate 
classification shifting. Furthermore, previous studies (Ali and Zhang, 2015; Strong and 
Meyer, 1987; Elliot and Shaw, 1998; Pourciau, 1993) observe a relationship between CEO 
tenure and earnings management. These studies document evidence that new CEOs are 
likely to misclassify or overstate the expenses/losses of their firms in the first year of service 
to discredit the previous CEOs in order to take credit for the resulting higher profits in 
subsequent years.   
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4.2.2. Cross-Country Classification Shifting Studies 
Interestingly, while classification shifting is prevalent among firms in the U.S., as 
evidenced by previous studies (Barua et al., 2010; Fan et al., 2010; McVay, 2006), only 
two studies have investigated classification shifting in an international setting. For 
example, Haw et al. (2011) examine it in East Asian countries using a sample of eight firms 
over the period 2001 to 2004. They find that in countries where code law is effective, 
classification shifting is common, but that countries with strong legal institutions are 
associated with less shifting. The study emphasised that the unique corporate governance 
mechanisms in East Asian countries may have influenced their findings and therefore 
generalising them to countries outside of East Asia would be risky. In addition, Behn et al. 
(2013) extend the international studies and investigate the relationship between 
classification shifting, financial analyst monitoring and investor protection using firms in 
41 countries. They find that a strong investor protection mechanism and more financial 
analyst following in an organisation reduces managers’ incentives to misclassify core 
expenses into non-recurring or exceptional items. They argue that analysts who have 
industry-specific knowledge and are conversant with finance and accounting issues are able 
to assess the quality of financial statements and financial reporting processes (Behn et al, 
2013; Kimbrough and Louis, 2011). Financial analysts could also play a monitoring role in 
mitigating managers’ opportunistic fraudulent practices and financial reporting 
irregularities because of the demand for high quality financial reports, which indirectly 
influences earnings management methods employed by firms. Similarly, Yu (2008) 
observes that analyst following mitigates accrual-based earnings management and 
discontinuity around earnings targets, therefore underlining the point that there is a negative 
relationship between analyst following and managers’ earnings management practices 
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because of the monitoring role of analysts.  On the contrary, Behn et al. (2013) observe that 
a greater analyst following could have a positive relationship with earnings management 
practices. 
4.2.3. Religiosity and Classification Shifting  
In terms of the relationship between religiosity and classification shifting, no studies treat 
the subject at both national and international levels. However, some have examined the 
relationship between tax evasion, tax avoidance, tax fraud, accrual-based and real activities 
earnings management and religiosity at both levels. For example, in examining the 
relationship between tax fraud acceptability and religiosity in 36 countries, Stack and 
Kposowa (2006) find that there is a negative relationship between them without controlling 
for cultural differences. Similarly, Richardson (2008) examines the relationship between 
religion, culture and tax evasion using country-level data from 47 countries. He finds that 
religion is negatively related to tax evasion, while uncertainty avoidance is positively 
related to it. In a related study, Callen et al. (2011) examine the relationship between 
religious background, culture and four metrics of accrual-based earnings management in 
49 countries. They observe that proxies for this type of earnings management are unrelated 
to a country’s level of religiosity or specific religious denominations, but that Hofstede’s 
(1980) cultural dimension variables do influence accrual-based earnings management. At 
the national level, McGuire et al. (2012) and Dyreng et al. (2012) examine the relationship 
between religiosity and financial reporting irregularities, religiosity and accrual-based 
management, as well as religiosity and real-activities earnings management, in the U.S. and 
find that firms located in areas with high religious social norms exhibit lower incidences of 
financial reporting irregularities, especially where external monitoring is low. These studies 
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also observe that religiosity is negatively related to accrual-based earnings management, 
but positively related to the proxies of real activities earnings management. However, 
neither study controlled for culture. Clearly, the relationship between classification shifting 
and the religiosity of the firms’ environment at both national and international levels 
remains unexplored. This paper seeks to extend the literature on classification shifting and 
close the gap with regard to the relationship between it and religiosity at an international 
level. This is important, because previous studies have indicated that religion has an 
influence on individuals’ behaviour, attitudes and ethical values (Tayler and Bloomfield, 
2011; Vitell, 2009; Parboteeah, Hoegl and Cullen, 2008). Recently, Shu et al. (2012) 
observe a positive relationship between religiosity and high ethical values. Research also 
indicates that a highly religious environment shapes the behaviour and morals of the 
individuals in that area (McGuire et al., 2012). For example, values such as accountability, 
honesty and discipline are known to be associated with highly religious environments 
(Lehrer, 2004; Keister, 2003; Iannaccone, 1998; Kennedy and Lawton, 1998). Given that 
classification shifting does not change the bottom line net income, core earnings are 
inflated, as they are shifted down to the bottom-line of the income statement. Consequently, 
there is limited external monitoring and no auditor vigilance, as these involve shifting 
operating expenses into extraordinary/exceptional items (Barnea, Ronen and Sadan, 1976); 
misclassifying core expenses as special items (Fan et al., 2010; McVay, 2006); and 
misclassifying operating expenses as discontinued operations (Barua et al. 2010). Thus 
with limited external monitoring and lack of auditor vigilance, it would appear that 
religious managers will be inclined or less inclined to engage in classification shifting to 
increase core earnings. Following the above discussions, one could argue that it is possible 
that countries with a high level of religiosity will be less inclined to misclassify core 
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expenses into special items or discontinue operations on ethical grounds. On the other hand, 
misclassification of core expenses into special items could be beneficial when it signals 
managers’ inside information to potential investors (Scott, 1995). Therefore, following the 
above discussions, the study posits that countrywide religious social norms are associated 
with classification shifting because of the incentive to signal managers’ inside information 
and because of the lack of external monitors. Thus, the following hypothesis is presented 
for testing: 
H1: Managers’ classification shifting behaviour is related to the religiosity of the 
country in which they are based 
4.2.4. Culture and Classification Shifting 
Hofstede et al. (2010) define culture as “the collective programming of the mind that 
distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from others”. Boyd and 
Richardson (1998, 2005) also define culture as “transmission from one generation to the 
next, via teaching and imitation, of knowledge, values, and other factors that influence 
behaviour.” Hofstede et al., (1980, 1991, 2001, and 2010) indicate that there are different 
dimensions of culture. A cultural dimension is an attribute of culture that can be computed 
relative to other cultures. While the relationship between religiosity and classification 
shifting is an important consideration, culture can also play a critical role in influencing 
managers’ misclassification of core expenses into special items. Previous cross-country 
studies have investigated the relationship between accrual-based and real activities earnings 
management and Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimension variables without consideration of 
classification shifting. For example, based on firm-level data from 31 countries, Leuz et al. 
(2003) develop four proxies for accrual-based earnings management without controlling 
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for culture and find that the relationship between earnings management and investor rights 
is negatively related at the country level. Similarly, based on firm-level data from 47 
countries, Fernandes and Ferreira (2007) repeat the study of Leuz et al. (2003) and observe 
that accrual-based earnings management in a particular country is influenced by specific 
firm-level characteristics. Fernandes and Ferreira (2007) find that external financing and 
firm valuation are negatively related to proxies for accrual-based earnings management; 
however, they did not control for national culture and countrywide religiosity variables. 
Indeed, several cross-country studies have investigated the relationship between 
discretionary accruals or real activities earnings management and culture, but with mixed 
and diverse results. For example, Guan et al. (2006) used firm-level data in five Asian-
Pacific countries to assess the relationship between Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimension 
variables and discretionary accruals. They found that there is a negative relationship 
between individualism, uncertainty avoidance and discretionary accruals, a proxy for 
earnings management.  
Similarly, Tsakumis et al. (2007) investigate the relationship between tax evasion and 
culture in 50 countries without controlling for religion, using both country-level data and 
Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimension framework. They find a positive relationship between 
tax evasion and both uncertainty avoidance and power distance, but a negative one between 
tax evasion and both masculinity and individualism. In a related study, Richardson (2008) 
examines country-level data from 47 countries to establish the relationship between 
religion, culture and tax evasion. He finds that Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimension 
variable of individualism is negatively related to tax evasion, while there is positive 
relationship between uncertainty avoidance and tax evasion.  In addition, Han et al. (2010) 
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use firm-level data from 32 countries to investigate the relationship between accrual-based 
earnings management and culture. They find that the relationship between uncertainty 
avoidance and accrual-based earnings management is negative, but that a positive 
relationship exists between individualism and this type of earnings management. In 
contrast, Desender et al. (2007), at the country-wide level, find that countries associated 
with high individualism and egalitarianism have a low incentive to manage accruals or 
engage in real activities earnings manipulation. However, they observe that legal 
institutional factors are correlated with both accrual-based and real activities earnings 
management. In addition, Callen et al. (2011) investigate the relationship between 
religiosity, culture and four metrics of accrual-based earnings management in 49 countries. 
Specifically, they find that Hofstede’s (1980) cultural variable of individualism is 
negatively related to accruals manipulation but uncertainty avoidance is positively related 
to it.  
Clearly, previous studies have failed to investigate or employ Hofstede’s updated (1991) 
cultural metrics to assess how national culture affects the misclassification of core 
expenses. The literature does not cover the extent to which Hofstede’s (1980, 1991) cultural 
dimension variables of individualism, uncertainty avoidance, power distance and 
masculinity influence managers' classification shifting behaviour in different countries (Li 
et al., 2013; Fidrmuc and Jacob, 2010). Therefore, this study reviews and discusses five 
constructs of national culture and their relationships with opportunistic misclassification 
behaviour and posits several hypotheses to be tested. It fills this gap in the classification 
shifting literature in an international setting. With regard to the extent that culture also 
shapes the attitudes, values, beliefs and behaviour of individuals in an environment or 
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country, it is important to establish how the updated Hofstede (1980, 1991) cultural 
dimension variables of individualism, uncertainty avoidance, power distance, long-term 
orientation and masculinity influence managers’ opportunistic reporting behaviour in an 
international setting.  
4.2.4.1 Power Distance  
Power distance is the extent to which society accepts the degree of inequality or equality 
between members of a country, organisations and institutions (Hofstede et al., 2010). A 
higher score on power distance signifies more power inequality, while a lower score 
indicates more power equality. In high power distance cultures, individuals accept and 
expect unequal power distribution. Previous studies (Callen et al., 2011; Hofstede et al., 
2010) indicate that in power distance cultures, accounting systems are used by top 
management and seen as a power holders’ tool to usurp authority and control. Hofstede et 
al. (2010) observe that power distance scores tend be higher for Eastern European, Latin, 
Asian and African countries, and lower for Scandinavian and English-speaking Western 
countries. For instance, China and Mexico have power distance scores of 80 and 81 
respectively, indicating a high level of power inequality compared with Scandinavian 
countries such as Finland (33), Norway (31), Sweden (31) and Denmark (30), where the 
scores suggest a high level of equality. In a power distance cultural environment, when top 
management want to portray outstanding financial performance to analysts and investors, 
they may have a strong incentive to engage in classification shifting behaviour. In fact, they 
will use their influence. Therefore, misclassification of core expenses as special items 
should take place more regularly in high power distance countries than low power distance 
ones.  Thus the study formulates the following hypothesis for testing: 
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H2a: Classification shifting is positively related to the degree of power distance in a 
country. 
4.2.4.2. Individualism (versus Collectivism)  
These terms indicate the extent to which people are assimilated into societal groups or 
interpersonal relationships. Individualist cultures show loose ties and limited allegiance to 
the extended family, and everyone cares about their immediate family and personal 
interests (Davis and Abdurazokzoda, 2016; Klasing, 2013; Hofstede, 1980, 2010). 
Collectivist cultures, on the other hand, are societies with strong family ties, and strong 
extended family systems with firm and unquestioning loyalty, which leads to nepotism and 
its associated corruption (Licht et al., 2005). Hofstede et al. (2010) observe that 
individualism tends to prevail in developed Western countries, but that less developed 
countries are characterised by collectivism. For instance, empirical evidence indicates that 
the United States is individualistic, with a high score of 80 on Hofstede’s evaluation of 
individualism, compared to China (20 on the scale). Callen et al. (2011) observe that 
accrual-based earnings management is prevalent in low individualism countries because of 
formal institutions, nepotism and the presence of powerful networks of influence. Recent 
studies (Davis and Abdurazokzoda, 2016; Klasing, 2013) indicate that individualism in a 
society has an effect on the quality of financial reporting and institutions. Following the 
above discussion, the study posits that countries with high Hofstede individualism scores 
will exhibit low classification shifting behaviour, or low motivation to misclassify core 
expenses into special items. Thus the following hypothesis is presented for testing:       
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H2b: Classification shifting is negatively related to the degree of individualism in a 
country. 
4.2.4.3. Uncertainty Avoidance  
Uncertainty avoidance focuses on society’s tolerance for uncertain and ambiguous 
situations. Hofstede et al. (2010) observe that uncertainty avoiding cultures use strict 
behavioural codes, rules and laws, with a belief in absolute truth and disapproval of 
divergent views to reduce the possibility of uncertainty. Consequently, individuals are 
careful, risk-averse, emotional and work hard to avoid unpredictable outcomes. Previous 
studies (Li and Zahra, 2012; Callen et al., 2011) indicate that countries with high 
uncertainty avoidance have low tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty, and there is major 
concern for security in life. Empirical evidence also indicates that uncertainty avoidance is 
very high in East and Central European countries, in Latin countries, in Japan and in 
German speaking countries, and low in English speaking and Chinese culture countries 
(Hofstede et al., 2010). Specifically, Hofstede et al (2010) observe that there is very high 
uncertainty avoidance in Greece (112) and Portugal (104), compared to Singapore (8) and 
Hong Kong (29). People in an uncertain cultural environment require a level of control over 
their future, life and destiny. Classification shifting provides a way to influence or control 
firm performance. Therefore, it is possible for managers and people in high uncertainty 
avoidance cultures or countries to engage in classification shifting behaviour to increase 
reported core earnings. This discussion leads to the following hypothesis:  
H2c: Classification shifting is positively related to the degree of uncertainty avoidance 
in a country. 
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4.2.4.4. Masculinity versus Femininity 
These terms refer to the distribution of values between genders and concentrates on the 
extent to which the customary roles of male achievement, control and power, and the work 
role model, are enforced in a country. Previous research (Davis and Abdurazokzoda, 2016; 
Callen et al., 2011, Hofstede et al., 2010) indicates that a masculine culture is characterised 
by aggressive behaviour, assertiveness, competitiveness, self-centredness, power, and a 
striving for achievement in terms of ego boosting, wealth and recognition. Hofstede et al. 
(2010) observe that masculinity is high in Japan (95), and Latin countries such as Italy (87) 
and Mexico (85). It is moderately high in English speaking western countries, but 
moderately low in Asian countries, France, Spain, Portugal, Chile, Korea and Thailand. 
However, masculinity is very low in Scandinavian countries, such as Finland (26), 
Denmark (16), Norway (8) and Sweden (5). In high masculinity countries, the achievement 
of financial goals and empire building through accounting systems is widespread 
(Herrmann-Pillatha et al., 2014, Callen et al., 2011; Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005). 
Therefore, it may be possible that managers’ involvement in opportunistic behaviour 
through the misclassification of core expenses into special items to achieve financial goals 
and gain recognition is likely to be high in masculine countries. Following the above 
discussions, the study posits that the occurrence of classification shifting should be high in 
masculine countries; thus the following hypothesis is formulated for testing:       
H2d: Classification shifting is positively related to the degree of masculinity in a 
country. 
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4.2.4.5. Long-term Orientation  
Long-term orientation centres on the extent to which a country holds long-term devotion to 
conventional forward thinking values. Hofstede et al. (2010) indicate that values include 
perseverance towards long-term goals, thrift, being sparing with resources, observing order, 
having a sense of shame, and having long-term approach to life and business decisions. 
Alternatively, short-term orientation is about respect for tradition, being generous with 
resources, personal stability, reciprocation of favours, and a quick result orientation (Callen 
et al., 2011; Hofstede, 1991). In Hofstede et al.’s (2010) study of masculinity versus 
femininity index scores, East Asian countries such as China (118), Hong Kong (96), 
Taiwan (87), Japan (80) and South Korea (75) were noted to have high long-term 
orientation scores. However, their study observes further that long-term orientation is low 
in Latin and Asian countries such as France, Spain and Portugal, and Chile, Korea and 
Thailand. Previous research (Callen et al., 2011; Hofstede, 2005) observes that firms 
operating in short-term oriented countries normally concentrate on current reported profits 
and practices that reinforce short-term economic goals such as management reward 
systems. Recently, Li and Zahra (2012) and Klasing (2013) observe that the short-termism 
of a local culture makes it possible for businesses to harness opportunities that cannot be 
ignored. Therefore, as a result of the perceived value placed on current earnings by short-
term oriented countries, it may be possible for firm managers in these countries to engage 
in opportunistic misclassification of core expense into special items to influence current 
core earnings. Following the above discussions, the study presents the following hypothesis 
for testing: 
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H2e: Classification shifting is negatively related to the degree of long-term orientation 
in a country. 
4.2.5. Legal Environment and Classification Shifting 
Previous studies (Behn et al., 2013; Callen et al., 2011; Luez et al., 2003; La Porta et al., 
1998) have investigated the relationship between a country’s legal environment and 
investor protection; legal environment and accrual-based earnings management; as well as 
legal environment and the relationship between weak and strong investor protection 
countries. These studies observe that a strong legal environment boosts investor confidence 
and mitigates accrual-based earnings management. For example, La Porta et al. (1998) 
indicate that strong legal enforcement is an indication that there is an active and well-
functioning judiciary system which can protect investors and curtail fraudulent 
management practices. Using “law and order” measured as the aggregate of the efficiency 
of the judicial system, contract repudiation by government, corruption, rule of law, and risk 
of expropriation to assess the extent to which the legal enforcement in countries affects 
investor protection; they observe that common law countries exhibit strong investor 
protection relative to civil law countries. La Porta et al. (198) conclude that investor 
protection and law enforcement are strong and effective in countries where the legal rules 
originate from common law tradition, but weak in those countries whose laws originate 
from civil law. In a related study, Leuz et al. (2003) examine the relationship between 
proxies for accruas-based earnings management and investor protection. They find that 
strong investor protection, evidenced by a well-functioning legal system, exhibits lower 
levels of accrual-based earnings management than in countries with weak investor 
protection and legal systems. Following these findings, Callen et al. (2011) argue that Leuz 
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et al. (2003) did not control for culture and religion; therefore, their findings might be 
affected by national cultural and religious backgrounds. As a result, they examine the 
relationship between accrual-based earnings management and the legal environment of the 
countries by controlling for culture and religion, and find that there is no relationship 
between accrual-based earnings management and the legal environment when culture and 
religion are considered as control variables. Recently, Behn et al. (2013) corroborated the 
findings of La Porta et al. (1998) and observe that classification shifting is common in both 
weak and strong investor protection countries, but they indicate that classification shifting 
is more prevalent in weak investor protection countries because of the loose legal 
enforcement systems. This study attempts to establish the relationship between legal 
environment and classification shifting on a broader international level for several reasons. 
First, Behn et al. (2013) did not control for the culture and religiosity of the countries 
sampled for the study. Second, Callen et al. (2011) found no relationship between accrual-
based earnings management and legal environment when culture and religion were used as 
control variables. Third, no study has examined the relationship between classification 
shifting and legal environment by controlling for culture and religion. This study fills the 
gap in the literature on classification shifting and legal environment. It is possible that 
managers' opportunistic behaviour to inflate core earnings by shifting core expenses into 
special items could be hampered or enhanced by the interaction between culture and legal 
environment, or the interaction between religion and legal environment. This is yet to be 
established in the literature. Following the above discussions and the fact that a country's 
legal environment, culture and religion can shape firm managers' behaviour, the following 
hypotheses are presented for testing: 
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H3a: Managers’ classification shifting behaviour is related to the interaction between 
the legal environment and cultural dimension variables of a country. 
H3b: Managers’ classification shifting behaviour is related to the interaction between 
the legal environment and religiosity of a country. 
 
 
4.3. Research Design and Empirical Methodology 
 
4.3.1. Measuring the Countrywide Religiosity Index 
The study gathers countrywide religious datasets from the World Values Survey (WVS) of 
the World Bank database between 2000 and 2015. The World Values Survey is a global 
network of social scientists studying changing values and their impact on the social and 
political life of countries. The survey also aims to help policy makers and academics 
understand the changes in values, beliefs and motivations of people around the world and 
how these changes impact on business and economics decisions. It asks representatives of 
over 143 countries and territories about the frequency of their attendance at religious 
services, weekly participation in religious activities and the level of importance placed on 
religious activities on daily basis. The results are based on surveys, and telephone and face 
to face interviews conducted between 2000 and 2015 with a minimum of 5,000 adults in 
each country. A total of over 400,000 respondents were interviewed globally. Across all 
the populations, the median response  to the survey questions was 82%. In addition, the 
survey indicates that 8 out of the 11 countries which are most religious (with a religiosity 
index of at least 98%) are poorer nations from sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. On the 
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contrary, the 10 least religious countries from the study have the highest living standards 
in the world. Of the 27 countries commonly seen as part of the developed world, the median 
proportion of nationals who state that religion is important, that they attend religious 
services regularly, and participate in weekly religious activities is below 45%. The only 
exception is the USA, with a median of 62%.  
 
 
Table 4.1: Comparison of Most and Least Religious Countries in the World - 2015 
Ten Most  
Religious Countries in 
the World 
Ranking 
Top Countries 
Ten Least 
 Religious Countries in 
the World 
Ranking 
Bottom 
Countries 
Niger  1 China 1 
Sri Lanka  2 Japan 2 
Malawi 3 Estonia 3 
Indonesia 4 Sweden 4 
Yemen 5 Denmark 5 
Thailand 6 Czech Republic 6 
Armenia 7 Hong Kong 7 
Bangladesh 8 Netherlands 8 
Georgia 9 United Kingdom 9 
Morocco 10 Vietnam 10 
Notes: Table 1 shows a comparison of most and least religious countries in the world, as compiled by Gallup. Since 1965, 
Gallup has conducted interviews about the countrywide religiosity of adults. The results suggest that religious attitudes 
are very stable, consistent with the World Values Survey of the World Bank as computed by Stack and Kposowa (2006).  
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4.3.2. Updated Hofstede (1980, 1991) Cultural Dimension Scores 
The study also collects countrywide measures of culture from the updated Hofstede (1980, 
1991) cultural dimensions, as developed by Tang and Koveos (2008). Initially, four 
dimensions of power distance, individualism, uncertainty avoidance and masculinity were 
identified by Hofstede (1980) through a survey of employees’ attitudes in all the 
subsidiaries of IBM using 117 questionaires in 40 countries. This was subsequently revised 
to include 10 countries and three regional groupings of countries (Hofstede, 1983). A fifth 
cultural dimension variable, known as long-term orientation, was identified in an 
international survey involving Chinese employees and managers by Hofstede and Bond 
(1988, 1991). However, Tang and Keveos (2008) criticised Hofstede (1980) for failing to 
update or track changes in culture over time. However, Tang and Keveos (2008) admit that 
some of the concepts fundamental to the original Hofstede (1980) framework are likely to 
remain intact over time, but others such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are susceptible 
to change after the survey period. Tang and Keveos (2008) revised the Hofstede (1980, 
1991) measures by regressing each of the five cultural dimensions with other countrywide 
variables, such as ethnic background, language, religious background, percentage of 
working women and weather differences. Consequently, this study uses the updated 
Hofstede (1980, 1991) cultural dimension variables as computed by Tang and Koveos 
(2008), such as; power distance scores (POWDIS), individualism scores (INDIV), 
uncertainty avoidance (UNCAVO), masculinity scores (MASCU) and long-term 
orientation scores (LONGTEO). The use of Schwartz’s (1994) countrywide culture metrics 
is avoided because Schwartz did not cover all the countries in the study sample, thus using 
these culture metrics would reduce the sample size for the measurement of classification 
shifting. House et al. (2004) also provide comprehensive GLOBE cultural data, which is 
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significantly different from the work of Hofstede (1980, 1991) in methodology and 
concepts. Given the above discussions and the literature supporting the updated Hofstede 
(1991) cultural metrics, this study chooses to use the updated Hofstede (1980, 1991) 
dimension variables as computed by Tang and Koveos (2008). 
Legal environment or enforcement  scores are also collected from the International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG), in line with previous research (Leuz et al. 2003; La Porta et al. 1998), 
for the period of the study. The ICRG datasets and methodology are used by academics and 
researchers at the IMF, as the datasets have received commendation in publications such as 
The Wall Street Journal, The Economist and Baron’s.  The ICRG employs 22 variables to 
measure risk in three main areas, political, financial and economic; however, a separate 
index is created for each subcategory. An aggregate of the three indices is scaled by two to 
produce the weights needed for inclusion in the composite country risk scores. The range 
of composite scores is between zero and 10 points. The higher the composite score 
(between 8 and 10 points), the lower the risk; and the lower the composite score (zero to 4 
points), the higher the risk.  La Porta et al. (1998), corroborated by Leuz et al., (2003), 
indicate that the strength of the legal enforcement or environment is measured as the mean 
score across three legal variables: (i) the efficiency of the judicial system; (ii) an assessment 
of the rule of law; and (iii) the corruption index. The range is between zero and ten for all 
three legal variables. This study follows the procedure employed by previous studies (Leuz 
et al., 2003; La Porta et al., 1998) to estimate the legal environment variable. In addition, 
country-specific variables such as the annual per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
inflation, economic risk and political risk are collected from International Country Risk 
Guide to control for differences in all the years and across countries.   
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4.3.3. Fixed Effects (FE) Models and Preliminary Mis-specification Tests 
To account for differences in countries and variations in firm sizes, the study follows 
previous ones (Elshandidy and Neri, 2015; Ntim et al., 2013; Behn et al., 2013; Haw et al., 
2011) and employs the fixed-effects regression model to assess the impact of religiosity 
(RELINT), legal enforcement/environment (LEGALENF) and proxies for CULTURE on 
unexpected core earnings (UNEXP_CE). The Hausman test is performed and the results 
favour the fixed effects regression model. Consequently, the alternative random effects 
regression model is rejected and the fixed effects regression model chosen to test the 
relationship between the dependent variable (UNEXP_CE) and independent variables 
(RELINT, LEGALENF and proxies for CULTURE). Therefore, models 2 to 13 are run 
using the fixed effects regression model. As in chapters 2 and 3, the study also conducts 
normality tests using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality, tests for the presence of 
heteroscedasticity, using Breusch-Pagan tests for heteroscedasticity and finally checks for 
serial correlation or auto-correlation with a Wooldridge test for auto-correlation in panel 
data. The results of these preliminary tests indicate that the data meet the requirements of 
normality, there is an absence of heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation or serial effects. 
 
4.3.4. Wald Joint Test for Significance 
In line with previous studies (Garcia-Herrero et al., 2009; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2014), 
a Wald test is run to omit insignificant variables and to estimate the model with only 
significant control variables to the maximum extent possible. Specifically, the Wald joint 
hypothesis test is estimated to ensure that the coefficients of the individual variables that 
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are insignificant are equal to zero. That is, the null hypothesis is rejected if the p-value is 
less than 10% (significant) and the study includes the control variable in the model for the 
analysis. On the other hand, if the p-value is greater than 10% (insignificant), the control 
variables are omitted from the model. Several Wald tests are run to reduce the number of 
insignificant control variables in the model until the remaining variable set of coefficients 
are equal to zero. This approach has the potential to reduce the number of variables to an 
efficient or minimum size.  
4.3.5. Measuring (Normal/Expected Core Earnings) Classification Shifting  
As in Chapter 2, and in line with previous studies (Behn et al., 2013; Haw et al., 2011; Fan 
et al., 2010; McVay, 2006), the study develops expected or normal core earnings 
(NOR_CE) model within each industry (Fama and French, 1997).  
NOR_CE = β0 + β1 CEt-1 + β2 ATO + β3 ACRUALSt-1 + β4∆SALES + β5 NEG_∆SALESt +  𝜀𝑡,                                                                                                             
(1) 
The definitions of the variables in the core earnings expectation model above are provided 
in Table 4.2 (definitions of the variables). The study adapts model (1) in line with Fan et 
al. (2010) and Haw et al. (2011) for international firms and annual data. Current accruals 
are excluded from McVay’s (2006) model to account for the concerns raised by Fan et al. 
(2010). As in Chapter 2, lagged core earnings (𝐶𝐸𝑡−1) are included in the model because 
earlier studies indicate that core earnings are unrelenting. An asset turnover ratio (𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑡 ) 
is also included the model because Nissim and Penman (2001) observe that asset turnover 
is inversely related to profit margin. In line with previous studies (Fan et al. 2010), lagged 
operating accruals (𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑡−1) are included because earnings performance is found to 
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be associated with the accruals figure. Sloan (1996) observes that accruals have a 
significant effect on future performance. Therefore, careful consideration of the accruals 
figure will help circumvent the econometric problems noted by McVay (2006). For 
international companies, the alternative accruals estimation model used by Francis and 
Wang (2008) and Behn et al. (2013) is employed to estimate accruals. Consistent with 
previous studies (Behn et al., 2013; Francis and Wang, 2008), the details and data items for 
the calculation of accruals for international companies are as follows: 
where accruals = (earnings before extraordinary items – operating cash flows) total assets 
in year t-1, where earnings before extraordinary items = net income – extraordinary items; 
operating cash flows = earnings before extraordinary items + depreciation and amortization 
+ change in deferred income tax + change in untaxed reserve + change in other liabilities 
+ minority interest – current accruals, where current accruals = change in non-cash working 
capital = ∆(total currents assets – cash and short-term investments – treasury stock shown 
as current assets - ∆(total current liabilities – total amount of debt in current liabilities – 
proposed dividends. In addition, Baker et al., (2009) indicate that cost increases are 
associated with changes in activity level. Therefore, this study includes change in sales 
∆SALES (and negative change in sales NEG_∆SALES) as in the McVay (2006) model.  
4.3.6. Measuring (Unexpected Core Earnings) Classification Shifting  
Following the above, the study runs model (1) to estimate the coefficients, which are the 
normal or expected core earnings of each firm. Thereafter, the actual values in the model 
are multiplied by the coefficients and the unexpected core earnings (UNEXP_CE) is then 
computed as the difference between reported core earnings (REP_CE) and expected core 
earnings (NOR_CE) for each firm. When firms engage in classification shifting, 
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unexpected core earnings increase with special items. The following model is important for 
carrying out the main tests for international firms: 
UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2 SIZE + β3 BMV + β4LEV + β5 BIG4 + β6ROA + β9GROWTH 
+ β10 CAPINTEN+ β11GDP + Year and Country Fixed Effects +   𝜀𝑡,                                                                              
(2) 
 where UNEXP_CE is unexpected core earnings and SPITEM is income decreasing special 
items multiplied by negative one (-1). Similar to Chapter 2, the coefficient β1 is examined. 
When β1 is positive and significant, it is an indication that firms are engaged in 
misclassification of core expenses into special items, which also suggests that reported core 
earnings have been influenced or manipulated to exceed expectations.  On the other hand, 
when the coefficient β1 is negative and significant, it is an indication that the overall firm 
performance is good and not related to classification shifting.  In line with previous studies 
(Behn et al. 2013; Fan et al. 2010; Ashbaugh et al., 2003), size and book to market value 
are included as control variables, plus other variables for year and country fixed effects. 
Firm size (SIZE) is included as a control variable because previous research (Ashbaugh et 
al. 2003; Callen et al, 2011) indicates that small firms are more likely to influence reported 
core earnings than large ones, and book to market value (BMV) is included to control for 
the effects of market capitalisation. Leverage (LEV) is included as a control 
variable because Zang (2008) finds that firms influence reported profit to meet debt 
covenants and to secure external financing. Return on assets (ROA) is also included as a 
firm level control variable because the literature states that earnings management is a 
function of firm performance (Zalata and Roberts, 2015; Cohen et al. 2008; McVay, 2006). 
Thus, poor performing firms are more likely to engage in classification shifting, and 
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therefore the study predicts the co-efficient of ROA to be negative. Similar to Athanasakou 
et al. (2009) and Doyle et al. (2003), the study controls for GROWTH because these earlier 
studies indicate that higher changes in working capital are associated with higher growth 
in firms, which affects future cash flows. The study also controls for per capita gross 
domestic product (GDP), as previous studies (Leuz et al. 2003) observe that GDP measures 
the wealth of countries. In line with other studies (Behn et al., 2013; Fan et al., 2010), levels 
of unexpected core earnings and profitable firms are used to establish the positive 
relationship between unexpected core earnings and negative special items. A series of 
regression models are run (Models 1- 13) using the measures of religiosity, legal 
environment and national dimensions of culture to assess their impact on classification 
shifting.  
 
Initially, previous studies (Callen et al, 2011; Stack and Kposowa, 2006) are followed for 
the measurement of countrywide religiosity. This is based on the level of involvement in 
religious practices from the World Values Survey of the World Bank, consistent with Stack 
and Kposowa (2006). The countrywide religiosity index is measured as the frequency of 
attendance at religious services, weekly participation in religious activities and the level of 
importance placed on religious activities by individuals. Responses were coded on a seven-
point scale from never (0) to more than once a week (6) and then averaged for each country. 
The higher the religiosity measure, the more religious the country is deemed to be, and 
vice-versa.  
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To test Hypothesis 1 to assess whether countrywide religiosity constrains the 
misclassification of core expenses into special items or not, the study uses and runs the 
following model: 
UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2RELINT + β3 RELINT x SPITEM + β4 SIZE + β5 BMV+ β6LEV 
+ β7BIG4 + β8ROA + β9GROWTH + β10 CAPINTEN+ β11CULTURE + β12GDP +Year and Country 
Fixed Effects + 𝜀𝑡,                                                                                                      (3) 
where countrywide religiosity (RELINT) is the measure of religiosity obtained from the 
World Values Survey of the World Bank. RELINT x SPITEM is the interactive term 
between countrywide religiosity and income-decreasing special items. The study expects 
the co-efficient on the interactive term between countrywide religiosity and negative 
special items, RELINT x SPITEM (RELSPI), to be significantly negative if religiosity 
mitigates classification shifting in international firms.   
In addition, to test Hypothesis 2, the extent to which countrywide measures of culture 
(CULTURE) mitigate classification shifting is examined. The study controls for religiosity 
in the model, as previous studies (Callen et al., 2011) indicate that religiosity is subsumed 
by other cultural variables. The updated Hofstede (1980, 1991) cultural dimension variables 
as computed by Tang and Koveos (2008) are used, which include power distance scores 
(POWDIS), individualism scores (INDIV), uncertainty avoidance (UNCAVO), 
masculinity scores (MASCU) and long term orientation scores (LONGTEO). Given the 
criticism levelled against Schwartz’s (1994) and House et al.’s (2004) GLOBE cultural 
data, this study uses the updated Hofstede (1980, 1991) dimension variables, as computed 
by Tang and Koveos (2008). The following model is therefore presented for testing: 
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UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2CULTURE + β3 CULTURE x SPITEM + β4 SIZE + β5 BMV + 
β6LEV + β7BIG4 + β8ROA + β9GROWTH + β10 CAPINTEN+ β11GDP  + β12RELINT + Year and 
Country Fixed Effects +   𝜀𝑡,                                                                            (4) 
where CULTURE represents the proxy for measuring different dimensions of culture, as 
revised by Hofstede (1981, 1991). CULTURE x SPITEM is the interaction between culture 
and negative special items. Models (5 to 9) are run by substituting or replacing CULTURE 
in model (4) by individual dimensions and measures of culture (POWDIS, INDIV, 
UNCAVO, MASCU and LONGTEO), as defined above. Specifically, the following 
models (5 to 9) are run to ascertain the effect of culture on classification shifting: 
UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2POWDIS + β3 POWDIS x SPITEM + β4 SIZE + β5 BMV + 
β6LEV + β7BIG4 + β8ROA + + β9GROWTH + β10 CAPINTEN+ β11GDP + β12RELINT + Year and 
Country Fixed Effects +   𝜀𝑡,                                                                                           (5) 
UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2INDIV + β3 INDIV x SPITEM + β4 SIZE + β5 BMV + β6LEV 
+ β7BIG4 + β8ROA + β9GROWTH + β10 CAPINTEN+ β11GDP  + β12RELINT + Year and Country 
Fixed Effects +   𝜀𝑡,                                                                                                    (6) 
UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2UNCAVO + β3 UNCAVO x SPITEM + β4 SIZE + β5 BMV + 
β6LEV + β7BIG4 + β8ROA + β9GROWTH + β10 CAPINTEN+ β11GDP  +  β12RELINT + Year and 
Country Fixed Effects +   𝜀𝑡,                                                                                                   (7) 
UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2MASCU + β3 MASCU x SPITEM + β4 SIZE + β5 BMV + β6LEV 
+ β7BIG4 + β8ROA +  β9GROWTH + β10 CAPINTEN+ β11GDP  +  β12RELINT + Year and Country 
Fixed Effects +   𝜀𝑡,                                                                                                   (8) 
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UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2LONGTEO + β3 LONGTEO x SPITEM + β4 SIZE + β5 BMV 
+ β6LEV + β7BIG4 + β8ROA + β9GROWTH + β10 CAPINTEN+ β11GDP  + β12RELINT + Year and 
Country Fixed Effects +   𝜀𝑡,                                                                                        (9) 
If culture helps to mitigate classification shifting, a negative co-efficient on the interactive 
term between cultural dimension variables and negative special items (CULTURE x 
SPITEM; POWDIS x SPITEM, INDIV x SPITEM, UNCAVO x SPITEM, MASCU x 
SPITEM and LONGTEO x SPITEM) is expected. The definitions of all variables in this 
study are provided in Table 4.3. 
Thirdly, this study follows previous ones (Leuz et al. 2003; La Porta et al. 1998) to measure 
the legal enforcement or environment for each country. La Porta et al. (1998), as 
corroborated by Leuz et al. (2003), define legal environment as the average score across 
three legal variables, namely (i) the level of corruption index, (ii) an index of the assessment 
of rule of law and (iii) an index of the efficiency of the judicial system. The average score 
of all three legal variables range from zero (0) to ten (10). To test whether the legal 
environment or enforcement mitigate managers’ classification shifting behaviour in 
different countries, the study controls for culture, as Callen et al. (2011) observe that the 
legal environment depends on culture. Initially, the following model (10) is employed:  
UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2LEGALENF + β3 LEGALENF x SPITEM + β4 SIZE + β5 BMV 
+ β6LEV + β7BIG4 + β8ROA + + β9GROWTH + β10 CAPINTEN+ β11GDP + β12CULTURE + Year 
and Country Fixed Effects +   𝜀𝑡,                                                                                       (10) 
where SPITEM is income-decreasing special items multiplied by negative one (-1), and 
legal environment (LEGALENF) is the aggregate of countrywide average score across all 
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three legal variables, as noted in Leuz et al. (2003) and La Porta et al. (1998). LEGALENF 
x SPITEM (LEGALSPI) is the interaction between the legal environment and negative 
special items. The study expects a positive and significant co-efficient on SPITEM to 
demonstrate the occurrence of classification shifting in international firms. If legal 
enforcement or the environment reduces misclassification in international firms, the study 
also expects the co-efficient on the interactive term between negative special items and 
legal environment LEGALSPI to be significantly negative.  
 
In addition, to test Hypotheses 3a and 3b to establish the joint effect of the interactive term 
between legal environment and religiosity, LEGALENF x RELINT (LEGALREL), and the 
interactive term between legal environment and culture, LEGALENF x CULTURE 
(LEGALCUL), on classification shifting, model (11) is run. To avoid multicollinearity 
problems, culture and religiosity measures are tested separately. A significant and negative 
relationship between classification shifting and LEGALREL and LEGALCUL is predicted. 
Therefore, the coefficients on LEGALREL and LEGALCUL are expected to be negative.  
Thus, model (11) is run to test the relationship between classification shifting and 
interactive term LEGALENF x CULTURE (LEGALCUL):   
UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β6CULTURE + β7BCULTURE x SPITEM + β8 LEGALENF + 
β9LEGALENF×SPITEM + β10 CULTURE×LEGALENF +β11 SIZE + β12BMV + β13LEV + β14BIG4 + β15ROA 
+ β16GROWTH + β17 CAPINTEN+ β18GDP  + β6RELINT + Year and Country Fixed Effects +   𝜀𝑡,                                                                                                 
(11)    
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Model (12) is also run to test the relationship between classification shifting and the 
interactive term LEGALENF x RELINT (LEGALREL). 
 UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2RELINT + β3REL x SPITEM + β4LEGALENF + β5 LEGALENF x 
SPITEM + β6 RELINT×LEGALENF + β7 SIZE + β8BMV + β9LEV + β10BIG4 + β11ROA + β12GROWTH + 
β13 CAPINTEN+ β14GDP  + β15CULTURE +Year and Country Fixed Effects +   𝜀𝑡,                                                                                                               
(12)    
Finally, all the variables in model (13) are included to assess their impact on classification 
shifting. 
UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2RELINT + β3REL x SPITEM + β4LEGALINT + β5 LEGALINT x 
SPITEM +β6CULTURE + β7BCULTURE x SPITEM + β8 RELINT×LEGALINT + β9RELINT×CULTURE + 
β10 CULTURE×LEGALINT +β11 SIZE + β12BMV + β13LEV + β14BIG4 + β15ROA + β16GROWTH + β17 
CAPINTEN+ β18GDP  + Year and Country Fixed Effects +   𝜀𝑡,                                                                            (13)    
All the variables are winsorized by year at the extreme 1% and 99% levels.  
 
4.4. Data, Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics  
 
Financial data was obtained from the Compustat Global Database to estimate abnormal 
core earnings and determine the extent of classification shifting across countries. The full 
sample consists of 908,125 firm-year observations for the period 2000 to 2015 from 117 
countries. In line with previous studies (Behn et al., 2013), countries require a minimum of 
10 firm-year observations to qualify for inclusion in the sample. To estimate abnormal core 
earnings, 55 countries were excluded because of the insufficient number of observations. 
All firm-years and variables with missing firm-year observations are also deleted. 
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Furthermore, to effectively use sales as a deflator for the majority of the variables and to 
avoid the creation of outliers, any firm year observation with sales revenue of less than 
$500,000 are excluded,  in line with earlier studies (Haw et al., 2011; Fan et al., 2010; 
McVay, 2006).  
In addition, countrywide religious datasets aree obtained from the World Values Survey of 
the World Bank, in line with previous studies (Callen et al. 2011; Stack and Kposowa, 
2008). The study employs the updated Hofstede (1980, 1991) cultural dimension variables 
as computed by Tang and Koveos (2008) and legal environment scores are obtained from 
the International Country Risk Guide (2015), similar to Leuz et al. (2003) and La Porta et 
al. (1998).  Consistent with previous studies (Behn et al., 2013; Haw et al., 2011) on 
classification shifting, the Fama and French (1997) four-digit (SIC) Industry Classification 
codes are used. The final datasets for all the variables needed for the analysis consist of 63 
countries (Table 4.2), 254,916 firm-year observations and 27,289 non-financial firms for 
the fiscal years 2000 to 2015. Table 4.2 presents the list of countries grouped under 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) classification of developed, emerging and developing 
countries. The breakdown of the final datasets consists of 26 developed countries, 26 
emerging countries and 11 developing ones with sufficient firm-year observations for the 
tests and analysis to be conducted. As indicated in Tables 4.2 and 4.9, included in the list 
of the developed countries are ones with significant number of firm-year observations, such 
as Australia, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Japan and the United States of America. 
Similarly, China, Indian, South Korea and Malaysia have a significant number of 
observations among the list of emerging countries.  In addition, Croatia, Tanzania, Vietnam 
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and Sri Lanka are among the list of developing countries with a high number of firm-year 
observations.  
Table 4.2: List of Developed, Emerging and Developing Economies/Countries 
Developed Emerging Developing 
Australia Argentina Côte d’Ivoire 
Austria Brazil Croatia 
Belgium Chile Gabonese Republic 
Canada China Lebanon 
Czech Republic Colombia Lithuania 
Denmark Estonia Malawi 
Finland Hungary Morocco 
France India Papua New Guinea 
Germany Korea (South) Sri Lanka 
Greece Kuwait Tanzania 
Iceland Malaysia Vietnam 
Ireland Mexico  
Italy Namibia  
Japan Nigeria  
Latvia Oman  
Luxembourg Peru  
Malta Philippines  
Netherlands Poland  
New Zealand Russian Federation  
Norway South Africa  
Portugal Thailand  
Spain Tonga  
Sweden Tunisia  
Taiwan Turkey  
United Kingdom United Arab Emirates  
United States of America Venezuela  
Source: IMF World Outlook Groupings and Classification, (2008).  
 
In Table 4.3, all the variables used in the analysis are listed and defined. The variables are 
classified into those measuring reported core earnings (REP_CE); the dependent variable, 
which is unexpected core earnings (UNEXP_CE); independent variables, which include 
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negative special items multiplied by country-level of religiosity (RELINTSPI); countrys’ 
legal environment multiplied by negative special items (LEGASPI); proxies for culture 
multiplied by negative special items (POWDSPI, INDIVSPI, MASCUSPI, UNCAVSPI 
and LONGTSPI); and control variables (SIZE, ROA, MBV, LEV, BIG4, CAPINTEN, 
GROWTH and GDP). As indicated above, earlier research (Behn et al., 2013; Haw et al., 
2011) provide empirical evidence to demonstrate the links between these control variables 
and classification shifting; consequently, this study has also attempted to develop direct 
theoretical and empirical links between these control variables and classification shifting, 
consistent with previous studies.   
 
 Table 4.3. List of Variables and Definitions 
Variable Name Variable 
Acronym 
Definitions 
Reported Core Earnings REP_CE Estimated as sales – cost of goods sold 
(COGS) – selling, general and 
administration expenses (SG&A) scaled by 
sales. Consistent with Behn et al. (2013), 
where firms fail to disclose COGS and 
SG&A, REP_CE is calculated as (sales – 
total operating expenses)/sales. 
Unexpected Core Earnings UNEXP_CE Calculated as the difference between 
expected core earnings (estimated from 
model 1) and reported core earnings by 
industry and fiscal year. A minimum of 10 
firm year observations are required per 
industry group. 
Special Items SPITEM Income-decreasing special items scaled by 
sales. 
Asset Turnover ATO Calculated as Salest scaled by average net 
operating assets [NOAt+NOAt-1]/2; average 
NOA is required to be > 0.  
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Net Operating Assets NOA Calculated as the difference between 
operating assets (OA) and operating 
liabilities (OL). 
Operating Liabilities OL Calculated as total assets – total debt (debt 
in current liabilities + long-term debt) – 
book value of common and preferred equity 
– minority interests.  
Operating Assets OA Calculated as total assets – cash and short-
term investments. 
Accruals  ACCRUALSt−1 
Calculated as in Francis and Wang (2008), 
as detailed above.  
Total Accruals TACC Difference between earnings before 
extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations and the cash flow from 
operational activities scaled by lagged total 
assets, similar to Behn et al (2013). 
Working Capital Accruals  WC_ACC Calculated as a change in current assets net 
of a change in cash, minus a change in 
current liabilities net of a change in the 
current portion of long-term debt, similar 
to Behn et al (2013). 
Change in Sales ∆SALESt 
Calculated as (Salest – Salest-1)Salest-1 
Neg. Change in Sales  𝑁𝐸𝐺_∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if change in 
sales < 0, and 0 otherwise. 
Religiosity RELINT Country level of religiosity measured by 
the World Values Survey of the World 
Bank, (Callen et al. 2011). 
Religiosity X Special Items RELINTSPI Interaction term between income-
decreasing special items and a country’s 
level of religiosity. 
Legal Enforcement/Environment LEGALENF Legal enforcement score from Leuz et al. 
(2003) and La Porta et al. (1998). 
Legal Enforcement/Environment X 
Special Items 
LEGALSPI Interaction term between legal 
enforcement and income-decreasing 
special items 
Power Distance POWDIS Power distance score from Tang and 
Koveos (2008), similar to Callen et al. 
(2011). 
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Power Distance  X Special Items POWDSPI Interaction between power distance and 
income-decreasing special items. 
Individualism  INDIV Individualism score from Tang and Koveos 
(2008), similar to Callen et al. (2001). 
Individualism X Special Items INDIVSPI Interaction between individualism and 
income-decreasing special items. 
Masculinity  MASCU Masculinity score from Tang and Koveos 
(2008), similar to Callen et al. (2011). 
Masculinity X Special Items MASCUSPI Interaction between masculinity and 
income-decreasing special items. 
Uncertainty Avoidance  UNCAVO Uncertainty avoidance score from Tang and 
Koveos (2008), similar to Callen et al. 
(2011). 
Uncertainty Avoidance X Special 
Items 
UNCAVSPI Interaction between uncertainty avoidance 
and income-decreasing special items. 
Long-Term Orientation LONGTEO Long term orientation score from Tang and 
Koveos (2008), similar to Callen et al. 
(2011). 
Long-Term Orientation X Special 
Items 
LONGTSPI Interaction between long term orientation 
score and income-decreasing special items. 
Size of Firms SIZE Natural log of market value of equity 
(Behn et al., 2013). 
Return on Assets ROA Calculated as net income plus interest 
expenses scaled by total assets at the 
beginning of the period (Behn et al., 2013). 
Market Book Value MBV Natural log of book value of equity scaled 
by market value of equity (Behn et al., 
2013). 
Leverage LEV Calculated as total liabilities scaled by total 
assets (Behn et al., 2013). 
Big Four Auditors BIG4 Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s 
auditor is a BIG4 audit firm, otherwise 
zero (0). 
Capital Intensity CAPINTEN Calculated as long-term assets scaled by 
total assets (Leuz et al., 2003; Behn et al., 
2013). 
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Growth  GROWTH Calculated as market value of outstanding 
shares at the end of the year scaled by book 
value of common equity at the end of the 
year, similar to Athanasakou et al. (2009) 
and Skinner & Sloan (2002). 
Annual Per Capita Gross Domestic 
Product  
GDP  GDP per capita U.S. $.World Development 
Indicators computed by the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
 
 
 
 
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Findings 
Table 4.4 shows the descriptive statistics of the full sample for the regression variables. For 
each of the variables, the count of the firm-year observations, the mean, the median, the 
standard deviation, the minimum and the maximum are reported.  The mean and median 
sale (in millions U.S. $) values for the full sample are 72619 and 1180 respectively, 
suggesting that wide variations in firm size exist among the sample country firms. In 
addition, the mean and median reported core earnings (REP_CE) are positive, at 0.166 and 
0.112 respectively. Similarly, the mean of income-decreasing special item (SPITEM) is 
positive at 0.001 and the median is zero. The mean and median unexpected core earnings 
(UNEXP_CE) are equal to zero. This is consistent with previous studies (Behn et al., 2013; 
Haw et al., 2011). Accruals are income-decreasing, as both the mean and median show 
negative -0.024 and -0.021 respectively. The mean religiosity (RELINT) across the sample 
countries is 66.03%; the median is 74.65%, the minimum is 10.6% and the maximum is 
98.7%. The mean religiosity figure of 66% suggests that a higher proportion of the country 
nationals within the sample attend religious services frequently, participate in weekly 
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religious activities and place a high level of importance on religious activities, according 
to the findings of the World Values Survey of the World Bank. The mean legal enforcement 
(LEGALENF) across the countries in the sample is 7.833, the median is 8.891, the 
minimum is 3.467 and the maximum is 10. The mean of 7.833 also indicates that strong 
legal enforcement exists in the majority of the countries sampled for the study, which is 
consistent with the findings of Leuz et al. (2003) and La Porta et al. (1998). The updated 
Hofstede (1981) cultural dimension variables are as follows: mean and median power 
distance (POWDIS, 61.06 and 66.19); individualism (INDIV, 48.88 and 47.83); 
masculinity (MASCU, 56.41 and 56.03); uncertainty avoidance (UNCAVO, 63.15 and 
68.05) and long-term orientation (LONGTEO, 37.98 and 34.51), suggesting that there is a 
wide variation in culture among the countries in the sample (Callen et al., 2011; Hofstede 
et al., 2010; Hofstede, 1991). However, power distance, uncertainty avoidance and 
masculinity appear to be the dominant cultures in most of the countries, as evidenced by 
the high mean (median) cultural scores.  
    Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics (Full Sample) 
Variables Count Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
SALE 254916 72619.156 1180.305 316145.6 147.574 12280.05 
REP_CE 254916 0.166 0.112 0.118 0.004 0.216 
UNEXP_CE 254916 0.000 0.005 0.031 -0.066 0.023 
SPITEM 254916 0.001 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.005 
ATO 254916 3.947 2.605 2.188 2.432 5.430 
ACCRUALS 254916     -0.024 -0.021 0.370 0.107 0.371 
∆SALES 254916 0.136 0.069 0.393 -0.042 0.225 
NEG_∆SALES 254916 0.106 0.049 0.360 -0.027 0.179 
Control Variables 
SIZE 254916 7.443 7.354 3.071 5.302 9.544 
ROA 254916 0.037 0.051 0.150 0.009 0.100 
MBV 254916 2.731 2.030 3.223 1.477 2.978 
LEV 254916 0.557 0.565 0.196 0.129 0.862 
CAPINTEN 254916 0.662 0.660 0.309 0.389 0.873 
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GDP 254916 19856 19782 15125 306 88003 
Independent Variables 
RELINT 254916 66.03 74.65 25.88 10.6 98.7 
LEGALENF 254916 7.833 8.891 1.893 3.467 10.00 
POWDIS 254916 61.059 66.190 20.366 11.989 86.344 
INDIV 254916 48.876 47.829 21.509 12.611 94.263 
MASCU 254916 56.410 56.025 22.565 19.761 95.190 
UNCAVO 254916 63.149 68.052 25.463 33.689 85.754 
LONGTEO 254916 37.983 34.510 20.521 1.820 84.471 
       
Notes: The final sample consists of 254,916 firm-year observations, of which 137,884 are from developed 
countries, 112,023 from emerging countries, and 5,009 from developing countries.  UNEXP_CE is computed as 
the difference between reported core earnings (REP_CE) and expected core earnings (NOR_CE) by industry and 
fiscal year (Behn et al., 2013). REP_CE is the reported core earnings estimated as sales – cost of goods sold – 
selling, general and administration expenses scaled by sales. For countries that disclose only the total value of 
operating expenses, UNEXP_CE is calculated as (sales – total operating expenses)/sales. SPITEM is negative 
special items as a percentage of sales. Income-decreasing special items are multiplied by (-1) but income-increasing 
ones are given a value of zero (0). ∆Sales is (Salest – Salest-1)/ Salest and NEG_∆Sales where ∆SALES is less 
than 0, otherwise zero. ATO is sales scaled by average net operating assets, where net operating assets is the 
difference between operating assets and operating liabilities. Operating assets = Total assets – Cash and Cash 
equivalent. Operating Liabilities = Total assets – Total debt - Book value of common equity – Preferred equity – 
Minority interests. ACCRUALS are calculated following Francis and Wang’s (2008) method. SIZE is the natural 
log of the market value of equity; LEV is measured as total debts scaled by total assets. CAPINTEN is capital 
intensity measured as the ratio of long-term assets scaled by total assets.  ROA is measured as net income before 
extraordinary items + interest income, divided by total assets at the beginning of the period and MBV is measured 
as the natural log of book value of equity scaled by the market value of equity. GROWTH is calculated as the 
market value of outstanding shares at the end of the year scaled by the book value of common equity at the end of 
the year All other variables are defined in Table 4.3 above. 
 
 
 
   Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics (Developed Countries) 
Variables Count Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
SALE 137884 58406.3 1238.01 251212.9 68.372 18332.65 
REP_CE 137884 0.163 0.110 0.118 0.003 0.212 
UNEXP_CE 137884 0.015 0.004 0.125 -0.051 0.068 
SPITEM 137884 0.014 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.002 
ATO 137884 3.754 2.344 8.794 0.707 5.730 
ACCRUALS 137884 -0.015 -0.017 0.385 -0.007 0.291 
∆SALES 136744 0.110 0.043 0.400 0.054 0.172 
NEG_∆SALES 137884 -0.079 0.032 0.354 -0.039 0.147 
Control Variables 
SIZE 137884 7.145 7.270 3.363 4.384 9.862 
ROA 137884 0.013 0.042 0.176 0.000 0.088 
MBV 137884 2.797 2.047 3.402 1.484 3.016 
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LEV 137884 0.517 0.516 0.261 0.339 0.673 
CAPINTEN 137884 0.092 0.043 0.306 -0.054 0.172 
GDP 137884 26461 26574 5575 648 88003 
Independent Variables 
RELINT 137884 49.09 41.38 23.06 19.71 89.01 
LEGALENF 137884 8.75 9.20 1.13 6.82 10.00 
POWDIS 137884 45 40 19 11 81 
INDIV 137884 63 71 18 27 90 
MASCU 137884 46 48 23 14 95 
UNCAVO 137884 64 70 23 24 99 
LONGTEO 137884 49 52 20 14 88 
       
Notes: The sample consists of 137884 firm-year observations from 26 countries from between 2000 and 2015. 
UNEXP_CE = computed as the difference between reported core earnings (REP_CE) and expected core 
earnings (NOR_CE) by industry and fiscal year (Behn et al 2013). REP_CE is the reported core earnings 
estimated as sales – cost of goods sold – selling, general and administration expenses scaled by sales. Countries 
that disclose only the total value of operating expenses, UNEXP_CE is calculated as (sales – total operating 
expenses)/sales. SPITEM is negative special items as a percentage of sales. Income-decreasing special items 
are multiplied by (-1) but income-increasing special items are given a value of zero (0). ∆Sales is (Salest – 
Salest-1)/ Salest and NEG_∆Sales is where ∆SALES is less than 0, otherwise zero ATO is Sales scaled by 
average net operating assets. Where net operating assets is the difference between operating assets and operating 
liabilities. Operating assets = Total assets – Cash and Cash equivalent. Operating Liabilities = Total assets – 
Total debt - Book value of common equity – Preferred equity – Minority interests. ACCRUALS are calculated 
following Francis and Wang (2008) method. SIZE is the natural log of the market value of equity; LEV is 
measured as total debts scaled by total assets. CAPINTEN is capital intensity measured as the ratio of long-
term assets scaled by total assets.  ROA is measured as net income before extraordinary items + interest income 
divided by total assets at the beginning of the period and MBV is measured as natural log of book value of 
equity scaled by market value of equity. GROWTH calculated as market value of outstanding shares at the end 
of the year scaled by book value of common equity at the end of the year All other variables are defined in 
Table 4.3. 
 
 
Table 4.5 presents the descriptive statistics for the developed countries sub-sample for each 
of the regression variables. For each regression variable, the count of firm-year 
observations, mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and the maximum statistics is 
provided. The mean and median sales (in million U.S. $) are 58,406 and 1,238, which is 
highly skewed and suggests that wide variations exist in firm size in the developed country 
sub-sample. The mean reported core earnings (REP_CE) scaled by sales are positive at 
0.163, with median earnings at 0.110. The mean income-decreasing special items 
(SPITEM) for developed countries are 0.014, with the median at zero. Similarly, the mean 
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and median unexpected core earnings (UNEXP_CE) are 0.015 and 0.004 respectively. This 
is consistent with previous studies in the U.S and UK and other developed countries 
(McVay, 2006; Athanasakou et al., 2009; Haw et al, 2011). Mean and median religiosity 
(RELINT) in the developed country sub-sample are 49.09% and 41.38% respectively. The 
average is below the full sample mean of 66%, suggesting that developed countries do not 
place a high value on religiosity. There are a few exceptions; for example, the United States 
has an average of 68.4% in religiosity. In addition, mean and median legal enforcement 
(LEGALENF) is 8.75 and 9.20, close to the maximum legal score of 10. This indicates that 
there is strong legal enforcement in the developed country sub-sample. The mean and 
median cultural dimension variables of POWDIS are 45 and 40, of INDIV 63 and 71, of 
MASCU 46 and 48, with UNCAVO at 64 and 70 and LONGTEO 49 and 52. The cultural 
dimension variables of individualism and uncertainty avoidance report the highest mean 
and median scores, an indication that developed countries are more individualistic and 
susceptible to uncertainty avoidance (Callen et al., 2011; Hofstede et al., 2010; Tang and 
Keveos, 2008).    
Table 4.6 shows the descriptive statistics for the emerging country sub-sample for each of 
the regression variables. Each regression variable, count, mean, median, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum statistics are reported. Mean sales (in millions U.S. $) are 75,841, 
with the median at 1,096, which is an indication of heterogeneity in firm size across the 
countries within emerging economies. The mean and median REP_CE are 0.008 and 0.124 
positive respectively, while mean and median SPITEM are 0.002 and zero. The mean and 
median UNEXP_CE are 0.015 and 0.043 positive. Accruals has both a negative mean and 
median of -0.034 and -0.028, suggesting income decreasing. The mean and median 
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RELINT are 72.07% and 80.85%, suggesting that a high percentage of the countries within 
the emerging sub-sample are religious. The mean and median LEGALENF are 6.02 and 
5.98, suggesting that the rule of law, efficiency of the judicial system and ability to combat 
the level of corruption in emerging countries are not as robust as in developed ones (Leuz 
et al., 2003; La Porta et al., 1998). In addition, the mean and median of the cultural 
dimension variable of POWDIS are 67 and 69, of INDIV 31 and 35, with MASCU at 48 
and 53, UNCAVO at 67 and 68 and LONGTEO 34 and 39. In the emerging countries, the 
higher mean and median power distance and uncertainty avoidance suggest that the two are 
the dominant cultures (Callen et al., 2011; Hofstede et al., 2010; Tang and Keveos, 2008). 
      Table 4.6: Descriptive Statistics (Emerging Countries) 
Variables Count Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
SALE 112023 75841.76 1096.774 346323.2 263.816 6076.423 
REP_CE 112023 0.008 0.124 0.103 0.058 0.217 
UNEXP_CE 112023 0.015 0.043 0.183 -0.008 0.191 
SPITEM 112023 0.002 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.001 
ATO 112023 2.171 1.973 2.345 -2.004 5.061 
ACCRUALS 112023 -0.034 -0.028 0.327 0.154 0.461 
∆SALES 112023 0.166 0.111 0.384 -0.023 0.276 
NEG_∆SALES 112023 0.138 0.072 0.364 -0.012 0.214 
Control Variables 
SIZE 112023 7.706 7.354 2.576 6.032 8.961 
ROA 112023 0.065 0.060 0.106 0.018 0.112 
MBV 112023 2.651 2.011 2.997 1.470 2.935 
LEV 112023 0.498 0.493 0.258 0.319 0.651 
CAPINTEN 112023 0.150 0.111 0.310 -0.023 0.276 
GDP 112023 18846 10977 4963 245 61313 
Independent Variables 
RELINT 112023 72.07 80.85 17.77 10.6 98.1 
LEGALENF 112023 6.02 5.98 1.23 3.47 8.19 
POWDIS 112023 67 69 17 31 100 
INDIV 112023 31 35 19 12 80 
MASCU 112023 48 53 18 13 88 
UNCAVO 112023 67 68 21 30 95 
LONGTEO 112023 34 39 29 13 100 
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Notes: The sample consists of 112,023 firm-year observations from 26 countries from between 2000 and 2015. 
UNEXP_CE is computed as the difference between reported core earnings (REP_CE) and expected core earnings 
(NOR_CE) by industry and fiscal year (Behn et al., 2013). REP_CE is the reported core earnings estimated as 
sales – cost of goods sold – selling, general and administration expenses scaled by sales. For countries that disclose 
only the total value of operating expenses, UNEXP_CE is calculated as (sales – total operating expenses)/sales. 
SPITEM is negative special items as a percentage of sales. Income-decreasing special items are multiplied by (-
1) but income-increasing special items are given a value of zero (0). ∆Sales is (Salest – Salest-1)/ Salest and NEG, 
while_∆Sales is where ∆SALES is less than 0, otherwise zero. ATO is sales scaled by average net operating 
assets, where net operating assets is the difference between operating assets and operating liabilities. Operating 
assets = Total assets – Cash and Cash equivalent. Operating Liabilities = Total assets – Total debt - Book value 
of common equity – Preferred equity – Minority interests. ACCRUALS are calculated following Francis and 
Wang’s (2008) method. SIZE is the natural log of the market value of equity; LEV is measured as total debts 
scaled by total assets. CAPINTEN is capital intensity measured as the ratio of long-term assets scaled by total 
assets.  ROA is measured as net income before extraordinary items + interest income divided by total assets at the 
beginning of the period and MBV is measured as the natural log of book value of equity scaled by the market 
value of equity. GROWTH calculated as the market value of outstanding shares at the end of the year scaled by 
the book value of common equity at the end of the year All other variables are defined in Table 4.3 above. 
 
 
Table 4.7 also presents descriptive statistics for the developing country sub-sample for each 
of the regression variables. The count of firm-year observations, mean, median, standard 
deviation, minimum and maximum statistics are again reported for each regression 
variable. The mean and median sales (in millions U.S. $) are 39,178 and 6,400 and the 
mean and median REP_CE are 0.015 and 0.027 positive. The mean and median SPITEM 
are 0.006 and zero. The mean and median UNEXP_CE are 0.001 and 0.002 positive. The 
mean and median accruals are negative -0.038 and -0.028, indicating income decreasing 
accruals. The mean and median RELINT are 85.40% and 89.14, confirming previous 
research findings that developing and poor countries are very religious (McGuire et al., 
2012; Dryeng et al., 2012). The mean and median LEGALENF are 5.62 and 5.89, 
confirming previous studies (Leuz et al., 2003; La Porta et al., 1998) which observe that 
the rule of law, the efficiency of the judicial system and the ability to combat the level of 
corruption in developing countries is weak. In addition, the mean and median cultural 
dimension variables of POWDIS are 65 and 68, of INDIV 46 and 42, with MASCU at 43 
and 48, UNCAVO at 54 and 56 and LONGTEO 55 and 59. This suggests that power 
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distance and long-term orientation tend to be higher for East European and African 
countries (Callen et al., 2011; Hofstede et al., 2010; Tang and Keveos, 2008). 
Table 4.8 presents the country-level descriptive statistics for religiosity (RELINT), legal 
enforcement or environment (LEGALENF) and five proxies for the cultural dimension 
variable: power distance (POWDIS), individualism (INDIV), masculinity (MASCU), 
uncertainty avoidance (UNCAVO) and long-term orientation (LONGTEO).  For each of 
the 63 countries, the count of firm-year observations and the mean are reported. There is a 
substantial difference in the number of firm-year observations across countries, which may 
be due to variations in country size, the availability of financial statements and capital 
market developments (Leuz et al., 2003). The countries with the highest number of firm-
year observations are Australia (15,884), China (24,650), India (25,621), Japan (23,897), 
Taiwan (17,670), the United Kingdom (18,721) and the United States of America (29,761). 
The mean (RELINT) for the 63 countries ranges from 10.6% (China) to 98.7% (Morocco). 
Most developed countries in the sample have a mean RELINT of below 45%, with the 
exception of Malta (84.10%), Austria (68.7%), the USA (68.4%) and Portugal (62.5%). All 
developing countries have a mean RELINT of 80% or above, suggesting that poor countries 
are more religious than rich countries. Similarly, the mean RELINT for emerging countries 
is 65.45%, suggesting these appear more religious than developed countries. On the 
contrary, the mean LEGALENF is high in all developed countries (ranging from 9 to 10), 
and low for all developing countries (ranging from 3.47 to 5.86), suggesting that the legal 
environment is stronger in developed countries than developing/emerging countries (Leuz 
et al., 2003; La Porta et al., 1998). Emerging countries have a mean of 6.2. Specifically, the 
mean LEGALENF for Australia is (9.51), Austria (9.34), Belgium (9.44), Denmark 
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(10.00), Finland (10.00), the UK (9.22) and the USA (9.54). In contrast, the mean 
LEGALENF for emerging countries such as China is (6.69), India (5.58), and Malaysia 
(7.72), and for developing countries such as Malawi is (5.86); Sri Lanka (4.63) and 
Tanzania (4.18). Similarly, there is wide cultural variation between the countries. Most 
developed ones exhibit a high mean on individualism (INDIV), with Australia at (90), 
Greece (89), Canada (80) and Norway (80), suggesting that individuals in most developed 
countries only care for themselves and their immediate family (Hofstede et al., 2010). 
 
Table 4.7: Descriptive Statistics (Developing Countries) 
Variables Count Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
SALE 5009 39178.6 6400.233 747945.3 676.518 368512.5 
REP_CE 5009 0.015 0.027 0.425 0.004 0.047 
UNEXP_CE 5009 0.001 0.002 0.052 -0.036 0.028 
SPITEM 5009 0.006 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.008 
ATO 5009 1.251 2.371 29.842 -2.519 6.347 
ACCRUALS 5009 -0.034 -0.28 0.276 0.165 0.435 
∆SALES 5009 0.156 0.106 0.343 -0.013 0.252 
NEG_∆SALES 5009 0.144 0.075 0.369 -0.007 0.231 
Control Variables 
SIZE 5009 9.743 8.961 3.320 7.101 12.874 
ROA 5009 0.085 0.075 0.102 0.028 0.129 
MBV 5009 2.715 2.015 2.974 1.445 2.920 
LEV 5009 0.481 0.486 0.237 0.302 0.637 
CAPINTEN 5009 0.444 0.506 0.285  0.083 0.652 
GDP 5009 8657 5483 3440 149 24380 
Independent Variables 
RELINT 5009 85.40 83.75 15.67 32.4 98.7 
LEGALENF 5009 5.62 5.89 0.78 4.18 7.01 
POWDIS 5009 65 68 19 39 100 
INDIV 5009 46 42 21 20 80 
MASCU 5009 43 48 18 12 66 
UNCAVO 5009 54 56 20 29 86 
LONGTEO 5009 55 59 22 14 87 
Notes: The sample consists of 5009 firm-year observations from 11 developing countries from between 2000 and 
2015. UNEXP_CE = computed as the difference between reported core earnings (REP_CE) and expected core 
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earnings (NOR_CE) by industry and fiscal year (Behn et al 2013). REP_CE is the reported core earnings 
estimated as sales – cost of goods sold – selling, general and administration expenses scaled by sales. Countries 
that disclose only the total value of operating expenses, UNEXP_CE is calculated as (sales – total operating 
expenses)/sales. SPITEM is negative special items as a percentage of sales. Income-decreasing special items are 
multiplied by (-1) but income-increasing special items are given a value of zero (0). ∆Sales is (Salest – Salest-1)/ 
Salest and NEG_∆Sales is where ∆SALES is less than 0, otherwise zero ATO is Sales scaled by average net 
operating assets. Where net operating assets is the difference between operating assets and operating liabilities. 
Operating assets = Total assets – Cash and Cash equivalent. Operating Liabilities = Total assets – Total debt - 
Book value of common equity – Preferred equity – Minority interests. ACCRUALS are calculated following 
Francis and Wang (2008) method. SIZE is the natural log of the market value of equity; LEV is measured as total 
debts scaled by total assets. CAPINTEN is capital intensity measured as the ratio of long-term assets scaled by 
total assets.  ROA is measured as net income before extraordinary items + interest income divided by total assets 
at the beginning of the period and MBV is measured as natural log of book value of equity scaled by market value 
of equity. GROWTH calculated as market value of outstanding shares at the end of the year scaled by book value 
of common equity at the end of the year All other variables are defined in Table 4.3 above. 
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    Table 4.8: Country-Level Descriptive Statistics (Independent Variables) 
Country  Count 
RELINT 
(Mean) 
LEGALENF 
(Mean) 
POWDIS 
(Mean) 
INDIV 
(Mean) 
MASCU 
(Mean) 
UNCAVO 
(Mean) 
LONGTEO 
(Mean) 
Argentina 865 58.200 5.957 49 46 56 86 20.40 
Australia 15884 31.100 9.507 38 90 61 51 21.16 
Austria 971 68.700 9.357 11 55 79 70 60.45 
Belgium 1285 58.300 9.440 65 75 54 94 81.86 
Brazil 2030 94.600 4.533 69 38 49 76 43.83 
Canada 1256 87.400 4.792 39 80 52 48 36.02 
Chile 2091 58.900 6.523 80 20 66 30 87.41 
China 24650 10.600 6.687 80 20 66 30 87.41 
Colombia 334 85.400 4.777 67 13 64 80 13.10 
Côte d’Ivoire 65 83.400 5.100 80 20 66 30 87.41 
Croatia 553 68.700 5.467 68 25 57 29 60.96 
Czech Republic 219 29.400 7.333 57 58 57 74 70.03 
Denmark 1695 17.400 10.000 18 74 16 23 34.76 
Estonia 212 25.200 7.567 40 60 30 60 82.12 
Finland 1796 54.200 10.000 33 63 26 59 38.29 
France 8508 40.500 8.677 68 71 43 86 63.48 
Gabonese Republic 19 78.300 5.967 68 71 43 86 63.48 
Germany 8916 38.000 9.053 18 74 16 23 34.76 
Greece 2254 72.300 6.817 35 89 66 35 51.13 
Hungary 250 34.600 7.667 46 80 88 82 58.19 
Iceland 119 89.100 9.330 28 70 68 35 24.43 
India 25621 88.800 5.583 77 48 56 40 50.88 
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Ireland 727 52.300 8.357 58 41 43 59 13.60 
Italy 3272 69.800 7.070 50 76 70 75 61.46 
Japan 23897 19.000 9.167 54 46 95 92 87.91 
Korea 9527 54.200 5.550 60 18 39 85 100.00 
Kuwait 694 93.900 7.000 60 18 39 85 100.00 
Latvia 323 41.300 7.913 40 60 50 70 63.98 
Lebanon 13 77.000 5.913 44 70 9 63 68.77 
Lithuania 382 84.100 6.350 42 60 19 65 81.86 
Luxembourg 371 37.400 7.153 40 60 50 70 63.98 
Malawi 24 97.500 5.857 70 46 53 68 14.11 
Malaysia 10717 96.800 7.720 70 46 53 68 14.11 
Malta 115 84.100 7.500 81 30 69 82 24.18 
Mexico 1390 83.800 5.373 100 26 50 36 40.81 
Morocco 363 98.700 6.273 100 26 50 36 40.81 
Namibia 26 89.100 6.007 70 46 53 68 14.11 
Netherlands 1945 25.200 10.000 38 80 14 53 67.00 
New Zealand 1280 36.100 10.000 22 79 58 49 32.75 
Nigeria 595 97.500 4.337 80 38 14 53 67.00 
Norway 2435 32.600 10.000 38 80 14 53 67.00 
Oman 765 81.500 7.567 31 69 8 50 34.51 
Papua New Guinea 31 94.400 5.920 94 32 64 44 27.46 
Peru 1140 80.200 4.650 64 16 42 87 25.19 
Philippines 1677 98.100 3.467 94 32 64 44 27.46 
Poland 4130 79.600 6.500 68 60 64 93 37.78 
Portugal 698 62.500 7.187 63 27 31 99 28.21 
Russian Federation 1866 41.800 7.623 93 39 36 95 81.36 
South Africa 3097 83.900 6.447 70 20 40 30 57.18 
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Spain 8914 38.000 9.051 18 74 16 23 34.76 
Sri Lanka 1649 89.400 4.633 42 60 19 65 81.86 
Sweden 5383 26.200 10.000 31 71 5 29 52.90 
Taiwan 17670 52.700 7.373 66 37 45 85 45.59 
Tanzania 61 83.400 4.177 66 37 45 85 45.59 
Thailand 5838 87.700 4.893 64 20 34 64 31.74 
Tonga 118 91.300 6.367 47 16 58 55 12.59 
Tunisia 284 98.100 5.000 47 16 58 55 12.59 
Turkey 1873 92.700 4.787 66 37 45 85 45.59 
United Arab Emirates 491 93.400 8.190 80 38 53 68 23.00 
United Kingdom 18721 34.600 9.223 68 71 43 86 63.48 
United States of 
America 
29761 68.400 9.543 
61 66 38 98 26.20 
Venezuela 145 78.200 5.857 81 12 73 76 15.62 
Vietnam 1829 32.400 7.013 70 20 40 30 57.18 
Notes: The sample consists of 63 countries, of which 26 are from developed countries, 26 are from emerging ones and 11 from developing countries. RELINT is computed as the country’s 
level of religiosity measured by the World Values Survey (WVS) of the World Bank between 2000 and 2015. LEGALENF is the average score across three legal variables, namely (i) the 
level of corruption index, (ii) an index of the assessment of rule of law and (iii) an index of the efficiency of the judicial system. The average score of all t three legal variables ranges from 
zero to ten (Leuz et al., 2003; La Porta et al., 1998). POWDIS = the power distance cultural dimension score from Tang and Koveos (2008). INDIV = the individualism cultural dimension 
score, also from Tang and Koveos (2008). MASCU = the masculinity cultural dimension score from Tang and Koveos (2008). UNCAVO = the uncertainty avoidance cultural dimension 
score from Tang and Koveos (2008) and LONGTEO = long-term orientation cultural dimension score from Tang and Koveos (2008). All other variables are defined in Table 4.3 above. 
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   Table 4.9: Country-Level Descriptive Statistics 
Country  Count 
REP_CE  
(Mean) 
REP_CE 
 (Median) 
UNEXP_CE 
(Mean) 
UNEXP_CE 
(Median) 
SPITEM 
(Mean) 
Argentina 865 0.203 0.173 0.002 0.001 0.003 
Australia 15884 0.190 0.138 0.003 -0.003 0.004 
Austria 971 0.314 0.277 0.003 0.001 0.001 
Belgium 1285 0.328 0.222 0.002 0.001 0.001 
Brazil 2030 0.369 0.149 0.003 0.001 0.001 
Canada 1256 0.305 0.280 0.009 -0.001 0.003 
Chile 2091 0.126 0.116 0.009 0.001 0.002 
China 24650 0.114 0.104 0.002 0.001 0.002 
Colombia 334 0.255 0.237 0.002 0.001 0.004 
Côte d’Ivoire 65 0.130 0.108 0.006 0.002 0.002 
Croatia 553 0.209 0.186 0.012 0.001 0.001 
Czech Republic 219 0.260 0.213 0.002 0.003 0.003 
Denmark 1695 0.149 0.134 0.002 0.001 0.001 
Estonia 212 0.207 0.183 0.008 0.005 0.004 
Finland 1796 0.434 0.384 0.004 0.002 0.003 
France 8508 0.259 0.187 0.014 0.002 0.001 
Gabonese Republic 19 0.501 0.455 0.002 0.001 0.000 
Germany 8916 0.312 0.220 0.002 0.002 0.001 
Greece 2254 0.187 0.121 0.006 -0.006 0.001 
Hungary 250 0.180 0.128 0.003 0.002 0.003 
Iceland 119 0.155 0.129 0.004 0.002 0.001 
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India 25621 0.253 0.119 -0.011 -0.006 0.002 
Ireland 727 0.130 0.123 0.007 0.004 0.002 
Italy 3272 0.318 0.217 0.002 0.001 0.001 
Japan 23897 0.133 0.103 0.007 0.006 0.001 
Korea 9527 0.179 0.108 0.002 0.002 0.001 
Kuwait 694 0.194 0.142 -0.002 -0.007 0.002 
Latvia 323 0.119 0.102 0.005 -0.007 0.001 
Lebanon 13 0.326 0.233 0.002 0.001 0.000 
Lithuania 382 0.171 0.119 0.007 0.006 0.001 
Luxembourg 371 0.117 0.105 0.001 0.001 0.002 
Malawi 24 0.298 0.278 0.001 -0.002 0.004 
Malaysia 10717 0.169 0.138 0.002 0.001 0.002 
Malta 115 0.275 0.284 0.002 -0.003 0.001 
Mexico 1390 0.206 0.168 0.002 0.001 0.004 
Morocco 363 0.226 0.171 0.003 0.001 0.001 
Namibia 26 0.123 0.115 0.004 0.001 0.002 
Netherlands 1945 0.324 0.207 0.002 0.002 0.001 
New Zealand 1280 0.275 0.180 0.006 0.006 0.002 
Nigeria 595 0.165 0.139 0.003 0.003 0.005 
Norway 2435 0.253 0.232 0.002 0.003 0.003 
Oman 765 0.194 0.164 0.002 0.002 0.001 
Papua New Guinea 31 0.420 0.382 0.004 0.003 0.003 
Peru 1140 0.292 0.171 0.003 0.005 0.003 
Philippines 1677 0.291 0.177 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Poland 4130 0.220 0.182 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
Portugal 698 0.303 0.255 0.001 0.006 0.003 
Russian Federation 1866 0.207 0.180 0.003 0.002 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 287 
South Africa 3097 0.201 0.131 0.005 0.002 0.001 
Spain 8916 0.312 0.220 0.002 0.002 0.001 
Sri Lanka 1649 0.170 0.122 0.001 0.002 0.003 
Sweden 5383 0.147 0.109 0.004 0.001 0.002 
Taiwan 17670 0.194 0.113 0.004 0.001 0.002 
Tanzania 61 0.321 0.308 0.003 0.002 0.004 
Thailand 5838 0.251 0.201 0.005 0.004 0.003 
Tonga 118 0.216 0.173 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
Tunisia 284 0.219 0.205 -0.001 -0.003 0.002 
Turkey 1873 0.352 0.296 0.004 0.002 0.004 
United Arab Emirates 491 0.218 0.189 0.004 0.003 0.001 
United Kingdom 18721 0.262 0.105 0.004 0.001 0.002 
United States of America 29761 0.266 0.258 0.002 0.001 0.004 
Venezuela 145 0.325 0.256 0.002 0.001 0.002 
Vietnam 1829 0.146 0.108 0.003 0.002 0.002 
 
Notes: The sample consists of 63 countries, of which 26 are from developed countries, 26 are from emerging ones and 11 from developing countries. UNEXP_CE is computed as the 
difference between reported core earnings (REP_CE) and expected core earnings (NOR_CE) by industry and fiscal year (Behn et al., 2013). REP_CE is the reported core earnings estimated 
as sales – cost of goods sold – selling, general and administration expenses scaled by sales. For countries that disclose only the total value of operating expenses, UNEXP_CE is calculated 
as (sales – total operating expenses)/sales. SPITEM is negative special items as a percentage of sales. Income-decreasing special items are multiplied by (-1) but income-increasing special 
items are given a value of zero (0). All other variables are defined in Table 4.3 above. 
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Mean power distance (POWDIS) is high for both emerging countries (Mexico, 100; Chile, 
80; China, 80; Philippines, 94) and developing countries (Morocco, 100; Papua New 
Guinea, 94; Croatia, 68 and Vietnam, 70), suggesting that individuals in these countries 
accept inequality and expect that power is distributed unequally (Callen et al., 2011; 
Hofstede et al., 2010). The other cultural dimension variables exhibit wide variations in 
mean figures across the countries.   
In addition, Table 4.9 provides further countrywide descriptive statistics. For each of the 
63 countries, the count of firm-year observations, the mean and the median for reported 
core earnings (REP_CE), unexpected core earnings (UNEXP_CE) and income-decreasing 
special items (SPITEM) are reported. The mean of income-decreasing special items scaled 
by sales for the 63 countries is 0.003, with Nigeria (0.005), Australia (0.004), the USA 
(0.004), Estonia (0.004) and Turkey (0.004) exhibiting the highest income-decreasing 
special items. The mean and median unexpected core earnings (UNEXP_CE) for the 63 
countries are 0.004 and 0.007 and the mean and median income-decreasing special items 
are consistent with the distribution reported by previous research (Behn et al., 2013; Haw 
et al., 2011).  
To ensure that there is non- multi-collinearity problem, in Table 4.10 both the Pearson and 
Spearman correlation coefficients are presented for all the variables in the regression 
model. The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients are shown above, and 
Spearman’s rank-order correlation coefficients are shown below. It is worth noting that the 
directions of both Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients are generally similar, an 
indication that there is a lack of multi-collinearity problem within the data. Again, 
Consistent with Green (2012) and Kennedy (2008) further tests are conducted to ensure 
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that there are no multi-collinearity problems. The study estimates the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) for the independent variables and the highest VIF among all the independent 
variables is below 3.4. Green (2012) indicates that a VIF of 10 or less is a good sign of non-
multicollinearity problems. Appendix C, Table C1 provides results showing both the VIF 
and the tolerance level (TOL) for all the independent variables in the study. As indicated 
in Table 4.10, UNEXP_CE is negatively and significantly correlated with RELINT, 
LEGALENF, ROA, SIZE, MBV, BIG4, GDP, INDIVSPI and LONGTSPI. However, 
UNEX_CE is positively and significantly correlated with SPITEM, LEV, GROWTH, 
CAPINTEN, POWDSPI, UNCAVSPI and MASCUSPI. Consistent with previous studies 
(Callen et al., 2011; Leuz et al., 2003), legal enforcement, religiosity and the updated 
Hofstede cultural variables of individualism and uncertainty avoidance are significantly 
and negatively correlated with each other and with the unexpected core earnings. Given the 
correlation between the variables, it is therefore important to carry out multivariate 
regression analysis to ascertain whether unexpected core earnings are mitigated by religion, 
legal environment or culture, by an interactive term between culture and legal environment 
or by an interactive term between religion and legal environment. The correlation 
coefficients support the validity of the model and the multivariate regression results will 
further confirm the relationship.   
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       Table 4.10: Pearson’s above and Spearman’s below correlation matrices (full sample) 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 REP_CE  0.21 0.08 0.01 -0.12 0.04 0.06 -0.14 -0.03 -0.05 0.08 0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 0.04 -0.11 0.05 0.01 -0.10 
2 UNEXP_CE 0.21  0.09 -0.04 -0.02 -0.06 -0.01 -0.14 -0.20 -0.07 0.04 0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 -0.04 
3 SPITEM 0.08 0.09  -0.01 -0.13 -0.04 -0.09 -0.21 -0.07 -0.02 0.03 -0.06 0.01 -0.02 -0.11 -0.08 0.17 -0.07 -0.01 -0.12 
4 ATO 0.01 -0.04 -0.02  0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.07 -0.01 0.07 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
5 ACCRUALS -0.12 -0.02 -0.15 0.07  -0.01 -0.01 0.25 0.27 0.10 -0.23 0.01 0.18 0.08 -0.28 0.19 -0.28 0.08 -0.07 0.11 
6 ∆SALES 0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 -0.07  0.17 -0.06 0.10 -0.02 -0.08 0.17 0.02 -0.07 0.08 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.04 
7 NEG_∆SALES 0.06 -0.05 -0.06 0.06 0.00 0.15  -0.01 0.22 0.00 0.02 0.16 -0.04 0.05 -0.05 0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 
8 SIZE -0.14 -0.11 -0.23 0.08 0.24 -0.02 0.02  0.29 0.12 0.09 -0.04 0.19 -0.14 -0.18 -0.19 -0.40 0.27 0.10 0.39 
9 ROA -0.03 -0.21 -0.05 0.04 0.25 0.13 0.22 0.26  -0.02 -0.12 0.14 0.01 0.04 -0.17 0.13 -0.16 0.02 -0.01 0.11 
10 MBV -0.05 -0.10 -0.01 0.02 0.11 -0.01 0.05 0.13 -0.02  0.15 -0.02 0.23 -0.06 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.07 
11 LEV 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.07 -0.16 -0.05 0.01 0.10 -0.11 0.13  -0.07 0.27 -0.08 0.00 -0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.02 0.11 
12 CAPITEN 0.05 0.06 -0.06 -0.02 0.07 0.14 0.19 -0.02 0.13 -0.01 -0.05  -0.02 0.07 -0.07 0.06 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 -0.03 
13 GDP -0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.03 0.23 0.01 -0.03 0.24 0.01 0.23 0.26 -0.01  0.00 0.02 -0.03 0.08 -0.05 0.00 0.04 
14 RELINT -0.05 -0.02 -0.06 0.01 0.05 -0.09 0.07 -0.16 0.08 -0.08 -0.08 0.09 0.00  -0.30 0.20 -0.17 -0.01 -0.29 -0.28 
15 LEGALENF -0.05 -0.06 -0.09 -0.02 -0.31 0.10 -0.08 -0.19 -0.13 0.03 -0.01 -0.10 0.01 -0.27  -0.24 0.35 -0.15 0.35 -0.05 
16 POWDIS 0.04 0.07 -0.05 0.01 0.24 0.02 0.10 0.11 0.13 -0.02 -0.03 0.05 -0.02 0.23 -0.27  -0.23 0.20 0.26 0.24 
17 INDIV -0.12 -0.10 0.22 0.01 -0.26 -0.05 -0.05 -0.42 -0.08 0.02 0.06 -0.05 0.07 -0.16 0.36 -0.25  -0.26 0.18 -0.23 
18 MASCU 0.02 0.03 -0.05 -0.02 0.09 -0.02 -0.03 0.30 0.06 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 -0.10 0.15 -0.26  0.39 0.21 
19 UNCAVO 0.03 0.02 -0.04 0.00 -0.10 -0.09 -0.06 0.12 0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.08 0.01 -0.28 0.31 0.26 0.20 0.35  0.12 
20 LONGTEO -0.10 -0.04 -0.12 0.02 0.09 -0.04 -0.02 0.42 0.05 0.06 0.11 -0.04 0.03 -0.26 -0.01 0.21 -0.25 0.21 0.13  
                      
Notes: The final sample consists of 254,916 firm-year observations, of which 137,884 are from developed countries, 112,023 from emerging countries and 5,009 from developing ones.  
Table 4.10 shows both Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients. The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients are shown above and the Spearman rank-order correlations 
coefficients are shown below. All variables are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent and are defined in Table 4.3. Bold co-efficient are significant at P < 0.10 (two tailed test).  
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4.5. Empirical Regression Results and Discussion 
 
4.5.1. Testing the Existence of Classification Shifting in the Global Sub-sample 
To assess the joint effect of legal environment and religiosity, and legal environment and 
national culture on classification shifting in international firms, the study first examines the 
existence of classification shifting in the full sample (63 countries), and also the sub-
samples of developed, emerging and developing countries to test whether misclassification 
as an earnings management method is prevalent or differs among the three groups of 
countries.  
Table 4.11 presents the regression results of the four separate fixed effect regression models 
using the full sample, the developed, the emerging and developing countries sub-samples. 
Initially, only SPITEM is included in the full and sub-sample models. The relationship 
between SPITEM and UNEXP_CE is positive and significant at the 1% level. Thereafter, 
the control variables are included and the relationship between unexpected core earnings 
(UNEXP_CE) and income-decreasing special items (SPITEM) is examined. For the the 
full sample and each sub-sample, if firms in the country classifications shift, then the 
coefficient on SPITEM should be positive and significant. The results indicate that the 
relationship between SPITEM and UNEXP_CE is positive and significant at the 1% level 
for both emerging and developing countries. However, SPITEM is positively related to 
UNEXP_CE at the 5% significance level in developed countries. This is consistent with 
previous studies (Behn et al., 2013; Haw et al., 2011) on classification shifting, which 
confirms the existence of misclassification in international firms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 292 
 
 
Notes: *,** and *** are used in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent levels. The table shows the co-efficient estimates and t-statistics (in brackets). SPITEM = income-decreasing 
special items scaled by sales; SIZE is the natural log of the market value of equity; and LEV is measured as total debts 
scaled by total assets. CAPINTEN is capital intensity measured as the ratio of long-term assets scaled by total assets.  
ROA is measured as net income before extraordinary items + interest income divided by total assets at the beginning of 
the period and MBV is measured as the natural log of book value of equity scaled by the market value of equity. 
GROWTH is calculated as the market value of outstanding shares at the end of the year scaled by the book value of 
common equity at the end of the year. All variables are defined in Table 4.3 above. 
 
 UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2 SIZE + β3 LEV + β4 ROA + β5 MBV ++ β6 BIG4 + β7 CAPINTEN + 
β8 GROWTH + β9 GDP + Year Fixed Effects +Country Fixed Effects 
 
Table 4.11: Testing the Existence of Classification Shifting in the Global Sub-samples 
Dependent Variable :UNEXP_CE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Full Sample Developed Emerging Developing 
     
SPITEM  0.748***  0.128**  0.379***   0.313*** 
 (6.923) (2.076) (4.991) (3.259) 
SIZE  -0.063***  -0.106***  -0.018*** -0.015* 
 (-7.167) (-6.994) (-5.022) (-1.776) 
ROA -0.089***  -0.274***  -0.563*** -0.137* 
 (-7.272) (-3.545) (-5.218) (-1.740) 
MBV -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (-1.476) (-1.076) (-1.118) (-0.641) 
LEV   0.387***   0.151***   0.664***   0.404*** 
 (6.459) (4.940) (4.235) (6.842) 
BIG4 -0.025**  -0.026**  -0.038***  -0.133** 
 (-2.511) (-2.244) (-3.146) (-2.048) 
CAPINTEN  0.030** 0.022** 0.017* 0.027* 
 (2.309) (2.157) (1.703) (1.733) 
GROWTH  0.055***  0.056***   0.058***   0.133*** 
 (3.511) (3.844) (6.146) (5.948) 
GDP PER CAPITA -0.349 -0.970 -0.476 -0.681 
 (-0.682) (-0.989) (-0.816) (-0.848) 
CONSTANT   0.329***  0.732***   0.159***   0.455*** 
 (6.593) (5.574) (5.592) (4.029) 
     
Observations 254916 137884 112023 5009 
R-squared 0.20 0.22 0.37 0.40 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Breusch-Pagan 3343.31 2178.41 2022.83 1178.83 
P-Value (0.7581) (0.7024) (0.6595) (0.6183) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 635.17 542.35 407 386 
P-Value (0.5327) (0.5237) (0.5213) (0.4218) 
Wooldridge Test 122.48 148.91 92.43 86.76 
P-Value (0.4019) (0.4137) (0.3913) (0.3710) 
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The results also indicate that SIZE and ROA are negatively related to UNEXP_CE at the 
1% significance level in both developed and emerging countries, but at the 10% 
significance level in developing countries. This suggests that the sub-samples of developed, 
emerging and developing countries have more small firms, as previous studies (Behn et al., 
2013; Haw et al., 2011) indicate that the smaller the firm, the more likely its management 
will be involved in classification shifting behaviour to increase reported core earnings. The 
negative coefficient of ROA also suggests that firms in the developed, emerging and 
developing country sub-samples increase their reported core earnings through classification 
shifting when profits are low, and decrease misclassification of core expenses when profits 
are high. This finding is consistent with earlier studies (Behn et al., 2013; Athanasakou et 
al., 2009). Similarly, the study controls for the BIG4 auditors, as previous studies indicate 
that effective corporate governance mechanisms play a monitoring role in subduing firms’ 
classification shifting behaviour (Zalata and Roberts, 2015). From the results, there is a 
negative and significant relationship at 5% and 1% between BIG4 and UNEXP_CE in 
developed, developing and emerging countries respectively, suggesting that the presence 
of BIG4 auditors mitigates misclassification of core expenses into special items in 
international firms. This finding is consistent with previous research (Zalata and Roberts, 
2015; Behn et al., 2013; Haw et al., 2011). The relationship between MBV and UNEXP_CE 
is negative, but not significant. On the other hand, the coefficient of LEV is positive and 
significant at 1% for all the sub-samples, suggesting that firms in developed, emerging and 
developing countries engage in classification shifting to improve their reported core 
earnings when securing external financing. Similarly, the relationship between CAPINTEN 
and UNEXP_CE is positive and significant at 5% and 10% for developed countries, 
emerging and developing countries respectively. In addition, GROWTH is positively 
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related to UNEXP_CE and significant at the 1% level for all the sub-samples, an indication 
that share prices respond positively to good reported core earnings. GDP per capita is also 
negatively related to UNEXP_CE, but not significant. From the above discussions, it is 
concluded that misclassification of core expenses into special items is pervasive 
management behaviour occurring in developed, emerging and developing countries, with 
greater evidence of it in emerging and developing countries, as indicated by coefficients 
which are statistically significant at the 99% confidence level for both emerging and 
developing countries, and 95% for developed countries. In general, the control variables 
also exhibit various signs and levels of significance consistent with earlier studies (Behn et 
al., 2013; Haw et al., 2011, Fan et al., 2010; McVay, 2006).         
                                       
4.5.2. Relationship between Countrywide Religiosity and Classification Shifting 
 
To test hypothesis 1, the relationship between countrywide religiosity (RELINT) and 
unexpected core earnings (UNEXP_CE) is examined, as well as the interactive term 
between RELINT X SPITEM (RELINTSPI) and UNEXP_CE as the variable of interest. 
Consistent with previous studies (McGuire et al., 2012; Behn et al., 2013), fixed effects 
regression model (3) is run to account for the variations in firm sizes and country-level 
differences. The first hypothesis predicts a negative or positive relationship between 
RELINTSPI and UNEXP_CE. Table 4.12 presents the findings for the full sample, as well 
as for the developed, emerging and developing country sub-samples. Regardless of the 
sample examined, SPITEM is positive and significant at 1% for both the full sample and 
sub-samples, confirming the earlier findings in Table 4.11 that classification shifting is 
prevalent in all the sub-samples. The results in Table 4.12 also indicate that RELINT is 
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negatively related to UNEXP_CE at 5% and 10% significance levels in the developing, and 
emerging country sub-samples respectively. Similarly, it is found that the relationship 
between RELINTSPI (RELINT×SPITEM) and UNEXP_CE is negative and significant at 
1% and 5% levels for the developing and emerging country sub-samples. Consistent with 
previous studies (McGuire et al., 2012; Dyreng et al., 2012), this finding suggests that 
religiosity mitigates misclassification of core expenses into special items.  However, the 
findings of this study contradict those of Callen et al. (2011), who observe that religiosity 
is unrelated to earnings management. This study controls for culture and shows that 
management classification shifting behaviour is subdued by the religious social norms of 
the country’s firm environment and that the effect is acute in developing countries, where 
the median religiosity figure is over 80%. The study controls for both culture and BIG4 
auditors because previous studies (McGuire et al., 2012; Callen et al., 2011; Dyreng et al., 
2012) observe that they impact negatively on earnings management practices. Similar to 
Chapter 2, the negative association suggest that religious managers possibly deem it 
unacceptable, unethical and morally wrong to engage in classification shifting to boost core 
earnings to signal their inside information to investors, to raise the expectations of the 
market, or to beat/meet earnings benchmarks (McGuire et al., 2012).  
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Notes: *,** and *** are used in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent levels. The study shows co-efficient estimates and t-statistics (in brackets).. All variables are defined in 
Table 4.3 above. 
  UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2 RELINT + + β3 RELINT x SPITEM + β4 SIZE + β5 LEV + β6 ROA + β7 MBV + β8 
BIG4 + β9 CAPINTEN + β10 GROWTH + β11 CULTURE +β12 GDP + Year Fixed Effects +Country Fixed Effects 
 
Table 4.12: Regression of Countrywide Religiosity and Classification Shifting 
Dependent Variable: UNEXP_CE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Full Sample Developed Emerging Developing 
     
SPITEM   0.851***  0.110***  0.784*** 0.235** 
 (2.869) (2.586) (8.681) (2.430) 
RELINT -0.054** -0.072 -0.171* -0.237** 
 (-1.980) (-1.430) (-1.779) (-2.304) 
RELINTSPI -0.906*** -0.308 -0.349**  -0.676*** 
 (-3.493) (-1.551) (-2.512) (-3.208) 
SIZE -0.063*** -0.105*** -0.018*** -0.014 
 (-7.166) (-6.884) (-4.953) (-1.247) 
ROA  -0.088*** -0.274*** -0.565*** -0.136* 
 (-7.242) (-4.548) (-5.259) (-1.726) 
MBV -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (-1.472) (-1.069) (-1.130) (-0.694) 
LEV  0.387*** 0.151***  0.663***   0.405*** 
 (9.448) (4.941) (4.164) (6.855) 
BIG4 -0.029** -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.133** 
 (-2.034) (-3.861) (-6.106) (-1.945) 
CAPINTEN  0.305*** 0.293*** 0.316*** 0.025 
 (15.307) (9.163) (15.363) (0.489) 
GROWTH  0.007** 0.045*   0.055*** 0.052** 
 (2.287) (1.691) (3.425) (2.498) 
CULTURE -0.977 -0.291 -0.076 -0.700 
 (-0.061) (-0.205) (-0.481) (-0.531) 
GDP PER CAPITA -0.379 -0.990 -0.481 -0.981 
 (-0.642) (-0.799) (-0.216) (-0.748) 
CONSTANT 0.644 0.383 0.381* 0.699 
 (1.219) (1.004) (1.710) (1.163) 
     
Observations 254916 137884 112023 5009 
R-squared 0.21 0.22 0.37 0.42 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Breusch-Pagan 2732.18 2203.12 2044.73 1583.32 
P-Value (0.6547) (0.6242) (0.6189) (0.6033) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 751.73 746.65 640.68 638.63 
P-Value (0.5423) (0.5327) (0.5289) (0.4815) 
Wooldridge Test 128.82 153.18 96.59 87.47 
P-Value (0.4132) (0.4347) (0.3968) (0.3757) 
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4.5.3. Testing the Relationship between Hofstede’s Updated Cultural Variables and 
Classification Shifting 
To test hypotheses 2a to 2e, the study runs models 5 to 9 using the updated Hofstede cultural 
dimensions as computed by Tang and Koveos (2008), namely; power distance scores 
(POWDIS), individualism scores (INDIV), uncertainty avoidance (UNCAVO), 
masculinity scores (MASCU) and long term orientation scores (LONGTEO). Model 5 is 
run to examine the relationship between power distance scores (POWDIS) and unexpected 
core earnings (UNEXP_CE), as well as the interaction between POWDIS X SPITEM 
(POWDSPI) and unexpected core earnings (UNEXP_CE). The variable of interest is 
POWDSPI and a positive relationship between POWDSPI and UNEXP_CE is predicted, 
in line with previous studies (Callen et al., 2011; Han et al, 2010).  
Table 4.13 provides the results for the full sample, and for developed, emerging and 
developing country sub-samples. SPITEM is positive and significantly related to 
UNEXP_CE at 99% and 95% confidence levels, confirming the existence of classification 
shifting in the developed, emerging and developing country sub-samples. The results also 
indicate that POWDIS and POWDSPI are positively related to UNEXP_CE at 1% and 5% 
significance levels for the developing and emerging country sub-samples respectively. This 
finding is consistent with previous research (Callen et al., 2011; Han et al., 2010; Hofstede 
et al., 2010), which observes that earnings management occurs more frequently in high 
power distance cultures than in low power distance ones. The findings also confirm that 
power inequality exists in developing, emerging and developed countries. Hofstede et al. 
(2010) indicate that power distance index scores are high for countries in Africa, Asia, Latin 
America and Eastern European, but low for English and German-speaking western 
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countries. The findings from the study contribute to the literature and support the notion 
that accounting systems are used to validate the decisions of top management, and applied 
as a tool to portray their image, thus misclassification of core expenses serves as an 
incentive and a mechanism to achieve the desired image of top management. Therefore, in 
developing and emerging countries, where power distance is an acceptable practice, there 
is strong incentive for firm managers to misclassify core expenses into special items to help 
them maintain their desired image.  On the contrary, the results indicate a positive but 
insignificant relationship between POWDSPI and UNEXP_CE for the developed countries 
sub-sample. This is understandable, because of the low power distance culture in western 
countries (Hofstede et al., 2010). In general, power distance is positively related to 
classification shifting, but the effect is noticeable and significant in developing and 
emerging countries, where power distance is high.       
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Notes: *,** and *** are used in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent levels. Co-efficient estimates and t-statistics (in brackets) are shown in the table.  All variables are defined 
in Table 4.3 above. 
 
  UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2 POWDIS + + β3 POWDIS x SPITEM + β4 SIZE + β5 LEV + β6 ROA + β7 MBV + 
β8 BIG4 + β9 CAPINTEN + β10 GROWTH + β11 RELINT +β12 GDP + Year Fixed Effects +Country Fixed Effects 
 
 
Table 4.13: Regression of Power Distance Cultural Scores and Classification Shifting 
Dependent Variable:  UNEXP_CE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Full Sample Developed Emerging Developing 
     
SPITEM  0.238***  0.581**   0.296***  0.824** 
 (4.154) (2.326) (5.663) (2.350) 
POWDIS 0.020**  0.018*  0.011**   0.019*** 
 (2.278) (1.758) (2.098) (4.300) 
POWDSPI   0.063***  0.042   0.045**   0.065*** 
 (4.362) (1.467)  (2.255) (4.482) 
SIZE   -0.063***   -0.055***   -0.018*** -0.014** 
 (-7.203) (-6.886) (-5.016) (-2.173) 
ROA  -0.089***  -0.073***   -0.065*** -0.037** 
 (-3.304) (-3.521) (-5.272) (-2.332) 
MBV -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (-1.460) (-1.092) (-1.161) (-0.644) 
LEV   0.387***   0.151***  0.665***   0.402*** 
 (5.475) (4.935) (4.281) (6.766) 
BIG4 -0.029**   -0.054***  -0.053***  -0.033** 
 (-2.425) (-3.788) (-6.147) (-2.100) 
CAPINTEN  0.306***  0.293***  0.319*** 0.013* 
 (5.333) (9.166) (5.504) (1.745) 
GROWTH  0.005***   0.057***   0.058***    0.034*** 
 (3.577) (3.883) (6.179) (5.986) 
RELINT -0.096** -0.048* -0.072**  -0.055*** 
 (-2.169) (-1.791) (-2.362) (-3.149) 
GDP PER CAPITA -0.593 -0.256 -0.715 -0.695 
 (-0.515) (-0.732) (-0.256) (-0.130) 
CONSTANT 0.202* 0.959 0.134 0.205 
 (1.645) (1.237) (1.297) (1.543) 
     
Observations 254916 137884 112023 5009 
R-squared 0.21 0.22 0.37 0.41 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Breusch-Pagan 3362.73 3073.28 2746.27 1751.74 
P-Value (0.7178) (0.6527) (0.6334) (0.6118) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 658.74 614.52 603.15 812.34 
P-Value (0.3412) (0.3274) (0.3289) (0.3815) 
Wooldridge Test 124.29 165.21 194.75 106.42 
P-Value (0.3137) (0.3353) (0.3934) (0.3107) 
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Notes: The study use *,**,*** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent 
levels. The study shows co-efficient estimates and t-statistics (in brackets). All variables are defined in Table 4.3 above. 
 
  UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2 INDIV + + β3 INDIV x SPITEM + β4 SIZE + β5 LEV + β6 ROA + β7 MBV + β8 
BIG4 + β9 CAPINTEN + β10 GROWTH + β11 RELINT +β12 GDP + Year Fixed Effects +Country Fixed Effects 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.14: Regression of Individualism Cultural Scores and Classification Shifting 
Dependent Variable: UNEXP_CE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Full Sample Developed Emerging Developing 
SPITEM   0.684***   0.393***   0.964***   0.176*** 
 (6.778) (2.847) (5.084) (3.089) 
INDIV -0.061**  -0.076*** -0.047* 0.022 
 (-2.419) (-3.146) (-1.757) (1.528) 
INDIVSPI  -0.038***   -0.011*** -0.058* 0.066* 
 (-6.642) (-3.208) (-1.766) (1.707) 
SIZE  -0.063***  -0.052***  -0.018*** -0.013*** 
 (-7.199) (-6.924) (-5.025) (-4.160) 
ROA  -0.087***  -0.074***  -0.068***  0.037*** 
 (-7.233) (-3.553) (-5.341) (-3.336) 
MBV -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (-1.450) (-1.066) (-1.222) (-0.645) 
LEV  0.387***   0.152***   0.664***  0.404*** 
 (5.433) (4.970) (4.208) (6.805) 
BIG4 -0.028**   -0.050***  -0.048***  -0.031** 
 (-2.427) (-3.780) (-6.112) (-2.100) 
CAPINTEN   0.306***   0.294***  0.317*** 0.014* 
 (5.341) (9.198) (5.445) (1.755) 
GROWTH  0.005***    0.056***   0.059***  0.133*** 
 (3.598) (3.834) (6.255) (5.967) 
RELINT -0.049** -0.045 -0.011** -0.069*** 
 (-2.179) (-1.496) (-2.200) (-3.729) 
GDP PER CAPITA -0.613 -0.216 -0.647 -0.776 
 (-0.519) (-0.728) (-0.097) (-0.146) 
CONSTANT 0.356 0.407 0.977 0.200 
 (1.009) (1.230) (1.137) (1.544) 
     
Observations 254916 137884 112023 5009 
R-squared 0.21 0.22 0.38 0.41 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Breusch-Pagan 3426.45 2645.86 2569.52 1751.74 
P-Value (0.7241) (0.6732) (0.6645) (0.6118) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 646.42 632.26 629.57 759.37 
P-Value (0.3458) (0.3274) (0.3237) (0.3564) 
Wooldridge Test 123.38 129.23 137.94 104.23 
P-Value (0.2313) (0.2347) (0.2942) (0.2104) 
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Notes: The study use *,**,*** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent levels. The study shows co-efficient estimates and t-statistics (in brackets). All variables are defined in 
Table 4.3 above. 
 
  UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2 UNCAVO + + β3 UNCAV x SPITEM + β4 SIZE + β5 LEV + β6 ROA + β7 MBV + 
β8 BIG4 + β9 CAPINTEN + β10 GROWTH + β11 RELINT +β12 GDP + Year Fixed Effects +Country Fixed Effects 
 
 
 
Table 4.15: Regression of Uncertainty Avoidance Scores and Classification Shifting 
Dependent Variable: UNEXP_CE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Full Sample Developed Emerging Developing 
     
SPITEM  0.492***  0.111***  0.702***   0.829*** 
 (7.796) (2.637) (11.402) (2.716) 
UNCAVO 0.023**  0.028**  0.031***   0.027** 
 (2.389) (2.057) (3.054) (2.403) 
UNCAVSPI  0.059***  0.038**  0.078***  0.033** 
 (7.665) (2.233) (9.838) (2.237) 
SIZE -0.063*** -0.052*** -0.018*** -0.014 
 (-7.103) (-6.896) (-4.909) (-1.210) 
ROA -0.085*** -0.073*** -0.055*** -0.034* 
 (-3.138) (-3.512) (-4.954) (-1.706) 
MBV -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 
 (-1.528) (-1.096) (-1.164) (0.705) 
LEV  0.389***  0.150*** 0.674***  0.415*** 
 (5.541) (4.929) (4.720) (7.023) 
BIG4 -0.026**   -0.053***  -0.048***  -0.032** 
 (-2.387) (-3.707) (-6.133) (-2.100) 
CAPINTEN  0.308***  0.295***  0.322*** 0.014* 
 (5.347) (9.174) (5.528) (1.748) 
GROWTH  0.010***   0.059***   0.062***    0.035*** 
 (3.582) (3.895) (6.184) (5.988) 
RELINT -0.087** -0.072 -0.086** -0.071*** 
 (-2.159) (-1.484) (-2.358) (-3.130) 
GDP PER CAPITA -0.597 -0.315 -0.645          -0.122 
 (-0.516) (-0.738) (-0.246) (-0.211) 
CONSTANT 0.420 0.588 0.167 0.260 
 (1.010) (1.245) (1.278) (1.600) 
     
Observations 254916 137884 112023 5009 
R-squared 0.21 0.22 0.38 0.43 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Breusch-Pagan 3266.23 2378.14 2298.23 1821.42 
P-Value (0.6819) (0.6678) (0.6567) (0.6257) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 465.26 473.52 426.71 575.32 
P-Value (0.2443) (0.2742) (0.2376) (0.2642) 
Wooldridge Test 126.31 128.37 143.44 116.23 
P-Value (0.2139) (0.2347) (0.3194) (0.2209) 
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To test Hypothesis 2b, model 6 is run to examine the relationship between individualism 
cultural dimensions scores (INDIV) and unexpected core earnings (UNEXP_CE), as well 
as the interactive term between INDIV X SPITEM (INDIVSPI) and (UNEXP_CE). The 
variable of interest is INDIVSPI and a negative relationship is predicted between 
INDIVSPI and UNEXP_CE, in line with previous studies (Callen et al., 2011; Han et al, 
2010). Table 4.14 presents the results for the full sample and sub-samples. The results 
indicate that the coefficient on individualism (INDIV and INDIVSPI) is negative and 
significantly related to classification shifting in developed (99% confidence level) and 
emerging (90% confidence level) countries, but positive and significant at the 10% level in 
developing countries. This suggests that classification shifting is mitigated by the 
individualism cultural dimension in developed and emerging countries. In other words, 
misclassifying core expenses into special items is more likely to be accepted in low 
individualism countries than high individualism ones.  Hofstede et al. (2010) indicate that 
individualism prevails in developed and Western countries, while collectivism (low 
individualism) tends to prevail in Africa, Asia and Eastern European countries. In addition, 
the results suggest that countries that score high on individualism have no incentive to 
engage in misclassification, while the converse is true for countries that score low. Hofstede 
et al. (2010) observe that low individualism countries have strong family ties and networks, 
which make them susceptible to corruption and earnings management; however, high 
individualism cultures have loose ties, and everyone is expected to look after themselves 
and their immediate family only. The findings are consistent with Callen et al. (2011) and 
Desender et al. (2007), who observe a negative relationship between high individualism 
and accrual-based earnings management.   
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To test hypothesis 2c, model 7 is run to assess the relationship between uncertainty 
avoidance and classification shifting. Uncertainty avoidance shows the degree of 
uncertainty and the extent to which individuals are affected by the unknown (Han et al., 
2010; Richardson et al., 2008). The variable of interest is UNCAVSPI, and a positive 
relationship is predicted between UNCAVSPI and UNEXP_CE, in line with previous 
studies (Callen et al., 2011; Richardson et al, 2010). Table 4.15 presents the results of the 
full sample, and the developed, emerging and developing country sub-samples. For all the 
sub-samples, the results indicate that the coefficient on UNCAVSPI is positive and 
significantly related to UNEXP_CE at 1% and 5% levels for emerging, developed and 
developing countries respectively. The results suggest that uncertainty prevails in all the 
countries in the sub-samples, and that the higher the uncertainty, the higher the 
misclassification of core expenses to boost reported core earnings. The results are 
consistent with Hofstede et al. (2010), who find that uncertainty scores are higher in 
Eastern, Central European and Latin countries, but lower in English-speaking and Chinese 
culture ones. The positive relationship between UNCAVSPI and UNEXP_CE is consistent 
with the findings of previous research (Callen et al, 2011; Richardson, 2008).      
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Notes: *,** and *** are used in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent levels. The table shows co-efficient estimates and t-statistics (in brackets). All variables are defined in Table 
4.3 above. 
 
  UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2 MASCU + + β3 MASCU x SPITEM + β4 SIZE + β5 LEV + β6 ROA + β7 MBV + β8 
BIG4 + β9 CAPINTEN + β10 GROWTH + β11 RELINT +β12 GDP + Year Fixed Effects +Country Fixed Effects 
 
To test Hypothesis 2d, model 8 is run to examine the relationship between masculinity 
(MASCU) scores and classification shifting. Earlier studies (Callen et al., 2011; Hofstede 
et al., 2010) indicate that high masculinity countries are associated with high masculine 
Table 4.16: Regression of Masculinity Cultural Scores and Classification Shifting 
Dependent Variable: UNEXP_CE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Full Sample Developed Emerging Developing 
     
SPITEM    0.348***  0.530**    0.914***   0.457** 
 (3.275) (2.288) (6.927) (2.486) 
MASCU   0.022*  0.013  0.015*   0.012* 
 (1.789) (1.606) (1.725) (1.742) 
MASCUSPI   0.031**   0.014*   0.018**   0.017** 
 (2.311) (1.769) (2.387) (2.229) 
SIZE   -0.063***   -0.062***   -0.018***  -0.014** 
 (-7.168) (-6.947) (-4.895) (-2.203) 
ROA   -0.088***   -0.073***   -0.056*** -0.035 
 (-7.264) (-3.518) (-5.194) (-1.323) 
MBV -0.001 -0.002 -0.001  -0.002 
 (-1.469) (-1.066) (-1.181) (-0.637) 
LEV   0.388***  0.152***  0.666***   0.409*** 
 (5.478) (4.970) (4.326) (6.916) 
BIG4  -0.029**   -0.055***  -0.054***  -0.033** 
 (-2.287) (3.741) (-6.121) (-2.232) 
CAPINTEN     0.305***  0.294*** 0.318*** 0.030 
 (5.318) (9.213) (5.487) (0.588) 
GROWTH 0.006*    0.078***  0.019**   0.031** 
 (1.762) (3.798) (2.129) (2.345) 
RELINT -0.082** -0.044 -0.090** -0.032*** 
 (-2.125) (-1.461) (-2.205) (-3.093) 
GDP PER CAPITA  -0.681 -0.081 -0.631 -0.012 
 (-0.532) (-0.714) (-0.094) (-0.190) 
CONSTANT 0.059 0.281 0.603 0.753 
 (1.001) (1.228) (1.130) (1.586) 
     
Observations 254916 137884 112023 5009 
R-squared 0.21 0.22 0.38 0.42 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Breusch-Pagan 3125.88 2189.72 2124.39 1678.25 
P-Value (0.6744) (0.6281) (0.6179) (0.6027) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 243.29 276.37 263.18 257.26 
P-Value (0.2378) (0.2429) (0.2234) (0.2417) 
Wooldridge Test 124.63 126.72 134.52 118.27 
P-Value (0.2137) (0.2276) (0.3242) (0.2232) 
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work roles, control, power, assertiveness, and striving for achievement in terms of ego 
boosting and wealth recognition.  
Notes: The study use *,**,*** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent levels. The study shows co-efficient estimates and t-statistics (in brackets). SPITEM = income-decreasing 
special items scaled by sales, LONGTEO is long-term orientation score from Tang and Koveos (2008). MASCUSPI is 
masculinity score multiply by income-decreasing special items (LONGTEO x SPITEM). SIZE is the natural log of the 
market value of equity; LEV is measured as total debts scaled by total assets. CAPINTEN is capital intensity measured 
as the ratio of long-term assets scaled by total assets.  ROA is measured as net income before extraordinary items + interest 
Table 4.17: Regression of Long-term Orientation Scores and Classification Shifting 
Dependent Variable: UNEXP_CE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Full Sample Developed Emerging Developing 
     
SPITEM    0.957*** 0.191**    0.601***   0.357** 
 (3.275) (2.427) (3.216) (2.086) 
LONGTEO -0.122** -0.213  -0.143**  0.120 
 (-2.189) (-0.736) (-2.125) (1.460) 
LONGTSPI -0.570*** -0.203  -0.170***  0.756* 
 (-3.549) (-0.897) (-5.484) (1.697) 
SIZE -0.063*** -0.055*** -0.018*** -0.014 
 (-7.187) (-6.920) (-5.045) (-1.181) 
ROA -0.089*** -0.075*** -0.059*** -0.138** 
 (-7.274) (-3.560) (-5.105) (-2.347) 
MBV -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 
 (-1.466) (-1.066) (-1.156) (0.599) 
LEV  0.388*** 0.151*** 0.667*** 0.405*** 
 (5.486) (4.956) (4.379) (6.860) 
BIG4 -0.025*** -0.056*** -0.058*** -0.133* 
 (-2.659) (-3.836) (-6.141) (-1.742) 
CAPINTEN  0.306***  0.293***  0.321*** 0.027 
 (5.358) (9.192) (5.502) (1.520) 
GROWTH   0.015***   0.056***  0.058***  0.133*** 
 (3.559) (3.836) (6.141) (5.942) 
RELINT -0.087** -0.048* -0.092** -0.036*** 
 (-2.187) (-1.766) (-2.245) (-3.103) 
GDP PER CAPITA -0.660 -0.178 -0.952 -0.887 
 (-0.528) (-0.724) (-0.142) (-0.166) 
CONSTANT 0.138 0.485 0.269 0.242 
 (1.003) (1.231) (1.182) (1.572) 
     
Observations 254916 137884 112023 5009 
R-squared 0.21 0.22 0.37 0.41 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Breusch-Pagan 3541.19 2696.23 2347.52 1785.64 
P-Value (0.6479) (0.6321) (0.6239) (0.6109) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 433 234 331 546 
P-Value (0.4132) (0.2178) (0.3210) (0.6112) 
Wooldridge Test 86.41 143.37 228.24 287.97 
P-Value (0.2363) (0.2816) (0.3234) (0.4125) 
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income divided by total assets at the beginning of the period and MBV is measured as natural log of book value of equity 
scaled by market value of equity. GROWTH calculated as market value of outstanding shares at the end of the year scaled 
by book value of common equity at the end of the year. RELINT is country-wide level of religiosity measured by World 
Values Survey of the World Bank (Callen et al., 2011). All variables are defined in Table 4.3 above. 
UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2 LONGTEO + + β3 LONGTEO x SPITEM + β4 SIZE + β5 LEV + β6 ROA + β7 MBV 
+ β8 BIG4 + β9 CAPINTEN + β10 GROWTH + β11 RELINT +β12 GDP + Year Fixed Effects +Country Fixed Effects 
Table 4.16 presents the results of the full sample and sub-samples. The variable of interest 
is MASCUSPI and a positive relationship is predicted between MASCUSPI and 
UNEXP_CE, in line with previous studies (Callen et al., 2011; Hofstede et al, 2010). The 
results indicate that for both developing and emerging countries, there is a positive and 
significant relationship at the 5% level between MASCUSPI and UNEXP_CE. The 
coefficient on MASCUSPI is positive and significantly related to UNEXP_CE at the 10% 
level for developed countries. The results therefore suggest that masculinity is higher in 
developing and emerging countries than developed ones, which is consistent with Hofstede 
et al.’s (2010) findings. The higher the masculinity, the higher the incentive to misclassify 
core expenses to special items to gain control, power, recognition and wealth. Hofstede et 
al. (2010) observe that masculinity is high in Africa, Japan, Italy, Mexico, and in German-
speaking countries; moderately high in English-speaking Western countries and the 
Netherlands, but low in Latin and Asian countries such as France, Spain, Portugal, Chile, 
Korea and Thailand. In general, masculinity is positively related to classification shifting 
and the effect is significant in both the developing and emerging country sub-samples, at 
5%.    
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Table 4.18: Regression of Hofstede’s Cultural Variables and Classification Shifting 
Dependent Variable: UNEXP_CE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Full Sample Developed Emerging Developing 
     
SPITEM   0.478***   0.302***   0.232**  0.317** 
 (5.661) (4.498) (2.473) (2.052) 
POWDIS   0.019**  0.017*  0.010**     0.017*** 
 (2.271) (1.752) (2.091) (4.187) 
POWDSPI  0.065**  0.084*   0.046**   0.067*** 
 (2.287) (1.760) (2.127) (4.382) 
INDIV -0.032**  -0.018** -0.047 0.020 
 (-2.020) (-2.146) (-1.517) (1.527) 
INDIVSPI   -0.085***  -0.046***  -0.038* 0.046* 
 (-2.941) (-3.554) (-1.739) (1.714) 
MASCU   0.020*  0.012  0.013*   0.011* 
 (1.780) (1.600) (1.723) (1.740) 
MASCUSPI   0.025** 0.014**  0.036**    0.073* 
 (2.016) (2.315) (2.549) (1.776) 
UNCAVO  0.020**  0.024**  0.023***   0.025** 
 (2.312) (2.005) (3.001) (2.377) 
UNCAVSPI  0.034***   0.079***   0.072***  0.065** 
 (7.875) (3.677) (7.958) (2.449) 
LONGTEO -0.022** -0.013  -0.043**  0.020 
 (-2.104) (-0.686) (-2.187) (1.448) 
LONGTSPI -0.053** -0.075  -0.019***  0.022* 
 (-2.450) (-0.909) (-4.301) (1.785) 
SIZE -0.063***  -0.058*** -0.017*** -0.014 
 (-7.036) (-6.814) (-4.885) (-1.215) 
ROA -0.085***    -0.275*** -0.558*** -0.173* 
 (-7.175) (-3.564) (-5.077) (-1.703) 
MBV -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 
 (-1.573) (-1.096) (-1.348) (0.527) 
LEV  0.387***   0.148*** 0.675*** 0.378*** 
 (5.456) (4.835) (-4.791) (6.381) 
BIG4 -0.027*** -0.056*** -0.059*** -0.132* 
 (-3.754) (-3.792) (-6.264) (-1.741) 
CAPINTEN  0.309***  0.295***  0.325*** 0.018 
 (5.493) (9.252) (5.844) (0.356) 
GROWTH  0.008***   0.056***  0.059***   0.032*** 
 (3.754) (3.792) (6.264) (5.941) 
RELINT -0.065** -0.032* -0.071** -0.028*** 
 (-2.118) (-1.760) (-2.192) (-3.047) 
GDP PER CAPITA -0.408 -0.948 -0.754 -0.325 
 (-0.478) (-0.701) (-0.262) (-0.251) 
CONSTANT 0.836 0.798 0.338 0.779 
 (1.046) (1.210) (1.301) (1.619) 
     
Observations 254916 137884 112023 5009 
R-squared 0.22 0.23 0.40 0.62 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Breusch-Pagan 3461.32 2643.71 2476.83 1829.73 
P-Value (0.7296) (0.6548) (0.6356) (0.6254) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 434.18 236.31 321.64 504.93 
P-Value (0.4136) (0.2180) (0.3201) (0.5612) 
Wooldridge Test 89.42 150.74 241.42 423.31 
P-Value (0.2374) (0.2989) (0.3306) (0.5103) 
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Notes: The study use *,**,*** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent levels. The study shows co-efficient estimates and t-statistics (in brackets). All cultural variables are defined 
in Table 4.3 above. 
 
  UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM +β2 POWDIS +β3 POWDIS x SPITEM + β4 INDIV +  β5 INDIV x SPITEM + β6 
UNCAVO +β7 UNCAV x SPITEM + β8 MASCU +β9 MASCU x SPITEM + β10 LONGTEO +β11 LONGTEO x SPITEM 
+ β12SIZE + β13 LEV + β14 ROA + β15 MBV + β16 BIG4 + β17 CAPINTEN + β18 GROWTH + β19 RELINT +β20 GDP + 
Year Fixed Effects +Country Fixed Effects 
 
Table 4.17 provides the results examining the relationship between long-term orientation 
and classification shifting. Equation 9 is run to test hypothesis 2e and the variable of interest 
is LONGTSPI. A negative relationship is predicted between LONGTSPI and UNEXP_CE 
if countries are long-term oriented, otherwise positive. The results in Table 4.17 indicate 
that the coefficient on UNEXP_CE is negative and significant at the 1% level (-0.170, t-
value; -5,484), related to LONGTSPI in the emerging country sub-sample. There is also a 
negative but insignificant relationship between UNEXP_CE and LONGTSPI in the 
developed country sub-sample. On the contrary, there is a positive relationship at the 10% 
significance level between UNEXP_CE and LONGTSPI in the developing country sub-
sample. The coefficient on UNEXP_CE is positive (0.756, t-value, 1.697). The negative 
relationship suggests that in both the developed and emerging sub-samples, some countries 
are long-term oriented. Therefore, they are not focussed on current earnings or are quick 
results-oriented, but are cautious, careful with resources and focussed on long-term goals. 
This is consistent with previous studies (Callen et al. 2011; Hofstede et al., 2010), which 
observe that countries in East and South Asia, as well as Europe, are long- or medium-term 
oriented. It is further observed that the U.S.A and Australia, and Latin American, African 
and Muslim countries are short-term results-oriented. The positive relationship noted in the 
developing country sub-sample confirms the findings of previous studies (Hofstede et al., 
2010) that developing countries are short-term oriented and seek quick earnings through 
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misclassification. There is therefore an incentive to engage in classification shifting to 
influence reported core earnings in short-term oriented countries.   
Table 4.18 shows the summary position of the relationship between Hofstede’s cultural 
dimension scores and classification shifting. Initially, only POWDSPI is included in the 
model, followed by INDIVSPI, and subsequently UNCAVSPI is added, until all the 
cultural dimension scores are included.  The study controls for countrywide religiosity 
(RELINT) and firm-level control variables, as discussed in the methodology. The results 
are consistent with those provided in Tables 4.13 to 4.17. In particular, the coefficients on 
INDIVSPI and LONGTSPI are negative and significant at 1% or 5% in relation to 
UNEXP_CE in the developed or emerging country sub-samples respectively. There is still 
a positive and significant relationship between INDIVSPI, LONGTSPI and UNEXP_CE 
in developing countries, suggesting that they are short-term results-oriented and low on 
individualism. Table 4.18 also shows that POWDSPI, UNCAVSPI and MASCUSPI are 
positively related to UNEXP_CE at different levels of significance (1%, 5% and 10%). 
This confirms the findings that countries with cultural dimensions of power distance, 
uncertainty avoidance and masculinity have the incentive to misclassify core expenses into 
special items in order to influence reported core earnings. In summary, the study shows that 
countrywide culture affects classification shifting. However, whether the impact is positive 
or negative depends on the country and the associated Hofstede cultural dimension scores 
in that country (Callen et al., 2011).    
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4.5.4. Testing the Relationship between Legal Environment and Classification 
Shifting 
To test hypotheses 3a and 3b, the relationship between legal environment (LEGALENF), 
interactions between the legal environment and special items (LEGALSPI) and 
classification shifting (UNEXP_CE); interactions between the legal environment and 
countrywide culture (LEGALCUL); interactions between the legal environment and 
countrywide religiosity (LEGALREL); and classification shifting (UNEXP_CE) are first 
tested. Table 4.19 shows the results of the relationship between LEGALSPI and 
UNEXP_CE for the full and sub-samples. As indicated below, the relationship between 
LEGALSPI and UNEXP_CE in the developing country sub-sample is negative but not 
significant (-0.058, t-value; -1.529). The coefficients on UNEXP_CE for both emerging (-
0.055, t-value; -1.729) and developed (-0.069, t-value; -2.276) sub-samples are also 
negative and significant at 10% and 5% respectively. The results suggest that the 
countrywide legal environment subdues misclassification of core expenses into special 
items; however, the impact is greater in developed and emerging countries. The findings 
from this study are consistent with earlier studies (Behn et al., 2013; Haw et al., 2011; Leuz 
et al., 2003; La Porta et al., 1998), which observe that a strong legal environment and 
investor protection mitigate classification shifting and accrual-based earnings management. 
However, the results contradict those of Callen et al. (2011), who find no relationship 
between legal environment and accrual-based earnings management. The results further 
suggest that the legal environment in developing countries is weak, hence the insignificant 
negative relationship between LEGALSPI and UNEXP_CE. The converse is true for the 
developed and emerging country sub-samples, as evidenced by previous studies (Behn et 
al., 2013; Haw et al., 2011; Leuz et al., 2003). 
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Notes: *,** and *** are used in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent levels. The table shows co-efficient estimates and t-statistics (in brackets). All variables are defined in Table 
4.3 above. 
 
UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2LEGALENF + β3 LEGALENF x SPITEM + β4 SIZE + β5 BMV + β6LEV + β7BIG4 
+ β8ROA + + β9GROWTH + β10 CAPINTEN+ β11GDP + β12CULTURE + Year and Country Fixed Effects +   𝜀𝑡,   
 
Table 4.19: Regression of Countrywide Legal Environment and Classification 
Shifting 
Dependent Variable: UNEXP_CE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Full sample Developed Emerging Developing 
     
SPITEM   0.647***  0.974***  0.338**  0.195** 
 (4.596) (2.737) (2.188) (2.479) 
LEGALENF -0.015** -0.063* -0.011 -0.010 
 (-1.728) (-1.764) (-0.846) (-0.967) 
LEGALxSPI -0.093**  -0.069** -0.055* -0.058 
 (-2.397) (-2.276) (-1.729) (-1.529) 
SIZE  -0.063***   -0.105***  -0.018*** -0.014 
 (-7.227) (-6.845) (-4.983) (-1.242) 
ROA -0.088***   -0.075***   -0.064*** -0.046** 
 (-3.257) (-3.580) (-5.223) (-2.423) 
MBV -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (-1.532) (-1.092) (-1.117) (-0.660) 
LEV  0.383***   0.149***  0.664***   0.384*** 
 (5.256) (4.866) (4.226) (6.417) 
BIG4 -0.026**  -0.057*** -0.058*** -0.036** 
 (-2.343) (3.864) (-6.152) (-2.102) 
CAPINTEN  0.025***   0.093***  0.032*** 0.012* 
 (5.299) (9.173) (5.399) (1.740) 
GROWTH  0.007***    0.082***  0.021**   0.034*** 
 (3.877) (3.804) (2.299) (3.448) 
RELINT -0.045* -0.034 -0.064* -0.037** 
 (-2.018) (-0.976) (-1.792) (-2.232) 
CULTURE -0.082 -0.829 -0.976 -0.004 
 (-0.201) (-0.056) (-0.197) (-0.222) 
GDP PER CAPITA -0.064 -0.091 -0.051 -0.023 
 (-0.523) (-0.815) (-0.982) (-0.173) 
CONSTANT 0.729 0.690 0.253 0.877 
 (1.067) (1.366) (1.142) (1.554) 
     
Observations 254916 137884 112023 5009 
R-squared 0.21 0.22 0.37 0.43 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Breusch-Pagan 4469.57 3634.31 2488.28 1798.48 
P-Value (0.7687) (0.6683) (0.6465) (0.6349) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 434.21 223.37 347.33 458.49 
P-Value (0.4134) (0.2415) (0.3638) (0.5761) 
Wooldridge Test 81.41 132.78 246.21 418.32 
P-Value (0.2186) (0.2628) (0.3346) (0.4513) 
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Table 4.20 presents the regression results to further establish the impact of both legal 
environment and culture on classification shifting; hypothesis 3a is tested and model 11 
run, as discussed in the methodology section. The LEGAL, CULTURE and SPITEM 
variables are interacted to assess their impact on UNEXP_CE. The variable of interest is 
LEG x CUL x SPI. The variable CULTURE is computed as the simple mean of the 
aggregate of all the five cultural dimension variables, in line with Callen et al. (2011). 
Indeed, the analyses above have shown that the countrywide legal environment and cultural 
dimension variables impact negatively and/or positively on managers’ motivation to 
misclassify core expenses into special items in the full and sub-samples for developed, 
emerging and developing countries. In particular, the coefficient on SPITEM is still 
positive and related to UNEXP_CE at the 1% significance level across all the samples in 
the analysis. Similar to the results in Table 4.19, the coefficient on LEGALSPI is negative 
and significant at 5% and 10% for the developed and emerging country sub-samples 
respectively. The co-efficient on LEGALSPI is negative, but not significant (-0.890; t-
value; -1.575) for the developing country sub-sample, suggesting that there is a weak legal 
environment in developing countries. Conversely, there is a strong and robust legal 
environment in both developed and emerging countries to curtail classification shifting 
behaviour. This finding is consistent with previous studies (Behn et al., 2013; Leuz et al., 
2003, La Porta et al., 1998), which observe that investor confidence is high and 
classification shifting is low in developed countries due to their strong legal environments. 
In addition, CULSPI (CULTURE x SPITEM) is negatively associated with UNEXP_CE at 
5% and 10% levels of significance in developed and emerging countries respectively. The 
negative relationship between CULSPI and UNEXP_CE supports the evidence that both 
legal environment and culture mitigate misclassification of core expenses in both developed 
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and emerging economies. However, CULSPI is positively related to UNEXP_CE at the 
10% significance level, suggesting that the dominant culture (POWDIS and UNCAVO) in 
developing countries provides an incentive or motivation for managers to engage in 
misclassification of core expenses into special items, hence the positive relationship 
between CULSPI and UNEXP_CE in the developing country sub-sample.   
The results in Table 4.20 also show that in the developed country sub-sample, the 
coefficient on LEGxCULxSPI is negative (-0.698, t-value; 3,430) and significant at the 
99% confidence level. This shows that LEGxCULxSPI is negatively related to 
UNEXP_CE. Similarly, the coefficient on LEGxCULxSPI for both the emerging and 
developing country sub-samples shows a negative coefficient, but is related to UNEXP_CE 
at the 10% significance level. This suggests that culture complements the legal environment 
and that the effect is much more pronounced in developed countries than developing and 
emerging ones. For example, in the developed country sub-sample, the coefficient on 
LEGALSPI without culture is (-0.453, t-value; -3.198), compared with the coefficient on 
LEGxCULxSPI (-0.698, t-value; 3.430). The inclusion of culture as an interactive variable 
slightly changes the coefficient from -0.453 to -0.698 for developed countries. Indeed, the 
coefficient on LEGALSPI in developing countries is negative but not significant, however, 
when the study interacts culture and special items with legal environment, the results show 
that LEGxCULxSPI is still negative (-0.991, t-value;  
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Notes: The study use *,**,*** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent levels. The study shows co-efficient estimates and t-statistics (in brackets). All variables are defined in 
Table 4.3 above. 
 
Table 4.20: Regression of Legal Environment, Culture and Classification Shifting 
Dependent Variable: UNEXP_CE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Full Sample Developed Emerging Developing 
SPITEM 0.396*** 0.615*** 0.182** 0.922* 
 (6.630) (3.087) (2.363) (1.739) 
LEGALENF -0.014** -0.060* -0.010 -0.010 
 (-1.726) (-1.761) (-0.842) (-0.967) 
CULSPI -0.983*** -0.268** -0.020*  0.853* 
 (-3.127) (-2.307) (-1.767) (1.763) 
LEGALxSPI -0.215*** -0.453** -0.633* -0.890 
 (-6.789) (-2.198) (-1.703) (-1.575) 
LEGxCULxSPI  -0.293*** -0.698*** -0.160* -0.991* 
 (-7.292) (-3.430) (-1.739) (-1.698) 
SIZE  -0.063*** -0.105***  -0.018*** -0.016 
 (-7.200) (-6.793) (-5.102) (-1.387) 
ROA -0.087*** -0.273*** -0.566*** 0.149 
 (-7.236) (-3.512) (-5.276) (1.457) 
MBV -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 
 (-1.606) (-1.113) (-1.226) (0.649) 
LEV  0.382***  0.147***  0.664***  0.389*** 
 (6.175) (4.803) (4.204) (6.492) 
BIG4 -0.027**  -0.053***   -0.058*** -0.137* 
 (-2.432) (-3.687) (-4.125) (-1.748) 
CAPINTEN 0.305*** 0.292*** 0.318*** 0.022 
 (15.320) (9.161) (15.457) (0.430) 
GROWTH 0.036** 0.057*   0.059**    0.136** 
 (2.288) (1.856) (2.243) (2.075) 
RELINT    -0.035*** -0.026 -0.183**   -0.228*** 
 (-3.293) (-1.430) (-2.239) (-4.866) 
GDPTOTAL -0.271 -0.168 -0.538 -.901 
 (-0.620) (-0.907) (-0.077) (-0.728) 
CONSTANT 0.853 0.531 0.158* 0.602* 
 (1.013) (1.271) (1.839) (1.872) 
     
Observations 254916 137884 112023 5009 
R-squared 0.22 0.23 0.38 0.47 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Breusch-Pagan 4241.92 3374.55 2474.16 1733.43 
P-Value (0.7498) (0.6563) (0.6349) (0.6114) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 417.62 234.27 335.23 143.39 
P-Value (0.4238) (0.2281) (0.3413) (0.1223) 
Wooldridge Test 85.38 150.76 244.20 108.91 
P-Value (0.2177) (0.2880) (0.3144) (0.2113) 
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UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2LEGALENF + β3 LEGALENF x SPITEM + β4 LEGALENF x CULTURE + β5 
LEGALENF x CULTURE x SPITEM +β6 SIZE + β7 BMV + β8LEV + β9BIG4 + β10ROA + + β11GROWTH + β12 
CAPINTEN+ β13GDP + β14RELINT + Year Fixed Effects and Country Fixed Effects +   𝜀𝑡,   
 
-1.698) and significant at the 10% level, an indication that culture complements the legal 
environment in mitigating classification shifting behaviour in both developed and 
developing countries. On the contrary, the emerging country sub-sample shows 5% and 
10% significance levels for LEGASPI and LEGxCULxSPI respectively. This is consistent 
with the findings in Tables 4.13 and 4.15, which show that emerging countries are 
characterised by uncertainty avoidance and power distance cultures (Hofstede et el., 2010). 
As observed in Tables 4.13 and 4.15, these cultures have a positive relationship with 
classification shifting. Therefore, in power distance and uncertainty avoidance cultural 
environment, the impact of LEGALENF on UNEXP_CE is less effective, suggesting a 
weak legal environment in emerging countries. Hence, the insignificant negative 
relationship. The positive relationship between POWDSPI, UNCAVSPI and UNEXP_CE 
accounts for the reduction in the significance level from 5% to 10% and the coefficient 
from -0.633 to -0.160 in the emerging country sub-sample. In a nut shell, the study finds 
that legal environment has negative effect on classification shifting behaviour in both 
developed and emerging countries but the negative impact is significant in developed 
countries. This is consistent with Behn et al. (2013) who observe that strong legal 
environment mitigate earnings management. Again, the analysis shows that culture plays a 
complementary role in mitigating classification shifting in developed and developing 
countries, especially when culture interacts with the legal environment. To further confirm 
the complementary role of Hofstede’s cultural dimension variables in mitigating 
misclassification, LEGALENF and SPITEM are interacted with each of the five cultural 
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dimension variables to ascertain their level of significance and impact on UNEXP_CE in 
the developed, emerging and developing country sub-samples. The results are provided in 
Tables 4.21, 4.22 and 4.23 respectively. 
Table 4.21 provides the regression results showing the relationship between UNEXP_CE 
and LEGALENF, as well as the interaction between the cultural dimension variables and 
SPITEM (POWDSPI, INDIVSPI, MASCUSPI, UNCAVSPI and LONGTSPI) for the 
developed country sub-sample. The variables of interest are POWD x LEG x SPI, INDIV 
x LEG x SPI, MASCU x LEG x SPI, UNCAVO x LEG x SPI and LONGT x LEG x SPI. 
Six separate regressions are run using the developed country sub-sample and the results are 
shown in columns (1) to (6). Initially, in column (1) all the variables are included in the 
model to assess their impact on UNEXP_CE.  The results indicate that SPITEM is 
positively related to UNEXP_CE at 5% or 1% significance levels for each of the six 
columns, confirming that classification shifting exists in the developed country sub-sample. 
The results in column (1) also indicate that the coefficients on POWD x LEG x SPI and 
INDIV x LEG x SPI are negative (-0.28, t-value; -1.76 and -0.24, t-value; -1.83) and 
significant at the 90% confidence level. This suggests that in developed countries, the 
presence of power distance or individualism culture, coupled with a strong legal 
environment, mitigates classification shifting. Thus, both power distance and individualism 
cultures induce or strengthen legal environment in developed countries to subdue 
management classification shifting behaviour. The results in column (1) also show that 
MASCU x LEG x SPI, UNCAV x LEG x SPI and LONGT x LEG x SPI are negatively 
related to UNEXP_CE. The control variables and RELINT exhibit the expected signs and 
coefficients.  In column (2), four of the variables of interest previously included in column 
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(1) are dropped and the model is run using only POWD x LEG x SPI. The results indicate 
that POWD x LEG x SPI is negatively related to UNEXP_CE. The coefficient POWD x 
LEG x SPI is negative (-0.42, t-value; -2.46) and significant at the 95% confidence level, 
suggesting that there is weak power distance but a strong legal environment in developed 
countries to subdue classification shifting. Similarly, in column (3) the model is run using 
only INDIV x LEG x SPI as the independent variable to establish the relationship between 
individualism, legal environment, special items and unexpected core earnings. The results 
in column (3) clearly show that the co-efficient on individualism is negative (-0.70, t-value; 
-3.80) and related to UNEXP_CE at the 1% significance level. This confirms the findings 
in tables 4.14 and 4.19, which report that individualism and legal environment mitigate 
misclassification of core expenses into special items in developed countries. The results in 
column (3) highlight the complementary role of individualism and legal environment in 
subduing managers’ incentive to engage in shifting.  In addition, the model is run using 
MASCU x LEG x SPI as the variable of interest. The results in column (4) reveal that this 
coefficient is negative (-0.10, t-value; -3.97) and significant at the 99% confidence level. 
This signifies that masculinity and legal environment interactions mitigate 
misclassification in developed countries. The results also suggest that the legal environment 
in developed countries has the potential to influence classification shifting negatively, 
relative to the positive effect of masculinity on unexpected core earnings, as shown in tables 
4.19 and 4.16 respectively. The results in column (5) present an examination of the 
relationship between UNCAV x LEG x SPI and UNEXP_CE.  Indeed, the previous results 
in Table 4.15 indicate that uncertainty avoidance is positively related to classification 
shifting, the converse is true for the legal environment. Interestingly, the interaction 
between uncertainty avoidance, legal environment and special items reveals that UNCAV 
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x LEG x SPI is negatively related to UNEXP_CE at the 1% significance level (coefficient, 
-0.12, t-value; -3.81). This implies that the legal environment is not induced by 
uncertainties in developed countries in mitigating classification shifting behaviour. 
Therefore, in a culture where uncertainty will influence classification shifting, such 
opportunistic managerial behaviour is constrained by the legal environment, perhaps due 
to for fear of law suits. Thus, in a strong legal environment, the positive effects often 
associated with uncertainty avoidance can no longer be demonstrated. In other words, the 
legal environment in developed countries deters misclassification, even in uncertain 
situations. Finally, in column (6) of Table 4.21, the study provides the regression results of 
the relationship between LONGT x LEG x SPI and UNEXP_CE. The previous results in 
Table 4.17 indicate that there is negative but insignificant association between LONGTSPI 
and UNEXP_CE for developed countries. As reported in column (6), the coefficient on 
LONGT x LEG x SPI is negative (-0.78, t-value; -2.78) and significant at the 99% 
confidence level. This suggests that developed countries are long-term results-oriented. The 
interaction between legal environment and long-term orientation serves as a disincentive 
for misclassification. Therefore, long-term orientation complements the legal environment 
in mitigating classification shifting in developed countries.   
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Table 4.21: Regression of Developed Countries’ Legal Environment, Culture and Classification Shifting 
Dependent Variable: UNEXP_CE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Developed Developed Developed Developed Developed Developed 
SPITEM    0.35**  0.29*** 0.23**    0.83***   0.95***     0.59*** 
 (2.22) (2.92) (2.36) (2.72) (3.29) (2.69) 
LEGALENF -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* 
 (-1.76) (-1.75) (-1.74) (-1.72) (-1.71) (-1.70) 
POWDIS   0.02*  0.03*     
 (1.72) (1.76)     
POWDSPI   0.05*   0.07*     
 (1.78) (1.85)     
POWDLEGSPI -0.28*   -0.42**     
 (-1.76) (-2.46)     
INDIV  -0.02**   -0.05**    
 (-1.96)  (-2.15)    
INDIVSPI  -0.03**   -0.06***    
 (-2.15)  (-3.55)    
INDIVLEGSPI  -0.24*    -0.70***    
 (-1.83)  (-3.80)    
MASCU  0.01             0.02   
 (1.50)   (1.60)   
MASCUSPI  0.01**   0.04**   
 (2.05)   (2.15)   
MASCULEGSPI -0.22     -0.10***   
 (-1.42)   (-3.97)   
UNCAVO  0.02**     0.04**  
 (2.05)    (2.09)  
UNCAVSPI   0.07***      0.09***  
 (3.67)    (3.77)  
UNCAVLEGSPI -0.08*      -0.02***  
 (-1.74)    (-3.81)  
LONGTEO 0.03*     0.02 
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(-1.74) (0.53) 
LONGTSPI -0.03**     0.03 
 (-2.24)     (0.64) 
LONGTLEGSPI -0.06*       -0.78*** 
 (-1.72)     (-2.78) 
SIZE  -0.05**  -0.10***  -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.11*** 
 (-2.26) (-6.82) (-6.87) (-6.88) (-6.83) (-6.87) 
ROA -0.22**  -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.27*** -0.27*** -0.28*** 
 (-2.52) (-3.55) (-3.58) (-3.55) (-3.54) (-3.58) 
MBV -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (-1.12) (-1.13) (-1.09) (-1.11) (-1.13) (-1.09) 
LEV  0.11** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 
 (2.28) (4.81) (4.86) (4.82) (4.80) (4.86) 
BIG4 -0.02*  -0.03**  -0.03**  -0.03**  -0.03**  -0.03** 
 (-1.84) (-2.24) (-2.24) (-2.24) (-2.24) (-2.24) 
CAPINTEN  0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29***  0.29*** 
 (9.20) (9.15) (9.18) (9.21) (9.16) (9.17) 
GROWTH  0.06***  0.06***  0.06***  0.06***  0.06***  0.06*** 
 (3.84) (3.89) (3.85) (3.80) (3.88) (3.86) 
RELINT -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 
 (-1.08) (-1.50) (-1.48) (-1.49) (-1.47) (-1.44) 
GDPTOTAL (-0.19) -0.35 -0.17 -0.18 -0.41 -0.17 
 (-0.883) (-0.884) (-0.882) (-0.882) (-0.884) (-0.882) 
CONSTANT 0.59 0.30 0.60 0.92 0.20 0.40 
 (1.13) (1.10) (1.07) (1.11) (1.12) (1.06) 
       
Observations 137884 137884 137884 137884 137884 137884 
R-squared 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Breusch-Pagan 3845.92 3234.62 3174.57 3137.59 3264.65 3114.22 
P-Value (0.6649) (0.6503) (0.6438) (0.6353) (0.6563) (0.6401) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 239.56 237.84 234.64 232.32 231.72 230.47 
P-Value (0.2413) (0.2181) (0.2085) (0.1861) (0.1801) (0.1789) 
Wooldridge Test 152.78 150.25 145.57 142.68 140.44 165.84 
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Notes: All 
variables are defined in Table 4.3. *,** and *** are used in a two tailed test to indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels respectively. The table shows co-
efficient estimates above and t-statistics below in brackets. 
P-Value (0.2917) (0.2816) (0.2798) (0.2716) (0.2698) (0.3281) 
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In Table 4.22, the results of the emerging country sub-sample are presented and the 
relationship between legal environment, cultural dimension variables, special items 
interactions and unexpected core earnings shown. As in Table 4.21, the variables of 
interests are POWD x LEG x SPI, INDIV x LEG x SPI, MASCU x LEG x SPI, UNCAVO 
x LEG x SPI and LONGT x LEG x SPI. Six separate regressions are run and the results 
presented in columns (1) to (6) indicate that SPITEM is positively related to UNEXP_CE 
at 95% or 99% confidence levels. In column (1), all the variables of interest are included 
in the model to run the regressions for the emerging country sub-sample. The results reveal 
that INDIV x LEG x SPI and UNCAV x LEG x SPI are negatively related to UNEXP_CE 
at the 1% significance level. Similarly, MASCU x LEG x SPI and LONGT x LEG x SPI 
are negatively related to UNEXP_CE at the 5% significance level. However, the coefficient 
on POWD x LEG x SP is negative, but not significant. The results in column (1) suggest 
that in the emerging country sub-sample, the interactions of legal environment and 
individualism, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity and long-term orientation cultural 
variables provide a strong monitoring mechanism to curb the misclassification of core 
expenses into special items. In column (2), the regression model is run using only POWD 
x LEG x SPI as an independent variable. The results indicate that the coefficient on POWD 
x LEG x SPI is negative (-0.41, t-value; -2.47) and significant at the 95% confidence level, 
confirming that power distance and legal environment in emerging countries restrain 
managers’ motivation for classification shifting.  In column (3), the relationship between 
INDIV x LEG x SPI and UNEXP_CE are examined. As noted in Tables 4.14 and 4.19, 
both individualism and legal environment are seen to be negatively associated with 
UNEXP_CE at the 10% significance level. However, in column (3) the results show a 
significant negative relationship at the 99% confidence level between INDIV x LEG x SPI 
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and UNEXP_CE. This suggests that the combined effects of individualism and legal 
environment in emerging countries have the potential to reduce classification shifting. Thus 
a country’s legal environment could complement the culture of individualism to quell 
shifting or monitor managers’ behaviour. In column (4), the cultural variable of masculinity 
interacts with legal environment and special items to examine their impact on classification 
shifting.  As noted in Table 4.16, masculinity is positive and related to unexpected core 
earnings at the 5% significance level in emerging countries. However, Table 4.19 presents 
a negative and significant relationship at 10% between them. The results in column (4) 
show a negative but insignificant relationship between MASCU x LEG x SPI and 
UNEXP_CE. This signifies that whilst a culture of masculinity gives managers the 
incentive to misclassify core expenses into special items, the legal environment in emerging 
countries is effective in deterring managers’ classification shifting behaviour. That is, 
despite an insignificant negative relationship, the study observes that in a masculinity 
culture, people assert power and authority to influence corporate decisions but the positive 
impact of masculinity culture is constrained by the legal environment. The legal 
environment plays an effective monitoring role in subduing classification shifting, thus 
neutralising the positive effects of such a culture.      
In column (5), the relationship between uncertainty avoidance, legal environment, special 
items and unexpected core earnings (UNCAV x LEG x SPI and UNEXP_CE) is examined. 
The previous results in Table 4.15 indicate that there is a significant positive relationship 
between the uncertainty avoidance score and classification shifting in emerging countries. 
This suggests that the higher the uncertainty avoidance in the business environment, the 
higher managers’ motivation to engage in classification shifting. However, in column (5) 
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the results indicate that the coefficient on UNCAV x LEG x SPI is negative (-0.76, t-value; 
-4.26) and significant at the 99% confidence level, suggesting that classification shifting is 
reduced by the interaction between the uncertainty avoidance score and the legal 
environment in the emerging country sub-sample. The legal environment index offsets the 
positive impact of this score. Where the legal environment and uncertain avoidance culture 
interact, the former is effective in curbing classification shifting behaviour. In column (6) 
of Table 4.22, a separate model is run using LONGT x LEG x SPI as the only independent 
variable to assess its effect on UNEXP_CE using the emerging country sub-sample. 
Consistent with the results in Table 4.17, the coefficient on LONGT x LEG x SPI is 
negative (-0.42, t-value; -5.34) and significant at the 99% confidence level. Previous results 
in Table 4.17 and 4.19 indicate that both LONGTSPI and LEGALSPI are negatively related 
to UNEXP_CE at 1% and 10% significance levels. The combined effect of both long-term 
orientation and legal environment, (LONGT x LEG x SPI), is also negative and related to 
UNEXP_CE at the 99% confidence level. This implies that some developed countries that 
are characterised by long-term oriented culture, set long term objectives, report the true 
financial position of the firm and are not in hurry to misclassify reported core earnings to 
meet short term gains. This disincentive to engage in classification shifting is induced by 
the strong legal environment in developed countries, thus making the effect more 
pronounced. In a nutshell, Table 4.22 shows that in the emerging country sub-sample, the 
combined effect of culture and legal environment subdues classification shifting, as 
evidenced by the negative co-efficient in columns (1) to (6) and the significant relationship 
between the interactive variables of culture, legal environment and classification shift
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Table 4.22: Regression of Emerging Countries’ Legal Environment, Culture and Classification Shifting 
Dependent Variable: UNEXP_CE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Emerging Emerging Emerging Emerging Emerging Emerging 
SPITEM 0.15** 0.16***   0.11*** 0.64*** 0.29***   0.22*** 
 (2.42) (6.10) (6.21) (7.09) (-12.17) (3.64) 
LEGALENF -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 
 (-1.62) (-1.61) (-1.61) (-1.61) (-1.58) (-1.56) 
POWDIS  0.01**  0.01**     
 (2.04) (2.09)     
POWDSPI   0.03**   0.04**     
 (2.07) (2.13)     
POWDLEGSPI -0.57 -0.41**     
 (-1.34) (-2.47)     
INDIV -0.04  -0.07    
 (-1.51)  (-1.57)    
INDIVSPI  -0.03*   -0.08*    
 (-1.74)  (-1.79)    
INDIVLEGSPI -0.42**  -0.80***    
 (-2.59)  (-3.61)    
MASCU  0.01*    0.03*   
 (1.73)   (1.79)   
MASCUSPI  0.03**    0.06**   
 (2.05)   (2.49)   
MASCULEGSPI -0.25**   -0.28**   
 (-2.54)   (-2.59)   
UNCAVO  0.02***     0.03***  
 (3.01)    (3.15)  
UNCAVSPI   0.04***      0.07***  
 (4.58)    (7.95)  
UNCAVLEGSPI   -0.03***    -0.76***  
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 (-7.93)    (-4.26)  
LONGTEO  -0.03**      -0.04** 
 (-2.17)     (-2.87) 
LONGTSPI  -0.02***      -0.09*** 
 (-4.01)     (-4.30) 
LONGTLEGSPI -0.21**     -0.42** 
 (-2.35)     (-2.34) 
SIZE -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 (-4.90) (-4.95) (-5.16) (-4.95) (-4.78) (-4.99) 
ROA  -0.56***  -0.57*** -0.57***   -0.56*** -0.55*** -0.56*** 
 (-5.08) (-5.32) (-5.33) (-5.17) (-4.98) (-5.14) 
MBV -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (-1.35) (-1.17) (-1.25) (-1.18) (-1.17) (-1.16) 
LEV  0.67***  0.66***  0.66***  0.67*** 0.67*** 0.67*** 
 (4.78) (4.26) (4.24) (4.34) (4.76) (4.38) 
BIG4 -0.02** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 
 (-2.24) (-6.21) (-6.25) (-6.21) (-6.12) (-6.17) 
CAPINTEN  0.33*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 
 (15.84) (15.50) (15.48) (15.50) (15.71) (15.50) 
GROWTH    0.06***  0.06***  0.06***  0.06***  0.06*** 0.06*** 
 (6.26) (6.21) (6.25) (6.21) (6.12) (6.17) 
RELINT -0.18* -0.18* -0.17* -0.18* -0.18* -0.18* 
 (-1.76) (-1.75) (-1.70) (-1.73) (-1.72) (-1.73) 
GDPTOTAL -0.18 -0.50 -0.45 -0.94 -0.92 -0.25 
 (-1.25) (-1.07) (-1.07) (-1.14) (-1.13) (-1.18) 
CONSTANT 0.02 0.09* 0.49* 1.23* 0.54* 0.51* 
 (1.00) (1.87) (1.81) (1.78) (1.80) (1.76) 
       
Observations 112023 112023 112023 112023 112023 112023 
R-squared 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Breusch-Pagan 2437.54 2733.12 2548.66 2488.37 2474.16 2474.16 
P-Value (0.6342) (0.6592) (0.6397) (0.6269) (0.6349) (0.6349) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 333.54 330.84 249.96 242.67 235.43 231.75 
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P-Value (0.3213) (0.3201) (0.3102) (0.3028) (0.2938) (0.2854) 
Wooldridge Test 246.21 244.29 228.39 221.13 67.54 61.47 
P-Value (0.3346) (0.3267) (0.3149) (0.3123) (0.1938) (0.1856) 
       
 
Notes: All variables are defined in Table 4.3. *,** and *** are used in a two tailed test to indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels respectively. The table 
shows coefficient estimates above and t-statistics below in brackets. 
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In Table 4.23, the interactions between legal environment and culture for the developing 
country sub-sample are examined. Six separate models are run and the results are presented 
in columns (1) to (6). The coefficient on SPITEM is positive and significant at the 95% 
confidence level in all the columns, signifying and confirming the existence of 
classification shifting behaviour in developing countries, as observed in Table 4.11 
(McVay, 2006; Haw et al., 2001). Initially, all variables are included in column (1), and the 
results indicate that all the independent variables - POWD x LEG x SPI, INDIV x LEG x 
SPI, MASCU x LEG x SPI, UNCAV x LEG x SPI and LONGT x LEG x SPI are negatively 
related to UNEXP_CE at 1% or 5% significance level. For example, the coefficients on 
POWD x LEG x SPI and INDIV x LEG x SPI are both negative and significant at the 99% 
confidence level (-0.90, t-value; -2.61 and -0.09, t-value; -3.92). The results in column (1) 
indicate that the combined effect of culture dimension variables and legal enforcement 
mitigates management misclassification behaviour in developing countries. On the 
contrary, the results in Tables 4.12 to 4.17 show that the coefficient on the cultural 
dimension variables of power distance (POWDISPI), individualism (INDIVSPI), 
masculinity (MASCUSPI), uncertainty avoidance (UNCAVSPI) and long-term orientation 
(LONGTSPI) are positive and significant at levels of 5% or 10% in relation to classification 
shifting (UNEXP_CE). This suggests that in the presence of an effective legal environment 
in developing countries, dominant culture has no effect on expense and revenue 
misclassification. Thus, legal environment undermines the effects of the prevailing and 
dominant culture on classification shifting. This finding is consistent with Leuz et al. (2003) 
and Haw et al. (2011), who observe that earnings management is negatively associated with 
a country’s legal enforcement.  In column (2), four of the variables of interest are dropped 
and the model run to establish the association between POWD x LEG x SPI and 
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UNEXP_CE only. The coefficient on POWD x LEG x SPI is negative (-0.19, t-value; -
2.37) and significantly associated with UNEXP_CE at the 95% confidence level. Similarly, 
in column (3) only INDIV x LEG x SPI is included in the model to examine their effects 
on UNEXP_CE. The results in column (3) indicate that the coefficient on INDIV x LEG x 
SPI is negative (-0.23, t-value; -2.70) and significant at the 99% confidence level. The 
results in both columns (2) and (3) suggest that the legal environment influences 
classification shifting behaviour more than power distance and individualism cultures in 
developing countries. In columns (4) to (6), the association between MASCU x LEG x SPI 
and UNEXP_CE, UNCAV x LEG x SPI and UNEXP_CE, LONGT x LEG x SPI and 
UNEXP_CE are examined. The results indicate that the association between MASCU x 
LEG x SPI, UNCAV x LEG x SPI, LONGT x LEG x SPI and UNEXP_CE is still negative 
and significant at 99% and 95% confidence level respectively. Consistent with Leuz et al. 
(2003), the results confirm that the legal environment mitigates classification shifting. 
Therefore, the role of culture in motivating misclassification behaviour in developing 
countries can no longer be demonstrated when the legal environment interacts with the 
cultural dimension variables. The control variables exhibit their expected coefficient signs 
and significance levels.
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Table 4.23: Regression of Developing Countries’ Legal Environment, Culture and Classification Shifting  
Dependent Variable: UNEXP_CE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing 
SPITEM    0.11**   0.38**   0.20**   0.11**       0.60***   0.22** 
 (2.35) (2.11) (2.39) (2.27) (2.62) (2.04) 
LEGALENF -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
 (-1.54) (-1.54) (-1.53) (-1.52) (-1.51) (-1.50) 
POWDIS     0.03**     0.07**     
 (2.07) (2.08)     
POWDSPI   0.06***   0.07***     
 (3.03) (3.08)     
POWDLEGSPI   -0.90*** -0.19**     
 (-2.61) (-2.37)     
INDIV 0.02  0.04    
 (1.52)  (1.57)    
INDIVSPI 0.04*  0.06*    
 (1.74)  (1.77)    
INDIVLEGSPI   -0.09***    -0.23***    
 (-3.92)  (-2.70)    
MASCU   0.04*     0.06*   
 (1.74)   (1.76)   
MASCUSPI    0.07*      0.08*   
 (1.77)   (1.79)   
MASCULEGSPI   -0.25***      -0.42***   
 (-2.13)   (-2.88)   
UNCAVO   0.05**      0.07**  
 (2.37)    (2.39)  
UNCAVSPI  0.06**     0.08**  
 (2.49)    (2.69)  
UNCAVLEGSPI -0.29**    -0.35**  
 (-2.04)    (-2.30)  
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LONGTEO  0.02      0.03 
 (1.44)     (1.48) 
LONGTSPI  0.02*      0.03* 
 (1.75)     (1.78) 
LONGTLEGSPI -0.95**     -0.98** 
 (-2.04)     (-2.10) 
SIZE -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (-1.26) (-1.31) (-1.31) (-1.34) (-1.34) (-1.31) 
ROA 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 
 (1.63) (1.39) (1.41) (1.41) (1.38) (1.42) 
MBV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.47) (0.70) (0.69) (0.66) (0.75) (0.66) 
LEV 0.39***  0.39***  0.38***  0.38***  0.40***  0.39*** 
 (6.52) (6.46) (6.42) (6.42) (6.62) (6.50) 
BIG4 -0.037** -0.035** -0.036** -0.034** -0.035** -0.034** 
 (-2.106) (-2.100) (-2.102) (-2.095) (-2.100) (-2.092) 
CAPINTEN 0.13* 0.10* 0.11* 0.12* 0.011* 0.010* 
 (1.74) (1.72) (1.73) (1.74) (1.73) (1.72) 
GROWTH   0.13***  0.14***  0.14***  0.14***  0.13***  0.14*** 
 (5.90) (6.09) (6.10) (6.09) (6.00) (6.06) 
RELINT -0.04** -0.03** -0.03** -0.03** -0.03** -0.03** 
 (-2.24) (-2.22) (-2.23) (-2.23) (-2.23) (-2.22) 
GDPTOTAL 0.82 0.25 0.34 0.43 0.69 0.33 
 (0.886) (0.878) (0.879) (0.880) (0.884) (0.879) 
CONSTANT 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.34 
 (1.11) (1.11) (1.11) (1.10) (1.10) (1.10) 
       
Observations 5009 5009 5009 5009 5009 5009 
R-squared 0.20 0.40 0.40 0.50 0.50 0.40 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Breusch-Pagan 1785.43 1658.23 1594.25 1679.33 1609.65 1798.48 
P-Value (0.6486) (0.6342) (0.6293) (0.6367) (0.6328) (0.6349) 
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Notes: All variables are defined in Table 4.3. *,** and *** are used in a two tailed test to indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels respectively. The table 
shows coefficient estimates above and t-statistics below in brackets.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 143.65 123.72 123.33 115.49 113.45 112.42 
P-Value (0.1385) (0.1311) (0.1213) (0.1203) (0.1202) (0.1201) 
Wooldridge Test 84.43 82.78 81.29 78.39 67.54 62.58 
P-Value (0.2378) (0.2281) (0.2231) (0.2134) (0.1938) (0.1887) 
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Table 4.24 provides the fixed effects regression results for testing hypothesis 3b.  Model 
12 is run to examine the interactions between special items (SPITEM), religiosity 
(RELINT) and legal environment (LEGALENF) and their impact on classification shifting 
(UNEXP_CE). The variable of interest is LEG x REL x SPI. The results in Table 4.24 
indicate that there is still a positive and significant relationship at the 1% level between 
SPITEM and UNEXP_CE in the full sample and the sub-samples of developed, emerging 
and developing countries, suggesting that classification shifting exists in the sub-samples. 
The coefficients on RELINTSPI are also negative and significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
for developing, emerging and developed countries respectively, confirming the findings in 
Table 4.12. That is, countrywide religiosity subdues misclassification and the effect is more 
noticeable and significant in developing countries than developed ones. Similarly, the 
coefficient on LEGALSPI is negative and significant at 5% and 10% respectively in the 
developed and emerging country sub-samples. However, the coefficient on LEGALSPI is 
negative but not significant in the developing country sub-sample. This is consistent with 
the findings of previous studies (Behn et al., 2013; Leuz et al., 2003) and confirms the 
results in Table 4.19. The variables SPITEM, LEGALENF, and RELINT are interacted and 
it is observed that there is a negative relationship between the interactive term LEG x REL 
x SPI and UNEXP_CE across all the sub-samples. For example, the coefficient on LEG x 
REL x SPI is negative (-0.132, t-value; -2.890) and significant at the 99% confidence level 
in the developed country sub-sample. Similarly, there is a negative coefficient (-0.358, t-
value; -1,976 and -0.168, t-value; -2,397) and a significant relationship at the 5% level 
between LEG x REL x SPI and UNEXP_CE in both the emerging and developing country 
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sub-samples. The results of the interactive terms (LEG x REL x SPI) on unexpected core 
earnings suggest that countrywide religiosity reduces managerial motivation to misclassify 
core expenses into special items, however, a country’s religious social norms are induced 
by the legal environment to subdue classification shifting. Thus, the joint effect of 
countrywide religiosity and legal environment play a complementary and monitoring role 
in curbing management classification shifting behaviour in developed, emerging and 
developing countries. It is further observed that both countrywide religiosity and legal 
environment constrain management motivation to misclassify core expenses into special 
items to boost reported core earnings. This is a noble contribution to the literature on 
managers’ classification shifting behaviour. The results build on the findings of earlier 
studies in the U.S.A and Asia, and other international studies on classification shifting 
(Behn et al., 2013; McGuire et al. 2012,  Callen et al., 2011, Haw et al., 2011, Leuz et al., 
2003). In conclusion, the results in Table 4.24 reveal that both legal environment and 
religiosity restrain classification shifting behaviour in developed, emerging and developing 
countries. However, the legal environment is effective in developed countries and 
religiosity is effective in both developing and emerging countries in subduing classification 
shifting. The joint effect of the interactive term LEG x REL x SPI on UNEXP_CE is much 
more pronounced in mitigating or monitoring misclassification behaviour in all types of 
countries than the individual variables.  
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Table 4.24: Regression of Countrywide Legal Environment, Religiosity and 
Classification Shifting 
 
Notes: *,**and *** are used in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent levels. The table shows the co-efficient estimates and t-statistics (in brackets). All variables are defined in 
Table 4.3 above. 
 
Dependent Variable: UNEXP_CE  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Full Sample Developed Emerging Developing 
SPITEM  0.741***  0.531** 0.493* 0.942** 
 (8.477) (2.553) (1.877) (2.123) 
RELINT    -0.035** -0.022 -0.153*   -0.228*** 
 (-1.978) (-1.428) (-1.739) (-2.866) 
LEGALENF -0.013* -0.062* -0.011 -0.010 
 (-1.702) (-1.761) (-0.846) (-0.967) 
RELINTSPI -0.296** -0.137 -0.493**  -0.425*** 
 (-2.386) (-1.478) (-2.059) (-3.358) 
LEGALSPI -0.186** -0.051** -0.054* -0.098 
 (-2.451) (-2.334) (-1.791) (-1.506) 
LEGxRELxSPI  -0.315***  -0.132*** -0.358** -0.168** 
 (-4.196) (-2.890) (-1.976) (-2.397) 
SIZE  -0.063***  -0.105***   -0.018*** -0.015 
 (-7.162) (-6.813) (-4.886) (-1.321) 
ROA -0.089***  -0.275***   -0.570*** -0.136 
 (7.287) (-3.578) (-5.387) (-1.332) 
MBV -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 
 (-1.564) (-1.102) (-1.153) (0.483) 
LEV   0.383***  0.148***  0.663***  0.383*** 
 (9.243) (4.841) (4.192) (6.407) 
BIG4 -0.065***  0.057***  -0.057***  -0.135** 
 (-3.580) (3.883) (-6.091) (-2.029) 
CAPINTEN  0.304*** 0.292*** 0.316*** 0.016* 
 (15.262) (9.153) (15.369) (1.703) 
GROWTH 0.017** 0.074* 0.054** 0.027* 
 (2.137) (1.857) (2.170) (1.819) 
CULTURE -0.023 -0.573 -0.227 -0.956 
 (-0.097) (-0.596) (-0.384) (-0.308) 
GDPTOTAL -0.534 -0.517 -0.855 -0.888 
 (-0.661) (-0.851) (-0.123) (-0.731) 
CONSTANT 0.031  0.245 0.986 0.704 
 (1.076) (1.364) (0.818) (1.052) 
     
Observations 254916 137884 112023 5009 
R-squared 0.21 0.22 0.38 0.48 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Breusch-Pagan 4282.27 3376.58 2487.31 1768.09 
P-Value (0.7498) (0.6563) (0.6349) (0.6114) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 237 333 549 135 
P-Value (0.2181) (0.3213) (0.6123) (0.1938) 
Wooldridge Test 152.78 246.21 428.39 67.54 
P-Value (0.2981) (0.3346) (0.5134) (0.1938) 
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UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2RELINT +  β3LEGALENF + β4 LEGALENF x SPITEM + β5 LEGALENF x 
RELINT + β6 LEGALENF x RELINT x SPITEM +β7 SIZE + β8 BMV + β9LEV + β10BIG4 + β11ROA + + β12GROWTH 
+ β13CAPINTEN+ β14GDP + Year and Country Fixed Effects +   𝜀𝑡,   
4.6. Robustness Analysis 
Several sensitivity tests are performed to validate the robustness of the results.  
4.6.1. Validity of the Expectation Model 
First, as a robustness check, total accruals (ACCRUALS) are substituted by working capital 
accruals (WC_ACC) in McVay’s (2006) expectation model (1) to compute the normal core 
earnings (NOR_CE). The aim of replacing ACCRUALS by WC_ACC is to eliminate bias 
in the expectation model resulting from depreciation expenses and special items, in line 
with Athanasakou et al. (2009). The results in Table 4.11 are reproduced using WC_ACC 
in model (1) to compute the new UNEXP_CE. Everything remains the same in the model 
except that the WC_ACC is used to compute NOR_CE and subsequently UNEXP_CE. 
UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2 SIZE + β3 BMV + β4LEV + β5 BIG4 + β6ROA + β9GROWTH 
+ β10 CAPINTEN+ β11GDP + Year and Country Fixed Effects + 𝜀𝑡,                                                                              
(2) 
The regression is re-run using model (2) with the re-estimated UNEXP_CE and the results 
in Table 4.25, Panel A, columns (1) to (4) show that the coefficient on SPITEM is still 
positive and significant at 1% and 5% levels for the full sample, the emerging, developing 
and developed countries sub-samples respectively, confirming that firms in the three 
categories of countries are engaged in expense misclassification to boost reported core 
earnings as observed in previous research (Behn et al., 2013; Haw et al., 2011). These 
results are also similar to those reported in Table 4.11, implying that firms increase reported 
core earnings through classification shifting. This evidence is consistent with earlier cross-
country and national studies on classification shifting (McVay, 2006; Fan et al., 2010, Haw 
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et al., 2011; Behn et al., 2013), implying that firms in the sub-samples have the incentive 
to engage in classification shifting. Barua and Cready (2008) argue that McVay’s (2006) 
evidence of classification shifting is illustrative of model bias because of the inclusion of 
special items accruals. In response, McVay (2008) provides empirical evidence of expense 
misclassification without accruals in the model of normal core earnings. Consequently, this 
study follows previous research (Haw et al., 2011; McVay, 2008) to exclude accrual 
variables from expectation model (1) and re-runs the regression models using both the full 
and sub-samples. 
Table 4.25, Panel A, columns (5) to (8) present the regression results when NOR_CE and 
UNEXP_CE are re-estimated without accruals, consistent with McVay (2008) and Fan et 
al. (2010). Model (2) is run for all the sub-samples to re-estimate the main regressions by 
excluding accruals. Interestingly, the results in columns (5) to (8) indicate that there is still 
a positive and significant relationship between SPITEM and UNEXP_CE for the full 
sample, and the developed, emerging and developing country sub-samples. This confirms 
the existence of expense misclassification in the full sample and sub-samples, as noted in 
previous studies (Behn et al., 2013; Haw et al., 2011). The result is consistent with the main 
findings and indicates that special items are inflated as core expenses are shifted down the 
bottom line into special items, resulting in an increase in reported core earnings. This result 
is consistent with the findings of McVay (2006), who observes that special items increase 
with core earnings. Specifically, in column (6) the co-efficient on SPITEM for the 
developed country sub-sample is positive (0.095, t-value; 2.231) and significant at the 95% 
confidence level. Similarly, the coefficient on SPITEM for the emerging and developing 
country sub-samples are positive (0.231 & 0.269, t-value; 3.547 & 3.125) and significant 
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at the 99% confidence level respectively. The coefficients and level of significance are 
comparable to those reported in Table 4.11, specifically columns (1) to (4). The inference 
remains the same and confirms evidence of classification shifting in the developed, 
emerging and developing country sub-samples.  In short, the results in Table 4.25 columns 
(1) to (8) with working capital accruals and without accruals in the regression model 
suggest that the previous reported findings of expense misclassification based on McVay’s 
(2006) expectation model are bias free.   In Panel B of Table 4.25, the regression results 
are presented to show the association between RELINTSPI, POWDSPI, INDIVSPI, 
MASCUSPI, UNCAVSPI, LONGTSPI, LEGALSPI and UNEXP_CE when working 
capital accruals or no accruals are included in the expectation model. The results are 
presented in columns (1) to (8) of Panel B. Clearly, columns (1) to (4) show the regression 
results when working capital accruals are used to compute expected core earnings. Even 
though accruals are excluded in the expectation model, the results in columns (4) to (8) are 
similar to those in columns (1) to (4) and are consistent with the main findings. In both 
cases and in emerging and developing countries columns, the coefficient on RELINTSPI 
is negative and significant, thus confirming that countrywide religiosity restrains 
management incentive to misclassify core expenses into special items. The coefficient on 
POWDSPI is positive and significant, consistent with the findings of Callen et al. (2011. 
Similarly, consistent with Li and Zahra (2012), the coefficient on UNCAVSPI is positive 
and significant, suggesting that countries with high uncertainty avoidance have a low 
tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty. In addition, MASCUSPI is significant and 
positively related to UNEXP_CE. Herrmann-Pillatha et al. (2014) find that in high 
masculinity cultures, the achievement of financial goals and empire building through 
accounting systems is widespread, hence classification shifting should be more prevalent 
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in high masculinity countries. Therefore, the result of the study is consistent with prior ones 
(Herrmann-Pillatha et al., 2014; Callen et al., 2011).  Consistent with the main findings, the 
coefficients on INDIVSPI and LONGTSPI are negative and significant at 95% or 
significant at the 90% confidence level for both the developed and emerging country sub-
samples in all the columns, but positive for developing countries (at the 90% confidence 
level), suggesting that developing countries are short-term result-oriented and less 
individualistic. This finding is consistent with Davis and Abdurazokzoda (2016), Klasing 
(2013) and Callen et al. (2011), who observe that accrual-based earnings management is 
prevalent in low individualism countries due to the absence of formal institutions, 
widespread corrupt practices and nepotism. In summary, the results in columns (1) to (8) 
of Table 4.25 show that countrywide religiosity, culture and legal environment are 
associated with classification shifting behaviour.  
Furthermore, special items are interacted with legal environment, cultural dimension 
variables and religiosity to confirm the results in Tables 4.21, 4.22 and 4.23. The regression 
results in columns (1) to (4) of Table 4.26 are obtained when total accruals (ACCRUALS) 
are replaced in McVay’s (2006) expectation model by working capital accruals (WC_ACC) 
before estimating normal core earnings and subsequent unexpected core earnings. 
Similarly, columns (5) to (8) show the regression results when accruals are omitted from 
the expectation model before estimating normal core earnings.  Clearly, the results in 
columns (1) to (4) indicate that there is a significant negative association between the 
interactive terms POWD x LEG x SPI, INDIV x LEG x SPI, MASCU x LEG x SPI, 
UNCAV x LEG x SPI and LONGT x LEG x SPI and UNEXP_CE. That is, when interacted 
with culture and special items, the legal environment serves as a monitoring mechanism to 
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demotivate managers’ classification shifting behaviour in all the sub-samples.  As noted in 
Table 4.25, the coefficients on the cultural dimension variables of power distance, 
uncertainty avoidance and masculinity are positive and significantly associated with 
classification shifting. These results do not capture the effect of legal environment 
interaction on culture and special items. Therefore, the results in Table 4.26 show the 
impact of religion, legal environment and culture interaction on expense misclassification. 
In Panel B of Table 4.26, the coefficients of all the interactive terms (POWD x LEG x SPI, 
INDIV x LEG x SPI, MASCU x LEG x SPI, UNCAV x LEG x SPI and LONGT x LEG x 
SPI) are negative and significantly related to unexpected core earnings (UNEXP_CE) at 
95% or 99% confidence levels in the full sample and sub-samples of developed, emerging 
and developing countries respectively.  This is consistent with the previous findings that 
religiosity, culture and legal environment play a complementary role in mitigating 
managers’ classification shifting behaviour. However, the effect of legal environment and 
religiosity are much more pronounced in subduing managers’ expense misclassification. 
The result is consistent with previous studies (Behn et al., 2013; Haw et al., 2011), which 
observe that a country’s legal environment mitigates classification shifting and plays a 
monitoring role in boosting investor confidence, as well as preventing financial statement 
misreporting.  In summary, the inferences for H1, H2a, H2b, H2c, H2d, H2e, H3a and H3b 
remain the same. There is still strong evidence of expense misclassification into special 
items and that legal environment, religiosity and culture interactions have a significant 
negative impact on classification shifting, confirming the mitigating impact of legal 
environment, religiosity and culture on classification shifting.  
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Table 4.25: Regression of Religion, Culture and Legal Environment on Classification Shifting in the Global Sub-samples  
 
Variables 
             (Using Working Capital Accruals)        Dependent Variable: UNEXP_CE              (Without Accruals in Expectation Model) 
      (1)  (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Full sample  Developed Emerging Developing   Full sample Developed  Emerging Developing 
Panel A: Regression of Special Items on Unexpected Core Earnings 
 
SPITEM  0.686***   0.125**  0.289***    0.307***      0.474***  0.095**   0.231***   0.269*** 
 (6.487)  (2.068) (4.625) (3.238)   (4.354) (2.231)  (3.547) (3.125) 
SIZE  -0.058***   -0.094***  -0.017*** -0.018*    -0.047***  -0.086***   -0.013*** -0.016* 
 (-6.148)  (-6.982) (-4.876) (-1.779)   (-5.292) (-4.175)  (-3.263) (-1.743) 
ROA -0.083***   -0.086***  -0.066*** -0.036*   -0.064***  -0.058***   -0.049*** -0.032* 
 (-6.467)  (-3.375) (-5.198) (-1.752)   (-3.851) (-3.108)  (-4.376) (-1.745) 
MBV -0.001  -0.002 -0.001 -0.002   -0.001 -0.002  -0.001 -0.002 
 (-1.325)  (-1.074) (-1.109) (-0.636)   (-1.247) (-1.021)  (-1.087) (-0.631) 
LEV   0.327***    0.148***   0.421***   0.367***     0.285***   0.124***    0.257***   0.228*** 
 (5.862)  (4.924) (4.214) (6.563)   (4.784) (3.852)  (3.683) (3.427) 
BIG4 -0.025**   -0.024**  -0.032***  -0.037**   -0.023**  -0.021**   -0.027*  -0.029** 
 (-2.344)  (-2.215) (-3.112) (-2.126)   (-2.018) (-2.186)  (-1.762) (-1.746) 
CAPINTEN  0.031**  0.022** 0.018* 0.028*    0.026** 0.021**  0.016* 0.019* 
 (2.321)  (2.149) (1.725) (1.742)   (2.183) (1.897)  (1.718) (1.738) 
GROWTH   0.057***   0.054***   0.056***   0.047***       0.043***   0.038***    0.033**   0.034** 
 (3.424)  (3.764) (6.124) (5.281)   (3.125) (2.884)  (2.124) (2.298) 
GDP        -0.342  -0.280 -0.357 -0.345   -0.187 -0.194  -0.162 -0.155 
 (-0.768)  (-0.789) (-0.784) (-0.848)   (-0.506) (-0.724)  (-0.768) (-0.843) 
 
Panel B: Regression of Interaction term (between Special Items; Religion, Culture and Legal Environment) on Classification Shifting 
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SPITEM     0.686***    0.125**     0.289***     0.307***      0.474***  0.095**     0.231***   0.269*** 
 (6.487)  (2.068) (4.625) (3.238)   (4.354) (2.231)  (3.547) (3.125) 
RELINT  -0.014**  -0.078* -0.022*  -0.042**   -0.024* -0.045*  -0.034* -0.024** 
 (-2.174)  (-1.701) (-1.745) (-2.214)   (-1.754) (-1.712)  (-1.712)     (-2.014) 
RELINTSPI  -0.512**  -0.289* -0.229**  -0.272***   -0.053** -0.068*  -0.071* -0.037** 
 (-2.235)  (-1.738) (-2.186) (-3.989)   (-1.978) (-1.748)  (-1.774)     (-2.315) 
POWDIS   0.019**    0.017*   0.010**   0.016**     0.019**   0.017*    0.010**   0.016** 
 (2.271)  (1.751) (2.091) (4.271)   (2.271) (1.751)  (2.091) (4.271) 
POWDSPI  0.061**   0.052*   0.046**   0.054***   0.022** 0.021*   0.017**   0.019*** 
 (2.282)  (1.754) (2.127) (3.152)   (2.249) (1.744)  (2.076) (3.451) 
INDIV  -0.022**   -0.018**  -0.038   0.024    -0.022**  -0.018**   -0.038   0.024 
 (-2.025)  (-2.124) (-1.417) (1.527)   (-2.025) (-2.124)  (-1.417) (1.527) 
INDIVSPI   -0.068***    -0.043***  -0.034*  0.038*   -0.057**  -0.062***  -0.043* 0.026 
 (-2.938)  (-3.278) (-1.734) (1.712)   (-2.274) (-3.257)  (-1.737) (1.524) 
MASCU    0.026**    0.042***   0.036*     0.016*     0.056***   0.040***    0.034*    0.014* 
 (2.141)  (3.522) (1.721) (1.741)   (2.886) (3.414)  (1.719) (1.738) 
MASCUSPI   0.039**  0.033**  0.025**   0.027*    0.022*  0.014*   0.018**  0.012* 
 (2.411)  (2.306) (2.249) (1.768)   (1.763) (1.718)  (1.924) (1.742) 
UNCAVO   0.020**    0.024**     0.027***     0.026**     0.019**   0.022**      0.029***     0.029** 
 (2.312)  (2.002) (3.002) (2.402)   (2.308) (2.027)  (3.009) (2.458) 
UNCAVSPI   0.029***    0.027***   0.032***  0.030**   0.026**  0.023**   0.030***   0.024** 
 (4.156)  (3.126) (4.138) (2.257)   (2.451) (2.125)  (2.954) (2.231) 
LONGTEO -0.027**  -0.031  -0.011**  0.013   -0.025** -0.028   -0.010**  0.011 
 (-2.108)  (-1.509) (-2.010) (1.428)   (-2.102) (-1.504)  (-2.005) (1.422) 
LONGTSPI -0.041**  -0.037*  -0.019**  0.023*   -0.012** -0.021*   -0.043**  0.012 
 (-2.168)  (-1.709) (-2.301) (1.728)   (-2.109) (-1.714)  (-2.105) (1.460) 
LEGALENF -0.013*  -0.062* -0.011 -0.010   -0.012* -0.060*  -0.010 -0.010 
 (-1.702)  (-1.761) (-0.846) (-0.967)   (-1.700) (-1.759)  (-0.844) (-0.967) 
LEGALSPI -0.073**   -0.064** -0.051* -0.052   -0.024** -0.034*  -0.013 -0.21 
 (-2.382)  (-2.227) (-1.718) (-1.469)   (-1.734) (-1.721)  (-0.847) (-0.937) 
CONSTANT   0.224**   0.424   0.154**   0.421     0.246**  0.351*     0.127** 0.256 
 (2.391)  (1.367) (2.159) (0.708)   (2.191) (1.791)  (2.187) (0.946) 
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Observations 254916  137884 112023 5009   254916 137884  112023 5009 
R-squared 0.23  0.25 0.39 0.42   0.22 0.24  0.38 0.41 
Country FE YES  YES YES YES   YES YES  YES YES 
Year FEs YES  YES YES YES   YES YES  YES YES 
Breusch-Pagan 5282.27  5137.15 4488.26 3206.89   5122.78 5189.32  4476.47 3202.45 
P-Value (0.7498)  (0.7304) (0.6486) (0.6108)   (0.7248) (0.7120)  (0.6486) (0.6104) 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov 
428  329 234 132   435 333  237 135 
P-Value (0.4132)  (0.3211) (0.2172) (0.1917)   (0.4138) (0.3213)  (0.2181) (0.1938) 
Wooldridge 
Test 
89.47  243.21 148.78 64.53   88.43 246.21  152.78 67.54 
P-Value (0.2372)  (0.3245) (0.2876) (0.1827)   (0.2378) (0.3346)  (0.2981) (0.1938) 
 
Notes: All variables are defined in Table 4.3. *,** and *** are used in a two tailed test to indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels respectively.  
Coefficient estimates are shown above and t-statistics below in brackets. 
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4.6.2. Exclusion of Countries with Highest Number of Observations 
  
Given the heterogeneous nature of the sample, in line previous studies (Dietrich and 
Wanzenried, 2014; Behn et al., 2013, Haw et al., 2011), further robustness tests are run to 
ensure that the findings are not driven by the large number of firm-year observations, 
extreme values in the data, or specific data characteristics. Leuz et al. (2003) indicate that 
results might be influenced by firm-year observations across countries due to variations in 
country size, the availability of financial statements and capital market developments. 
Consequently, Behn et al. (2013), in a cross-country study investigating classification 
shifting and investor protection, excluded U.S., Japan and U.K. firm-year observations to 
avoid a situation where the results could be driven by extremely high or low quantities of 
data from these countries. Similarly, Haw et al. (2011) examined the association between 
corporate governance and classification shifting in East Asian countries, and excluded 
Hong Kong firm-year observations from the study.   
 
Consequently, this study follows previous research to exclude countries with a high number 
of firm-year observations. The following countries with large firm year observations are 
excluded from the developed country sub-sample: Australia, Japan, Taiwan, the UK and 
the U.S. Initially, the study re-runs the models to exclude only U.S. observations from the 
developed countries sub-sample. The results are presented in column (1) of Panel A, Table 
4.27 and indicate clearly that the inferences for H1, H3a and H3b do not change. The 
regression models are also re-run to exclude both U.S and UK firm year observations from 
the developed country sub-sample. The results in column (2), Panel A of Table 4.27 are 
consistent with previous findings. This confirms that even without the U.S. and UK firm-
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year observations, the inferences remain the same. Third, the regression model is re-run 
excluding U.S., UK and Japanese firm-year observations from the developed country sub-
sample. The results from the altered sample are presented in column (3) of Table 4.27. 
Although some changes are observed in the coefficients and t-values, the main results, and 
most importantly the inferences, still remain the same. In addition, the study re-runs the 
regressions to exclude U.S., UK, Japanese, Australian and Taiwanese firm-year 
observations from the developed country sub-sample. The results are presented in column 
(4), Panel A of Table 4.27. The results are consistent with the previous findings and confirm 
that classification shifting is prevalent in the developed country sub-sample, even with the 
exclusion of countries with large number of firm-year observations. Specifically, the 
coefficients on RELINTSPI, LEGALSPI and LEGALRELSPI are negative and significant 
at 95% or 90% confidence levels. The results confirm that in the developed country sub-
sample the interactive terms between religiosity, special items and legal environment lessen 
managers’ incentive to engage in expense misclassification to increase reported core 
earnings. Thus the inferences remain unchanged and confirm the previous findings, that the 
motivation to engage in expense misclassification is restrained by legal environment, 
culture and religiosity interactions. 
 
Furthermore, Panel A of Table 4.27 presents the regression results of the emerging country 
sub-sample after excluding observations from China and India. Initially, the regression 
model is re-run to exclude Chinese firm-year observations from the emerging country sub-
sample and the results are presented in column (5). The coefficients on RELINTSPI, 
LEGALSPI and LEGALRELSPI remain negative and significant at 99% or 95% 
confidence levels. The results in column (5) are consistent with the findings in Table 4.22 
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and the inferences do not change. Specifically, the coefficient on special items is positive 
and significantly related to unexpected core earnings. The joint effect of religiosity and 
legal environment is also negatively associated with classification shifting. The effect is 
obvious when legal environment and religiosity are interacted to assess their impact on 
expense misclassification. There is still a significant and negative association between the 
interactive terms and classification shifting, confirming the previous findings in the 
emerging country sub-sample. Thus, religiosity and legal environment potentially mitigate 
classification shifting. However, the impact of religiosity on classification shifting is more 
pronounced in emerging countries than developed ones. Similarly, column (6) of Panel A, 
Table 4.27 presents the regression results, when the study excludes both Chinese and Indian 
firm-year observations from the emerging country sub-sample. Consistent with the results 
in column (5) and Table 4.22, it is observed that religiosity, legal environment and their 
interactive terms potentially have a negative effect on expense misclassification. Even 
when Chinese and Indian firm-year observations were excluded, the inferences remain the 
same. Slight changes are observed in the coefficients and estimates; however, the main 
results and the results of the data for the emerging country sub-sample in columns (5) and 
(6) are consistent with previous findings.  
 
Panel A of Table 4.27 presents the results of the developing country sub-sample, excluding 
Vietnamese and Sri Lankan firm-year observations. First, the regression model is re-run 
excluding Vietnamese observations. Thereafter, both Vietnamese and Sri Lankan firm-year 
observations are excluded and the results are presented in columns (7) and (8) respectively. 
Consistent with previous results, the coefficient on RELINTSPI is negative and significant 
at the 99% confidence level in both columns (7) and (8), confirming the potential impact 
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of religiosity in decreasing classification shifting behaviour in developing countries. 
However, the coefficients on LEGALENF and LEGALSPI are negative but not significant 
in both columns (7) and (8), confirming the previous results that developing countries’ legal 
environment is not strong enough to subdue classification shifting behaviour. These results 
are consistent with the previous results in Table 4.19 and the inferences do not change. The 
coefficients on LEGALREL and LEGALRELSPI are negative and significant at the 95% 
confidence level in both columns (7) and (8), an indication that the interactive terms of 
religiosity, special items and legal environment constrain the misclassification of core 
expenses into special items to increase reported core earnings. The results in Panel A of 
Table 4.27 remain unchanged and are consistent with previous findings (Behn et al., 2013; 
Haw et al., 2011). Therefore, the findings suggest that the legal environment in developed 
and emerging countries is strong to mitigate classification shifting behaviour, but it is weak 
in developing countries. Notwithstanding, the interactive term LEGALRELSPI has a 
negative impact on all the sub-samples, suggesting that countrywide religiosity is 
strengthened by the country’s legal environment to mitigate expense misclassification. In 
addition, the joint effect of religiosity and legal environment serves as a form monitoring 
mechanism to subdue classification shifting behaviour in developed, emerging and 
developing countries. However, the monitoring role of religion and legal environment to 
mitigate this managerial opportunistic behaviour is strong in developed and developing 
countries.  
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Table 4.26: Regression of Interaction Term between Special Items, Culture and Legal Environment on Classification Shifting  
 
Variables 
     (Using Working Capital Accruals)       Dependent Variable: UNEXP_CE       (Without Accruals in Expectation Model) 
      (1)  (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Full sample  Developed Emerging Developing   Full sample Developed  Emerging Developing 
Panel A: Regression of Special Items on Unexpected Core Earnings 
 
SPITEM   0.645***   0.123**    0.287***    0.301***      0.471***  0.089**   0.226***   0.256*** 
 (6.484)  (2.063) (4.622) (3.232)   (4.350) (2.228)  (3.534) (3.118) 
SIZE  -0.057***   -0.093***  -0.017*** -0.018*    -0.045***  -0.082***   -0.013*** -0.015* 
 (-6.146)  (-6.980) (-4.876) (-1.779)   (-5.286) (-4.171)  (-3.260) (-1.741) 
ROA  -0.074***   -0.076***  -0.064*** -0.034*   -0.062***  -0.057***   -0.042*** -0.031* 
 (-6.427)  (-3.358) (-5.192) (-1.748)   (-3.831) (-3.078)  (-4.306) (-1.742) 
MBV -0.001  -0.002 -0.001 -0.002   -0.001 -0.002  -0.001 -0.002 
 (-1.322)  (-1.072) (-1.107) (-0.634)   (-1.244) (-1.022)  (-1.082) (-0.627) 
LEV   0.256***    0.129***   0.421***   0.238***     0.226***   0.114***    0.213***   0.218*** 
 (5.432)  (4.765) (4.147) (6.254)   (4.284) (3.232)  (3.243) (3.238) 
BIG4 -0.024**   -0.023**  -0.030***  -0.033**   -0.022**  -0.021**   -0.025*  -0.028* 
 (-2.341)  (-2.212) (-3.108) (-2.118)   (-2.017) (-2.184)  (-1.760) (-1.745) 
CAPINTEN  0.030**  0.021** 0.017* 0.026*    0.023** 0.019**  0.015* 0.017* 
 (2.317)  (2.144) (1.722) (1.740)   (2.181) (1.892)  (1.712) (1.733) 
GROWTH   0.055***   0.053***   0.055***   0.045***       0.041***   0.036***    0.031**   0.031** 
 (3.421)  (3.761) (6.122) (5.279)   (3.124) (2.881)  (2.121) (2.292) 
GDP        -0.341  -0.280 -0.357 -0.344   -0.182 -0.193  -0.162 -0.155 
 (-0.767)  (-0.789) (-0.784) (-0.844)   (-0.504) (-0.722)  (-0.768) (-0.843) 
Panel B: Interaction Term between Special Items, Culture Dimensions and Legal Environment on Classification Shifting 
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LEGALENF -0.012*  -0.060* -0.011 -0.010   -0.011* -0.060*  -0.010 -0.010 
 (-1.700)  (-1.760) (-0.847) (-0.966)   (-1.700) (-1.759)  (-0.844) (-0.967) 
POWDIS    0.019**    0.017*   0.010**   0.016**     0.019**   0.017*    0.010**   0.016** 
 (2.171)  (1.751) (2.091) (2.271)   (2.271) (1.751)  (2.091) (2.071) 
POWDSPI  0.061**   0.052*   0.046**   0.054**   0.022** 0.021*   0.017**    0.019*** 
 (2.201)  (1.754) (2.127) (2.152)   (2.249) (1.744)  (2.076) (3.451) 
POWDLEGSPI  -0.261**   -0.132**   -0.374**   -0.421**    -0.122** -0.125**   -0.117**   -0.191*** 
 (-2.472)  (-2.254) (-2.027) (-2.312)   (-2.489) (-1.864)  (-2.241) (-4.251) 
INDIV  -0.022**   -0.018**  -0.038   0.024    -0.022**  -0.018**   -0.038   0.024 
 (-2.025)  (-2.124) (-1.417) (1.527)   (-2.025) (-2.124)  (-1.417) (1.527) 
INDIVSPI   -0.068***    -0.043***  -0.034*  0.038*   -0.057**  -0.062***  -0.043* 0.026 
 (-2.938)  (-3.278) (-1.734) (1.712)   (-2.274) (-3.257)  (-1.737) (1.524) 
INDIVLEGSPI    -0.224***    -0.423***  -0.147**   -0.262**   -0.257**   -0.362***  -0.138** -0.233** 
     (-4.426)  (-4.452) (-2.234) (-2.212)   (-3.362) (-3.341)  (-1.937) (-2.324) 
MASCU   0.036**     0.042**   0.036*     0.016*      0.056***   0.040***    0.034*    0.014* 
 (2.141)  (2.222) (1.721) (1.741)   (2.886) (3.414)  (1.719) (1.738) 
MASCUSPI   0.029**   0.023**  0.015**   0.017*    0.022*  0.014*   0.018**  0.012* 
 (2.211)  (2.106) (2.249) (1.768)   (1.763) (1.718)  (1.924) (1.742) 
MASCULEGSPI     -0.129**  -0.203**  -0.156*   -0.322**    -0.123* -0.104**   -0.182*  -0.124** 
     (-2.234)    (-2.327)    (-1.749)     (-1.998)     (-1.763)   (-1.986)     (-1.734)    (-1.982) 
UNCAVO   0.019**    0.024**     0.026***     0.025**     0.018**   0.020**      0.027***     0.026** 
 (2.308)  (2.402) (3.000) (2.398)   (2.306) (2.024)  (3.001) (2.446) 
UNCAVSPI   0.026***     0.027***    0.031***  0.030**    0.024**  0.022**     0.029***   0.023** 
 (3.107)  (3.125) (3.638) (2.257)   (2.437) (2.122)  (2.947) (2.228) 
UNCAVLEGSPI     -0.129***    -0.128***    -0.424***    -0.323**   -0.126**  -0.124**    -0.241***   -0.292** 
     (-4.109)     (-3.453)    (-4.241)    (-2.186)   (-2.451) (-2.361)  (-2.854) (-2.031) 
LONGTEO -0.027**  -0.031  -0.011**  0.013   -0.025** -0.028   -0.010**  0.011 
 (-2.108)  (-1.509) (-2.010) (1.428)   (-2.102) (-1.504)  (-2.005) (1.422) 
LONGTSPI -0.041**  -0.037*  -0.019**  0.023*   -0.012** -0.021*   -0.043**  0.012 
 (-2.168)  (-1.709) (-2.301) (1.728)   (-2.109) (-1.714)  (-2.105) (1.460) 
LONGTLEGSPI    -0.532**  -0.424**  -0.317** -0.932***   -0.212**      -0.421**   -0.252**  -0.712** 
       (-2.364)       (-2.267) (-2.301) (-2.741)     (-2.128) (-2.023)  (-2.105) (-2.385) 
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LEGRELSPI        -0.173**   -0.131*** -0.356** 0.167       -0.124***     -0.134***  -0.213** -0.241 
     (-2.452)  (-2.887) (-1.974) (-1.394)     (-2.734) (-2.721)  (-1.847) (-1.337) 
CONSTANT         0.218  0.424   0.154*       0.421   0.246  0.351   0.127*        0.252 
  (0.854)  (1.367) (1.793) (0.708)   (0.891) (1.491)  (1.872) (0.946) 
             
Observations 254916  137884 112023 5009   254916 137884  112023 5009 
R-squared 0.23  0.24 0.39 0.41   0.22 0.23  0.37 0.40 
Country FE YES  YES YES YES   YES YES  YES YES 
Year FEs YES  YES YES YES   YES YES  YES YES 
Breusch-Pagan 5325.84  5218.24 4765.47 3107.21   5122.78 5189.32  4476.47 3202.45 
P-Value (0.7436)  (0.7209) (0.6654) (0.6075)   (0.7248) (0.7120)  (0.6486) (0.6104) 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov 
426.84  322.24 231.36 129.75   430.81 337.46  239.73 133.57 
P-Value (0.4026)  (0.3141) (0.2017) (0.1787)   (0.4149) (0.3218)  (0.2282) (0.1939) 
Wooldridge 
Test 
86.94  241.27 142.71 62.56   89.47 246.21  151.76 68.58 
P-Value (0.2237)  (0.3153) (0.2779) (0.1836)   (0.2373) (0.3328)  (0.2961) (0.1946) 
 
Notes: All variables are defined in Table 4.3. *,** and *** are used in a two tailed test to indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels respectively. The 
table shows co-efficient estimates above and t-statistics below in brackets. 
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Table 4.27: Regression of Interaction Term between Special Items, Culture and Legal Environment on Classification Shifting  
Dependent Variable: UNEXP_CE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Developed Developed Developed Developed Emerging Emerging Developing Developing 
Panel A: Regression of Legal Environment, Religiosity and Special Items on Unexpected Core Earnings 
SPITEM    0.771***    0.750***    0.067***   0.236**  0.735** 0.639**   0.798***   0.681*** 
 (2.720) (3.745) (3.093) (1.940) (1.917) (2.390) (3.495) (3.553) 
RELINT -0.205 -0.213 -0.270 -0.230 -0.361* -0.420* -0.895**   -0.075*** 
 (-1.480) (-1.488) (-1.429) (-1.363) (-1.658) (-1.659) (-2.257) (-2.871) 
RELINTSPI -0.309  -0.472 -0.116 -0.112 -0.083*   -0.163**   -0.323*** -0.648*** 
 (-1.498) (-1.504) (-1.561) (-1.267) (-1.702) (-2.079) (-3.860) (-3.862) 
LEGALENF         -0.186**  -0.283**  -0.354**  -0.391** -0.040* -0.052* -0.090 -0.047 
 (-1.932) (-2.156) (-2.070) (-2.080) (-1.777) (-1.687) (-1.589) (-1.510) 
LEGALSPI   -0.676***   -0.375***   -0.453***   -0.680***  -0.393** -0.189** -0.357   -0.845 
 (-2.889) (-3.298) (-2.719) (-3.006) (-1.994) (-2.016) (-1.543) (-1.422) 
LEGALREL -0.290* -0.338* -0.423* -0.335* -0.280** -0.156* -0.136** -0.121** 
 (-1.727) (-1.768) (-1.716) (-1.726) (-2.221) (-1.733) (-2.187) (-2.268) 
LEGALRELSPI -0.077** -0.087** -0.055** -0.029**   -0.061*** -0.235** -0.239** -0.320** 
 (-2.186) (-2.221) (-2.266) (-2.359) (-3.038) (-2.466) (-2.154) (-2.340) 
SIZE  -0.111***  -0.102***  -0.108***   -0.104*** -0.009** -0.024*** -0.007 -0.011 
 (-3.638) (-3.837) (-3.570) (-3.782) (-2.465) (-3.167) (-0.383) (-0.519) 
ROA  -0.334***  -0.350***  -0.399***   -0.159*** -0.208*** -0.045* -0.196* -0.129* 
 (-3.088) (-3.758) (-3.106) (-3.243) (-5.365) (-1.759) (-1.704) (-1.748) 
MBV -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003** -0.004*** -0.004*** 0.001 0.002 
 (-0.995) (-1.254) (-0.586) (-1.966) (-3.157) (-2.963) (0.265) (0.498) 
LEV   0.169***   0.255***  0.237***  0.265***  0.486***   0.440***  0.346***  0.332*** 
 (5.136) (6.576) (4.703) (7.544) (3.280) (3.520) (4.614) (3.507) 
BIG4  -0.025** -0.023**  -0.024** -0.022** -0.022** -0.025** -0.016* -0.019* 
 (-2.130) (-2.471) (-2.452) (-2.263) (-2.170) (-2.235) (-1.739) (-1.705) 
CAPINTEN  0.030** 0.033**  0.024**  0.023** 0.026* 0.031* 0.054 0.101 
 (2.190) (2.243) (2.287) (2.208) (1.729) (1.771) (0.842) (1.266) 
GROWTH   0.065***   0.083***   0.104***  0.092***  0.052***  0.025***  0.160*** 0.069* 
 (4.130) (4.571) (4.452) (5.763) (5.170) (10.635) (5.539) (1.705) 
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GDP -0.316 -0.368 -0.146 -0.200*** -0.920 -0.446 -0.212 -0.478 
 (-0.802) (-1.127) (-1.087) (-2.773) (-0.137) (-0.079) (-1.200) (-0.623) 
         
Panel B: Regression of Legal Environment, Culture and Special Items on Unexpected Core Earnings 
 
POWDIS   0.017*   0.017*   0.016*   0.016*   0.011**   0.010**   0.016**   0.016** 
 (1.751) (1.751) (1.750) (1.749) (2.101) (2.091) (2.271) (2.271) 
POWDSPI   0.092** 0.075* 0.074**  0.182**  0.056**  0.035**  0.030**  0.057** 
 (2.198) (1.802) (2.243) (2.404) (2.317) (1.983) (2.268) (2.429) 
POWDLEGSPI -0.135** -0.142* -0.196** -0.137* -0.282**  -0.259**  -0.227** -0.124** 
 (-2.289) (-1.838) (-2.225) (-1.776) (-2.396) (-1.961) (-2.265) (-2.440) 
INDIV  -0.019**  -0.018**  -0.017**  -0.017**  -0.038  -0.037   0.024   0.023 
 (-2.125) (-2.124) (-2.122) (-2.121) (-1.417) (-1.416) (1.526) (1.525) 
INDIVSPI  -0.040**  -0.038** -0.058**  -0.086** -0.015* -0.013* 0.027*  0.032* 
 (-2.081) (-2.176) (-2.497) (-2.437) (-1.744) (-1.725) (1.779) (1.807) 
INDIVLEGSPI -0.339** -0.107** -0.308**  -0.232*** -0.187** -0.108** -0.075* -0.082* 
 (-2.088) (-2.190) (-2.465) (-4.929) (-2.146) (-2.289) (-1.718) (-1.802) 
MASCU    0.042**    0.042**    0.041**    0.040**   0.036*   0.035*    0.015*    0.016* 
 (2.222) (2.222) (2.220) (2.218) (1.721) (1.720) (1.740) (1.741) 
MASCUSPI 0.044* 0.042* 0.041* 0.040* 0.086* 0.096*  0.053**  0.075** 
 (1.776) (1.767) (1.749) (1.746) (1.722) (1.744) (2.313) (2.295) 
MASCULEGSPI -0.591* -0.856* -0.381**  -0.138*** -0.409**  -0.724** -0.393* -0.415* 
 (-1.693) (-1.749) (-1.983) (-5.021) (-2.283) (-2.159) (-1.761) (-1.765) 
UNCAVO   0.024**   0.024**   0.023**   0.022**     0.026***     0.024***     0.024**     0.023** 
 (2.402) (2.402) (2.400) (2.398) (3.000) (2.980) (2.396) (2.382) 
UNCAVSPI    0.067***    0.026***    0.021*** 0.084*  0.028* 0.043* 0.027* 0.025* 
 (3.255) (3.863) (3.735) (1.731) (1.825) (1.865) (1.739) (1.764) 
UNCAVLEGSPI -0.343** -0.318** -0.418*  -0.210** -0.321* -0.388* -0.332*  -0.445** 
 (-2.267) (-2.837) (-1.711) (-2.228) (-1.764) (-1.770) (-1.708) (-2.221) 
LONGTEO -0.031 -0.030 -0.030 -0.029  -0.010**  -0.011**  0.012  0.011 
 (-1.509) (-1.504) (-1.503) (-1.500) (-2.006) (-2.013) (1.422) (1.420) 
LONGTSPI -0.031* -0.039* -0.046**   -0.056*** -0.026** -0.23** 0.053* 0.089* 
 (-1.769) (-1.710) (-2.400) (-2.726) (-2.048) (-2.174) (1.747) (1.847) 
LONGTLEGSPI          -0.496**  -0.435**   -0.393***  -0.356*** -0.367** -0.307** -0.249**   -0.852*** 
 (-2.448) (-2.309) (-3.380) (-2.946) (-2.192) (-2.188) (-2.243) (-2.819) 
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CONSTANT -0.966 -0.674 -0.800 -0.266** 0.952 0.858 0.144* 0.028 
 (-0.426) (-0.572) (-0.550) (-2.261) (0.430) (0.238) (1.697) (1.261) 
         
Observations 108,123 89,402 65,505 31,951 87,373 61,752 3,180 1,531 
R-squared 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.16 0.26 0.26 0.53 0.47 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Breusch-Pagan 5186.15 5142.19 4987.19 4468.17 4488.26 4488.26 5276.26 5206.89 
P-Value (0.7254) (0.7159) (0.7058) (0.6558) (0.6598) (0.6598) (0.7154) (0.7108) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 328 256 231 119 230.36 223.64 143.26 138.49 
P-Value (0.3416) (0.2813) (0.2210) (0.1608) (0.2113) (0.1908) (0.1959) (0.1927) 
Wooldridge Test 244.28 213.29 183.62 134.48 143.18 121.16 63.48 47.27 
P-Value (0.3146) (0.2825) (0.2514) (0.2367) (0.2592) (0.2254) (0.1823) (0.1462) 
Notes: All variables are defined in Table 4.3. *,** and *** are used in a two tailed test to indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels respectively. The table 
shows co-efficient estimates above and t-statistics below in brackets.
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In addition, Panel B of Table 4.27 provides further regression results to confirm that the 
findings are robust when the study excludes large numbers of firm-year observations. The 
study re-runs the regression models and interacts special items with cultural dimension 
variables, and special items and legal environment with cultural dimension variables to 
confirm that the results obtained previously in H2a, H2b, H2c, H2d and H2e are robust. 
Columns (1) to (4), columns (5) to (6), and (7) to (8) provide the results for the developed, 
emerging and developing country sub-samples respectively. These indicate that the 
coefficients on POWDSPI, MASCUSPI, and UNCAVSPI are positive and significant at 
99%, 95% and 90% confidence levels in developed, emerging and developing countries 
respectively, consistent with the previous results. The inferences do not change and indicate 
that high power distance, high masculinity and high uncertainty avoidance cultures provide 
motivation for firm managers to engage in classification shifting behaviour across the sub-
samples. Again, similar to the previous results, the coefficients on INDIVSPI and 
LONGTSPI are negative and significant at 95% and 90% confidence levels, as indicated in 
Panel B, columns (1) to (6). The results suggest that some countries in the developed and 
emerging country sub-samples are long-term result -oriented and individualist, consistent 
with the previous findings. Therefore, there is no incentive for short-term profits or no 
extended family pressure to meet, hence the negative association between INDIVSPI, 
LONGTSPI and classification shifting. On the contrary, the coefficients on INDIVSPI and 
LONGTSPI for developing countries are positive and significant at the 90% confidence 
level, confirming that these countries are characterised as being short-term result-oriented 
and collectivist, hence the positive relationship between INDIVSPI, LONGTSPI and 
UNEXP_CE. The inferences remain the same and contribute to the previous literature on 
culture and earnings management (Callen et al., 2011; Han et al., 2010; Richardson, 2008)
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Table 4.28: Regression of Interaction Term between Special Items, Culture, Religion and Legal Environment on 
Classification Shifting 
Dependent Variable : UNEXP_CE 
 (HIGH) (LOW) (HIGH) (LOW) (HIGH) (LOW) 
VARIABLES Developed Developed Emerging Emerging Developing Developing 
Panel A: Regression of Legal Environment, Religiosity and Special Items on Unexpected Core Earnings 
 
SPITEM   0.710***   0.451**  0.397** 0.794*   0.663*** 0.487* 
 (4.787) (2.413) (2.231) (1.763) (2.746) (1.732) 
RELINT -0.663* -0.705 -0.016** -0.023  -0.204***  -0.085* 
 (-1.750) (-0.611) (-1.981) (-1.552) (-3.121) (-1.713) 
RELINTSPI  -0.709** -0.056  -0.233***  -0.185  -0.234*** -0.117* 
 (-2.084) (-1.465) (-5.236) (-1.589) (-4.716) (-1.877) 
LEGALENF -0.086**  -0.249** -0.083* -0.178 -0.056 -0.099 
 (-2.467) (-1.962) (-1.713) (-0.866) (-0.166) (-0.285) 
LEGALSPI   -0.397*** -0.549** -0.095* -0.098* -0.379 -0.319 
 (-3.253) (-2.297) (-1.763) (-1.718) (-1.318) (-1.139) 
LEGALREL -0.044* -0.040* -0.333** -0.266** -0.218**  -0.058** 
 (-1.747) (-1.776) (-1.997) (-2.038) (-2.405) (-2.135) 
LEGALRELSPI  -0.839*** -0.051* -0.128** -0.458**  -0.237*** -0.174** 
 (-4.263) (-1.722) (-2.359) (-2.255) (-4.693) (-2.297) 
SIZE  -0.064***  -0.139*** -0.011**   0.047** -0.012 -0.018 
 (-3.726) (-3.018) (-2.106) (-2.436) (-0.821) (-0.973) 
ROA  -0.239*** -0.345** -0.389***  -0.208*** -0.163* -0.069* 
 (-3.939) (-2.123) (-3.301) (-3.525) (-1.706) (-1.705) 
MBV -0.004*** -0.001 -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.007* -0.005 
 (-3.047) (-0.607) (-2.878) (-2.892) (-1.669) (-1.646) 
LEV  0.395***  0.090**   0.485***  0.961***  0.342***  0.507*** 
 (3.157) (2.503) (4.058) (5.763) (3.971) (5.911) 
BIG4 -0.018**  -0.017** -0.024** -0.034** -0.072* -0.204 
 (-2.496) (-2.359) (-2.022) (-2.433) (-1.738) (-1.332) 
CAPINTEN  0.087** 0.097* 0.024** 0.014** 0.007* 0.068 
 (2.077) (1.742) (2.207) (2.064) (1.787) (1.032) 
GROWTH  0.168***  0.117***  0.024**  0.114***  0.072**   0.204*** 
 (10.996) (6.659) (2.022) (7.433) (2.138) (7.332) 
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GDP  -0.524*** -0.855 -2.695 -0.316 -0.726 -0.940 
 (-4.266) (-0.895) (-0.289) (-0.212) (-1.475) (-0.361) 
 
Panel B: Regression of Legal Environment, Culture and Special Items on Unexpected Core Earnings 
POWDIS  0.095*  0.095*   0.011**   0.010**   0.015**   0.016** 
 (1.716) (1.716) (2.101) (2.091) (2.268) (2.270) 
POWDSPI  0.095*  0.096*  0.033**  0.056**   0.017**  0.013* 
 (1.716) (1.783) (1.973) (2.317) (2.142) (1.742) 
POWDLEGSPI  -0.152** -0.219*  -0.192** -0.142**  -0.158**  -0.132** 
 (-2.294) (-1.815) (-1.988) (-1.796) (-2.107) (-2.087) 
INDIV  -0.018**  -0.017**  -0.038  -0.039   0.024   0.023 
 (-2.124) (-2.120) (-1.417) (-1.424) (1.526) (1.525) 
INDIVSPI -0.062* -0.080* -0.011* -0.009* 0.022* 0.017 
 (-2.054) (-2.185) (-1.721) (-1.742) (1.729) (1.624) 
INDIVLEGSPI  -0.184**  -0.376** -0.103** -0.098** -0.068* -0.038* 
 (-2.170) (-2.378) (-2.224) (-2.146) (-1.709) (-1.702) 
MASCU    0.042**    0.040**   0.036*   0.036*   0.014*    0.016* 
 (2.228) (2.220) (1.721) (1.721) (1.739) (1.741) 
MASCUSPI            0.044** 0.043** 0.072* 0.067* 0.038*  0.039* 
 (2.557) (2.541) (1.738) (1.769) (1.737) (1.748) 
MASCULEGSPI -0.829* -0.734* -0.321** -0.249** -0.247* -0.223* 
 (-1.882) (-1.785) (-2.131) (-2.176)  (-1.756)  (-1.728) 
UNCAVO   0.024**   0.023**     0.024**     0.022**     0.020**     0.021** 
 (2.402) (2.400) (2.180) (2.070) (2.301) (2.306) 
UNCAVSPI  0.083** 0.059* 0.033*  0.025*  0.025*  0.021 
 (2.290) (1.760) (1.812) (1.775) (1.726) (1.626) 
UNCAVLEGSPI  -0.279*** -0.248** -0.271* -0.251* -0.284* -0.251* 
 (-3.779) (-2.111) (-1.765) (-1.738) (-1.705) (-1.703) 
LONGTEO -0.029 -0.030  -0.011**  -0.010**  0.011  0.012 
 (-1.502) (-1.503) (-2.026) (-2.016) (1.421) (1.422) 
LONGTSPI -0.090* -0.085 -0.22** -0.019** 0.046* 0.035* 
 (-1.710) (-1.065) (-2.171) (-2.098) (1.758) (1.729) 
LONGTLEGSPI -0.246** -0.101* -0.214** -0.258**  -0.249** -0.173** 
 (-2.261) (-1.720) (-2.148) (-2.174) (-2.124) (-2.078) 
CONSTANT -0.633 0.068 -0.119 0.777 -0.080 0.558 
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Notes: All variables are defined in Table 4.3. *,** and *** are used in a two tailed test to  indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels 
respectively. The table shows co-efficient estimates above and t-statistics below in brackets.
 (-1.503) (0.967) (-0.327) (1.302) (-0.179) (0.426) 
       
Observations 63,520 74,364 70,742 41,281 3,568 1,441 
R-squared 0.50 0.24 0.28 0.36 0.45 0.48 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Breusch-Pagan 4474.42 4462.13 4488.26 4378.36 4276.26 4206.89 
P-Value (0.6587) (0.6532) (0.6598) (0.6547) (0.6154) (0.6154) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 322 349 230.36 173.68 114.38 94.37 
P-Value (0.3313) (0.3708) (0.2113) (0.1908) (0.1825) (0.1729) 
Wooldridge Test 243.29 264.48 143.18 121.16 62.24 58.49 
P-Value (0.3025) (0.3767) (0.2592) (0.2254) (0.1728) (0.1683) 
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4.6.3. High and Low Religiosity Countries 
The above analyses have established a negative and significant relationship between 
RELINT, RELINTSPI, LEGALRELSPI and UNEXP_CE in all the three sub-samples. 
However, they do not indicate the extent to which the results might be affected by the 
geographic location of the countries. For instance, the results might be driven by countries 
with high or low levels of religiosity in the developed, emerging and developing country 
sub-samples. To address this concern, previous studies (McGuire et al., 2012; Dyreng et 
al., 2012) are followed to segregate the datasets into two samples, consisting of high and 
low religiosity countries. The study defines countries with above the median religiosity 
figure in each sub-sample as having high religiosity, and those below the figure as low. 
Initially, the previous regression models are re-run to assess the impact of SPITEM, 
RELINT, RELINTSPI, LEGALENF, LEGALSPI, LEGALREL and LEGALRELSPI on 
UNEXP_CE. The regression results are presented in Panels A and B of Table 4.28. 
Interestingly, in Panel A the coefficients on SPITEM are still positive and significant at 5% 
or 1% levels for both high and low religiosity countries in the country sub-samples.  Thus 
the inferences still remain unchanged, confirming the previous results that core earnings 
increase with special items in both high and low religiosity countries. In highly religious 
countries, the coefficients on RELINT and RELINTSPI are negative and significant at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively for developing, emerging and developed countries, but 
insignificant in low religiosity developed and emerging countries. Note that in developing 
countries, both high and low religious sub-samples show a negative and significant 
association between RELINT, RELINTSPI and UNEXP_CE at 1% and 10% respectively. 
This finding is consistent with previous studies (McGuire et al., 2012; Dyreng et al., 2012) 
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and shows that religiosity mitigates classification shifting and that the effect is much more 
pronounced in developing countries.   
Panel A of Table 4.28 indicates that the coefficients on LEGALENF, LEGALSPI, 
LEGALREL and LEGALRELSPI are negative and significant at 5% or 1% for both high 
and low religiosity developed countries.  There is also a negative and significant association 
at 5% or 10% levels between LEGALENF, LEGALSPI, LEGALREL, LEGALRELSPI 
and UNEXP_CE in both high and low (religiosity) emerging countries. Consistent with 
previous results, the coefficients on LEGALENF and LEGALSPI are negative but not 
significant in high and low (religiosity) developing countries. However, LEGALREL and 
LEGALRELSPI are negative and significant at 5% and 1% in highly religious developing 
countries, but 5% and 10% in developing countries with low religiosity respectively. The 
results confirm that the legal environment in developing countries is weak and has limited 
impact on expense misclassification but it’s strengthened by the countrywide religiosity to 
decrease classification shifting behaviour.  The results are consistent with previous results 
(Table 4.24), suggesting that the joint effect of legal environment and religiosity has the 
potential to monitor or reduce classification shifting behaviour in developed, emerging and 
developing countries, although the negative effect is stronger in countries with a strong 
legal environment and high level of religiosity.  
In Panel B of Table 4.28, the regression results are presented showing the association 
between the interactive terms POWDSPI, POWDLEGSPI, INDIVSPI, INDIVLEGSPI, 
MASCUSPI, MASCULEGSPI, UNCAVSPI, UNCAVLEGSPI, LONGTSPI, 
LONGTLEGSPI and UNEXP_CE in the high and low religiosity sub-samples. The 
previous regression models are re-run including the interactive terms separately, until all 
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the variables are included in the model for all sub-samples. Separate regression models are 
run for the high and low religiosity sub-samples for developed, emerging and developing 
countries.  The results are consistent with the findings in Table 4.18 and suggest that firm 
managers in a country with high level of power distance, masculinity and uncertainty 
avoidance cultural orientation have an incentive to engage in classification shifting. In 
particular, the coefficients on POWDSPI, MASCUSPI and UNCAVSPI are positive and 
maintain their significant levels, even when the sample is broken down into high and low 
religiosity countries. Consistent with previous results, INDIVSPI and LONGTSPI for 
developed and emerging countries show a negative coefficient and significant association 
with UNEXP_CE in high and low religiosity countries. However, in the high and low sub-
samples for developing countries, the coefficients on INDIVSPI and LONGTSPI are 
positive and significant only for the highly religious countries. The results are consistent 
with the findings in Table 4.18 and the inferences do not change; that is, developing 
countries are less individualistic and short-term result-oriented because of the high level of 
extended family pressure and the desire to meet short-term profit targets at the expense of 
long-term goals.   
Panel B of Table 4.28 indicates that the coefficients on POWDLEGSPI, INDIVLEGSPI, 
MASCULEGSPI, UNCAVLEGSPI and LONGTLEGSPI are negative and significantly 
related to UNEXP_CE. The results suggest that in the presence of strong legal environment, 
the effect of power distance, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance cultures on 
misclassification in a country diminishes. However, legal environment induces 
individualism and long-term orientation cultures to mitigate classification shifting. The 
results are consistent with the findings in Tables 4.21 to 4.23 and indicate that the 
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interactive terms between culture and legal environment subdue managers’ classification 
shifting behaviour in both high and low religiosity sub-samples. The results document 
evidence that legal environment mitigates or complements the effect of Hofstede’s cultural 
dimension variables in classification shifting behaviour. For example, the positive 
coefficients on POWDSPI, MASCUSPI and UNCAVSPI change to negative coefficients 
when these variables interact with the legal environment. As indicated by Panel B of Table 
4.28, the coefficients on POWDLEGSPI, MASCULEGSPI and UNCAVLEGSPI are 
negative and significant for all the sub-samples. Similarly, the negative and significant 
coefficients on INDIVSPI and LONGTSPI are strengthened when INDIVSPI and 
LONGTSPI interact with the legal environment. There is a change in both the negative 
coefficients and significance levels from 10% to 5% or 5% to 1%, confirming the previous 
results that the legal environment complements culture and religiosity in mitigating 
classification shifting behaviour. 
Finally, additional robustness tests are conducted, controlling for country-specific variables 
such as inflation rates, economic risk and political risk to ensure that the regression results 
are not driven by certain country-specific or macroeconomic variables. Previous studies 
(Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2014; Behn et al., 2013; Haw et al., 2011) indicate that countries 
associated with high inflation rates, and economic and political risk might drive study 
findings. Therefore, the main regression models are repeated by controlling for country-
specific variables and the model re-estimated with the full and censored data. Several 
regressions are re-run for each hypothesis. Even though some changes are observed in the 
coefficients and estimates, the untabulated results and, most significantly, the relationship 
between SPITEM and UNEXP_CE is significantly positive. The untabulated results 
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indicate that the findings for hypotheses 1, 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e, 3a and 3b are not influenced 
by additional controls for inflation rates, and economic or political risk. The results of the 
study are therefore robust with the inclusion of country-specific variables. In summary, it 
is concluded that the expectation model for the regression analysis, extreme values, large 
sample size, geographic location and religiosity of the countries do not affect the results of 
the study. 
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4.7. Conclusion 
 
This study provides new international evidence on classification shifting behaviour in 63 
countries in its contribution to the earnings management literature. The aim of the study is 
to examine the impact of countrywide religiosity, national culture and legal environment 
on classification shifting behaviour in developed, emerging and developing countries. It 
also aims to explore the joint effect of interactive terms between religion and legal 
environment, and culture and legal environment on classification shifting. It is found that 
classification shifting exists in the developed, emerging and developing country sub-
samples, in line with the earnings management literature (Behn et al., 2013; Haw et al., 
2011; Fan et al. 2010; Athanasakou et al., 2009; McVay, 2006). Strong evidence is 
documented to indicate that religiosity mitigates classification shifting, but the negative 
impact of religiosity on expense misclassification is significantly prominent in emerging 
and developing countries. This finding contradicts the cross-country study by Callen et al. 
(2011), but supports McGuire et al.’s (2012) and Dyreng et al.’s (2012) studies in the U.S. 
on religiosity and accrual-based earnings management. 
Secondly, the study investigates the impact of Hofstede’s cultural dimension variables of 
power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance and long-term 
orientation on classification shifting in an international setting. It is found that power 
distance, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance are positive and significantly related to 
managers’ classification shifting behaviour in developed, emerging and developing 
countries. However, the study observes that masculinity and power distance facilitate 
classification shifting more in emerging and developing countries than developed ones. It 
is found that individualism and long-term orientation constrain or deter classification 
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shifting behaviour in developed and emerging countries; however, their negative impact or 
ability to reduce classification shifting is well-defined in developed countries.  On the 
contrary, the study documents evidence to show that developing countries are low on 
individualism (as opposed to collectivism) and are short-term result-oriented; 
consequently, this facilitates the positive relationship between individualism, long-term 
orientation and classification shifting in these countries. This is a notable contribution to 
the literature on earnings management and contributes to existing studies (Davis and 
Abdurazokzoda, 2016; Klasing, 2013; Callen et al., 2011; Han et al., 2010; Richardson, 
2008) on accrual-based earnings management and culture. 
Thirdly, the study finds and documents evidence to show that the legal environment 
subdues classification shifting behaviour in developed and emerging countries. However, 
in developing countries an insignificant negative relationship is found. The study interacts 
the legal environment with religiosity, and with the Hofstede cultural dimensions variables 
(power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance and long-term 
orientation) and finds that the legal environment complements religiosity and national 
culture to reduce managers’ classification shifting behaviour. Specifically, it is found that 
the joint effect of the interactive terms between religion and legal environment on 
classification shifting is significant in developed and developing countries, relative to the 
negative impact of the individual variables. The study finds that the joint effect of legal 
environment and national culture nullifies the positive relationship observed between 
power distance, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance and accrual-based earnings 
management documented in other studies (Davis and Abdurazokzoda, 2016; Klasing, 2013; 
Callen et al., 2011). In addition, it is found that the interactive term between individualism, 
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long-term orientation and legal environment has a negative effect on classification shifting 
behaviour in developing countries. Therefore, the positive relationship between 
individualism, long-term orientation and classification shifting can no longer be 
demonstrated. This is also a significant contribution to the literature on culture and earnings 
management.  
Therefore, the study contributes to the literature as follows. Firstly, it contributes to the 
earnings management literature by providing first time evidence of the relationship between 
religion, culture, legal environment and classification shifting in an international setting. 
Secondly, it contributes to the literature by showing first time evidence of the relationship 
between the interactive term between religion and legal environment and their joint effect 
on classification shifting in an international setting. Thirdly, it contributes by providing 
first time evidence of the relationship between national cultural dimension variables and 
classification shifting, showing the impact of the interactive term between legal 
environment and national culture on classification shifting. It is also the first study to 
examine the impact of religion, culture and legal environment in developed, emerging and 
developing countries. Finally, the study has documented evidence to show the 
complementary role of religion and legal environment, or culture and legal environment, 
in subduing managers’ classification shifting behaviour. Therefore, the research has 
important policy, practitioner and regulatory implications for all types of countries as it 
provides further external monitoring to complement existing internal corporate governance 
mechanisms in mitigating classification shifting and earnings management behaviour.   
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Appendix C 
Table C1: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance Levels (TOL) 
VARIABLES DEVELOPED  EMERGING DEVELOPING 
 Co-eff / t-value TOL VIF Co-eff / t-value TOL VIF Co-eff / t-value TOL VIF 
SPITEM 
      0.308*** 
(4.661) 0.48 
2.10 
  0.234** 
(2.305) 0.47 2.12 
  0.312** 
(2.090) 0.48 2.08 
RELINT 
-0.065* 
(-1.728) 0.43 
2.30 
-0.072** 
(-2.187) 0.43 2.32 
-0.028 
(-3.382) 0.44 2.28 
POWDIS 
  0.018* 
(1.751) 0.56 
1.80 
  0.012** 
(2.060) 0.55 1.82 
0.018 
(4.309) 0.56 1.78 
POWDSPI 
 0.065* 
(1.787) 0.43 
2.30 
   0.045** 
(2.460) 0.43 2.32 
     0.053*** 
(3.810) 0.44 2.28 
POWDLEGSPI 
   -0.065** 
(-2.263) 0.38 
2.60 
   -0.045** 
           (-2.460) 0.39 2.57 
 -0.023** 
(-2.170) 0.38 2.63 
INDIV 
   -0.042*** 
(-3.020) 0.67 
1.50 
-0.045 
(-1.460) 0.68 1.47 
0.039 
(1.380) 0.65 1.53 
INDIVSPI 
  -0.046*** 
(-3.554) 0.59 
1.70 
-0.052* 
(1.750) 0.60 1.66 
0.058* 
(1.740) 0.58 1.73 
INDIVLEGSPI 
   -0.095*** 
(-6.354) 0.53 
1.90 
  -0.086** 
(1.985) 0.54 1.86 
  -0.072** 
(-2.530) 0.52 1.93 
MASCU  
0.012 
(1.536) 0.63 
1.60 
0.022* 
(1.710) 0.64 1.56 
0.036* 
(1.820) 0.61 1.63 
MASCUSPI 
   0.015** 
(2.175) 0.56 
1.80 
   0.037** 
(2.370) 0.56 1.77 
    0.069** 
(2.160) 0.55 1.83 
MASCULEGSPI 
  0.087** 
(3.514)     0.50 
2.00 
   0.083** 
(2.789) 0.51 1.96 
    -0.073*** 
(-2.290) 0.49 2.03 
UNCAVO 
 0.024** 
(2.005) 0.53 
1.90 
     0.027*** 
(3.456) 0.54 1.86 
  0.027** 
(2.056) 0.52 1.93 
UNCAVSPI 
  0.079*** 
(3.677) 0.45 
2.20 
    0.056*** 
(6.387) 0.46 2.16 
0.034 
(2.408) 0.45 2.23 
UNCAVLEGSPI 
    0.254*** 
(8.677) 0.37 
2.70 
    0.271*** 
(8.387) 0.38 2.66 
-0.072 
(-2.234) 0.37 2.73 
LONGTEO 
-0.013 
(-0.686) 0.71 
1.40 
-0.042** 
(-2.260) 0.69 1.44 
0.020 
(1.250) 0.70 1.43 
LONGTSPI 
-0.075 
(-0.909) 0.59 
1.70 
-0.074** 
(-2.490) 0.57 1.74 
           0.029* 
(1.732) 0.58 1.73 
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LONGTLEGSPI 
-0.078 
(-1.409) 0.53 
1.90 
   -0.127*** 
(-2.849) 0.52 1.94 
 -0.028** 
(-2.320) 0.52 1.93 
LEGALENF 
 
0.56 
1.80 
-0.024** 
(-2.230) 0.54 1.84 
-0.094** 
(-2.020) 0.55 1.82 
LEGALSPI 
    
 0.43 
2.30 
-0.097** 
(-2.420) 0.45 2.24 
-0.086** 
(-2.190) 0.43 2.32 
LEGCULSPI 
 
0.32 
3.10 
-0.042** 
(-2.030) 0.33 3.04 
          -0.068 
(-1.449) 0.32 3.12 
SIZE 
 -0.035*** 
(-5.270) 0.56 
1.80 
  -0.015*** 
(-4.130) 0.57 1.74 
-0.018 
(-1.009) 0.55 1.82 
ROA 
     -0.176*** 
(-3.582) 0.63 
1.60 
-0.387*** 
(-4.090) 0.65 1.54 
-0.162* 
(-1.728) 0.62 1.62 
MBV 
-0.002 
(-1.096) 0.71 
1.40 
-0.006 
(-1.040) 0.75 1.34 
0.005 
(0.580) 0.70 1.42 
LEV 
    0.148*** 
(4.835) 0.63 
1.60 
   0.209*** 
(4.478) 0.62 1.62 
    0.328*** 
(4.378) 0.62 1.62 
BIG4 
   -0.056*** 
(-3.792) 0.92 
1.09 
          -0.056*** 
         (-6.240) 0.89 1.12 
          -0.212 
          (-1.708) 0.90 1.11 
CAPINTEN 
 0.295*** 
(9.252) 0.48 
2.10 
    0.235*** 
(5.421) 0.47 2.13 
  0.034 
(1.538) 0.47 2.12 
GROWTH 
  0.056*** 
(3.792) 0.42 
2.40 
   0.058*** 
(5.825) 0.41 2.43 
   0.012** 
(2.215) 0.41 2.42 
GDP PER 
CAPITA 
-0.948 
(-0.701) 0.34 
2.90 
 -0.078 
(-0.498)   0.34 2.93 
0.143 
(1.104)   0.34 2.92 
          
Observations 137884   112,023   5009   
Adjusted R2 0.25   0.40   0.58   
F-Value 5.07***   5.97***   5.89***   
Notes: All variables are defined in Table 4.3. The study uses *,**and *** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. The co-
efficient estimates are shown above and the t-statistics below in brackets. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance Level (TOL) are respectively shown for the three sub-groupings; 
Developed, Emerging and Developing Countries. Full discussion of the VIF and TOL are provided in the study.  
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Chapter 5: Summary and Conclusions 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
In this thesis, the study has empirically examined several aspects of accruals-based, real 
activities and classification shifting earnings management practices in the U.S. and 63 
countries globally.  
 In particular, the study has examined the impact of religiosity, corporate governance and 
religiosity, audit characteristics and religiosity interactions on classification shifting in the 
U.S.   
Again, the study has examined the impact of religiosity, legal environment and their 
interactions on accrual-based and real activities earnings management practices in the U.S.   
In addition, the study investigated and discussed in an international setting involving 63 
countries, the impact of country-wide religiosity, national dimensions of culture and legal 
environment on classification shifting. 
 Furthermore, the study interacts country-wide religiosity and legal environment, national 
dimensions of culture and legal environment to assess their impact on classification shifting 
in an international setting.  
In Chapter 5, the study concludes, summarises and discusses some of the major findings 
and contributions of the study. In addition, the limitations of the study, policy implications 
and suggestions for future research are also provided in this chapter.     
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5.2. Summary of the Results 
 
In a nutshell, the findings are consistent with social norm theory, as social norms are 
reported to shape the behaviour and attitudes of managers in corporate decision-making. In 
additions, the findings confirm agency theory and demonstrate that managers will not 
always act or make decisions in the best interest of shareholders. In line with agency theory, 
the findings clearly show that managers are opportunistic individuals who try to maximise 
their selfish interest through earnings management. The study observes a positive 
relationship between special items and unexpected core earnings, an evident of 
classification shifting. Again, the study observes that some U.S firms are engaged in both 
accruals-based and real activities earnings management to influence reported net income. 
This opportunistic managerial behaviour results in a tension between the principal and the 
agent, which stems from the fact that both parties struggle to maximise their economic 
benefits. Interestingly, the study notes that this opportunistic managerial behaviour is 
mitigated by the religious social norms of the firm’s environment as indicated by the social 
norms theory. Overall, the study finds that religious social norms acts as a form of 
monitoring mechanism to complement the existing corporate governance mechanism 
established by management to subdue opportunistic managerial behaviour such as earnings 
management.    
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5.2.1. Chapter 2 Results 
 
In this chapter, the study investigates whether the religious social norms of the U.S. firm 
environment affect managers’ classification shifting behaviour. Consistent with previous 
studies (McGuire et al., 2012; Dryeng et al., 2012), it is found that these norms subdue 
management incentive and motivation to engage in expense and revenue misclassification 
in the U.S. To ensure that the findings are not influenced by the high earnings quality often 
associated with rural areas, the data is divided into rural and urban sub-samples, in line with 
other studies, and finds that religious social norms mitigate classification shifting more in 
rural areas than in urban ones. The data is also divided into high and low religious areas in 
the U.S. and provides strong empirical evidence to indicate that classification shifting 
decreases significantly in strong religious social norm environment compared to weak 
areas.  This finding is to some extent consistent with McGuire et al. (2012) and Dyreng et 
al. (2012), who observe that accrual-based earnings management is subdued in highly 
religious areas.  In addition, religiosity and corporate governance variables, such as board 
size, board independence, audit committee, audit tenure and BIG4 auditors are interacted 
with religiosity and it is found that religiosity serves as a monitoring mechanism and 
complements existing corporate governance mechanisms, audit characteristics and the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) to mitigate classification shifting. Finally, the study investigates 
the impact of religiosity on classification shifting in geographically centralised and 
dispersed segments and finds that religiosity is negative and significantly related to 
classification shifting in centralised segments, but has no effect on misclassification in 
geographically dispersed segments.  
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5.2.2. Chapter 3 Results 
 
In Chapter 3, the study examines the impact of religious social norms and firms’ legal 
environment on accrual-based and real activities earnings management. It is found that the 
religious social norms of a firm’s environment reduce accrual-based earnings management, 
perhaps due to the scrutiny of auditors and external monitoring. However, real activities 
earnings management is positive and significantly related to religiosity. This may be due 
to limited auditor vigilance and non-GAAP violation (McGuire et al., 2012).  It is also 
found that the legal environment weakens accrual-based earnings management, but that the 
negative impact of the legal environment on real activities is not significant.  
The study also interacts religiosity and the legal environment to examine their impact on 
accrual-based and real activities earnings management. It is found that religiosity 
complements the legal environment in decreasing accrual manipulation, but that the 
positive impact of religiosity on real activities can no longer be demonstrated. The sample 
is divided into high and low religiosity areas and rural and urban areas. It is found that the 
impact of religiosity on accrual-based and real activities earnings management is much 
more pronounced in high religious social norm environments and that religiosity affects 
earnings management in urban areas despite the strong heterogeneity in religious beliefs 
among individuals in big cities compared to rural areas. Notwithstanding, the negative 
impact is stronger in rural areas. The study also interacts religiosity and the legal 
environment with governance variables and audit characteristics and finds that religiosity 
complements existing governance mechanisms in subduing accrual-based and real 
activities earnings management practices in all the sub-samples.   
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As a result of recent developments in the literature (Fan et al., 2010; Athanasakou et al., 
2009), in the robustness checks, accruals and real activities are estimated using different 
measures to establish their association with religiosity, legal environment and governance 
variables. Overall, it is found that there is a significant negative relationship between 
religiosity and accrual-based earnings management, suggesting that accrual manipulation 
decreases in a religious social norm environment, in line with previous studies (McGuire 
et al., 2012; Dyreng et al., 2012), perhaps due to scrutiny by auditors, ethical concerns and 
external monitoring. On the contrary, a positive relationship is observed between religious 
social norms and real activities earnings management, but that the positive effect of 
religiosity on real activities can no longer be demonstrated when the legal environment 
interacts with religiosity. In addition, the study observes that the interactive term between 
religiosity and corporate governance mechanisms subdues accrual-based and real activities 
earnings management and that religiosity complements existing monitoring systems in 
firms to reduce earnings manipulation. 
 
5.2.3. Chapter 4 Results 
 
In Chapter 4, for the first time, the effects of countrywide religiosity, individual dimensions 
of cultural perspectives and the legal environment on classification shifting in developed, 
emerging and developing countries are examined. The study finds that religiosity mitigates 
classification shifting, but that the effect is much more pronounced in developing countries 
than emerging and developed ones. Similarly, it is found that the legal environment 
decreases expense misclassification in both developed and emerging countries, but that the 
negative impact is insignificantly related to classification shifting in developing countries. 
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With regards to individual dimensions of culture and classification shifting, the study finds 
that individualism and long-term orientation cultural dimensions subdue expense 
misclassification in developed and emerging economies, but that power distance, 
masculinity and uncertainty avoidance cultural dimensions increase managers’ incentive to 
engage in classification shifting in all categories of countries. It is observed that developing 
countries are short-term result-oriented and not individualistic, hence the positive 
relationship between classification shifting and the cultural dimensions of individualism 
and long-term orientation. The study also examines the impact of the interactive term 
between countrywide religiosity and legal environment on classification shifting and finds 
that religiosity and legal environment interactions play a complementary role in decreasing 
managers’ incentive to engage in classification shifting in developed, emerging and 
developing countries. However, the negative impact is much more pronounced in 
developed countries than emerging or developing ones because of the strong legal 
environment in the former. To further assess the impact of national culture and legal 
environment on classification shifting, the legal environment is interacted with individual 
dimensions of national culture to examine their effect on classification shifting in the sub-
samples. The results indicate that the legal environment weakens the positive effect of 
power distance, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance on classification shifting in all types 
of countries. Indeed, the positive impact of individualism and long-term orientation on 
classification shifting in developing countries can no longer be sustained. In the robustness 
checks, the study estimates unexpected core earnings using different expectation models, 
excludes countries with insignificant or a large number of firm-year observations, as well 
as dividing the data into high or low religiosity countries to assess their impact on 
classification shifting. Overall, it is found that religiosity and the legal environment subdue 
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classification shifting in developed, emerging and developing countries, but that a negative 
effect is much more pronounced when countrywide religiosity interacts with the legal 
environment. It is also found that power distance, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance 
facilitate expense misclassification in developed, emerging and developing countries, but 
that individualism and long-term orientation cultural dimensions mitigate classification 
shifting in developed and emerging countries. In developing countries, the study finds that 
national culture dimension variables are positively related to classification shifting; 
however, the positive impact of power distance, masculinity, individualism, long-term 
orientation and uncertainty avoidance on classification shifting can no longer be 
demonstrated when the legal environment interacts with individual dimensions of cultural 
perspectives. 
 
5.3. Implications of the Thesis and Recommendations 
 
The study has several policy and practical implications. First, the results reinforce social 
norm theory and confirm the effectiveness of religious social norms and national culture in 
shaping the attitude and behaviour of firm managers in corporate decision-taking. The 
findings show the complementary role of religious social norms, national culture and a 
country’s legal environment and emphasise management’s need to strengthen corporate 
governance mechanisms and audit practices. Indeed, an appreciation of the extent to which 
the interactive terms of religiosity and legal environment, as well as national culture and 
legal environment, shape corporate financial reporting is essential to maintain quality and 
consistency in financial reporting. However, religion is rarely discussed in secular 
organisations, although the findings from the study are useful for regulators, external 
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monitors and investors as they indicate that religion, culture and the legal environment 
strengthen the existing internal monitoring mechanisms put in place by management to 
mitigate classification shifting behaviour. 
5.4. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
Despite the rigorous empirical evidence presented in this study, there are several limitations 
which could weaken the reliability and robustness of the findings. The limitations are as 
follows. 
 First, in Chapter 2 the study examines the impact of religious social norms, corporate 
governance and audit characteristics on classification shifting. In doing so, it does not 
control for the legal environment. Previous cross-country studies (Behn et al., 2013; Haw 
et al., 2011) indicate that the legal environment has a negative impact on expense 
misclassification. However, this study controls for audit characteristics and internal 
governance variables. Moreover, the study does not control for culture due to the 
unavailability of, or the inability to access, state-level cultural databases. This is likely to 
be a limitation because previous research indicates that national cultural differences affect 
due diligence, the quality of financial information, and influences firms’ cost of equity 
(Gray et al., 2013; Roth and O’Donnell, 1996) as well as foreign direct investment (Kogut 
and Singh, 1998). 
In addition, the study uses religious adherence and the religious social norms of the firm 
environment, but does not interview managers or employees to ascertain their individual 
religious backgrounds or beliefs. Whilst this method will provide primary religious data 
source for the study, it is very sensitive information to collect, and very costly and time 
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consuming to interview individual managers across several firms in the U.S. Moreover, 
firm managers are not open nowadays about their religious position, consequently other 
studies (McGuire et al., 2012; Callen et al., 2011; Dyreng et al., 2012; Grullon et al., 2010) 
have relied on religious databases for their analyses. Future studies should question or 
survey the religious backgrounds of managers and employees. Notwithstanding this, the 
present results are useful for regulators, external monitors and investors, as they indicate 
that religion strengthens the existing monitoring mechanism put in place by management 
to mitigate classification shifting. 
Second, in Chapter 3 the study examines the interactive effect of religious social norms and 
legal environment on accrual-based and real activities earnings management. There is a 
limitation associated with the legal environment data. Although firm managers were 
interviewed and data collected by Harris Polls, the sample size was small and this could 
affect the major findings of the study. It is admitted that this limitation could influence the 
results of the study and therefore future research should consider a large sample size. One 
way to improve the overall sample is to widen the scope of respondents by interviewers; 
for example, Harris Polls could contact as many managers, employees and shareholders as 
possible connected to the sampled firms. Moreover, the study does not control for the 
national cultural differences across U.S. states. This could potentially undermine the major 
findings because previous studies (Gray et al., 2013; Angwin, 2001) observe that culture 
affects the quality of financial reporting and cultural distance affects shareholder wealth of 
the acquiring firms. Notwithstanding, the study uses religiosity datasets as proxy for 
religion and culture as both affect firms’ decisions.  
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Third, in Chapter 4 the study examines international evidence on the links between 
countrywide religiosity, Hofstede’s national cultural dimension scores, the legal 
environment and classification shifting. The religious datasets are based on surveys 
conducted by the World Values Surveys of the World Bank. The results of the study might 
be affected by several factors, therefore the findings should be interpreted in the following 
contexts. For instance, both countrywide religiosity and Hofstede’s individual cultural 
dimensions were collected through questionnaires and interviews, with their associated 
limitations of accuracy. Countrywide religiosity and individual cultural dimension datasets 
are also mostly time invariant and cross-sectional in nature. In addition, countrywide 
religiosity or individual cultural score cannot be traced to individuals within the country. 
The results might also be influenced by the geographical dispersion of the firm headquarters 
or managers might travel from a distant location to work in the country and therefore are 
not influenced by national culture or countrywide religiosity. Therefore, future global 
research should interview or survey corporate managers and employees to ascertain their 
religious backgrounds, cultural backgrounds, views and beliefs over time. Future research 
could sample more countries in different continents to have a global sample to assess the 
results. Notwithstanding, this study provides new international evidence on the association 
between expense misclassification and the interactive terms of countrywide religiosity and 
legal environment, and national culture and legal environment, to contribute to the literature 
on classification shifting. The findings are therefore useful for multinational firms, global 
businesses and national organisations seeking to expand their operations across several 
countries.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 378 
The study gives rise to further research questions. In Chapters 2 to 4, it uses annual financial 
data from Compustat to assess the impact of religiosity, national culture, and legal 
environment on classification shifting, in line with McVay (2006, 2008). However, Fan et 
al. (2010) use quarterly financial data and observe that classification shifting occurs more 
during the fourth quarter than interim ones.  Indeed, it will be interesting to examine the 
impact of religiosity, national culture and legal environment on classification shifting at 
both national and global levels using Compustat quarterly financial statements. In addition, 
further research on the possible interaction between religion and the legal environment, and 
culture and the legal environment, and their impact on classification shifting, real activities 
and accrual-based earnings management using quarterly financial data for G-7 countries, 
developed, emerging and developing economies will provide further insight into the 
monitoring role of religion, national culture and the legal environment in subduing earnings 
management.   
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